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This dissertation inquires into the problem of understanding as it pertains to the 
psychotherapeutic situation. It analyses- some of the ways in which the therapist's 
understanding of the patient has been conceptualised and uses concepts from 
hermeneutic philosophy in order to suggest possible resolutions to some of the 
problems identified in the discussion of the theory of psychotherapy. 
For heuristic purposes I start with the thesis that there are three distinct 
'positions' a therapist can take up vis-ä-vis his patient, each of these positions 
opening up different avenues to coming to know the other person. I distinguish 
an empathic, a dialogic and an interpretive/explanatory position. The treatment of 
the concept of empathy by the various psychotherapy theorists serves me as a 
benchmark to draw out the different conceptualisations of the process of 
understanding. Starting from the predominantly objectivist stance of Freud who 
pursued an ideal of the analyst as scientist I show how Ferenczi presented an 
early subjectivist challenge to this position. Following this theme through some of 
the analytic literature I show that this objectivist-subjectivist tension concerns not 
only the scientific status of analysis; it goes to the heart of the therapeutic 
enterprise and has deep implications for the nature of the relationship between a 
therapist and her patient. Humanistic alternatives to psychoanalysis are also 
considered. With intersubjectivist formulations gaining more and more ground in 
the recent past, the therapist becomes a personally involved participant and 
hermeneuticist, rather than remaining a detached observer-scientist. A 
conception of understanding as a conjoint giving meaning to an experience has 
largely replaced an ideal of knowledge as discovery of underlying realities. 
Within philosophy the problems of understanding have been addressed by 
hermeneutics which analyses the contingencies of the place of the interpreter in 
the process of interpretation. I take the German philosopher Gadamer, whose 
philosophical hermeneutics emphasises the dialogic structure of all 
understanding, as my main source for the discussion of the problem of clinical 
understanding. Understanding is here revealed as an open-ended process of 
interpretation which unfolds dialectically between two participants in a 
conversation. The three positions which served as the starting points for this 
inquiry, rather than demanding a choice of one over the others, can be seen as, 
together, constituting a 'field' in which understanding becomes possible. It is 
suggested that only the therapist who can 'move' between positions and, by the 
same token, entertain multiple points of view can hope to understand his 
patients. 
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Positioning and Understanding 
Psychotherapy is primarily a conversation, but it is a conversation of a 
particular kind. Like any other conversation its medium is language, although 
not everything that is communicated in the course of this conversation is 
communicated through language. It differs from ordinary conversations in that 
its purpose is to foster understanding of one of its participants ('the patient' in 
psychoanalytic terminology, 'the client' in humanistic psychotherapy parlance) 
with the aim of alleviating the 'problems in living' of that person. The other 
participant (the analyst, or psychotherapist) intends to facilitate this process 
by engaging in this conversation in, more or less broad, accordance with the 
psychological theory embraced by him or her. 
Freud had called psychoanalysis a "talking cure". In Die Frage der 
Laienanalyse he gives the following strikingly innocuous account of what is 
going on between the analyst and his patient: "Es geht nichts anderes 
zwischen ihnen vor, als daß sie miteinander reden. [... ] Der Analytiker bestellt 
den Patienten zu einer bestimmten Stunde des Tages, läßt ihn reden, hört ihn 
an, spricht dann zu ihm und läßt ihn zuhören" (1926, p. 279). "Nothing 
happens between them, except that they talk with each other. [... ] The analyst 
calls the patient for an appointment at a certain hour of the day, lets him talk, 
listens to him, then speaks to him and lets him listen. " 
"Words, words, words" (Hamlet, 2. act, 2. scene), one might be forgiven for 
saying. How is this supposed to be helpful? A couple of pages later Freud 
writes, rather intriguingly, that the patient "soll mehr sagen, als er weiß" (ibid. 
p. 281), he "is supposed to say more than he knows". The patient apparently 
can say more than he knows, but he often also knows more than he says. The 
analyst too brings knowledge to the meeting, but not, from the start, 
knowledge of this patient. What the analyst (or therapist) knows is meant to 
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help the patient know what he says, and to say what he knows. The need to 
come to know what is said brings into focus the problem of understanding as 
interpretation. Theodor Reik wrote that understanding was "the first task of the 
analyst". How this knowledge or understanding comes about, or better: how 
this process of coming to know or understand the patient is conceptualised in 
the psychotherapy literature, is the subject matter of this dissertation. 
This issue of interpersonal comprehension (to introduce a third term meant to 
refer to both understanding and knowing) is quite obviously fundamental to 
the project of psychotherapy; on closer inspection it develops into a whole 
cluster of interrelated questions. The patient and his problems need to be 
understood, but in what terms? What constitutes such an understanding, i. e. 
what is it that needs understanding about the patient, where is one to look and 
how is one to structure what one finds? Whose comprehension is central to 
therapy, the patient's or the therapist's, or both? Is this comprehension of the 
other person to be thought of as a process of understanding, i. e. of 
interpretation in terms of meaning, or is it more appropriate to speak of it in 
terms of knowing? What safeguards are there that any understanding 
achieved is the right kind of understanding? And, if proper understanding is 
achieved, how is this of help? What is it that needs to be said and done (and, 
by the same token, what needs to remain unsaid and undone) between the 
therapist and her patient, that is, what kind of relationship needs to exist 
between them for this process to have a chance of succeeding? To formulate 
this last question from the side of the therapist: is there a position, or are there 
a number of positions, for the therapist to take up vis-ä-vis his patient in order 
to foster the relevant understanding and knowledge? Also, to what extent and 
in what ways does knowledge and understanding constitute, or contribute to, 
being psychologically helpful to another? Intrinsically linked with this cluster of 
problems, but threatening to broaden out the array of issues rather too much, 
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are questions regarding what it is to be a 'self, and what is an 'other, 
questions of identity which have to do with alienation and belonging. ' 
In chapters 1-4 I will be looking at how these problems of understanding have 
been formulated and what ways of resolving them have been suggested in 
sections of the psychotherapy literature. The various conceptualisations of 
these issues put forward in the history of psychotherapy can be portrayed as 
pulling in different directions on a number of dimensions, this pull having 
been, on many occasions, strong enough to be divisive and thus contributing 
to the fragmentation of the field of psychotherapy into innumerable schools or 
approaches. The, poles of these tensions can be identified in a number of 
ways, such as objectivist vs. subjectivist (or, these days, intersubjectivist) 
stances; 'hard' natural sciences vs. 'soft' human or social sciences paradigms; 
epistemology vs. hermeneutics etc. They seem to cluster around two 
opposites which place the various therapy approaches along a continuum 
defined by the polarities of observation and participation. 2 The question will 
have to be asked, however, whether it is indeed useful to keep thinking of the 
field as divided up into these kinds of opposing 'camps'. 
Freud, as is well known, was very keen to establish psychoanalysis on a 
natural science foundation and a great number of his theoretical writings 
substantiate a reading of his work which places him on the objectivist 
observer end of this spectrum (although Ricoeur (1970) demonstrated a 
tension between 'the epistemological Freud' and 'the hermeneutic Freud' 
running through the entirety of his published work). Freud's case studies and 
parts of his technical writings raise the question, however, to what extent he 
had intended this scientific ideal to be translated into clinical practice. 
1 It should be clear from the kinds of questions raised here that I treat the problem of 
comprehending the other not in its 'essential', but rather in its 'contingent' aspects. I am not 
addressing the philosophical problem of 'other minds' which asks how it is that we know of the 
subjectivity of another person. Instead, I take this problem up in line with the more 'practical' 
concern of psychotherapy; the question then becomes: How can we improve on an 
approximate understanding? 
2 The notion of the therapist as participant-observer was, as far as I know, introduced into 
psychotherapy literature by Harry Stack Sullivan. 
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Some of Freud's followers have, from very early on in the history of the 
psychoanalytic movement, challenged the possibility, advisability and efficacy 
of an analyst set up as a neutral objectivist observer. From Ferenczi (chapter 
1) via Reik and Fliess (chapter 2) to Kohut and the more recent 
intersubjectivist psychoanalysts (chapter 3) - to name but a few of the diverse 
and 'divergent' voices discussed in the following - there has been a tendency, 
expressed with varying degrees of ambivalence, to reformulate 
psychoanalysis in ways which place much more emphasis on the subjective, 
participatory, interpersonal dimension of the therapeutic engagement. As an 
important point of divergence the concept of empathy acquired much greater 
centrality in the work of these analysts. Empathy became a core concept also 
in the development of the humanistic strand of psychotherapy, most notably in 
the work of Carl Rogers (chapter 4). 
A different type of challenge to the objectivist position came from the 
phenomenological and existentialist quarters within philosophy (e. g. Scheler, 
Buber, Heidegger) and was embraced in various ways both by sections of the 
psychoanalytic tradition (e. g. the 'intersubjectivists', discussed in chapter 3) 
and the humanistic psychotherapies (e. g. Gestalt psychotherapy, discussed in 
chapter 4). Attempts to formulate the problem of understanding another 
person as one of a subject taking the other as an object of inquiry are deemed 
entirely misguided. Participation is both primary and ineluctable, and the 
understanding of the other can only proceed from within this engagement with 
one another. In contradistinction to the empathic route towards understanding, 
which emphasises sameness or similarity, this tradition of thought stresses 
the separateness and difference of the two persons meeting and 
understanding each other. The other person is always thought to be met as 
an other. 
Different psychotherapy theories suggest different central foci of 
understanding and consequently vary in terms of the routes they take to what 
they consider relevant for the therapeutic process. Any psychotherapy theory 
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privileges a particular position. The decision about the best position for the 
therapist to take up is inseparably linked to ideas about what constitutes the 
important 'data' for clinical understanding. That is to say, the therapist's views 
on which aspects of the patient's mental life are of prime importance for the 
therapeutic process will, to a large extent, determine what stance he will adopt 
in order to gain access to these areas. Conversely, this means also that the 
stance adopted by the therapist will bring to the fore those privileged aspects 
- at the expense of other aspects which are accessible only from different 
relational positions. My thesis is that different positions give access to 
different kinds of understanding. The process of knowing and understanding 
is thus inseparably linked to a relational process; differences in view about the 
relevant content of therapeutic communications cannot be meaningfully 
discussed without attending to the relational context of these communications. 
For heuristic purposes, I take as the starting point for my investigation the 
thesis that it might make sense to distinguish between three different positions 
which a therapist can take up vis-ä-vis his patient. The first position I term the 
empathic position; it constitutes an as-if identification with the patient's 
experience. The therapist meets the patient not so much as an other, 
confronting the patient with her otherness, but sees herself as capable of 
understanding the patient to the extent that their experiences are similar or 
even the same. The central idea here is to put oneself into the other person's 
experience, to experience it, as it were, from 'inside the other. 
The second position I propose to call dialogical. Here the therapist and patient 
meet each other as others; it is through coming up against the otherness of 
the other that the therapist understands his patient, and the patient learns 
about himself and his relations to the world. From this perspective the 
identification of the empathic stance is seen as an avoidance of the 
ineluctable interpersonal dimension which alone can give meaning to human 
experience and definition to a person's sense of self. The guiding idea here is 
to 'come up against each other'; difference is emphasised and is 
conceptualised as that which engenders understanding of self and the other. 
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Finally, I posit an interpretive/explanatory stance. Here the therapist takes up 
a position of distance which allows for the observation of the patient and his 
behaviours and the formulation and explanation of what is observed in the 
light of theoretical concepts and clinical experience, both of which are, as it 
were, 'external' to the present person. This stance, which allows for the 
application of a 'body of general knowledge' to a particular case, is the only 
one which fits into a classic natural sciences paradigm. It is, however, also 
taken up by therapists who strongly disagree with the objectifications implicit 
in the idea of the application of knowledge. 
Linked to thoughts about 'the right position' vis-ä-vis the patient are of course 
also ideas about what it is that promotes 'cure'. Indeed, there has been, more 
recently, a marked shift, prefigured by Ferenczi, in the evaluation of the 
curative factors in psychotherapy, away from an emphasis on the cognitive 
dimensions of insight and knowledge towards the subjective and affective 
dimensions of the patient's experience of therapy. The feeling of being 
understood has become, in some models, more important than the notion of a 
'correct' understanding. The three positions which I am putting forward vary 
above all in their conceptualisations and relative weighting of the participatory 
and observing aspects of the therapist's relation to his patients; i. e. they 
disagree most about the extent and the type of involvement a therapist ought 
to have in the process of therapy. 
In my review in chapters 1-4 of the formulations of clinical understanding in 
psychotherapy theory I place considerable emphasis on the development of 
empathy. I trace the concept of empathy through the history of psychoanalysis 
and use its treatment by various theorists to draw out contrasting conceptions 
of knowledge and understanding. The question is, of course, whether any of 
the formulations offered is adequate to the task of describing the very 
complex process of interpersonal understanding. Some of the key metaphors 
used have, in my view, contributed considerably to the kinds of problems they 
were meant to help resolve. 
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The discussion of the theories presented will reveal that the distinctions 
between the various positions are not as clear-cut as they may seem at first 
glance. Only in the last chapter, however, will I be able to put forward a way of 
thinking about these different positions as dialectically interrelated. Part I of 
this thesis takes a relatively 'descriptive' approach to psychotherapeutic 
theory, i. e., the various theories are discussed, by and large, in their own 
terms. In Part II I will draw on, mainly hermeneutic, philosophy to try to 
overcome this 'naivety'. Taking Hans-Georg Gadamer as my main source I 
will try to elaborate a more sophisticated account of the way in which 
positioning relates to understanding. 
Central to Gadamer's hermeneutics is the idea that understanding always 
progresses from within one's cultural-historical horizon. Understanding is 
constituted and limited by one's situatedness; new understanding evolves out 
of dialogic engagement with an 'other' (whose otherness is largely constituted 
by his positioning within a different horizon). Understanding involves a 
moment of 'fusion of horizons', a process which unfolds through and in 
language. Ultimately, it is the capacity to speak a common language which 
allows for understanding. Whilst this capacity itself rests on the basis of a 
shared cultural and linguistic tradition, language (and understanding through 
language) evolves through the engagement with the other. In chapter 5I will 
discuss Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy by contrasting it with ideas of 
Mikhail Bakhtin and Richard Rorty. 
Chapter 6 seeks to develop some of the consequences of hermeneutics for 
the conceptualisation of clinical understanding. Psychotherapy is conceived 
as a conversation between patient and therapist, structured in a way which 
allows investigating and opening up the particular organisations of the 
patient's experience. This is a task which can be achieved only to the extent 
that the different horizons of the patient and the therapist can be brought into 
contact with each other. Clinical understanding - which is, importantly, mutual 
understanding - gives new meaning to the patient's experience, a process 
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which enhances the patient's scope for thinking, feeling and acting in new 
ways. New meanings result from the dialectic dialogue unfolding between 
therapist and patient. On the therapist's side this dialectic engagement is not 
only with the person of the patient, but also - in a parallel silent 'conversation' 
- with the body of theories and generalised experience available to her. 
'Theory' does not operate in the singular; only to the extent that multiple 
meanings are considered is the therapist engaged with the otherness of the 
particular patient. New understanding - and, according to Gadamer, all true 
understanding is new understanding - involves a change on both sides of the 
hermeneutic dialogue. The preparedness to be changed through dialogic- 
dialectic engagement with the other is the hallmark of the hermeneutic spirit; it 
also constitutes an important aspect of what one might wish to call 
'psychological health'. 
Finally, a note regarding the use of translations. For the exposition of my main 
German language sources, i. e. primarily Freud, Ferenczi and Gadamer, 
have used the original German texts and supplied my own translations. This 
seemed especially important in the case of Freud's writings, since the English 
Standard Edition of his work has proven problematic in some respects. 
Occasionally, I have compared my translations with the English publication, 
and I give the German original as well as my own translation where I use 
longer quotes. 
Part I 
Theories of Clinical Understanding 
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Chapter 1 
The question of the `subjective factor' 
Freud and Ferenczi on Einfühlung 
Introduction 
Einfühlung (empathy), with its strong affective and subjectivist connotations, is 
not a central concept in Freud's theory of psychoanalysis. Freud wanted to 
put his new science on what seemed then the much securer footing of the 
natural sciences paradigm -a paradigm which, with its emphasis on causality, 
evidence, objectivity, universality etc., does not leave much room (if any at all) 
for 'the subjective factor. Yet empathy is not entirely absent from Freud's 
work; traces of this notion can be found both in his theoretical and in his 
technical writings. In this chapter I intend to introduce the concept of empathy 
as it was present to Freud and as it is present in his work. I will bring to the 
fore passages in his work where the notion of empathy (and related concepts 
which he treats synonymously) appears. The discussion of these sections will 
serve me at the same time to explicate important aspects of his theory of mind 
and of his approach to the mind of the patient in psychoanalytic practice. 
A number of (often subterraneous) lines of tension will be shown to be running 
through Freud's work. To briefly preview the main lines of opposition: 
objectivist vs. subjectivist notions, cognition vs. affect, representation vs. 
imagination, neutrality of observation vs. participation in the observed, the 
detached observer-analyst vs. the interpersonally engaged therapist - all 
these opposing notions play important roles in the web of 'conceptual forces 
called psychoanalysis. The tensions inherent in Freud's work will be brought 
into much starker relief in the juxtaposition with the work of Ferenczi, the 
pupil, long-term friend and collaborator with whom Freud fell out over the 
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direction psychoanalysis should take. In terms of the history of the movement 
Ferenczi lost the struggle with the establishment. The opposition which he first 
presented has re-emerged however, and many of the ideas he first formulated 
exert a stronger influence now than at any point in the development of 
psychoanalysis. The Freud-Ferenczi controversy is still of great relevance in 
the debate over what it is to understand the patient in analysis. 
Empathy 
Empathy translates the German Einfühlung, a term which originated in 19th 
century German aesthetics and philology. The term Einfühlung was coined by 
Robert Vischer in 1873 who used it to designate the projection of human 
feeling onto the natural world. Whilst the concept gained increasing 
importance in a highly psychological form of aesthetics it was the German 
philosopher Theodor Lipps (1851-1914) who gave it a central place in his 
philosophy. Einfühlung for Lipps is not only relevant for the understanding of 
objects of art but also, even more importantly, for the psychological problem 
of understanding other selves; indeed, it is the process by which we come to 
realise the existence of other minds in the first place. 
In his Leitfaden der Psychologie (1903a) Lipps asserts that only Einfühlung, 
rather than perception or conclusions arrived at by analogy, can answer the 
question: how do we come to understand others? Lipps sees two instincts 
working hand in hand: "My understanding of the living expressions of others is 
grounded on the instinctive drive of imitation on the one hand, and the 
instinctive drive to express my own psychic experiences in a distinct way on 
the other hand. " (1903b, p. 193). Imitation of the living expressions of the other 
leads to a corresponding psychic experience in the subject. Entirely positive 
Einfühlung leads to an experience of there being only one self; only by 
stepping outside of this positive Einfühlung, or in negative Einfühlung is there 
a separation of selves, an experience which, Lipps concludes, lays the 
foundation of our entire social existence. 
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Freud knew Lipps' work (he owned at least nine of his books), and several 
letters to Fliess, written in the summer of 1898 whilst he was working on the 
Traumdeutung, show his admiration for Lipps. A letter written on 26 August 
1898 bears witness to the fact that the degree of similarity between their 
respective ideas, especially the speculations regarding the unconscious, even 
caused Freud some anxiety: "I found the substance of my insights stated quite 
clearly in Lipps, perhaps rather more so than I would like. 'The seeker often 
finds more than he wishes to findl"' (quoted in Pigman 1995, p. 241). Lipps' 
influence on Freud is acknowledged both in the Interpretation of Dreams and 
in Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, and as late as 1940 in An 
Outline of Psychoanalysis. 
The term empathy was coined as a translation of Einfühlung by Titchener in 
1909 and was, as Pigman (1995) shows in considerable detail, adopted with 
great reluctance by Strachey for the English Standard Edition of Freud's work. 
Einfühlung, Verstehen, Wissen 
The understanding of the significance to Freud of the concept of empathy has 
been hampered by, amongst other things, problems of translation. Freud 
occasionally used the German term Einfühlung and the verb sich einfühlen, 
which literally translates into 'to feel oneself into' another person. According to 
Pigman (1995) Freud uses Einfühlung twenty times, eight of those in Jokes 
and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905a), a text not often studied by 
clinicians in Britain. Of the other twelve occurrences only three are translated 
by the Standard Edition as 'empathy', and the verb einfühlen, which appears 
eight times, is never translated as 'empathise'. 
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Freud first uses Einfühlung in Jokes3 as a concept central to the 
understanding of how we can distinguish between a joke and a naive remark. 
"Auf ein solches Sichhineinversetzen der anderen Person in den psychischen 
Vorgang bei der produzierenden Person werden wir hier zuerst aufmerksam 
gemacht" (1905a, p. 171). "Here for the first time our attention is drawn to the 
other person putting himself into the psychical process of the producing 
person" (1905a, Standard Edition, Vol. VIII, p. 183). 'Putting himself into' here 
translates Sichhineinversetzen, a term which is translated on page 186 of the 
Standard Edition as 'empathy'. This appears to be justified by Freud's own 
synonymous use of Sichhineinversetzen and Einfühlung. 
The comic pleasure we experience on hearing a naive remark Freud 
attributes to a difference in the degree of inhibition between the person 
making the remark and the person hearing and laughing about it. 
Wir ziehen also den psychischen Zustand der produzierenden Person in 
Betracht, versetzen uns in denselben, versuchen ihn zu verstehen, indem wir 
ihn mit dem unsrigen vergleichen. Aus solchem Sichhineinversetzen und 
Vergleichen resultiert eine Ersparung von Aufwand, die wir durch Lachen 
abführen. (1905a, pp. 173-4). 
We take into account the mental state of the producing person, put ourselves 
into it, try to understand it by comparing it with our own. Putting oneself into 
and comparing oneself with the other in such a fashion results in a saving of 
effort which is discharged through laughter. 
Sichhineinversetzen, putting oneself into the other, is here used 
synonymously to versuchen zu verstehen, trying to understand. This use of 
expression is repeated on the following page: "Das Sichhineinversetzen, 
Verstehenwollen ist... " (ibid., p. 175). 
3 Jokes is in some ways an unfortunate translation of the German Der atz, since it loses 
important meanings. Witz used in the singular denotes not only a joke, but also a quickness of 
mind. A gewitzte person is someone who grasps a situation with immediacy and acuity. 
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Freud proceeds to investigate the comic effect that the perception of another's 
behaviour can have on us, e. g. the exaggerated antics of a clown, and of a 
child learning to write and following the movements of the pen with contortions 
of the tongue. He gives these examples to show that the process of 
understanding the other by putting oneself into his place is linked originally to 
one of physical imitation, which, although taking place in one's mind, is 
nevertheless accompanied by innervations of the muscles. The onlooker 
imitates, is indeed impelled to imitate, in his Vorstellung (which, interestingly 
and confusingly, can mean 'representation' as well as 'imagination'), the 
movements of the other and is thus able to compare, on the basis of his own 
experience of similar movements, the degrees of effort made. Freud 
suggests, 
daß mit der Wahrnehmung einer bestimmten Bewegung der Impuls zu ihrer 
Vorstellung durch einen gewissen Aufwand gegeben sein wird. Ich mache 
also beim 'Verstehenwollen', bei der Apperzeption dieser Bewegung einen 
gewissen Aufwand, verhalte mich bei diesem Stück des seelischen 
Vorganges ganz so, als ob ich mich an die Stelle der beobachteten Person 
versetzte. Wahrscheinlich gleichzeitig fasse ich aber das Ziel dieser 
Bewegung ins Auge und kann durch frühere Erfahrung das Maß von Aufwand 
abschätzen, welches zur Erreichung dieses Zieles erforderlich ist. Ich sehe 
dabei von der beobachteten Person ab und benehme mich so, als ob ich 
selbst das Ziel der Bewegung erreichen wollte. Diese beiden 
Vorstellungsmöglichkeiten kommen auf einen Vergleich der beobachteten mit 
meiner eigenen Bewegung hinaus. Bei einer übermäßigen und 
unzweckmäßigen Bewegung des anderen wird mein Mehraufwand fürs 
Verständnis in statu nascendi, gleichsam in der Mobilmachung gehemmt, als 
überflüssig erklärt und ist für weitere Verwendung, eventuell für die Abfuhr 
durch Lachen frei. (ibid. pp. 180-1) 
that together with the perception of a particular movement the impulse is 
given for its representation via a certain effort. Thus, in 'wanting to 
understand' I make a certain effort during the perception of this movement, I 
behave during this piece of mental process exactly as if I was putting myself 
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in place of the observed person. Probably simultaneously I focus on the aim 
of this movement and am able to gauge on the basis of prior experience the 
amount of effort, which is required for the achievement of this -aim. In doing so 
I ignore the observed person and behave as if I wanted to achieve the aim of 
this movement myself. These two possibilities of representation amount to a 
comparison between the observed movement and my own. In the case of an 
excessive or unfeasible movement of the other person my surplus effort for 
understanding is blocked in statu nascendi, during mobilisation, as it were, 
declared superfluous and becomes available for other uses, possibly for 
discharge through laughter. 
A similar process Freud believes to be at work when the mental or psychic 
(geistigen oder seelischen) qualities of the other person are the source of the 
comic effect. Here too a comparison is being made between oneself and the 
other person; and "the difference between the effort made in empathy and 
one's own" (ibid. p. 182) becomes the most important source of comic 
pleasure. Empathy thus involves two Vorstellungsmöglichkeiten, two 
possibilities of representing to oneself (or imagining) the same situation. It is 
as if we were able to see/experience the same situation twice, once from the 
perspective of the observed person and once from our own. The discrepancy 
between the two opens up, in Freud's understanding of the comic effect, the 
possibility of discharge of excess energy in laughter. 
Freud's conception of empathy as putting oneself into the place of another is 
intrinsically linked to the wish to understand the other. The intention to 
understand is not described as prior to the mental movement of 
sichhineinversetzen, it does not motivate or 'set off the empathic move; 
instead, the two processes are presented as happening simultaneously, as 
being two aspects of the same movement. It is not by coincidence that Freud 
uses the metaphor of Sichhineinversetzen, a term implying physical 
movement, for his discussion of empathy, nor that his first use of the term 
empathy concerns the understanding of physical movement. Empathy, as it is 
here linked with the notion of imitation, is a physiological process. The 
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imitation involved consists of an internal, imaginary setting up of the physical 
situation, the posture and movement of the other person -a process which, 
whilst happening on a greatly reduced scale, nevertheless involves muscular 
innervation. This physiological link is maintained also when it comes to the 
empathic imitation of the "energetic expenditure" involved in other mental 
processes. In basing the empathic move on an impulsion to imitate Freud 
seems to suggest an involuntary and somewhat automatic character of this 
process. This physiological link is made ambiguous however through his 
usage of terms such as Verstehenwollen (wanting to understand); the 
intentionality here ascribed to empathy transcends the realm of the drives. 
Freud leaves it rather unclear in which part (or parts) of his topographic model 
this process takes place. It is questionable whether he sees the impulse to 
empathise/understand altogether linked to the biological realm of the instincts. 
A further look at the concepts of Vorstellung and Verstehen is required in this 
context. Freud's concept of Vorstellung is one of representation; it follows 
Herbart's position that representation is prior to imagination which uses 
representations as its elements. For Freud Trieb (drive), which is largely 
understood as belonging to soma, enters the conscious through psychical 
representatives which have an ideational (Vorstellungs-) and an affective 
component. Ideas and affects are juxtaposed and have different 'destinies' in 
the development of psychological symptoms. Ideas are repressed and thus 
enter the unconscious; affect is separated off from the ideas and suffers 
suppression. Vorstellungen are understood as some sort of 'delegates' of the 
drives, the psychic manifestations of originally somatic processes. Ideas are 
not in a clear-cut causal relation to drives, since the aims that the latter pursue 
and the objects which they attach themselves to give them Triebschicksale 
(destinies), which are experienced as our personal histories. The repressed 
ideas make up the 'content' of the unconscious, giving rise to the notion of 
'unconscious ideas' (unbewußte Vorstellungen). 
Freud's concept of empathy as imitation, where imitation is linked to both 
mental representation and the physiological impulsion to imitate, accounts for 
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the process of gaining knowledge of the other person in mostly physiologically 
based terms. This certainly serves Freud in his ambition to proceed as natural 
scientist. It begs the question, however, if imitation can, of itself, indeed lead 
to understanding of another4. What we are seeking (and maybe getting) via 
imitation is the same experience as that of the other, an experience which in 
its immediacy and hence lack of reflectivity is not thereby understood. Nor is 
the fact that we are engaging in a process of imitation - to the extent that it is 
impulsive, automatic and not conscious - recognised and understood. It is 
conceivable that understanding, rather than being the result of a process of 
imitation, is already involved from the outset as a kind of pre-understanding. 
In perceiving the other person and as one puts oneself in their place there is 
already a preconception, based on previous experience, of what it is to be like 
that person at that moment. Hence, when imitating there is already a sense of 
what to imitate. 
Two rather different conceptions of understanding/knowing become 
juxtaposed here. Interestingly, the two different notions of understanding can 
be developed from the two meanings of the German term Vorstellung, which 
means representation on the one hand and imagination on the other. In 
Freud's theory of representation repressed ideas are linked to symptoms. 
Chains of association lead to memory traces that allow the recovery of 
repressed mental contents, giving rise to a formulation of the psychoanalytic 
cure as the reconstruction of a forgotten past. The process of understanding 
is one of discovery of objective structures. One of Freud's favourite metaphors 
for the psychoanalytic process was, after all, the archaeological dig. In 
contrast to the idea of gaining knowledge of objective entities, Vorstellung as 
imaginary imitation evokes a much more subjective notion of 
Sichhineinversetzen, an Einfühlen which stresses the (inter)personal and 
affective aspects of the experience of understanding. As the controversy with 
Ferenczi will show, Freud clearly distrusted the latter, more subjective notion 
4 This is a question which Scheler (1926) first raised in relation to Lipps' concept of imitation. 
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of understanding, marring as he thought it did the rigour of the objective- 
scientific route to knowledge. 
The juxtaposition of Wissen and Verstehen was introduced by the German 
philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey had a major influence on the 
development of the Geisteswissenschaften (the social or human sciences) as 
a discipline independent from the natural sciences, both in subject matter and 
methodology. For Dilthey the former are distinguished from the latter by the 
use of a method of verstehen, understanding, which aims at the 
comprehension of the meaning of a human expression, be it in actions or 
words. Dilthey established hermeneutics as the universal methodological 
basis for the Geisteswissenschaften. Hermeneutics, he claimed, was as 
scientifically rigorous as the methods applied in the natural sciences; 
consequently, Geisteswissenschaften was equal in status to the natural 
sciences whose paradigm had become so overpoweringly dominant in the 
19th century. Dilthey pointed out that Weltanschauungen (world views) are 
necessarily subject to a circularity, which entails that our understanding is 
contingent on the perspective from which we approach our objects (the so- 
called 'hermeneutic circle'). This brings into opposition hermeneutic 
philosophy, which makes the claim that all Weltanschauungen (and, by the 
same token, all theories) are circular, and natural science, which claims to get 
hold of a reality 'out there' and is therefore superior to so-called 'relativist' 
conceptions. 
Freud's psychology, which focuses centrally on making conscious the 
unconscious, seeks Wissen, not Verstehen. Einfühlung and Sympathie which 
open up subjective routes to knowledge (and are therefore suspected to be 
highly contingent on the understanding subject) play only a marginal role in 
his science. These subjective aspects were given infinitely more weight by 
Ferenczi, whose convictions led him to develop an alternative conception of 
psychoanalysis (discussed below). 
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Schriften zur Behandlungstechnik 
Freud's use of Einfühlung in his technical writings is lost to the reader of the 
English translation, where Einfühlung is never translated as 'empathy' 
(Pigman, 1995). Freud did, however, view empathy as a prerequisite for the 
analytic work, since in the absence of it the patient would not begin to develop 
the positive transference on which the analyst has to rely for the work of 
interpretation. In 'Zur Einleitung der Behandlung' (1913a; 'On Beginning the 
Treatment') Freud advises the analyst to foster first of all the rapport between 
himself and his patient by demonstrating interest and patience, doing "nothing 
more" than giving the patient time and avoiding mistakes. 
Man kann sich diesen ersten Erfolg allerdings verscherzen, wenn man von 
Anfang an einen anderen Standpunkt einnimmt als den der Einfühlung, etwa 
einen moralisierenden, oder wenn man sich als Vertreter oder Mandatar einer 
Partei gebärdet, des anderen Eheteils etwa usw. (1913a, p. 199) 
It is certainly possible to forfeit this first success if from the start one takes up 
any standpoint other than one of empathy, a moralising one for instance, or if 
one behaves like a representative or advocate of some contending party, e. g. 
the patient's spouse etc. 
The Standard Edition (Vol. XII, p. 139) translates Einfühlung as "sympathetic 
understanding". This is misleading since it seems to stress the emotional 
warmth of Anteilnahme (a German synonym for 'sympathy') over the need to 
be perceptually in the right position (i. e. that of the patient as opposed to 
anyone else's). The German original makes it clearer that Freud indeed 
regarded empathy as a sine qua non of analysis. Only the empathic analyst 
can hope to help the patient to form the positive emotional bond that is a 
prerequisite for the therapeutic work. 
Einfühlung is a precondition for analysis; it is, however, not central to the task 
of analytic understanding itself. Empathy does not primarily serve the function 
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of gaining entry into the patient's subjectivity, but concerns itself more with the 
creation of the relational conditions which will enable the patient to engage in 
the task of free association. Free association has, since the Studien über 
Hysterie (1895), become the central method of psychoanalysis; by 1912 (in 
Zur Dynamik der Übertragung) Freud calls it the psychoanalytische 
Grundregel, the fundamental rule of analysis. The patient is urged to say 
everything that comes to mind, spontaneously and without conscious 
selection or censorship. Whilst these spontaneous associations are called 
'free', the whole point of this methodology rests on the fact that they are not. 
The chains of associations lead the analyst to the repressed origins of the 
psychic conflict which unconsciously structure these associations. Free 
association, to which the analysand is asked to submit himself, has a 
counterpart in the mental attitude the analyst needs to adopt. In Ratschläge 
für den Arzt bei der psychoanalytischen Behandlung (1912b) Freud 
addresses the question how the analyst should be listening to the verbal 
productions of his patient. Freud is aware that the understanding of the 
patient's communications by the analyst is jeopardised if the analyst's 
preconceptions and expectations remain in the foreground of his mind. 
Sowie man nämlich seine Aufmerksamkeit absichtlich bis zu einer gewissen 
Höhe anspannt, beginnt man auch unter dem dargebotenen Materiale 
auszuwählen; man fixiert das eine Stück besonders scharf, eleminiert dafür 
ein anderes und folgt bei dieser Auswahl seinen Erwartungen oder seinen 
Neigungen. Gerade dies darf man aber nicht; folgt man bei der Auswahl 
seinen Erwartungen, so ist man in Gefahr, niemals etwas anderes zu finden, 
als was man bereits weiß; folgt man seinen Neigungen, so wird man 
sicherlich die mögliche Wahrnehmung fälschen. (ibid. p. 172) 
As soon as one intentionally strains one's attention to a certain level one 
begins to choose amongst the material offered; one fixes with particular acuity 
upon one part, eliminates instead another, and follows in this choice one's 
own expectations and tendencies. But this is exactly what needs to be 
avoided; if in making this choice one follows one's own expectations one is in 
21 
danger never to find anything other than what one already knows; if one 
follows one's tendencies one will certainly distort possible perception. 
Freud attempts here to find a way around the problem that our understanding 
of new material might be co-determined by our preconceptions. The danger 
he clearly identifies is that the material which needs understanding is taken as 
already understood. If this problem turned out to be indeed inescapable, 
clearly this would put paid to any notion of psychoanalysis as an objective 
scientific discipline. Freud did, however, hold that perception was possible, if 
one could circumvent the dangers of distortion (Fälschung). How is the 
analyst to deal with this problem of correct perception? 
Freud proposes the concept of gleichschwebende Aufmerksamkeit (evenly 
suspended attention) which is to form the counterpart on the side of the 
analyst to the psychoanalytische Grundregel of free association. The analyst 
is required to interrupt the motives which would normally guide his mental 
activities, i. e. his personal preferences, prejudices, expectations, including his 
theoretical assumptions, however well founded. This is meant to enable him 
to suspend any a priori evaluation of the offered material and thus to find 
access to the inherent unconscious connections which need to be brought 
out. Since the verbal communications of the patient are regarded as 
distortions (re-workings by the secondary process) everything needs to be 
treated, in the first instance, as possessing equal importance. 
Wie der Analysierte alles mitteilen soll, was er in seiner Selbstbeobachtung 
erhascht, mit Hintanhaltung aller logischen und affektiven Einwendungen, die 
ihn bewegen wollen, eine Auswahl zu treffen, so soll sich der Arzt in den 
Stand setzen, alles ihm Mitgeteilte für die Zwecke der Deutung, der 
Erkennung des verborgenen Unbewußten zu verwerten, ohne die vom 
Kranken aufgegebene Auswahl durch eine eigene Zensur zu ersetzen, in eine 
Formel gefaßt: er soll dem gebenden Unbewußten des Kranken sein eigenes 
Unbewußtes als empfangendes Organ zuwenden, sich auf den Analysierten 
einstellen wie der Receiver des Telephons zum Teller eingestellt ist. Wie der 
Receiver die von Schallwellen angeregten elektrischen Schwankungen der 
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Leitung wieder in Schallwellen verwandelt, so ist das Unbewußte des Arztes 
befähigt, aus den ihm mitgeteilten Abkömmlingen des Unbewußten dieses 
Unbewußte, welches die Einfälle des Kranken determiniert hat, 
wiederherzustellen. (ibid. pp. 175-6) 
Just as the analysand who is required to communicate everything which he 
can get hold of in the process of self-observation, putting aside all logical or 
affective objections which urge him to select, the physician must put himself 
in the position which enables him to use everything the patient says for the 
purposes of interpretation, the recognition of the hidden unconscious, without 
replacing the selection which the patient has given up with his own 
censorship; to summarize in a formula: he must turn his own unconscious like 
a receptive organ toward the emerging unconscious of the patient, adjust 
himself to the analysand as the receiver of the telephone is adjusted to the 
transmitting microphone. As the receiver transmutes the electric fluctuations 
induced by the sound-waves back again into sound-waves, so is the 
physician's unconscious mind able to reconstruct the patient's unconscious, 
which has determined his associations, from the communication derived from 
it. 
Freud suggests here that the unconscious of the analyst can enter into direct 
communication with the unconscious of the analysand, and can thus be used 
as an important 'instrument' for analysis. This idea is presented more in the 
form of an assertion rather than a worked-out explanatory model. Freud posits 
that a telephone line is in place between the unconscious of the patient and 
that of the analyst; it is this line which makes communication possible. The 
existence of this line is asserted without Freud putting forward, in this 
passage, any formulation which could explain the creation of such a line. Nine 
years later, in Massenpsychology und Ich Analyse (1921) he will develop the 
concept of identification, which is linked to empathy, as a candidate to 
account for the understanding of the unconscious of another person 
(discussed below). In Die Disposition zur Zwangsneurose Freud states that 
this type of understanding via direct access to the unconscious is by no 
means a capacity special to analysts: "[... ] jeder Mensch [besitzt] in seinem 
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eigenen Unbewußten ein Instrument, mit dem er die Äußerungen des 
Unbewußten beim Anderen zu deuten vermag" (1913b, p. 213). "[... ] 
everybody possesses in their unconscious an instrument which enables him 
to interpret the expressions of the unconscious of the other person. " The 
process by which one person can come to know something about another 
person that this person himself does not know (something, furthermore, which 
by definition is not accessible to immediate knowing) by using one's own 
unconscious as a `receiver', remains so far however rather obscure. 
There is another important question connected with this metaphor. Are we 
dealing here, as the image suggests, with a communication, implying at least 
two persons, the speaker and an addressee? Or is the telephone meant to be 
just an instrument for observation, like for instance the microscope, where the 
species under scrutiny is not presumed to communicate to the person of the 
scientist? This question concerns the issue whether this 'tapping into' the 
unconscious is a process of participation in a communication/conversation, or 
an observation performed by a scientist who is not implicated in this process. 
The choice of the metaphor suggests the former - usually telephone 
communications are between persons, and work both ways. This places the 
analyst in the position of the other whose understanding is desired. Why ring 
and speak into a telephone unless there is a wish to communicate, that is, to 
speak to another person? Why speak, unless there is a response? However, 
if there is a response, does this not mean that the analyst too is engaged in 
an unconscious communication with the patient? And if there is no response, 
will the patient not - after a number of increasingly desperate 'hallo? 's - stop 
communicating, and hang up, presuming that the line is dead? 
It is highly unlikely, however, that Freud intended this meaning of 
interpersonal communication. In spite of his recognition that everyone, not just 
analysts, possess such a 'telephone', there is no indication that he thought 
that the patient was also receiving communications from the analyst's 
unconscious. His emphasis on the technology of the phone suggests that he 
was keener to demonstrate that the analyst possesses an instrument of 
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science rather than acknowledging a process of interpersonal communication. 
Had he further developed the implications of his metaphor it might have 
shown some problems in his assumption of the analyst as scientist. 
Furthermore, if the important `data' are transmitted from unconscious to 
unconscious this poses the problem, also not taken up by Freud, how the 
analyst can gain knowledge of his unconscious. Even if it is presumed 
possible that the unconscious of the analyst is in some form of direct contact 
with the unconscious of the analysand, the analyst's conscious mind - if the 
conscious/unconscious distinction is to mean anything - cannot have direct 
access to his own unconscious. Some process of decoding or translation 
needs to be presumed to take place. Deutsch (1926) remarked that knowing 
one's own unconscious was like being able to see the back of one's own 
head. An explanation is required how this is possible. 
When Binswanger asks Freud to clarify the telephone metaphor, Freud 
replied, in a letter dated 22 Feb. 1925, that he meant this in "a modest and 
rationalistic sense", adding the term 'unconscious' was used descriptively and 
that it would have been more accurate, dynamically speaking, to use the term 
'preconscious' (quoted in Pigman, 1995, p. 247). Freud was clearly concerned 
to stress the more rational aspect of the analyst's activity and, whilst he did 
not further explain the mechanism believed to be involved, he was intent to 
distance himself from any notions of the mystical. 
Helene Deutsch (1926) attempts to find a rational explanation for the 
understanding of another person's unconscious -a phenomenon which, 
according to Freud's own definition, has to be termed telepathic5. Deutsch 
approaches Freud's telephone metaphor by hypothesising that under the 
condition of a "certain unconscious readiness" a person can become the 
"receiving station" of the unconscious ideas of another. "These emotionally 
5 Freud had defined telepathy as the reception of a mental process by one person from 
another by means other than sensory perception" (quoted in Deutsch 1926, p. 134). 
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cathected ideas must mobilize in the unconscious of the second person [the 
receiver] analogous ideas of similar content, which then manifest themselves 
in the conscious as 'internal experiences"' (ibid. p. 135). Only through the 
conscious intellectual re-working of what was initially passively received does 
the external source of this internal experience become apparent. This 
recognition is necessary for the transmitted material to be rendered useful to 
gain insight into the other person. For the analytic setting Deutsch proposes to 
speak of the analyst's "unconscious perception", a term which she uses 
interchangeably with both "analytic intuition" and "intuitive empathy". 
The affective psychic content of the patient, which emerges from his 
unconscious, becomes transmuted into an inner experience of the analyst, 
and is recognized as belonging to the patient (i. e. to the external world) only 
in the course of subsequent intellectual work. [... ] intuitive empathy is 
precisely the gift of being able to experience the object by means of an 
identification [... ] made possible by the fact that the psychic structure of the 
analyst is a product of developmental processes similar to those which the 
patient himself had also experienced. Indeed the unconscious of both the 
analyst and the analysand contains the very same infantile wishes and 
impulses. (ibid. pp. 136-7) 
The patient's affective experience first has to become an affective experience 
for the analyst; its origin in the patient is recognised only on subsequent 
reflection. A transmission of affect, made possible by the shared quality both 
of psychic structure and of early experiences, which gives rise to 
identification, is, according to the elaboration given by Helene Deutsch, the 
basis of empathy. The idea of the unconscious of the analyst 'listening in' 
directly to the unconscious of the patient has been developed further in the 
direction of empathy by Theodor Reik, who called this process "listening with 
the third ear' (1948; further discussed below). 
Freud's writings on technique are, on the whole, a collection of mainly 
negative injunctions which have contributed a great deal to the idea of the 
26 
'Freudian' analyst as a remote and withholding figure. Of the many possible 
examples of negative advice I will quote only one passage -a passage which 
has often been used either to fortify the resolve of the 'Freudian' analyst or to 
attack his lack of humanity: 
Ich kann den Kollegen nicht dringend genug empfehlen, sich während der 
psychoanalytischen Behandlung den Chirurgen zum Vorbild zu nehmen, der 
alle seine Affekte und selbst sein menschliches Mitleid beiseite drängt und 
seinen Kräften ein einziges Ziel setzt: die Operation so kunstgerecht als 
möglich zu vollziehen. [... ] Die Rechtfertigung der vom Analytiker geforderten 
Gefühlskälte liegt darin, daß sie für beide Teile die vorteilhaftesten 
Bedingungen schafft, für den Arzt die wünschenswerte Schonung seines 
eigenen Affektlebens, für den Kranken das größte Ausmaß von Hilfeleistung, 
das uns heute möglich ist. (1912b, p. 175) 
To my colleagues I cannot recommend enough they model themselves, 
during psychoanalytic treatment, on the surgeon who pushes to on side all his 
affects and even his human compassion, and who directs all his efforts to one 
single goal: to execute the operation as skilfully as possible. (... ) The 
justification of the emotional coldness which is demanded of the analyst lies in 
the fact that it creates for both parties the most advantageous conditions; for 
the physician the desired preservation of his own affective life, for the patient 
the greatest degree of help we are capable of giving at present. 
Freud's technical writings call upon the analyst to restrain most aspects of his 
individual and emotional participation in the treatment and to abide by the 
rules of anonymity, neutrality and abstinence. In a letter to Ferenczi dated 4 
January 1928, Freud admits that his recommendations on technique were 
"essentially negative". He continues: "Almost everything one should do in a 
positive sense, I left to the 'tact' that you have introduced. What I achieved 
thereby was that the obedient submitted to these admonitions as if they were 
taboos and did not notice their elasticity" (quoted in Pigman 1995, p. 247). 
Already in Über Wilde' Psychoanalyse (1910a) Freud had used the terms Takt 
und Schonung (tact and care) to denote the qualities the analyst needs to 
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bring to his work. Tact is specified as the analyst's sensitivity to the receptivity 
of the patient to his interpretations and to the task of facilitating a positive 
transference. When, 18 years later, Ferenczi suggested the notion of tact as 
the guiding principle for the phrasing and timing of interpretations Freud 
agreed with him. Ferenczi wrote: "But what is 'tact'? The answer is not very 
difficult. Tact is the capacity for empathy' (1928, p. 239; italics in orig. ). Having 
admitted to the largely negative character of his technical guidelines and the 
importance of tact, Freud still worries about the "elasticity" Ferenczi wants to 
introduce into the analytic work. His letter to Ferenczi continues: 
[... ] it seems to me that a concession in this form is just as questionable. All 
those without tact will see therein a justification for arbitrariness, i. e. for the 
subjective factor, i. e. for the influence of personal complexes that have not 
been overcome. What we do in fact, - in a manner remaining mostly 
preconscious - is to consider the various reactions we expect from our 
interventions, and what matters especially is a quantitative estimate of the 
dynamic factors in the situation. There are naturally no rules for this appraisal, 
the analyst's experience and normality will be decisive. For beginners 
certainly one should strip 'tact' of its mystical character. (In Pigman 1995, 
p. 247) 
Introducing concepts like empathy or tact posed the danger for Freud that too 
much of `the subjective factor' could be imported into psychoanalysis, thus 
undermining its scientific credibility. Any interpersonal notions, which are not 
rule-bound or measurable but still make up an important aspect of the clinical 
work, are to be read as connected with the more rational aspects of the 
'preconscious'. By speaking the language of quantities, appraisals, and 
considered expectations Freud hopes to rid empathy of any suspiciously 
subjective or even mystical characteristics. To lend weight to his assertions of 
the rational character of empathy he is however left to gesture rather vaguely 
towards "the analyst's experience and normality". 
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Erkennen and verstehen in Freud's case studies 
Whilst the whole trajectory of his technical writings points in the direction of 
the distanced, disinterested and withholding stance of the analyst, this is not 
necessarily the attitude Freud adopted in his own clinical practice. Perhaps 
the best glimpse into Freud's actual practice is afforded us through the rather 
surprising discovery after his death of original notes which he had taken in the 
early stages of the treatment of the 'Ratman' (1955 [1907-08])6. These notes 
present us with much that was to be expected, since they support the 
description of the treatment in his published work: a lot of material concerning 
the patient's early life as it emerges during the sessions and a brief record of 
Freud's thoughts about the case and the interpretations he offers. 
Over and above this, however, there is an abundance of instances where 
Freud seemingly 'transgresses' the limits he himself laid down in his writings 
on technique. Freud repeatedly explains and discusses his theory with his 
patient - referring to these conversations as "lectures" (Vorlesungen) at one 
point (ibid. p. 544) - and promises that that his theory will be proven to the 
patient in the course of the treatment. He also suggests future insights, 
engages in numerous attempts of persuasion, reassures the patient, praises 
him and pays him compliments. He laughs at the patient's outrageous 
fantasy, and at one point denies that he is a relative of a Viennese murderer 
also called Freud. He argues with the patient and twice refers to a "struggle" 
(Kampf, ibid. p. 527 and p. 543) going on between them. Apart from these 
affectively charged exchanges other, material, exchanges take place: he 
offers the patient food on one occasion7, lends him a book on another (Zola's 
Joie de vivre, ibid. p. 561), and writes him a card signed "herzlich" (cordially) - 
an intimacy about which the patient complains. From the patient he demands 
Freud took these notes at the end of his working day. The notes begin on 1 Oct. 1907, when 
he had the first consultation with this patient, and end abruptly on 20 Jan. 1908, despite the 
treatment continuing for another seven months. It is not clear why they break off, nor how 
they came to survive, since Freud used to always destroy his case notes. 
7 This is referred to only in the briefest of fashions: "28 Dez, Hungerig u wird gelabt" (ibid. 
p. 559; "28 Dec, hungry & is fed") 
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he brings to the session a photo of the lady he is involved with, which earns 
him more complaints. Surprisingly, the patient at times seems extremely 
active, agitatedly walking up and down in the consulting room. 
The level of active participation and personal engagement evidenced by these 
notes does not seem to tally very well with the image of the neutral, abstinent 
and cold scientist-analyst which Freud promoted in his technical writings. To 
read 'Freud in practice' does however help to understand the fact that he 
maintained for so many years a strong and positive link with Ferenczi who 
publicly promoted, against the grain of 'official' psychoanalysis, the personal 
engagement and 'activity' of the analyst. 
In the published 'Ratman' case study Bemerkungen Ober einen Fall von 
Zwangsneurose (1909) little of the flavour of the therapeutic interaction comes 
through. Freud does however show quite openly his struggles in 
understanding his patient, whose 'otherness' presents particular difficulties to 
him. In the preface Freud admits to the severe limitations of this study not only 
due to the need to select, and by the same token somewhat distort, the 
personal material of the patient, but also due to the insufficient understanding 
gained so far of obsessional neuroses. I will quote this passage at some 
length because it contains a number of important, if rather varied, ideas and 
metaphors regarding the process of clinical understanding. 
Ich bekenne, daß es mir bisher noch nicht gelungen ist, das komplizierte 
Gefüge eines schweren Falles von Zwangsneurose restlos zu durchschauen, 
und daß ich es nicht zustande brächte, diese analytisch erkannte oder 
erahnte Struktur durch die Auflagerungen der Behandlung hindurch anderen 
in der Wiedergabe der Analyse sichtbar zu machen. Es sind die Widerstände 
der Kranken und die Formen von deren Äußerung, welche letztere Aufgabe 
so sehr erschweren; aber man muß sagen, daß das Verständnis einer 
Zwangsneurose an und für sich nichts leichtes ist, viel schwerer als das eines 
Falles von Hysterie. Eigentlich sollte man das Gegenteil erwarten. Die Mittel 
durch welche die Zwangsneurose ihre geheimen Gedanken zum Ausdruck 
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bringt, die Sprache der Zwangsneurose ist gleichsam nur ein Dialekt der 
hysterischen Sprache, aber ein Dialekt in welchen uns die Einfühlung leichter 
gelingen müßte, weil er dem Ausdrucke unseres bewußten Denkens 
verwandter ist als der hysterische. Er enthält vor allem nicht jenen Sprung 
aus dem Seelischen in die somatische Innervation, - die hysterische 
Konversion, - den wir mit unserem Begreifen doch niemals mitmachen 
können. Vielleicht trägt auch nur unsere geringere Vertrautheit mit der 
Zwangsneurose die Schuld daran, daß die Wirklichkeit jene Erwartung nicht 
bestätigt (p. 382-3). 
I confess that I have not managed so far to completely see through the 
complicated structure of a severe case of obsessional neurosis and that I 
could not manage to make visible to others this analytically recognised or 
conjectured structure by showing the layering of the treatment in the 
reproduction of the analysis. The resistances of the patients and the forms of 
their expression render this latter task so difficult; but it has to be said that the 
understanding of a obsessional neurosis is not easy in itself, it is much harder 
than that of a case of hysteria. One should expect the opposite. The means 
by which the obsessional neurosis expresses its secret thoughts, the 
language of the obsessional neurosis is, as it were, only a dialect of the 
hysterical language, but a dialect with which it should be easier to empathise, 
since it is more familiar than the hysterical one to the expressions of our 
conscious thoughts. Above all it does not contain that leap from psychical into 
somatic innervation - the hysterical conversion - in which we can never 
participate with our comprehension. Perhaps it is only our lesser familiarity 
with the obsessional neurosis which is to blame for the fact that reality does 
not confirm our expectation. 
A number of descriptions are employed here to illustrate the process of 
gaining knowledge of the patient's mental structure: 
Freud's aim, so far not achieved, is das komplizierte Gefüge... . restlos zu 
durchschauen - to totally see through the complicated structure. 
Durchschauen here invokes insight in its most visual sense: the structure is to 
be seen without remainder. As it stands he seems uncertain how far he has 
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proceeded in this task. The use of the alternative adjectives erkannte oder 
erahnte point to some ambiguity about the status of his understanding of the 
psychic structure. Erahnen (which can be translated as 'to conjecture' or 'to 
intuit/intimate') is certainly more ambiguous and tentative, and hence more 
prone to the fallacies smuggled in by the 'subjective factor', than the verb 
erkennen (to recognise, know, perceive) denoting the acquisition of 
knowledge. Sehen, erkennen leading to Wissen in the sense of objective 
representation are clearly the aims of Freud's work. 
Interestingly, Freud then switches metaphors, from seeing to understanding a 
language. The obsessional neurosis has its own language to express its 
secret thoughts (ihre geheimen Gedanken zum Ausdruck bringt). The 
neurosis was first portrayed as an objective structure penetrable, if with 
difficulties, by our gaze; now it turns out to have secret thoughts and the 
means to express them. The need for the analyst to look and perceive now 
changes into a need to listen and understand, that is, to be receptive to a 
communicative process. Die Sprache der Zwangsneurose ist ... ein Dialekt 
der hysterischen Sprache ... in welchen uns die Einfühlung leichter gelingen 
müßte, weil er dem Ausdrucke unseres bewußten Denkens verwandter ist. 
The language in question is not understood through translation, but felt into, 
i. e., it is understood empathically. The expectation that empathy should be 
easier in the case of processes closer to conscious thought link fühlen 
(feeling) with denken (thinking). Freud, furthermore, invokes the notion of 
Verwandtheit (kinship, familiarity) to explain his expectation of easier 
understanding. Freud's use of the language metaphor moves the process of 
comprehension much closer to the hermeneutic concept of understanding the 
meaning of an utterance. This formulation is in tension with the notion of 
representation implied by the use of metaphors of visual perception. 
In addition, there is an aspect of understanding linked to an idea of 
participation in the realm of the body. Freud writes about the Sprung aus dem 
Seelischen in die somatische Innervation..., den wir mit unserem Begreifen 
doch niemals mitmachen können (the leap out of the psychic into somatic 
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enervation... in which our comprehension can never participate). Contrary to 
the hysterical language the obsessional 'dialect' does not leap into somatic 
expression and does not therefore require our comprehension to perform an 
impossible move. Empathic comprehension can only participate in 
movements closer to conscious thought. The notion of participation in 
movement, whilst only negatively used, is the third metaphor Freud employs 
in this short paragraph to describe the process of understanding. It echoes his 
first formulations of empathy in Jokes where empathy is linked to a process of 
kinaesthetic imitation. 
For Freud the question remained why the obsessional neuroses should be so 
much harder to understand then the hysterical neuroses which he seemed to 
feel he understood quite well. He tries on what seems like a rather minimal or 
common sensical explanation: Vielleicht trägt auch nur unsere geringere 
Vertrautheit mit der Zwangsneurose die Schuld... (Perhaps it is just our lesser 
familiarity with the obsessional neurosis which carries the blame... ) This 
suggests that understanding is linked to a notion of familiarity or 
acquaintance. We understand the obsessional dialect less because we are 
less used to being addressed in this language, and therefore have greater 
difficulty in comprehending the meaning of the communication. 
Thus we find in this one paragraph a whole list of rather different terms being 
used to describe the process of gaining knowledge of the patient: 
durchschauen - to see through; erkennen - to recognise; erahnen - to intuit; 
possibly also, with more emphasis on cognition: to conjecture; eine Sprache 
verstehen - to understand a language; sich einfühlen (in eine Sprache) - to 
feel one's way into (a language); einen Sprung mitmachen - to participate in a 
leap; vertraut sein (und daher eine gewisse Erwartung haben) - to be familiar 
with (and hence to have certain expectations). Of the cluster of questions 
arising from these rather varied descriptive approaches I wish to pick up and 
elaborate on two: the problem of negotiating the `gap of otherness', and the 
idea of understanding the symptoms (and dreams) of the patient as 
communications in language. 
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The difficulty of empathically understanding the unfamiliar is repeatedly 
addressed by Freud in Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose 
(1918[1914]), the case study known as "Wolf-Man". In several passages the 
problems of Einfühlung are linked to the age gap between the remembered 
child and the analyst, the cultural differences between the patient and the 
analyst, and personal idiosyncrasies of the patient. In the preface to the case 
history Freud comments on the treatment of infantile neuroses, "the difficulty 
of empathising with the mental life of the child makes the work of the doctor 
particularly hard" (ibid. p. 130-1). And later: "[... ] once again, he behaved in the 
manner which was so characteristic of him, but which makes it so 
extraordinarily difficult to give a clear account of or to feel one's way into 
them" (1918 [1914], p. 199). "Personal peculiarities in the patient and a 
national character that was foreign to ours made empathy laborious" (ibid, p. 
216). In Totem and Taboo Freud flags up the same problem of empathising 
with experiences and mental processes unfamiliar to himself. "It is not easy to 
feel one's way [einzufühlen] into primitive modes of thinking. We 
misunderstand [mißverstehen] primitive men just as easily as we 
misunderstand children, and we are always apt to interpret their actions and 
feelings according to our own mental constellations" (1912-13, p. 389). . 
In the passages cited above empathy is clearly more than 'tact', and its 
function for the clinical work goes far beyond laying the interpersonal 
foundations for the analytic work of understanding. Arguably, to feel one's way 
into another person's thinking cannot proceed other than as an understanding 
of his world. Einfühlen itself is already an important aspect of understanding; if 
it fails analysis fails - and not just because the therapeutic relationship might 
break down. The last quote, furthermore, bears witness to Freud's 
appreciation of the danger that what we take to be an empathic understanding 
might in fact be a misunderstanding on the basis of our preconceptions. The 
'subjective factor', here due to being situated in a different culture, always 
threatens to undermine our attempts to gain knowledge of the other - 
especially if he is very other. (This 'problem' of preconceptions shaping our 
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understandings was made central by hermeneutic philosophy and will be 
extensively discussed in chapter 5. ) 
In his last purely technical essay Wege der psychoanalytischen Therapie 
Freud makes a statement which seems to run counter to previous utterances 
about the understanding via Einfühlung. "I have been able to help people with 
whom there was no link whatsoever in terms of commonality of race, 
education, social status, and world view, without disturbing them in their 
idiosyncratic ways" (1918/19, p. 246). This seems to be a rather questionable 
assertion - and not only because it is doubtful whether any of Freud's patients 
really came from a world which is culturally so alien to his as he claims here. 
The question arises how the understanding of these patients could have 
possibly been achieved, if indeed there was no overlap in cultural experience, 
values etc. 
The notion of familiarity problematises the cultural, social and personal 
context from within which the analyst meets his patient, raising a question 
which has an important bearing on the understanding of understanding. How 
can we comprehend what is entirely unfamiliar to us? Freud, as we saw, 
clearly struggled with this problem. Tact is a function of familiarity; the 
sensitivity to the experience of the other person results from a degree of 
familiarity and creates the interpersonal conditions for 'coming closer, i. e. 
increasing the scope of empathy. Empathy - feeling one's way into the other 
person's experience, thoughts, language - is a function of familiarity, as well 
as a way of familiarising oneself further, with the world of the other. It is to 
understand the experience of the other. For Freud the task of the analysis 
was not the understanding of the patient's subjectivity; still, empathy was, 
minimally, a precondition for the work, and at times appears to make essential 
contributions to the task of psychoanalytic understanding. 
The notion of the familiar, however, brings with it another problem, one that 
Freud was well aware of. What we view as familiar possibly appears so as a 
result of the super-imposition of our preconceptions and prejudices. The 
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familiar is the realm of the already understood; the danger is that the 
unfamiliar (the `other') is too readily subsumed under it. The familiar needs to 
be de-familiarised if the recovery of the repressed is to stand a chance. On 
the other hand, one needs to familiarise oneself with the unfamiliar so that it 
will speak to us and we can learn to understand its language. The gap of 
otherness needs to be bridged, and yet be held open, for analysis to succeed. 
The notion of Einfühlung into the language of neurosis, which appears in the 
'Rat Man' quote above, echoes formulations from Bruchstück einer Hysterie- 
Analyse. This case-study (also widely referred to as 'Dora'), whilst being 
published in 1905, had already been written in 1901, shortly after The 
Interpretation of Dreams, where Freud feels he had shown "... how one has to 
translate the language of the dream into the language of our thought, which is 
comprehensible without further help. " (1905b, p. 94). In 'Dora' he sets out to 
demonstrate that the principles of dream interpretation find their "practical 
application" in the analysis of the clinical material presented by his patient. 
Freud writes: 
Diese Kenntnis [der Traumdeutung], darf ich behaupten, ist für den 
Psychoanalytiker unentbehrlich, denn der Traum stellt einen der Wege dar, 
wie dasjenige psychische Material zum Bewußtsein gelangen kann, welches 
kraft des Widerstrebens, das sein Inhalt rege macht, vom Bewußtsein 
abgesperrt, verdrängt und somit pathogen geworden ist. Der Traum ist, 
kürzer gesagt, einer der Umwege zur Umgehung der Verdrängung, eines der 
Hauptmittel der sogenannten indirekten Darstellungsweise im Psychischen. 
(ibid. p. 94) 
This knowledge [of the interpretation of dreams], I put forward, is 
indispensible to the psychoanalyst, because the dream constitutes a way in 
which psychic material can become conscious which had been, due to the 
resistance that its content aroused, barred from the conscious mind, had 
been repressed and thus become pathogenic. To put it in a nutshell, the 
dream is one of the detours for the circumvention of repression, one of the 
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most important means for the so-called indirect representation in the realm of 
the psyche. 
The language of the dream (and of the symptom) is an indirect way in which 
repressed mental content can find its expression without falling foul of the 
censorship exercised in waking consciousness. Since the dream manages to 
circumvent repression the unconscious can use it to smuggle 'forbidden 
goods' into consciousness. The translation of this indirect language into 
ordinary language constitutes the core of the analytic treatment. "One 
observes [... ] the condition of the patient improve to the same extent that one 
contributed to the solution of their psychical tasks by translating pathogenic 
into normal material" (ibid. ). 
This use of the metaphor of translation is repeated in Die Handhabung der 
Traumdeutung in der Psychoanalyse, where Freud writes that dreams "can be 
equated at times with the translation*of the entire content of the neurosis into 
the language of the dream" (1911, p. 153). The language of the dream, itself a 
translation of neurotic material, is to be further translated into ordinary 
language through the process of interpretation. This sequential substitution of 
one kind of text by another is central to the hermeneutic approach to 
psychoanalysis which will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
Identification 
The theme of understanding the other is flagged up in Massenpsychology und 
Ich-Analyse (1921; "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego") as part 
of a very brief discussion of empathy which, nevertheless, contains the largest 
claims Freud makes on behalf of this concept. Here Freud draws on the 
concept of identification, which has assumed an increasingly central role in 
the development of his theory, in order to provide a libidinal basis for group 
psychological phenomena. In Totem und Tabu and Trauer und Melancholie 
Freud discussed identification in terms of oral incorporation, that is, as an 
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essentially regressive, and hence defensive, mechanism. Only after the 
Oedipus complex had been given centrality in the formation of psychic 
structure was identification reformulated as playing a constitutive role in this 
process. As a result of the Oedipal struggle, the libidinal cathexes are 
withdrawn from the parents and replaced by identifications. Freud first 
formulated this process in Das Ich und das Es (1923) where the psychic 
Instanzen are described as relics of various forms of object relations, i. e. the 
sedimentation of identifications. 
In Massenpsychologie Freud distinguishes three types of identification. 
Identification, he writes, is "the earliest expression of an affective tie", and it 
constitutes a distinct developmental phase between narcissism and object 
love; it comes into being before the Oedipal phase and constitutes an 
important bridge to the outside world. Identification starts off as the wish of the 
boy to be like the idealised father; subsequently, wanting to be like father 
turns into wanting to be father, i. e. wanting to replace father in order to gain 
possession of the loved object, mother. A second form of identification is 
found in the subject's adoption of the same symptom as the loved object; in 
this case the subject takes the place of the object of choice. In the former 
case identification "copies" the rival, in the latter the loved person. In a third 
"particularly frequent and important case", in the absence of sexual cathexis, 
identifications occur without object relationship; a symptom might be adopted 
via "psychic infection". 
Der Mechanismus ist der der Identifizierung auf Grund des sich in dieselbe 
[Person] Versetzenkönnens und Versetzenwollens [... ] Das eine Ich hat am 
anderen eine bedeutsame Analogie wahrgenommen, in unserem Beispiel in 
der gleichen Gefühlsbereitschaft, es bildet sich daraufhin eine Identifizierung 
in diesem Punkte [... ] (1921, p. 100). 
The mechanism is that of identification on the basis of the capacity and the 
wish to transpose oneself into [the other person] ... One ego perceived an 
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important analogy in the other, in our example the same affective disposition, 
as a result an identification forms at this point [... 1. 
This third type of identification thus points to an overlap (Deckungsstelle) of 
the two Ichs. Summarising his insights Freud writes, 
daß erstens die Identifizierung die urspünglichste Form der Gefühlsbindung 
an ein Objekt ist, zweitens, daß sie auf regressivem Wege zum Ersatz für 
eine libidinöse Objektbindung wird, und daß sie drittens bei jeder neu 
wahrgenommenen Gemeinsamkeit mit einer Person, die nicht Objekt der 
Sexualtriebe ist, entstehen kann. Je bedeutsamer diese Gemeinsamkeit ist, 
desto erfolgreicher muß diese partielle Identifizierung werden können und so 
dem Anfang einer neuen Bindung entsprechen (ibid. p. 100). 
firstly, that identification is the most original affective tie to an object; second, 
that it becomes, by way of regression, a substitute for a libidinous object tie; 
and third, that it can be occasioned by any new perceived similarity with a 
person who is not object of the sexual drives. The more meaningful this 
similarity is, the more successful this partial identification has to be able to 
become and thus correspond to the beginning of a new tie. 
This, Freud suspects, brings him nearer an understanding of the emotional tie 
binding group members together. He continues, however: 
Eine andere Ahnung kann uns sagen, daß wir weit davon entfernt sind, das 
Problem der Indentifizierung erschöpft zu haben, daß wir vor dem Vorgang 
stehen, den die Psychologie `Einfühlung' heißt und der den größten Anteil an 
unserem Verständnis für das Ichfremde anderer Personen hat. Aber wir 
wollen uns hier auf die nächsten affektiven Wirkungen der Identifizierung 
beschränken und auch ihre Bedeutung für unser intellektuelles Leben beiseite 
lassen (ibid. p. 101). 
Another intuition may tell us that we are far from having exhausted the 
problem of identification, and that we are faced with the process which 
psychology calls 'empathy and which plays the largest part in our 
39 
understanding of the ego alien [aspects] in other people. But we shall here 
limit ourselves to the immediate emotional effects of identification, and shall 
leave to one side its significance for our intellectual life. 
And in a footnote he adds: 
Von der Identifizierung führt ein Weg über die Nachahmung zur Einfühlung, 
das heißt, zum Verständnis des Mechanismus durch den uns überhaupt eine 
Stellungnahme zu einem anderen Seelenleben ermöglicht wird. (ibid. 101) 
A path leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy, that is, to the 
comprehension of the mechanism which is indispensable for our taking up an 
attitude towards another mental life. 
Freud discusses empathy in the context of identification, and whilst he leaves 
empathy behind in order to address the affective aspects of identification he 
gives its cognitive aspects, seemingly en passant, the central role in the 
understanding of another person. In the footnote he apparently refers to the 
philosophical debate regarding the existence of 'other minds', and he seems 
to suggest that it falls to empathy to provide the central mechanism to settle 
this issue. The reference to imitation points back to his view of the mechanics 
of the empathic process as elaborated in Jokes. Freud emphasises the 
importance of the intellectual aspect of empathy, amplifying but not 
developing its role in the understanding of others. Given the size and the 
somewhat cryptic character of the claims it is rather tantalizing that the 
significance of the concept is not discussed. 
The real problem in understanding this passage is, however, posed by the 
phrase das Ichfremde anderer Personen - literally: the ego alien [aspects] of 
other people-8 There is an ambiguity in the use of the term das Ichfremde (ego 
alien) which leaves room for two interpretations of this sentence resulting in 
8 Strachey translates this as "what is inherently foreign to our ego in other people" (Standard 
Edition, Vol. XVIII, p. 108). 
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different views about the `reach' of empathic understanding. In the first 
reading, the one suggested by Strachey's translation, the other person (or 
something about the other person) is foreign to one's own ego and empathy 
enables us to bridge this gap. In its second reading the Ich is understood in 
the context of Freud's structural model where it stands in an essential dialectic 
tension to the unconscious instinctual forces of the Id. Read this way, what is 
being empathically understood is not what is foreign to oneself in the other 
person, but rather that which is foreign to the ego of the other person. 
Empathy in this sense provides an understanding that goes further than the 
understanding the person has of himself. This kind of empathy opens up the 
possibility of putting oneself into the other's place and occupying a privileged 
vantage point from where more becomes visible than the other himself can 
see. This is a meaning perhaps implied, but not developed by Freud; it will 
play an important role, however, in later elaborations of empathy. 
In linking empathy with identification Freud seems to suggest that its basis is 
the perception of a partial sameness or, at least, likeness which is taken as 
the starting point of a process of copying (kopieren) the other person. Given 
this emphasis on sameness the concept of identification seems to lend itself 
quite well to explain the perception and understanding of similar or shared 
experience. This take makes it hard to see, however, how empathy can bring 
into view das Ichfremde anderer Personen in the first reading of this phrase, 
where the other person is different/alien to the Ich of the understanding 
subject. The other's otherness cannot be identified/empathised with in that 
case. 
Freud's clinical psychoanalysis 
Having presented in some detail Freud's view(s) on clinical understanding, 
with a particular emphasis on empathy, a brief but more systematic account of 
his model of the psychoanalytic process in now required. Given that Freud's 
'model' was in constant development over a span of more than 40 years it is 
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questionable whether it is even possible to speak of his model in the singular, 
consequently, the presentation of such an account is a task the difficulty and 
complexity of which in many ways exceeds the scope of this thesis. I will look 
at Freud's ideas as they coalesced after the introduction of his 'second 
topography' (in Das Ich und das Es; 1923). The focus of the treatment is now 
the analysis of the resistance of the ego, and the patient's transference is 
defined as the main 'battleground'. Resistance and transference, both of 
which refer to ideas already present in Studien Ober Hysterie (1895), have 
become established as the cornerstones of Freud's method. My brief account 
of psychoanalytic treatment will focus on these two central concepts. 
Resistance is that in the words and actions of the patient which opposes the 
access to his unconscious. Freud discovered resistance early in his work (he 
wrote about it as early as 1895). Initially he tried to oppose it by counter- 
pressure (including the exertion of physical pressure on the patient's 
forehead) and persuasion, until he realised that in resistance the same forces 
were at work as in repression and that resistance could therefore be used as 
a potential way of accessing the unconscious. Studien Ober Hysterie (1895), 
which he published together with Breuer, proposes the following mechanism. 
Memories can be seen as grouped in concentric circles around a pathological 
core; this grouping is in accordance to the degree of resistance attached to 
these memories. In the course of the treatment, as the pathological core is 
approached, each passage from one circle to the next leads to an increase in 
the resistance which the analyst meets. This theory already implies that 
resistance necessarily belongs to the treatment and the remembering it 
demands. 
Resistance being an obstacle to the access of the unconscious by its very 
appearance signals the unconscious conflict. Like a guard blocking a 
doorway, it betrays the existence of something that it seeks to keep hidden. 
Freud came to regard the analysis of resistance, and the interpretation of 
transference, more and more as the distinguishing feature of his approach. 
With the introduction of his new topography Freud came to conceptualise 
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resistance primarily in terms of ego-defence (Ichabwehr), rather then, as is 
implied by the theory put forward in the Studien, as a feature of the 
unconscious itself. The introduction of the second structural model, which 
distinguishes Es, Ich and Über-Ich, is in part explainable through the 
increased focus on defence mechanisms (Abwehrmechanismen) and their 
manifestation in the analytic process. However, the growing centrality Freud 
gave to the process of identification as developed in his Massenpsychologie 
itself demanded a different model for the structuring of personality. 
In Jenseits des Lustprinzips (1920) Freud writes that it is not the unconscious 
which resists the treatment; the unconscious, on the contrary, strives for 
expression. Resistance originates in the same "higher" region of the mind 
which was responsible for repression in the first place. It is, then, the ego itself 
which resists the analytic cure; resistance against health and the defence 
mechanisms of the ego are essentially of one piece. The ego blocks the 
pathways of association preventing the linking of related material in the 
patient's mind. The interpretation of the resistance is designed to facilitate the 
'over jumping' of this blockage, allowing a spontaneous link to occur. 
This shift is relevant for the conception of interpretation - and for the question, 
central to this thesis: who knows the relevant things? Interpretation in this 
theory is not the explanation of the true nature of the patient's experience by 
the analyst - and resistance its refusal by the patient. It is instead 
interpretation of the resistance designed to help the overcoming of a block in 
order to enable the spontaneous connection which leads to the remembering 
of the repressed. Resistance then is not the refusal to accept the analyst's 
interpretation of some unconscious content as right, but an inability to allow 
the occurrence of a mental link. Analysis of resistance seeks to re-establish a 
broken connection - so that the patient can (again) have knowledge of what 
he once knew but than repressed. 
This does not mean, however, that there was no room within Freud's 
technique for informing the patient of the content of his unconscious mind. In 
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Zur Einleitung der Behandlung (1913a), in the context of a warning not to 
pressure the patient to accept the analyst's knowledge of the repressed 
material, Freud writes, 
daß die bewußte Mitteilung des Verdrängten an den Kranken doch nicht 
wirkungslos bleibt... Sie wird zunächst Widerstände, dann aber, wenn deren 
Überwindung erfolgt ist, einen Denkanstoß anregen, in dessen Ablauf sich 
endlich die erwartete Beeinflußung der unbewußten Erinnerung herstellt 
(p. 202). 
that the conscious communication of the repressed does not after all remain 
without effect... It will trigger resistance at first, but eventually, after this has 
been overcome, an impetus for thought, in the course of which the expected 
influence on the unconscious memory manifests itself at last. 
The notion of resistance posits something that is resisted, i. e. it is based on 
the knowledge of the existence, if not the knowledge of the content, of some 
repressed memory. The knowledge of the content is supposed to lie within the 
unconscious of the patient's mind. The analyst's knowledge contributes the 
expertise which enables the unearthing of whatever the patient 'forgot'. There 
are passages in Freud however where it becomes clear that he feel he knows 
much more of the nature of the repressed content. "Often", he writes in 
Erinnern, Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten (1914), a new patient comes and, 
in spite of their long and varied life history and protracted illness, in the 
beginning "remains silent and insists that nothing comes to mind". Freud has 
no doubt about the nature of this particular resistance, for he continues: "This 
is of course nothing but the repetition of a homosexual attitude which pushes 
to the fore as resistance against all remembering" (1914, p. 210). To interpret 
the silence as a repetition, the repetition as a resistance against 
remembering, and to explain it in terms of a homosexual attitude requires a lot 
of `knowledge' on the part of the analyst. Whilst it could be argued that only 
the resistance is interpreted, the interpretation involves particularities of the 
patient's life history (previous homosexual attitude which are now 'repeated') 
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and details of his unconscious mind which do not stem from connections 
made by the patient. The patient had, after all, remained silent 
The argument that the relevant knowledge therefore lies with the patient, and 
that the analyst only helps in retrieving it - and is therefore not part of the 
constitution of what counts as knowledge in the end - is, in my mind, 
questionable. Even if the interpretation addressed 'only' the resistance, 
resistance is itself largely unconscious and interpretations of this aspect of the 
unconscious are not content free. The non-acceptance of the analyst's 
interpretation of the resistance is likely to be regarded as denial, that is, more 
resistance. The answer to the question whether Freud claimed to know the 
unconscious mind of his patient depends on 'which bit' of the unconscious is 
meant. Freud did not claim to already know what the patient once knew and 
then `forgot', i. e. the content of the repressed memories. But his claim to know 
when the patient resists and his suggestion of a particular structure of this 
resistance is not free of suppositions about unconscious content. 
Transference came to be regarded by Freud as perhaps the most important 
manifestation of resistance. The term transference denotes the actualisation 
of unconscious wishes in the analytic situation involving infantile prototypes 
which are experienced, often intensely, as belonging to the present situation. 
Initially Freud thought of transference as simply a displacement of affect 
(Affektverschiebung). In Studien Ober Hysterie he describes how the 
unconscious wish of the hysterical patient, which originated in her past, 
durch den im Bewußtsein herrschenden Assoziationszwang mit meiner 
Person verknüpft [wurde], welche ja die Kranke beschäftigen darf, und bei 
dieser Mesalliance - die ich falsche Verknüpfung heiße - wacht derselbe 
Affekt auf, der seinerzeit die Kranke zur Verweisung dieses unerlaubten 
Wunsches gedrängt hat. (1895, p. 95) 
became linked, due to the associative compulsion dominating her 
consciousness, with my person, with whom the patient feels entitled to 
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preoccupy herself; and in the course of this mesalliance - which I call wrong 
connection - the same affect awakes, which originally pressured the patient 
to reject this illicit wish. 
This "wrong connection" was originally viewed by Freud as a rather localised 
problem that was tackled, like any other symptom, by the analyst bringing his 
personal influence to bear on the patient. Transference was not yet seen as 
extending to the whole of the therapeutic relationship and therefore not an 
essential aspect of it. 
In the last chapter of `Dora' (1 905b), where Freud reflects on the failure of the 
treatment and understands it as a result of his omission to interpret the 
patient's transference, Freud offers the following well-known definition -a 
definition which, interestingly, again invokes the metaphor of the text: 
Was sind Übertragungen? Es sind Neuauflagen, Nachbildungen von den 
Regungen und Phantasien, die während des Vordringens der Analyse 
erweckt und bewußt gemacht werden sollen, mit einer für die Gattung 
charakteristischen Ersetzung einer früheren Person durch die Person des 
Arztes. Um es anders zu sagen: eine ganze Reihe psychischer Erlebnisse 
wird nicht als vergangen, sondern als aktuelle Beziehung zur Person des 
Arzes wieder lebendig. (1905b, p. 180) 
What are transferences? They are new editions, reproductions of impulses 
and fantasies which are to be aroused and made conscious during the 
progression of analysis, and which are characterised by the replacement of 
an earlier person through the person of the physician. To put it differently: an 
entire series of psychical experiences is revived not as past, but in the 
present relation to the person of the physician. 
Depending on the degree of sublimation these repetitions have undergone 
Freud distinguishes between Neubearbeitungen (revised editions) and simple 
Neudrucken (reprints). 
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In Zur Dynamik der Übertragung Freud writes that everyone, due to the 
combination of inherited traits and the influences of childhood history, 
acquired "a certain characteristic way in which to live his love life, that is, the 
love conditions he poses, the instincts he satisfies thus and the aims he 
pursues" (1912a, p. 159). This results in a patterning which is "regularly 
repeated, reprinted, as far as this is allowed by the external circumstances 
and the nature of the available love objects" (ibid. ). Transference love, and the 
thoughts and behaviours it gives rise to, is "patterned", i. e. repetitive. Its 
pattern too constitutes a "text" which requires translation. In Zur Dynamik der 
Übertragung transference became linked to the destiny of the child's love; it is 
always tied to "prototypes" (Vorbilder) - Freud speaks of the father-, mother-, 
and brother-imago (borrowing a phrase from Jung). But despite the often 
observed fact that the analyst too gets slotted into "one of the psychical `rows' 
which the patient has already formed" (ibid. p. 160), transference was not yet 
seen as necessarily involving the person of the analyst. 
With the development and growing centrality of the Oedipus complex 
transference was more closely tied to the parental, especially paternal, 
constellation, and it became apparent to Freud that the feelings and desires 
the patient experienced in relation to the figure of the analyst were often 
intensely ambivalent. He started to distinguish between positive and negative 
transference, referring to the loving and hostile impulses evoKea. 
Transference eventually came to be recognised as structuring the whole 
treatment situation, leading Freud to introduce the concept of transference 
neurosis. In 1914 Freud thought that it was possible to replace the original 
neurosis of the patient with the artificial transference neurosis which became 
the focus of the therapeutic activity. 
In terms of its function during treatment transference was first thought to 
constitute one of the main obstacles. It was noticed as a rather regular 
occurrence and, furthermore, it seemed to appear much more markedly when 
the central unconscious conflict was- approached. Freud thought that 
transference was a resistance in so far as it substitutes repetition `in action' for 
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remembering and verbalisation. Resistance, he thought, uses transference, 
but does not constitute it. On the other hand, transference is considered a 
way in which the patient manages to introduce repressed material into 
analysis, a sidestepping of the mechanism of repression. It is the actualisation 
of old desires which, due to the repression they have been subjected to, can 
only be presented as `new'. Transference, like the dream or the symptom, is 
an Umweg zur Umgehung der Verdrängung; it functions by substituting the 
object of the past (the original love object) with the person of the analyst. The 
affect is experienced by the patient as if it was entirely related to the present 
moment and the present relationship. 
Thus whilst transference is linked to resistance, it also points to a way to 
access repressed material. It is this potentiality which moved into the 
foreground for Freud. By 1912 transference had become the central focus of 
the analyst's attention and interpretive efforts: 
Auf diesem Felde muß der Sieg gewonnen werden [... ] Es ist unleugbar, daß 
die Bezwingung der Übertragungsphänomene dem Psychoanalytiker die 
größten Schwierigkeiten bereitet, aber man darf nicht vergessen, daß gerade 
sie uns den unschätzbaren Dienst erweist, die verborgenen und vergessenen 
Liebesregungen der Kranken aktuell und manifest zu machen, denn 
schließlich kann man niemanden in absentia or in effigie erschlagen. 
(1912a, pp. 167-8) 
On this ground victory has to be won [... ] It is undeniable that overcoming 
transference phenomena presents the psychoanalyst with the greatest 
difficulties, but it must not be forgotten that it is precisely these phenomena 
which do us the inestimable service of rendering present and manifest the 
hidden and forgotten love impulses of the patients; one cannot, after all, kill 
anyone in absentia or in effigie. 
Due to the strict limitations and the constancy of the analytic setting 
transference was seen as the privileged opportunity for the unfolding, 
observation and interpretation of the patient's unconscious mental processes. 
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The implication of transference theory is that the therapeutic relationship as it 
is experienced by the patient is a kind of series of "false connections" which 
tends to superimpose the original 'text' of the patient's early significant 
relationships onto the present person of the analyst and the whole analytic 
situation. The analyst is assimilated into the existing pattern of the patient's 
primary love objects. This implies a misreading, or a distortion, of the present 
in terms of the past. This idea raises a number of questions, however: Are all 
the emotions and wishes directed at the analyst of this transferential nature - 
and consequently 'inappropriate' to the present situation? Or are there 
affective aspects to the therapeutic relationship which are 'appropriate'? If so, 
how is the distinction made, and who is in the position to make this 
distinction? Since the notion of a "wrong connection" implies an idea of what 
the "right connection" looks like, the analyst's judgement that a particular 
behaviour is an expression of transference presupposes that he has access to 
what is 'real' and/or 'appropriate'. How can such a claim be 'grounded'? 
The theory of transference as the substitution of the analyst for the original 
love object has for Freud the further consequence that the patient's emotional 
needs as they arise in the analytic process have to be understood as the 
pursuit of Ersatzbefriedigungen (substitute gratifications), that is, essentially 
as demands for parental love which are now inappropriate and have to be 
"renounced". In Wege der psychoanalytischen Therapie Freud writes: 
Der Kranke sucht vor allem die Ersatzbefriedigung in der Kur selbst im 
Übertragungsverhältnis zum Arzt und kann sogar danach streben, sich auf 
diesem Wege für allen ihm auferlegten Verzicht zu entschädigen. Einiges 
muß man ihm ja wohl gewähren, mehr oder weniger, je nach der Natur des 
Falles und der Eigenart des Kranken. Aber es ist nicht gut, wenn es zuviel 
wird. (1918[1919], p. 245) 
In the transference relation to the physician the patient seeks above all the 
substitute gratification in the treatment itself and he can even strive to make 
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up in this manner for all the sacrifice demanded of him. Some of it one will 
have to grant him, more or less, depending on the nature of the case and the 
particularities of the patient. But it is not good, if it becomes too much. 
After this rather grudging concession Freud goes on to stress that any 
Verwöhnung (indulgence) of the patient can only be counterproductive to the 
aims of the cure; he therefore introduces the analyst's abstinence as a 
technical Grundsatz. This seems to close down any space in Freud's thinking 
that an affective personal relationship between the patient and the analyst had 
any reality and relevance of its own. The analyst seems to exist for the patient 
only transferentially, the patient for the analyst only as a case. There is no 
room for 'love' in Freud's formulation of analysis, except for the love of 
'knowledge'. 
Wege der Psychoanalytischen Therapie, the last essay on technique 
published by Freud, takes up "a new field of analytic technique [which is] still 
in the course of being evolved". Freud's paper was written in part to counter 
Ferenczi's suggestions for an 'active technique'. Freud had pretty much 
stopped writing on questions of technique in the hope that others, especially 
Ferenczi and Rank, would develop this area further. In the event their 
contributions proved to be highly controversial and caused serious rifts in the 
'inner circle' of psychoanalysis. It is primarily to Ferenczi's work, which very 
early on questioned a number of the most fundamental assumptions of 
Freud's psychoanalysis, that I wish to turn now. 
Ferenczi's challenge 
Sandor Ferenczi (1873-1933) was, during the 1910's and 20's, one of Freud's 
closest friends and collaborators (and also his occasional analysand). They 
first met in 1908 and maintained a frequent and intimate correspondence until 
the early 1930's, when their relationship became strained as a result of 
Freud's displeasure with the direction Ferenczi's work had taken. Ferenczi 
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developed, over very many years, an (inter)subjectivist and relational variant 
of psychoanalysis which emphasised affectivity and the active and personal 
participation of the analyst. The opposition that he presented to main-stream 
psychoanalysis was hard enough for Freud to bear; it was too much for many 
prominent members of the movement who, like Ernest Jones (who had been 
in analysis with Ferenczi), concluded that he must have gone mad (Stanton, 
1990). Whilst he was pretty much ostracised at the end of his life and 
subsequently `forgotten', many of his ideas (and recently his name) re- 
emerged and make their impact on contemporary psychoanalytic debate. In 
the following I will trace the development of his alternative theory and practice 
and discuss his contributions in terms of their relevance to my theme of 
positioning and understanding. 
In one of his early writings on psychoanalytic theory, Introjection and 
Transference (1909), Ferenczi explains the phenomenon of transference in 
terms that foreshadow British Object Relations theories. Unsatisfied and 
repressed "sexual hunger" can leave a "free-floating" quantity of excitation 
that is not fully bound in the neurotic symptom and that will seek to find 
gratification from an external object. "The idea of this excitation could be used 
to explain the neurotic passion for transference, and be made responsible for 
the 'manias' of the neurotic" (1909, p. 46). Introjection, here first introduced by 
Ferenczi, plays a central role in this process: 
[... ] the neurotic helps himself by taking into the ego as large as possible a 
part of the outer world, making it the object of unconscious phantasies. This is 
a kind of diluting process, by means of which he tries to mitigate the 
poignancy of free-floating, unsatisfied, and unsatisfiable, unconscious wish- 
impulses. One might give to this process, in contrast to projection, the name 
of introjection. The neurotic is constantly seeking for objects with whom he 
can identify himself, to whom he can transfer feelings, whom he can thus 
draw into his circle of interest, i. e. introject. (ibid. pp. 47-8) 
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Ferenczi's theory implies something which is prior to subjectivity, i. e. 
introjects, which structure how object relations are perceived. Introjection, a 
developmentally very early process, plays a crucial part in the establishment 
of ego-consciousness. 
The first loving and hating is a transference of auto-erotic pleasant and 
unpleasant feelings. The first 'object-love' and the first 'object-hate' are, so to 
speak, the primordial transferences, the roots of every future introjection [... ] 
Probably [... ] besides projection introjection is significant for man's view of the 
world. (ibid. p. 49) 
Introjection thus allows for the "mollification" of free-floating affect. This 
happens to a greater or lesser extent unconsciously (depending on the 
degree of neurosis); and it is transference, the defensive displacement of the 
affect from "certain objects that concern (one) nearly" to other less important 
figures, which is operative in disguising the libidinal aim. This process 
accounts also for the exaggerated feelings of love and admiration that the 
patient can feel for the analyst and which are at the centre of the so-called 
'transference cure'. Ferenczi paraphrases Freud's dictum "that we may treat a 
neurotic any way we like, he always treats himself psychotherapeutically, that 
is to say, with transferences" (ibid. p. 55). Ferenczi denies however that 
transference is altogether pathological; whilst insisting of course that 
transference needs to be made conscious through analysis, he claims quite 
on the contrary that "the ancient belief, which strikes its roots deep in the mind 
of the people, will be confirmed, that diseases are to be cured by 'sympathy"' 
(ibid. p. 57). 
In his discussion of how suggestion and hypnosis (the techniques Freud 
employed in the early years of psychoanalysis) 'work', Ferenczi explains that it 
is the evocation of "parental complexes" that put the patient in the state of 
mind of the obedient child. The neurotic patient, who is seen not so much as a 
special case but rather as an exaggerated 'version' of the normal person, 
brings to light the way the psyche functions: 
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It thus becomes manifest that the child with its desire for love, and the dread 
that goes with this, lives on literally in every human being, and that all later 
loving, hating, and fearing are only transferences, or, as Freud terms them, 
'new editions' of currents of feeling that were acquired in the earliest 
childhood (before the end of the fourth year) and later repressed. (ibid. p. 63) 
Transference is thus taken into account in explaining the patient's capacity to 
be hypnotised, and Ferenczi distinguishes two pathways this process can 
take, "dread and love" (italics in orig. ). The first results from the "imposing 
appearance on the part of the hypnotist" who gives the hypnotic commands 
"with such decision and sureness that contradiction should appear to the 
patient as quite impossible"; the latter relies on "a darkened room, absolute 
stillness, gentle, friendly address in a monotonous, slightly melodic tone [... ], 
light stroking of the hair, forehead, and hands" (ibid. p. 69). Ferenczi ascribes 
these two modes to the father and mother transference respectively, both 
evoking the most powerful feelings of love and fear in the regressed 
hypnotised subject. "The child that is dormant in the unconscious of the adult" 
(an expression Ferenczi ascribes to Freud) is re-awoken in the process. 
Foreshadowed here are some of the criticisms that Ferenczi will later make of 
the distant and aloof style of analysis, criticisms that will lead him to formulate 
and experiment with more 'maternal' forms of practice. 
Ferenczi insists that it is by no means obvious why the child should obey his 
parents and why it should be possible that he experiences this surrender of 
his own will as pleasurable. Ferenczi explains this surrender in terms of 
introjection and identification (two concepts he uses here almost 
synonymously) which are thought to take effect with the beginning of 'object 
love': "The loved objects are introjected, taken into the ego. The child loves 
his parents, that is to say, he identifies himself with them in thought" (ibid. 
p. 77). Introjection/identification are motivated by love and lead to the 
formation of internal objects which form the basis for transferences. Ferenczi 
performs a significant shift in emphasis here from gratification of instinct to 
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affect, especially love. The search for a loving object that can be taken inside 
is related to the process of cure - an idea that considerably changes the 
conceptualisation of the role which the analyst plays in this process. Ferenczi 
ceased to the see the active and personal participation of the analyst as a 
necessarily counterproductive gratification of the patient's instinctual wishes, a 
shift which allowed him to move away from the neutral and abstinent stance of 
the Freudian analyst and to develop what he called aktive Technik. , 
Active technique 
Ferenczi (1919) felt that the purely "passive role" played by the classical 
psychoanalyst was too restrictive and unhelpful in a number of his cases, and 
he began to experiment with more active interventions. The measures which 
he included in his extended repertoire comprised, amongst others, directing 
the focus of the patient's associations, the suggestion of tasks, the injunction 
not to behave in certain defensive ways or to seek secondary gratifications, 
the pressure to make decisions after periods of procrastination, the advice not 
to have sexual intercourse for a period, the suggestion that certain scenarios 
are enacted in the session (e. g. the singing of a song in one case), and the 
imposition of time limits in the 'end game' of the treatment. Ferenczi 
maintained that the patient needed to "presently experience" (aktuell erleben) 
the behaviour in question together with the accompanying emotions. He 
hoped that the affective intensity thus produced would facilitate the process of 
free association. "In promoting what is inhibited and inhibiting what is 
uninhibited we hope for a redistribution of the psychical, primarily libidinal, 
energies of the patient thus facilitating the bringing to light of repressed 
material" (1921, p. 89). The material triggered by the use of active technique 
was subsequently subjected to the classical procedure of analysis, 
interpretation. 
Ferenczi was aware how controversial his technical propositions were, and he 
stressed again and again that none of his techniques was in itself designed to 
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bring about the desired change, but was only Mittel zum Zweck, means to the 
end of analytic insight. "Active technique plays only the role of agent 
provocateur, its demands and prohibitions foster the occurrence of repetitions 
which are then to be interpreted, respectively reconstructed as memories" 
(ibid. p. 91). However, Ferenczi's stress on present subjective experience, its 
augmentation through the repetition of behaviour and the focus on emotions 
did imply a criticism of an "overly intellectual" practice of psychoanalysis 
relying almost exclusively on interpretation and reconstruction. 
These points were further elaborated in Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse 
(1924) which Ferenczi had co-written with Otto Rank. 9 The book reviews the 
main strands of the development of psychoanalytic technique and offers an 
'up-to-date' formulation of clinical practice focussing centrally on the analysis 
of the ego, transference, patient experience and the more active role of the 
analyst. Taking their departure from Freud's Remembering, Repeating and 
Working Through (1914) the authors stress that, precisely because what 
needs remembering is unconscious and hence not available to recall, 
there is no other way open to the patient than that of repeating, as well as no 
other means for the analyst to seize the essential unconscious material. It is 
now a question of understanding also this form of communication, the so- 
called language of gesture, as Ferenczi has called it, and of explaining it to 
the patient. (ibid. pp. 3-4) 
The re-living of infantile material is to play "the chief role in analytic technique" 
with the repeated material only gradually being made conscious in actual 
memory, the process to which Freud gave precedence. The relived and 
repeated material is to be interpreted in relation to the "analytic situation". 
Thus emphasis is placed on understanding the repetitions it manifests in the 
This work was originally written as an entry to a competition of writings on psychoanalytic 
technique, for which Freud had donated a prize. Freud himself did not plan to write further on 
the subject of technique after his Wege der Psycho-analytischen Therapie (1919[1918]), but 
hoped that others, chiefly Ferenczi and Rank, would carry on this task. Ferenczi and Rank in 
the end decided not to submit this book for the competition since they felt that the question of 
technique was too vast and complex to be dealt with in a single work. 
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session, rather than trying to block the patient's behaviour and asking the 
impossible of him, i. e. remembering the repressed. This is not an injunction to 
simply enact the material but a call for "a gradual transformation of the 
reproduced material into actual remembering (first permitting reproduction and 
then explaining it)" (ibid. p. 4, italics in orig. ). This emphasis on reproduction is 
however tantamount to a demand for an increase in "activity". The language 
of the gesture has to be allowed to be 'spoken' and `heard', before it can be 
transformed, i. e. translated into a memory which can be verbalised. 
Established technical procedures are criticised for the way in which 
"knowledge" is used in the analytic process. The authors denounce the 
"phenomenalistic" route of a purely descriptive analysis ("a contradiction in 
terms"), which uses only listening or description in the hope that a mere 
"talking out" would prove curative. At the same time they reject any notion of a 
direct, dictionary-type translation of the presented material, stressing that any 
so-called translation always requires an interpretation of the text. Correct 
interpretation can only be achieved on the basis of an understanding of the 
whole picture, i. e. an appreciation of the total personality rather than just of 
the symptom - and only "a series of converging experiences can place us in 
the position" required for such an understanding (ibid. pp. 30-1). The authors 
obviously had an awareness of the hermeneutic circularity of understanding. 
"Too much knowledge" can get in the way of such an understanding and lead 
to great technical difficulties; for instance, an overemphasis on the theory of 
psychosexual development can lead to a tendency to want to lay bare all the 
stages of this process, perhaps guided by the view that only this kind of 
completeness constitutes a 'full analysis'. "In thus searching for the 
constructive elements of the theory of sex, in some cases, the actual analytic 
task was neglected" (ibid. p. 34). Similar problems were encountered when, on 
the strength of only little clinical data, the analyst attempted premature 
speculative syntheses of the material, perhaps in the hope of finding 
confirmation of existing theories. 
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Any attempts at 'reconstructing' the patient's history through interpretation 
alone is similarly misguided; the mere communication by the analyst of that 
which is repressed does not have a therapeutic effect; "[... ] such information 
glides off from the patients without any effect. They can only convince 
themselves of the reality of the unconscious when they have experienced - 
mostly indeed after they have frequently experienced - something analogous 
to it in the actual analytic situation, that is, in the present" (ibid. p. 37). Hence, 
only through the attention to and elucidation of the actual experience of the 
repeated, re-enacted material in the present of the session can information 
lead to insight which is therapeutically valuable. Without experience no 
conviction, without conviction no cure. 
There are limits to how much the patient needs to know. It is not any longer 
the aim of the analysis to fill all the gaps in his memory. The only problem the 
analyst has to concern himself with is the patient's wish not to know, i. e. with 
his resistance. The authors agree with Freud's shift in technique which gives 
centrality to the patient's resistance. Only resistance is analysed and removed 
over time; the important gaps will be filled automatically, restoring the memory 
of everything the patient needs to know to get better. The stress now laid on 
the actual present experience of the patient limits the role knowledge plays in 
the analytic hour. 
Whereas formerly one tried to obtain the therapeutic result as a reaction to 
the enlightenment of the patient, we now try to place the knowledge obtained 
by psychoanalysis directly in the service of our therapy, by directly provoking 
the corresponding personal experience on the basis of our insight, and 
explaining to the patient only this experience, which is naturally directly 
evident to him also (ibid. p. 56). 
The core of this 'knowledge' is "the conviction of the universal importance of 
certain fundamental early experiences - as for example the Oedipus conflict". 
This re-formulated analytic technique is akin to an educational process, 
"because - like education itself - it consists, on account of the affective relation 
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to the teacher, far more in experience than in the factor of enlightenment" 
(ibid. ). Thus the authors stress the point that, whilst there cannot be too much 
knowledge in terms of the development of psychoanalytic theory, an excess of 
knowledge brought into the consulting room can impede the analytic process. 
Insight derived from analysis of the actual experience of the patient as it 
unfolds in the affective relation to the analyst ought to be the paramount 
concern, not insight as the result of the transmission of knowledge. 
The retreat of the analyst into an impersonal relationship with his patients is 
felt to run counter to the emphasis on the present subjective experience of the 
patient, which occurs after all always within the present relationship. "The 
theoretic requirement of avoiding all personal contact outside of the analysis 
mostly led to an unnatural elimination of all human factors in the analysis, and 
thus again to a theorizing of the analytic experience" (ibid. p. 40-1). The 
revision of technique suggested here pretty much rejects the stance of the 
neutral and abstinent analyst, which far from being accepted as ideal is recast 
as an insufficiency of technique. This appears to be a rather direct criticism of 
the injunctions Freud placed upon the analyst in his technical writings. 
Freud appears to have responded rather ambiguously to these 
recommendations, which amount after all to a radical reformulation of the 
technique he promoted in the 1910's. He had seen the text before publication 
and had given "valuable advice" to its authors. Freud seemed to accept the 
recommendations, although he expressed some unhappiness about the 
stress on experience. "... 'experience' is used like a catchword, its resolution 
not stressed enough", he writes to Ferenczi on 4 Feb. 1924. On 1 June he 
writes, "It's discovery is magnificent" (quoted in Stanton 1990 p. 35). Freud 
saw a clear juxtaposition between two types of technique, focussing on insight 
and experience respectively. In a letter dated 15 Feb. 1924 he writes about 
the different aims of "old" and "new" techniques; he advises equanimity in this 
debate and suggests the benefits of the new technique should be reviewed in 
a number of years. Whilst acknowledging the new development he writes, 
"Ferenczi's 'active therapy' is a dangerous temptation for beginners", and 
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adds, "Personally, I shall continue with 'classical' analysis" (letter to 
Committee, quoted in Haynal and Falzeder, 1993, p. 606). Haynal and 
Falzeder, who discuss the divergence between Freud and Ferenczi, suggest 
that 
behind this discussion also lies the problem of 'insight [Einsicht] in opposition 
to empathy [Einfühlung]. Does the analyst understand the patient's conflicts 
only with his rational thinking, as the emerging ego-psychology would have it, 
or is he, as Ferenczi thought very early, making introjections in identifying 
himself with aspects of the transference? (ibid. p. 612) 
In his 1926 Kontraindikationen der aktiven Psychoanalytischen Technik 
Ferenczi offers amendments to his technical suggestions in a move which 
seems motivated partly by the criticism he received from his colleagues and 
partly by disappointments he experienced in their clinical application. He 
reports how an overly active technique tends to increase patient resistance to 
the detriment of the analytic work especially in the earlier phases of the 
treatment, re-emphasises the need for a thorough training analysis, and 
warns beginners not to stray from the well-trodden path of the "classical 
method". Active intervention is now suggested as a last measure for 
experienced analysts, who will employ it - "gestützt auf ihr Wissen" 
("supported by their knowledge"; italics in original) - when, after the thorough 
application of more classical technique, "the patient for his conviction only still 
lacks the colour of actual experience" ("wenn zur Überzeugung des Patienten 
etwa nur noch das aktuelle Erlebniskolorit fehlt" [1926, p. 184]). 
Ferenczi stopped the use of demands and prohibitions, and 'activity' is now 
seen as the prerogative of the patient, which the analyst, within certain limits, 
allows or at times encourages. On the part of the analyst he recommends 
elasticity (elastische Nachgiebigkeit), which he contrasts with 
counterproductive rigidity (starre Konsequenz). The analyst's `activity' is 
restricted to interpretation or the occasional directive. Having clarified and to 
some extent retracted his earlier technical suggestions Ferenczi then 
proceeds to introduce a new type of active intervention: the advice to use 
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relaxation exercises, again in the service of the reduction of inhibitions and 
resistances so that the stream of associations is enhanced. Towards the end 
of this essay Ferenczi again defends the active intervention mode, arguing 
once more that only the emotional component of the actual experience has 
the power to convince the patient to an extent that insight can have a 
therapeutic effect. Ferenczi follows up this proposition with the following 
intriguing argument, in a passage which makes a rather audacious appeal to 
the audience of his lecture: 
Das letzte und logisch unumstößliche Wort der reinen Intellektualität des Ichs 
über das Verhältnis zu anderen Gegenständen ist der Solipsismus, der die 
Realität anderer menschlicher Lebewesen und der ganzen Außenwelt mit den 
eigenen Erfahrungen niemals gleichsetzen kann und sie nur als mehr oder 
minder lebhafte Phantome oder Projektionen anspricht. Wenn also Freud 
dem Unbewußten dieselbe psychische Natur zuschrieb, die man als Qualität 
des eigenen Ichs spürt, so tat er einen logisch nur wahrscheinlichen, aber nie 
beweisbaren Schritt in der Richtung des Positivismus. Ich stehe nicht an, 
diese Identifizierung den Identifizierungen, die wir als Vorbedingung 
libidinöser Übertragungen kennen, gleichzusetzen. Sie führt letzten Endes zu 
einer Art Personifizierung oder animistischen Auffassung der ganzen Umwelt. 
All dies ist vom logisch-intellektuellen Standpunkt gesehen 'transzendent'. Wir 
aber sollten dieses mystisch klingende Wort durch den Ausdruck 
'Übertragung' oder'Liebe' ersetzen und mutig behaupten, daß die Kenntnisse 
eines Teiles der Wirklichkeit nicht intellektuell, sondern nur erlebnismäßig als 
Überzeugung zu haben ist [... ] Ich persönlich fühle mich ganz zum 
Freudschen Positivismus bekehrt und ziehe vor, in Ihnen, die Sie da vor mir 
sitzen und mir zuhören, nicht Vorstellungen meines Ichs, sondern reale 
Wesen zu sehen, mit denen ich mich identifizieren kann. Logisch begründen 
kann ich Ihnen das nicht, wenn ich also trotzdem davon überzeugt bin, 
verdanke ich es nur einem emotionellen Moment - wenn Sie wollen, der 
Übertragung. (ibid. pp. 192-3) 
The last and logically irrefutable word of the pure intellect of the ego on the 
relationship to other things is solipsism, which can never equate the reality of 
other human beings and the whole external world with one's own experiences 
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and which can relate to them only as more or less lively phantoms or 
projections. Thus when Freud ascribed to the unconscious the same psychic 
nature, which one senses as the quality of one's own ego, he took a logically 
only probable, but never provable step in the direction of positivism. I do not 
hesitate to equate this identification with the identifications which we know as 
the precondition of libidinal transference. Ultimately it leads to a kind of 
personification or animistic conception of the whole external world. Seen from 
the logical-intellectual viewpoint all of this is 'transcendent'. But we should 
replace this mystic sounding word with the term 'transference' or'love' and we 
should state courageously that knowledge of part of reality, maybe of the 
most important part, is not intellectually, but only experientially available as 
persuasion [... ] I personally feel entirely converted to Freudian positivism and 
I prefer to see you, who are seated in front of me and listen to me, not as 
ideas of my ego but as real beings with whom I can identify. I cannot logically 
prove this to you, hence if I am still persuaded by this I owe it to the emotional 
aspect - if you like, to the transference. 
Ferenczi tells his audience here that the intellect cannot reach the world at all. 
The conviction of the reality of the other person, and indeed of the outside 
world - surely a conditio sine qua non for any knowledge we may gain of the 
other - can come about only via an actual affective experience, which is based 
on identification. Identification itself is a form of transference - or love. 
Knowledge is credible only as experienced knowledge, with the sense of 
conviction resting on emotion rather than logic. Thus Kenntnis and Liebe are 
tied together in this concept of identification. Identification appears here as our 
only reliable contact with external reality. The rhetorical manoeuvre Ferenczi 
performs here seems as crafty as audacious. By purporting to embrace what 
he terms Freud's "positivism", and using his concept of transference as the 
central link, he tries to get his audience to accept a proposition which, one 
would feel, must be anathema to Freud - the idea that all knowledge worthy 
of the name is based on an emotional experience. Science is lovel 
In Die Elastizität der psychoanalytischen Technik (1928), where Ferenczi 
returns to the question of what roles the cognitive and affective functions of 
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the analyst play in clinical practice, he again seems to retreat from this more 
extreme subjective and affective position. Empathy, which is here equated 
with tact, is described as guiding the technical decisions regarding the timing, 
content and tone of interventions. The actual content of the intervention is 
arrived at "with the help of our knowledge" gained from, primarily, self- 
analysis and clinical experience. Ferenczi thus stresses here the cognitive 
aspect of understanding, and leaves to empathy the task of finding the most 
sensitive, and ultimately most fruitful, way of communicating this insight to the 
patient. He recognizes that the patient thus treated will receive the impression 
of Güte (goodness, kindness, care), and adds, perhaps in an attempt to pre- 
empt criticism regarding the motives of this kindness, "even if the motives for 
this sensitivity stem purely from the intellectual side of the analyst". The 
impression of Ferenczi's nervousness in promoting anything like Güte, which 
is here the interpersonal effect of empathy, is only reinforced by the following 
re-assurance: 
I hasten to add here immediately that the capacity for this kind of 'kindness' 
means only one side of the analytic understanding. Before the physician 
decides to make a verbal intervention he must temporarily withdraw his libido 
from the patient and weigh the situation coolly, he must under no 
circumstances be guided by his feelings alone. (1928, p. 240) 
This is an interesting disclaimer, which, whilst reasserting the official version 
of a much more intellectual process, in fact seems to increase the claims 
made on behalf of empathy. Empathy does play a role in the analytic 
understanding, if only one amongst others. It is a libidinal process and an 
emotional one. There is a danger of getting carried away by this `warmer 
intersubjective understanding, therefore it needs checking through distancing 
and cooling by intellectual consideration. Ferenczi then speaks of the 
"demands of the 'rule of empathy"', using inverted commas as in the first 
introduction of a new term, and contradistinguishes this new and humbler 
style from the lofty attitude of the omniscient and omnipotent doctor (ibid. 
p. 244). 
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The elasticity of the analytic attitude which Ferenczi promotes involves a 
"constant oscillation between empathy, self-observation and judgements" 
(ibid. p. 245). The analyst's "cathexes swing between identification (analytic 
object love) on the one hand and self-control or intellectual activity on the 
other" (ibid. p. 248). The psychictemotional closeness (indeed oneness) and 
the distance the analyst needs when thinking about the patient's material in 
terms of theory and clinical experience are both essential parts of the 
analyst's mental process. Ferenczi's empathy is moving very close to being 
equated with love, here of course in the most sublimated form of analytic 
object love. Love and knowledge are the two poles between which the analyst 
swings. `Swinging' refers to an oscillation in the analyst's mental-emotional 
position vis-ä-vis his patient, a movement that Ferenczi makes central to the 
process of clinical understanding. 10 
During the last years of his life Ferenczi grew more and more critical of the 
intellectual and pedagogic approach of "one-sided ego analysis" (1930, 
p. 261), and he confesses he had felt forced to break more and more of the 
technical rules advocated by Freud. He suggests a "principle of permission" 
(Prinzip der Gewährung) according to which relaxation and a friendly caring 
attitude are employed to help overcome the patient's resistance. Whilst still 
professing to underwrite the "restrained observation position of the analyst" as 
the "most reliable, and in the beginning of the treatment the only justified" 
position, his critical comments on the overly strict and denying attitude of 
many analysts are becoming more frequent and more pronounced. The 
restrained and cool objective stance of the analyst can be counterproductive 
not only in that it makes it harder for the patient to trust the analyst and to give 
up his defences, it can also be outright harmful when it repeats in the analytic 
10 The two poles of 'empathy' and 'theory' foreshadow important aspects of Kohut's self. 
psychology (discussed in chapter 3). The idea of swinging between poles in the process of 
interpersonal understanding is also used by Buber, although Buber swings, as we will see in 
chapter 4, between different positions. I will return to this cluster of ideas more extensively in 
the final chapter. 
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relationship the original trauma that brought the patient to therapy in the first 
place. 
Ferenczi here re-introduces real trauma, i. e. actual failure in the parental/care- 
taking environment, as the cause of psychopathology - thus reversing Freud's 
turnaround of 1897.11 Not single traumatic events but repeated traumata 
which are inflicted on the child by an adult, mostly in the form of confused 
over-stimulation which exceeds the child's capacity to cope, lead to a splitting 
of the child's personality. It is precisely because pathology is seen as arising 
from problematic interactions between the child and adults that it becomes 
paramount that this trauma is not repeated in therapy. The acknowledgement 
of actual, rather than fantasised trauma, leads Ferenczi to formulate an 
opposition to Freud's technique of Versagung (frustration) and to give 
empathy an important role in the cure. It is wrong to frustrate the patient's 
need to be empathically (and this means increasingly: lovingly) understood. 
This new, kinder attitude is thought to have a reparative function. The patient 
is helped by this attitude to delve into the traumatic past under more 
favourable conditions and to give split off parts of the personality a chance to 
catch up with psychic growth. Ferenczi explicitly moves the analytic stance 
much closer to the maternal paradigm: "One proceeds like a tender mother" 
("Man verfährt also etwa wie eine zärtliche Mutter... " [1931, p. 284]) - at least 
for a period of deep regression which prepares the patient for the inevitable 
Versagung. The binary mother-child relationship is emphasised over and 
above the triangular Oedipal constellation which is central in Freud. The 
analyst as mother displaces the dominance of the father, and the need for 
love eclipses the need for knowledge. 
Ferenczi's increasingly radical opposition to Freud's formulation of 
psychoanalysis eventually take their toll on the friendship of the two men. 
11 In 1896 Freud had advanced the theory that hysterical symptoms were caused by 
unconscious memories of actual sexual seductions in childhood. By the turn of the century he 
repudiated the seduction theory and replaced it with the idea that hysterical symptoms were 
caused by repressed infantile sexual fantasies. The details of this shift are discussed by, 
among others, Smith (1991). 
64 
Freud not only openly criticises Ferenczi but suggests furthermore that 
Ferenczi's deviations are due to an illness. Understandably, Ferenczi is 
injured by this. The crisis came to a head in 1932 when Ferenczi presents 
Sprachverwirrung zwischen den Erwachsenen und dem Kind (1933), a paper 
which Freud had read and asked him not to publish. In it Ferenczi re-opened 
the theory of child sexual abuse as a major source of psychopathology, a 
theory which Freud had dismissed over 30 years ago. In the light of this 
alternative aetiology the established `classical' technique was made to look 
downright cruel: 
Die analytische Situation: die reservierte Kühle, die berufliche Hypokrisie und 
die dahinter versteckte Antipathie gegen den Patienten, die dieser in allen 
Gliedern fühlte, war nicht wesentlich verschieden von jener Sachlage, die 
seinerzeit - ich meine in der Kindheit - krankmachend wirkte. Indem wir bei 
diesem Stande der analytischen Situation dem Patienten auch noch die 
Traumareproduktion nahelegten, schufen wir eine unerträgliche Sachlage; 
kein Wunder, daß sie nicht andere und bessere Folgen haben konnte als das 
Urtrauma selbst. Die Freimachung der Kritik, die Fähigkeit, eigene Fehler 
einzusehen und zu unterlassen, bringt uns aber das Vertrauen der Patienten. 
Dieses Vertauen ist jenes gewisse Etwas, das den Kontrast zwischen der 
Gegenwart und der unleidlichen, traumatogenen Vergangenheit statuiert, den 
Kontrast also, der unerläßlich ist, damit man die Vergangenheit nicht als 
halluzinatorische Reproduktion, sondern als objektive Erinnerung aufleben 
lassen kann. (1933, p. 306) 
The analytic situation: the reserved coolness, the professional hypocrisy, and 
the hidden antipathy against the patient, which he feels in every bone, was 
not essentially different from the state of affairs which originally -I mean in 
childhood - caused the illness. Given this state of the analytic situation our 
requirement of the patient to reproduce the trauma created an unbearable 
condition; no wonder it did not have other and better effects than the original 
trauma. In contrast, the freeing of critique, the capacity to acknowledge and 
avoid our own mistakes earns us the trust of the patients. This trust is the 
certain something which constitutes the difference between the present and 
the unbearable traumatogenic past, i. e. the difference which is indispensable 
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in order to revive the past not as a hallucinatory reproduction, but as an 
objective memory. 
The rift with Freud precipitated by this devastating critique seemed to 
contribute to Ferenczi's preparedness in the last year of his working life to 
abandon all compromises and restraints in his challenges to classical 
psychoanalysis. The force of his convictions compelled him to experiment with 
unprecedented forms of participation in his patients' process and to record his 
thoughts and analytic experience in the Clinical Diary which he kept from 
January to October 1932. Here, in full opposition to the cool and purely 
intellectual attitude towards the patients' suffering, Ferenczi sets out 
to take really seriously the role one assumes, of the benevolent and helpful 
observer, that is, actually to transport oneself with the patient into that period 
of the past (a practice Freud reproached me for, as being not permissible), 
with the result that we ourselves and the patient believe in its reality, that is a 
present reality, which has not been momentarily transposed into the past 
(1988 [1932], p. 24). 
A joint regression into the traumatic past is risked in the hope that this will 
yield the patient's belief both in the reality of the original traumatic situation 
and the personal commitment of the analyst to the patient. This approach is 
now seen as the inevitable consequence of his idea of the analytic experience 
with its emphasis on the patient's conviction. 
In another case, in spite of months of repetition of the trauma, there is no 
conviction. The patient says, very pessimistically: It will never be possible for 
the doctor really to feel the events I am going through. Thus he cannot 
participate in experiencing the 'psycho-physical' intellectual motivation. I reply: 
Except if I sink down with her into her unconscious, namely with the help of 
my own traumatic complexes. The patient appreciates this, but has legitimate 
doubts about such a mystical procedure. (ibid. p. 38) 
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The patient's conviction is linked to the analyst's feelings, that is, his 
readiness to immerse himself in radical empathic identification with the 
patient's suffering. In the absence of his participation in the actual experience, 
which includes the physical aspect, there is no hope for progress. Ferenczi 
believed that the analytic cure depended on his deep identification with the 
patient's unconscious -a process which involved his delving into his own 
traumatised unconscious. Analysis had to become, in certain cases of 
particularly traumatised patients, "mutual analysis", where the analyst 
abandons his stance of professional authority and enters into a completely 
unreserved exchange with his patient. 
Certain phases of mutual analysis represent the complete renunciation of all 
compulsion and of all authority on both sides: they give the impression of two 
equally terrified children who compare their experiences, and because of their 
common destiny understand each other completely and instinctively try to 
comfort each other. Awareness of this shared destiny allows the partner to 
appear as completely harmless, therefore as someone whom one can trust 
with confidence. (ibid. p. 56; entry dated 13 March 1932; italics added). 
Complete understanding requires complete participation; it has nothing to do 
with bringing prior knowledge to a case. In the experimental phase of the 
Clinical Diaries Ferenczi entered into this participation with almost breath- 
taking honesty and seemingly no reserve. The 'technical procedures' included 
not only the acknowledgement of any mistakes and present feelings towards 
the patient, but also the sharing of aspects of his own neurosis. At times, 
when both analyst and analysand felt this necessary, their roles would 
reverse, and the unconscious of the analyst came under scrutiny. The 
tenderness that might be felt in the course of this intimate process was 
occasionally expressed not only in words. Ferenczi felt that patients who had 
been badly sexually abused needed to be physically held when in deep 
regression. Radical participation indeed. What Freud rather disparagingly 
called Ferenczi's "furor sanandi" certainly compelled him to engage in 
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extreme forms of experimentation. Some of his colleagues concluded that he 
had gone mad. 
Objectivity vs. subjectivity? 
The juxtaposition of Freud and Ferenczi certainly opens up the possibility of 
lining up a whole number of opposing notions in the way I did in the beginning 
of this chapter (i. e. objectivist vs. subjectivist stances, cognition vs. affect, 
representation vs. imagination, neutrality of observation vs. participation in the 
observed, the detached observer-analyst vs. the interpersonally engaged 
therapist). Freud's favourite metaphors - the therapist as the disinterested 
surgeon, psychoanalysis as archaeology etc. - show that he was clearly 
enthralled by the vision of the analyst as scientist. Clinical understanding for 
him was gaining knowledge of a hidden reality. Consequently he formulated 
the stance of the analyst in ways which allowed him to do analysis as 
reconstruction of a buried past. Subjectivist and interpersonal notions, as e. g. 
empathy, played only a supporting role in his formulations of analysis. The 
interpersonal/intersubjective dimension assumes much more importance for 
Ferenczi. The patient's Erlebnis in the analytic process and, later, the 
analyst's participation in the patient's subjectivity are crucial not only in terms 
of clinical understanding, but for the curative process itself. The notion of the 
scientist-analyst was anathema to the (literally) com-passionate analyst 
promoted by the later Ferenczi. 
Whilst this juxtaposition has a certain dramatic appeal - and the opposition of 
the key notions involved may also appeal to common sense - it is 
questionable whether they really do justice to the much more complex and 
multiple positions both Freud and Ferenczi took up at various points in their 
work. Furthermore, to the extent that the two writers can indeed be shown to 
take up these opposing positions the question remains just how adequate 
these polarised concepts are if one wants to get to grips with the problem of 
clinical understanding. 
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In terms of the subsequent development of psychoanalysis there can be no 
question that Freud's vision carried the day. Ferenczi's 'aberrations' were 
judged to have led him into a cul-de-sac, and his work was for a long time 
pretty much 'forgotten' (with the exception of a few analysts, notably Balint 
who further developed some of his ideas). Many of Ferenczi's thoughts - 
about early relational trauma, the need for an emotionally participatory stance 
of the analyst, the stress on countertransference, patient gratification, 
therapist self-disclosure, "regression to dependency", the curative aspects of 
the therapeutic relationship, etc. - re-emerged when further variants of 
psychoanalysis, especially those developed within the Kleinian and Object 
Relations approaches, were developed. Ferenczi can therefore, with much 
hindsight, be credited with having had a significant influence on the 
development of the clinical practice of psychoanalysis. His weakness was the 
insufficient theorisation of many of the key ideas he introduced, including the 
role of empathy. This work was taken up by some of the analytic writers to 
whom I will now turn. 
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Chapter 2 
Internalisation, Translation, Observation 
Some psychoanalytic formulations of clinical understanding after Freud 
Introduction 
In this chapter I intend to present some of the ways in which the problem of 
clinical understanding was treated by psychoanalytic authors writing in the 
wake of Freud. I will focus on contributions mainly from the 1940's and 
1950's, made by theorists who have not played a major role in mainstream 
British psychoanalysis. Some of the authors who had considerably more 
influence on contemporary psychoanalytic practice will be considered in the 
following chapter. 
Keeping in mind the concept of empathy as one of the red threads running 
through this thesis I want to show some of the diverse directions that clinical 
thinking took after Freud. The authors presented here are Reik, Fliess, 
Loewenstein and Sullivan, all of whom are psychoanalysts. Whilst the first 
three are clearly committed to Freud's legacy, Sullivan departed in important 
respects from his premises. Both Reik and Fliess, in different ways, develop 
concepts of clinical understanding which rely primarily on forms of 
internalisation. Loewenstein picks up the idea that there is a series of signs 
which can be traced back to the unconscious mind and elaborates a 
formulation of clinical knowledge in which the translation of different types of 
languages plays an important role. Sullivan, whose ideas of personality 
development and psychopathology fundamentally differ from Freud's drive 
based model of the mind, places clinical understanding firmly into the 
interpersonal field. The therapist, in his theory, is a participant-observer who 
seeks to gain understanding of his patient through the investigation of his 
interpersonal behaviour and his idiosyncratic language usage. 
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For all theorists presented here the scientific status of their work is an 
important issue. The adherence to the idea that science affords objective 
knowledge of an external reality poses a variety of problems since the 
understanding of the patient comes about in ways which involve, in different 
forms and to different degrees, interpersonal or intersubjective dimensions. 
Reik: The communication of the instincts 
Theodor Reik's work focuses centrally on listening to the patient and 
understanding his unconscious mental content. For Reik analytic 
understanding is a communicative process and he suggested that the 
affective signals emanating from within the analyst's own mind constitute a 
vital source of information for the comprehension of the patient. It is therefore 
of greatest importance that the analyst pay close attention to his own mental 
processes. 
In Der überraschte Psychologe (1935; Engl. transl. Surprise and the 
Psychoanalyst, 1937) Reik addresses the question how it becomes possible 
for the analyst to understand the unconscious processes of his patients. He 
distinguishes two processes, erraten and verstehen (conjecture and 
comprehension); broadly speaking, the former dominates the earlier, the latter 
the later phase of the analytic process. The analyst's first task is to open his 
mind, and his senses, to the patient's conscious and unconscious, verbal and 
non-verbal communications. He is to proceed like a detective whose first 
concern has to be to secure and collect the traces of a crime, taking 
everything into account, including his own hunches and seemingly irrational 
and irrelevant ideas. Whilst it is taken for granted that, at this stage, any 
conjectures are highly provisional and have to be treated as uncertain, the 
analyst should suspend his mental censorship and, by and large, follow a 
similar 'ground rule' as the patient, i. e. he should ask himself "what comes to 
mind? ". Only in the second phase of 'comprehension' are the individual facts, 
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thoughts, associations, the separate insights and mental links drawn together 
to a form of "logical conclusion", which subjects all previously collected 
material to a severe critique, and which itself has to withstand serious 
questioning. This is where rationality takes up its dominant position, and 
where psychoanalysis as a method ceases to be distinct from other sciences. 
One might ask at this point in what sense this procedure differs from 
procedures used in other sciences. In Reik's view, it is primarily the 
suggestion that the unconscious of the analyst supplies the main instrument 
for the perception of the state of the patient's unconscious which does not sit 
well with established conceptions of science. 
Reik links his ideas of understanding to a phylogenetic theory. He proposes 
that this purely intellectual process has its origins in a primitive bodily impulse, 
i. e. to possess the other thing in a very concrete, corporal way. Many of the 
words used to designate this mental process still betray its original meaning 
(to understand, to grasp, to comprehend in English, begreifen, erfassen in 
German, comprendre in French, capire in Italian etc. ). The most primitive and 
raw form of taking possession is incorporation, that is, literally to eat and thus 
getting to know what is most worth knowing about the object: how it tastes, 
and how it feels to have the object inside one's own body. The sublimated 
hunger for knowledge which drives the psychoanalytic inquiry (as any form of 
scientific project) has as its instinctual base just this urge to possess and 
devour. 
The psychological understanding of the other is a special case of this 
sublimated process of usurpation and incorporation. It is, as it were, 
psychological cannibalism. The other is taken into the ego, becomes 
transiently a piece of the ego. Thus, in the process of psychological 
understanding the human desire for power asserts itself not only in its most 
refined and sublimated, but unconsciously also in its rawest forms. (1935, 
pp. 189-90, my transl. ) 
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The culturally dominant form of the mental introjection of objects via 
understanding shares with primitive incorporation the characteristic that it 
results in a change of the subject's ego; "the ego itself becomes transiently 
the object; it transforms itself into the object" (ibid. p. 190). 
Reik believes that the concept of empathy has very little to contribute to the 
solution of the problem of understanding of unconscious mental processes. 
'Empathy' seems to promise a relatively easy route to understanding the 
other, a proposition which Reik imagines can apply only to the most 
superficial conscious or preconscious layers of the mind. In contrast he 
suggests the following formulation: 
(Die] Zusammenwirkung und Gegenwirkung der Worte, 
Ausdrucksbewegungen und unbewußten Signale, welche auf die Existenz 
bestimmter verborgener Triebregungen und Vorstellungen hinweisen, werden 
im analytischen Beobachter keineswegs zuerst das psychologische 
Verstehen erwecken. Ihre primäre Wirkung wird vielmehr die sein, daß sie in 
ihm unbewußt dieselben oder gleichgerichtete Triebregungen und 
Vorstellungen wachrufen. Die unbewußte Aufnahme jener Zeichen wird 
zuerst nicht ihre Deutung, sondern die Induktion der ihnen 
zugrundeliegenden, verborgenen Impulse und Affektinhalte zur Folge haben. 
(ibid. p. 194, italics orig. ). 
The co-relation and counter-relation of the words, expressive movements and 
unconscious signals, which point to the existence of certain hidden instinctual 
tendencies and ideas, will by no means initially evoke the psychological 
understanding of the analytic observer. Rather, their primary effect will be to 
awake in him unconsciously instinctual tendencies and ideas which are the 
same or have the same direction. The unconscious reception of those signs 
will result, first of all, not in their interpretation, but in the induction of their 
underlying, hidden impulses and affective contents. 
What is induced in the analyst is not so much the mental content, i. e. the 
unconscious thoughts, but the unconscious impulses themselves (Reik uses 
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variedly the German terms unbewußte Impulse, Antriebe, Neigungen, 
Triebregungen). Reik's emphasis on the biologically based, and in this sense 
more `material' side of mental processes leads him to reject the use of the 
more subjectivist terms identification and empathy. For him, it is not a case of 
'feeling oneself into' the experience of the other but of feeling unconsciously 
the same as the other. The resonance is not with other experience; "the 
resonance arises rather out of the unconscious remembering and re- 
evocation of one's own experience" (ibid. p. 196). 
Understanding is based on a two-step process involving an unconscious 
instinctual identification followed by conscious reflective dis-identification. 
"The psychological prerequisite of analytical conjecture of repressed 
tendencies is a [... ] momentary unconscious ego transformation as well as the 
subsequent re-transformation and the capacity to see this earlier transformed 
ego objectively and in the other" (ibid. p. 197). Whilst Reik concedes that we 
are here "in the vicinity of empathy theory" he insists there is an important 
difference; he talks about "the capacity to share in the experience of others, 
not like our own, but as our own" (ibid. ). The core of this process is not 
identification through imitation, but rather a temporary transformation of the 
ego evoked by the unconscious communication of the other, which leads to 
the momentary realisation of different hidden "ego possibilities" on the part of 
the subject. This is a process that Reik believes was much more prevalent in 
the phylogenetic beginnings of the formation of consciousness and culture; it 
is still in operation though in child play. The greater fluidity of ego 
identifications permits the child possibilities of understanding through 
participation which get closed down as a result of increased repression. The 
decrease in immediate understanding through non-repressed instinctual 
participation is the price we pay for sublimation and cultural development. 
The psychical possibilities in the ego of the observer are actualised for an 
instance by the process of induction of the unconscious impulses. In other 
words: the repressed contained in the expressions of the other turned into 
reality for one moment a latent ego possibility in the observer. This image of 
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the ego which became psychical reality is projected into the external world 
and, perceived as object. [... ] Thus comprehension is preceded by a 
reproduction of what goes on in the other person's mind, an unconscious 
resonance seized upon by endopsychic perception. The observation of 
another is here diverted into observation of the ego, or rather to the 
observation of a part of the ego, transformed by taking some object into itself. 
(ibid. p. 199) 
This concept of reproduction differs not only from empathy as the 
reproduction of the other's subjectivity but also from Freud's own formulation. 
Freud's telephone metaphor, for instance, suggests that he thought that the 
analyst's mind could perceive the unconscious thoughts of the patient. Since 
thoughts themselves are viewed by Freud as representations of instinctual 
wishes, what is reproduced in the analyst's mind are previous 
representations. Reik, in contrast, suggests that the instinctual wishes and 
affects connected to these wishes can be reproduced directly in the 
unconscious mind of the analyst. 
The understanding of the patient becomes possible only "by the roundabout 
way of inner perception" (ibid. p. 199); it proceeds via the analyst's observation 
of his own affective state as it has changed as the result of this "temporary 
introjection". This formulation of clinical understanding with its emphasis on 
the observation of the analyst's own subjectivity is, as I will elaborate in the 
following chapter, an early formulation of countertransference theory (without 
using this term). 
In Listening with the Third Ear (1948) Reik further pursues the problem of 
psychoanalytic understanding. He maintains the rough divide between 
conjecture and comprehension, but seeks to clarify the process further by 
separating out, admittedly somewhat artificially, three phases. First, there is 
"conscious or potentially conscious perception of the subject matter to the 
point where it dives down into the unconscious mind of the psychologist"; 
second, a process of unconscious assimilation of the observed material; and 
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third, "re-emergence into consciousness of the data so assimilated to the 
point of their description or formulation" (ibid. p. 131). 
The first stage of observation or perception raises the question of what it is 
the analyst perceives, the question of the relevant 'data'. Reik insists that the 
field of observation must be very wide, exceeding what is available both to the 
patient's and the analyst's conscious minds. Whilst it is important that the 
therapist opens his mind, and his senses, to everything observable in the 
patient's presentation - not just verbal content, but tone and volume of the 
voice, changes in breathing pattern, facial expressions, eye movements, 
changes in skin colour, gestures, quirks of behaviour etc. -, it is ultimately that 
which cannot be consciously observed which provides the essential 
information. "It is the unconscious mind of the subject [the patient] that is of 
decisive importance, and the analyst meets that with his own unconscious 
mind as the instrument of perception. That is easy to say, but difficult to 
realize" (ibid. p. 132). 
Again in contrast to Freud, who maintained that the important ideas came 
from the patient's mind and that the analyst had no knowledge of the content 
of the patient's unconscious (an assertion questioned in the previous chapter), 
Reik insists that it is from the analyst's unconscious that the important ideas 
arise. These thoughts are the result of his unconscious processing of the 
"psychical data" presented by the patient. "My unconscious mind is able to 
conjecture a hidden meaning only through given signs" (ibid. p. 133). Whilst 
this process is not open to scrutiny, there is nothing mystical about it; 
psychical data are after all first of all sensual data: 
If [... ] cognition arises from experience, that true dictum must be 
supplemented by the statement that experience has its origin in our sense- 
perceptions, that nothing can be in our intellect which was not there before in 
our senses [... ] This statement is also true for a psychologist who seeks to 
grasp the unconscious processes in others. (ibid. p. 135) 
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The psychical data that give the analyst perhaps the most vital clues as to 
their patients' unconscious process are thus based on impressions perceived 
below the threshold of consciousness - subliminal perceptions, as they have 
come to be referred to today. "A series of neurodynamic stimuli come to us 
from other people and play a part in producing our impressions, though we 
are not conscious of noticing them" (ibid. pp. 135-6). Understanding proceeds 
on the basis of a transmission of psychical data through channels of 
perception. Whilst this happens to a considerable degree outside 
consciousness, the channels, we feel, are known to us. Reik, however, goes 
further than this when he speculates on the possibility of receiving 
impressions "through senses that are in themselves beyond the reach of our 
consciousness" (ibid. p. 137). He refers here, again in a turn to phylogenesis, 
to "sense-communications, having their origin in the animal past of the human 
race and now lost to our consciousness" (ibid. ). Reik points to the animal 
capacity for instinctual orientation and perception of danger or pleasure, and 
he speculates that, whilst most of this prehistoric capacity got lost to us in the 
course of civilisation, some of it may survive and operate under certain 
conditions. In telepathy, for instance, Reik believes that something like this 
"direct psychical communication through these archaic, rudimentary surviving 
senses" takes place. Telepathy, so understood, is not a super-sensory but 
rather a "subsensuous" phenomenon, and should be thought about not so 
much as thought-reading but rather as "instinct-reading" (ibid. ). 
Returning to the "analyst's first task" to understand his patient, "he must aim 
at bringing into the field of consciousness those impressions which would 
otherwise remain unconscious" (ibid. p. 141). Only the utmost sensitivity to all 
kinds of information presented by the patient and appreciation of the 
importance of this unconscious communication can pave the way for the "joint 
assimilation of conscious and unconscious perception" which may yield 
understanding. Importantly, Reik's conception of understanding rests on a 
notion of communication, implying the communicator's (the patient's) wish for 
his unconscious message to be understood. This contrasts with Freud's 
conception of the patient primarily seeking gratification, not understanding. 
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For Reik the patient's communication is a purposeful endeavour seeking 
"psychical disburdenment" through the disclosure of something hidden in his 
life. The analyst's understanding of the unconscious communication makes 
this disclosure possible, it is the understanding of the showing of the hidden. 
Reik takes Freud's statement that "self-betrayal oozes from all our pores" to 
mean that a part of the patient wishes to betray himself. Understanding this 
communication requires that the analyst's mind supplies the counterpart to 
this oozing of desire, so that the "self-betrayal of another is sucked in through 
all our pores" (ibid. p. 143, italics in orig. ). 
The analyst needs to employ his "third ear" (an expression which Reik 
borrowed from Nietzsche) to listen to the patient, and what he will then hear is 
less of a heart-to-heart and more of a "drive-to-drive talk, an inaudible but 
highly expressive dialogue" (ibid. p. 144). This "ear" is directed outwards 
towards the patient's expressions, but at the same time listens acutely to the 
"voices from within the self that are otherwise not audible because they are 
drowned out by the noise of our conscious thought-processes" (ibid. p. 147). In 
the fleeting thoughts and emotions which are aroused in his mind the analyst 
might be able to catch hold of the current unconscious motives and meanings 
which might yield surprising insights into the communications of the patient. 
Contrary to the image of the analyst as objective observer Reik insists that the 
analyst must attend exquisitely to their own subjectivity if those unconscious 
responses are not to be lost for the process of understanding. It is in the 
subtle and often unconscious emotional and mental reactions to the patient 
that important communication takes place. In today's terminology we would 
say that Reik advises the analyst to monitor her countertransference process, 
trusting that this provides useful clues for understanding the patient. Reik did 
not have available to him this extended concept of countertransference, which 
was only formulated around 1950, but his later work prefigured this important 
development in psychoanalytic technique. Countertransference, as it was 
elaborated as a tool for understanding, will be treated in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
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Reik commends Freud's concept of the analyst's gleichschwebende 
Aufmerksamkeit as the best description of the state of mind in which the 
analyst is at his most receptive for unconscious communications both from 
inside and from the patient. Free-floating attention creates a "storeroom of 
impressions, from which later knowledge will suddenly emerge". It provides 
the condition for the gathering in and unconscious condensation of psychical 
data, the gestation of pre-knowledge, whilst the analyst consciously still waits 
for illumination. 
Understanding of the deep psychical processes of the other comes about via 
the "medium [of] the ego, into which the other person is unconsciously 
introjected. " Introjection of this kind, Reik repeats, is different from empathy. 
"In order to understand another we need not feel our way into his mind but to 
feel him unconsciously in the ego. We can attain to psychological 
comprehension of another's unconscious only if it is seized upon by our own, 
at least for a moment, just as if it were a part of ourselves - it is a part of 
ourselves" (ibid. p. 464). As in empathy it is the participation of the ego that 
provides the basis for understanding; and it is only through self-observation in 
this process of participation that comprehension can take place. Reik's idea of 
participation distinguishes it however from empathy. "Of course, we do not 
share the experiences of emotions of our patients", he writes. The difference 
that is so self-evident to him is both of a quantitative and qualitative nature. 
Quantitatively, there is a difference in the duration and intensity of the 
experiences, - if this was not the case we would be exactly in the same 
position as our patients: "we could not analyse them; our energy would be 
used to master these experiences. What really happens in the conjecture 
phase is that we get just a taste of the menu, no more, just enough so that our 
tongue and palate recognize the food" (ibid. p. 466). Qualitatively, the 
difference lies in the nature of the participation, its content, as it were. Reik 
insists that what is communicated to and resonated with in the ego of the 
analyst is the unconscious impulse of the patient, i. e. the instinctual base of 
his experience, not the "experience content as such". This resonance is likely 
to give rise to memories or associations linked with the analyst's own past 
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experience and thus the shared instinctual experience is fleshed out in 
accordance with the analyst's personal life experience. It is the recognition of 
the unconscious impulse which gives rise to psychological comprehension; 
the drawing of parallels between the analyst's life experiences and those of 
his patients carries, in Reik's view, grave dangers of misconstruing the latter. 
Conscious reference to our own experience in the face of unconscious 
processes in the other person, and self-observation for the purpose of 
comparison with another's life, would not only act as a disturbing factor in the 
analysis but would also be misleading. It would be bound to lead us astray, 
causing us to reinterpret another's experience in the light of our own, and thus 
to falsify it violently. While I reject conscious comparison with our own inner 
processes and reference to our own experience in the comprehension of 
another's processes, an unconscious reference to self nevertheless seems to 
me all the more important for psychological cognition. (ibid. p. 467) 
Given that the route through one's unconscious self is the only one open to 
understanding the other, there are clear dangers of seeing only oneself and 
thus superimposing one's own experience onto that of the patient, distorting 
his truth in the process. Reik admits this problem, but seems to be satisfied 
that psychoanalysis has sufficiently effective safety mechanisms available to 
deal with it. Firstly, there is the requirement of the training analysis of the 
analyst; secondly, Reik calls for "a strict examination of [the analyst's] own 
impressions and his own psychological judgment of the data" (ibid. p. 465), 
which is meant to safeguard "the careful observation of the subject, free from 
presuppositions" (ibid. p. 464). On condition that these safeguards work 
objective knowledge of the unconscious processes of the patient is, in Reik's 
view, attainable. 
What is essential in the psychical process going on in the analyst is - after the 
stage of observation - that he can vibrate unconsciously in the rhythm of the 
other person's impulse and yet be capable of grasping it as something 
outside himself and comprehending it psychologically, sharing the other's 
experience and yet remaining above the struggle, au dessus de la melee. The 
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first step in sharing the unconscious emotion is the condition of psychological 
comprehension: his own affective impulse comes to be a means of cognition, 
but until it is mastered there can be no objectively valid knowledge of the 
inner processes of the other person. (ibid. p. 468-9) 
On the level of unconscious communication there is no danger of 
misunderstanding or misinterpreting. The commonality of our impulsive life, to 
which we have retained some access as a faint residue of our prehistoric 
past, enables us to apprehend in our unconscious minds the instinctual 
tendencies of others immediately and reliably. Whilst the link to the conscious 
awareness of these impulses was lost in the course of history, the immediacy 
of unconscious understanding is still given, since on the level of the instincts 
we are the same. It is in the relation of the unconscious to the conscious 
mental processes that we differ, i. e. in the kind and the degree of repression. 
Only the advent of repression led to a level of differentiation that made 
psychology necessary, having made it possible in the first place. This leads 
Reik to the following, rather counter-intuitive conclusion: 
When people are so fond of declaring that they are all born psychologists, 
there is some truth in it, no doubt. Their unconscious is an incorruptible 
psychological organ of perception, but only their unconscious, a part of their 
personality that is, as a rule, inaccessible to them. They are right therefore, 
but not in the sense that they think they are. (ibid. p. 477) 
Reik's work constitutes a psychoanalytical perspective with strong 
interpersonal and communicative aspects. Understanding the patient 
proceeds on the basis of a communication from unconscious to unconscious 
where the quality of the instinctual state is 'the message'. This direct 
communication of 'mind to mind' differs from Freud's approach who sought to 
render the inaccessible accessible by establishing a chain of representations. 
Spontaneous ideas, as they were produced in the process of free association 
(the whole point of which was of course that they were not free, but 
psychically determined), established a path that allowed the tracing back of 
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mental content from the patient's dreams or symptoms to the unconscious 
origins. 
Understanding in Reik's terms happens on the instinctual `animal' level, the 
level of biology which is shared by all. Understanding therefore is of that 
which is the same. The individual differences of personal experience, resulting 
from the contingencies of one's life history and circumstances, are viewed as 
some kind of interference that has to be eliminated in order to perceive 
directly and reliably the message of the impulses. It is just this differentiation 
introduced by personal experience that brings with it the dangers of 
misunderstanding. Any understanding which is not derived from the 
perception of the unconscious impulse - i. e. the recognition of your impulse 
being the same as mine - is viewed as a likely superimposition of the 
circumstantial and hence irrelevant subjective experience of the analyst. 
Reik's formulations give rise to a number of questions, only two of which I 
would like to briefly discuss. The first concerns the problem of validation, the 
second the problem of otherness. Reik pursues the aim of objective 
knowledge, in a domain where both the object of inquiry and the main 
instrument of the analyst are the unconscious minds of the two participants. 
The 'knowledge' in question is of the instinctual domain, it is the knowledge of 
our 'animal nature', communicated on the level of instincts or impulses. Any 
knowledge that can be extracted from this level and formulated in the 
everyday language of the conscious mind cannot itself be said to be 'of 
nature' - it is inevitably a representation of nature in the culturally contingent 
medium of language. Language itself is saturated with the 'presuppositions' 
that Reik feels need to be controlled in order to get undistorted access to the 
reality of the unconscious mind. Not surprisingly, Reik does not specify how 
this control of the 'subjective factor', that is, the subtraction of contingent 
personal experience, can be established. His pointing to the requirement for 
analysts to have undergone analysis themselves does not satisfy as a method 
for safeguarding objective perception. 
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Turning to the second problem, if understanding proceeds only on the level of 
the unconscious impulse, presuming that on this level we are the same, the 
question arises whether anything about the other's otherness can ever be 
understood. It is not quite clear whether Reik regarded the contingencies of 
subjective experience as entirely incidental to the analytic work, or whether 
his appreciation of the dangers of misunderstanding the patient on the basis 
of individualised experience led him to rather dismiss all reference to 
"conscious experience". Differentiation is treated as an obstacle to 
understanding, rather than as something calling for understanding. As a result 
the possibilities of understanding difference remain unaccounted for. It seems 
that for Reik the other person can indeed only be understood to the extent 
that he is the same. It follows that the other who is understood is not an other 
at all. 
Fliess: Trial identifications 
Robert Fliess is generally credited for first describing empathy as "trial 
identification°. Whilst Fliess disagreed with Reik, who thought that the 
internalising processes involved should be called temporary introjections 
rather than identifications, his formulations largely parallel the ideas published 
by Reik some five years before him. Despite their terminological differences 
there exists a significant conceptual overlap between these two writers. 
In The Metapsychology of the Analyst (1942) Fliess asks what "ingredients" 
make for a good analyst, that is, what characteristics one needs to possess in 
order to perform the task of psychoanalysis. Fliess defines the analyst's task 
as "the application of very specialized knowledge to the understanding and 
correcting of pathological mental conditions in his patients" (1942, p. 212). It is 
interesting to note here the distinction Fliess makes between knowledge and 
understanding: the analyst possesses a body of knowledge which aids him in 
the understanding of the patient in clinical practice. In answer to his question 
Fliess cites, not surprisingly, the acquisition of analytic theory and clinical 
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experience together with the belief in the fundamental tenets of 
psychoanalysis gained through the obligatory process of training analysis. He 
does, however, stress that all of this could never suffice in preventing the 
analyst from getting "hopelessly caught in the ambiguities of interpretation". 
On the contrary: "He would come to feel that he must have overrated his 
instruction which has not taught him how to grasp the real character of his 
patient's utterances before it had him render them subject to an at least 
potentially correct interpretation" (ibid. p. 212). 
The most important ingredient, which alone can provide the crucial guidance 
and which is a prerequisite to any training rather than the result of it, is a 
capacity Fliess calls "psychological aptitude". It is defined as 
[the] ability to put himself in [the patient's] place, to step into his shoes, and to 
obtain in this way an inside knowledge that is almost first-hand. The common 
name for such a procedure is 'empathy; and we, as a suitable term for it in 
our own nomenclature, should like to suggest calling it trial identification. 
(ibid. p. 212-3, italics in orig. ) 
Empathy defined as trial identification affords the analyst with almost first- 
hand inside knowledge. Whilst Fliess thinks that Reik (1935) is wrong in 
disputing that empathy is essentially a process of identification, he agrees 
largely with Reik's descriptive treatment of the concept. Fliess suggests, we 
know that the nuclear process in identification is introjection" (ibid. p. 213). He 
argues that this "cannot possibly mean - as the idiom 'stepping into 
somebody's shoes' would suggest - that he introjects himself into the patient's 
mind, for it is in the analyst's mind that everything has to occur. It can only 
mean that he introjects the patient's mind" (ibid. )'2. And he adds, in a footnote: 
12 This contrasts with the view of Knight, another psychoanalyst who wrote about empathy in 
the 1940's. Knight, whilst maintaining that empathy involves a subtle interaction of projective 
and introjective processes, believes that projection is the main mechanism involved. 
Discussing the example of identifying with a character from a book or a movie, he writes: "I 
put myself in his place and live his experiences along with him, experiencing feelings 
appropriate to the situation which he encounters [ ... ] I identify myself with the object mainly by 
projection of my own feelings onto him, so that I imagine him to be experiencing emotions that 
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Wore correctly, the patient's ego as the hypothetical subject of the utterance 
to which empathy is directed" (ibid. p. 214). 
Empathy, so far, is described as a process of identification the core of which 
consists in an introjection on the part of the analyst of his patient's ego as the 
hypothetical subject of his speech. It is an intentional and conjectural process, 
yet at the same time a "like unconscious process" of reproducing the patient's 
mind, where the reproduction precedes any comprehension. This 
identificatory process is desirable for the analytic work only in its transient 
form and when linked to the detection and resolution of transference conflicts. 
Fliess, by his own admission somewhat artificially, divides this "metabolic 
process" into four phases: 
(1) The analyst is the object of (the patient's instinctual) striving; (2) he 
identifies with its subject, the patient; (3) he becomes this subject himself; (4) 
he projects the striving, after he has 'tasted' it, back onto the patient and so 
finds himself in the possession of the inside knowledge of its nature, having 
thereby acquired the emotional basis for his interpretation. (ibid. p. 215) 
In accordance with Freud's drive theory and the primacy of transference for 
analysis Fliess believes that this process is initiated by the instinctual impulse 
of the patient evoking the instinctual forces of the analyst. The chances of this 
leading to a therapeutic response on the part of the analyst depend on the 
completeness of the sublimation of these energies. Sublimation supplies the 
economical resources for the empathic process and at the same time ensures 
that it is guided solely by the therapeutic aim of understanding. About the 
subsequent phases (2) and (3) Fliess says curiously little, concluding "[... ] with 
this third phase the identification has been accomplished: the patient's striving 
am experiencing. It may be that I also then introject this object to produce [... ] identification" 
(1940, P. 336). Similarly, "The analyst projects his own unconscious responses onto the 
patient in response to the special stimulation of the patient's material, reacts to the material in 
terms of his own insight and then makes an interpretation if his conscious judgement so 
directs. The patient then introjects this piece of information or insight as, so to speak, a part of 
the analyst" (ibid. p. 339). 
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has been transformed into a narcissistic one in the analyst, who by now has 
become its subject as well as its object" (ibid. p. 216). He discusses the 
dangers that this inevitable disturbance of the analyst's narcissistic equilibrium 
entails for the analytic process, but he does not specify any further the actual 
'mechanics' of identification. He then continues, 
The fourth phase, that of reprojecting the striving in question after it had been 
the analyst's for the brief moment of trial identification, presupposes its having 
kept free from admixtures. It is here as it is in bacteriology, where we may 
transfer a bacterium from an animal onto a medium and back again, and 
where we have to be sure that it has remained uncontaminated by anything 
that the medium might carry. In other words, we have to be able to guarantee 
that no instinctual additions of our own distort the picture after the reprojection 
of the striving onto the patient. (ibid. p. 218-9) 
The demand is for the medium, the analyst's mind in our case, to be kept 
aseptically clean. An indication what might help this is given through the 
analogy of the tea-taster that Fliess uses to stress the very transient nature of 
the identification. Only a small quantity of tea is taken into the mouth and spat 
out as soon as it is tasted. 
This kind of identification, Fliess suggests, is made possible by an intentional, 
directed, and controlled regression on the part of the analyst who enters a 
state of "conditioned day-dreaming" (Freud's free-floating attention). The 
analyst's daydream is conditioned in so far as it is almost entirely stimulated 
by the patient's utterances. It is an intentional and controlled regression in as 
much as "reality testing is not lost but is temporarily renounced, and the ego 
obtains, at the price of this renunciation, free access at least to the whole 
range of the preconscious psychic content" (ibid. p. 220). In order to fulfil the 
almost impossible demands of this type of work - to engage fully in the free 
play of fantasy and free association whilst being ready all the time to subject 
this material to logical scrutiny and clinical judgement - the analyst must 
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acquire a special "work-ego" which can only function in the particular setting 
of the therapeutic frame. Only in this setting, with its specific aims and 
restrictions, is the ego granted a kind of special dispensation from the super- 
ego that makes the analytic process possible. 
Understanding in Fliess' model proceeds via the analyst's analysis of the 
empathic trial identification. Empathy allows the analyst to experience feelings 
which are not his own, but belong to the patient; the analyst "becomes the 
subject" in a transient and subtle way. His identification with the patient's 
experience needs to remain partial, however, leaving part of his mind free to 
do the analytic work. The instinctual material is only briefly taken into the 
therapist's mind and its relatively low dosage has to be quickly neutralised. 
Through empathy the analyst can obtain an "inside knowledge" not otherwise 
attainable, a knowledge which is subsequently subjected to analysis. Fliess' 
formulation offers a way of thinking about the process of understanding the 
patient's unconscious which stresses the need for the analyst to participate in 
the patient's mental life whilst at the same time remaining a detached 
observer. Sensitive intersubjective participation, the prerequisite for a deep 
understanding of the other, is, in this model, not seen to be in conflict with the 
demand to keep the investigative terrain "uncontaminated". 
Loewenstein: A science of translation? 
Rudolph Loewenstein, who played an important role in the French 
psychoanalytic society before WWII and became one of the foremost 
developers of ego psychology in America, concerned himself a great deal with 
questions of psychoanalytic interpretation. The issue of interpretation is quite 
obviously inseparably linked with the problems of knowledge and 
understanding central to this thesis. In The Problem of Interpretation 
Loewenstein asks: 
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What defines interpretation and distinguishes it from other interventions? In 
psychoanalysis this term is applied to those explanations, given to patients by 
the analyst, which add to their knowledge about themselves. Such knowledge 
is drawn by the analyst from elements contained and expressed in the 
patient's own thoughts, feelings, words and behavior. (1951, pp. 19-20) 
Interpretation contains knowledge which is new to the patient and yet is drawn 
from the patient. This echoes Freud's formulation in Laienanalyse that the 
patient needs to "tell more than he knows" (1926, p. 281). The patient, in 
words or otherwise, tells the analyst something he does not know; the analyst, 
who at the outset of the treatment does not know either, comes to know that 
which the patient needs to learn. The knowledge the analyst adds to what the 
patient knows is based on the body of theory which provides the explanatory 
framework. This seems to raise, rather than answer, the question where the 
relevant new knowledge originates. It is said to be located, but buried, in the 
patient's mind; he knows but doesn't know, and therefore can't say. The 
analyst knows something too, but nothing of the patient's hidden knowledge. 
The analyst knows psychoanalysis which allows what the patient once knew 
to be known again. 
In Some Remarks on the Role of Speech in Psychoanalytic Technique (1956) 
Loewenstein considers the role played by verbalisation in the analytic 
process. He uses a differentiation of the functions of speech which was first 
put forward by Bühler (1934). Speech can have (1) a function of 
representation (Darstellungsfunktion), which Loewenstein thinks of as a 
"cognitive function", communicating a description or knowledge of objects and 
relations between them; (2) a function of expression which communicates 
something about the speaker's experience; and (3) a function of appeal by 
which the speaker appeals to the addressee to respond or act in a certain 
way. 
In analysis the expressive function of the patient's speech is of the greatest 
importance. When the patient speaks in the representative function about 
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objects outside of himself the analyst will try to show him, via interpretations, 
that he is in fact speaking about aspects of himself. The omnipresence of the 
transference is revealed in the appeal function of the patient's speech, and it 
is again through interpretation that the analyst tries to transform the appeal 
into a self-expression which becomes available for reflection. The analyst 
himself is meant to stay clear of the expressive and appeals function in his 
communications to the patient and to confine himself to the cognitive or 
representative function. His task is to promote insight on the part of the 
patient, and any engagement in the expressive or appeals aspects of 
interlocution could detract from that task. 
Speech has the power to transmit mental states from one person to the next, 
with the three functions of speech communicating different aspects of 
experience. 
When the analyst believes, on the basis of preparatory work, that the patient 
is ready for it, he lends him the words, so to speak, which will meet the 
patient's thoughts and emotions halfway. In the peculiar dialogue going on 
between patient and analyst, their mutual understanding is based on the 
general property of human speech to create states of mind in the interlocutor 
akin to those expressed by the spoken words. The function of representation 
in speech elicits images and representations in the addressee which are 
similar to those used by the addressor. The expressive function tends to 
arouse emotions or states similar to those expressed. The function of appeal 
potentially creates the reactions corresponding to the appeal. As far as the 
analyst is concerned, we expect that the patient's speech shall elicit in him 
only those potential responses which may act as signals for his understanding 
of the patient, and which ultimately may be used by him in interpreting the 
latter's utterances. (ibid. p. 62) 
This is a formulation of empathy in other words, based on a concept of 
properties of speech. Understanding the other proceeds on the basis that the 
commonality of representations in language elicits the corresponding thoughts 
and emotions. Whilst this formulation offers an explanation how common 
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experiences are communicated through the use of a shared language, the 
question, already encountered above, regarding the possibility of 
understanding difference remains un-addressed. Loewenstein shows us how 
we understand an other, as long as the other is not all too `other', but more 
like ourselves. 
Furthermore, the analyst's participation in the dialogue with his patient is 
meant to be limited to the purely cognitive function, i. e. he is meant to speak 
as a detached and personally disinterested observer. However, since the 
important 'observational data' emerge only in the participatory, interpersonal 
mode of this "peculiar dialogue", and are gathered, moreover, in an intuitive or 
preconscious mode which itself escapes knowing, the objectivity which he 
strives to preserve in this situation appears to be already compromised. 
Whilst listening to the speech of the patient the analyst is required to pay 
attention not only to the actual content of his utterances, but also "to 
understand a second, a kind of coded message conveyed by them" (ibid. 
p. 62). The consciously spoken words of the patient are viewed as governed 
by the secondary process, i. e. understood to be the result of the reworking by 
the ego of more primary psychic phenomena. The task of analysis is to bring 
to consciousness the utterances which are under the sway of the primary 
process. The primary and secondary processes differ in their relation to object 
versus word representations (the signified and signifier in Saussure's terms). 
One might say that next to the usual vocabulary of any human language - i. e., 
to a definite set of meaningful relations between signs and ideas, 'signifying' 
and 'signified' - there exists another which is limited in scope, less definite, 
usually unconscious, and unintelligible, and which gains a partial hold upon 
the human mind on certain conditions; e. g. in dreams, in neurotic and 
psychotic thought processes. (ibid. p. 62) 
Free association is meant to bring to the fore this primary language. The idea 
of two different kinds of vocabulary being operational in the mind leads 
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Loewenstein to a formulation of understanding as a process of translating one 
vocabulary into the other. 
In respect to the primary and secondary processes, the analytic process has 
a twofold effect. On the one hand, analysis elicits expressions of the 
unconscious vocabulary. On the other hand, it causes these thoughts to be 
translated into words of the ordinary language. Being confronted with them, 
as it were, by means of the speech act, the patient during the analysis is led 
to a gradual gaining of insight into phenomena that are under the sway of the 
primary process. By putting them into words, he subjects them to the 
influence of the secondary process. (ibid. p. 63) 
By making unconscious thoughts available to consciousness and thus to 
speech "reality testing", both regarding external and internal/mental events, 
becomes possible and a much more differentiated appreciation of the 
complexities of one's own and other people's motivation can take place. Given 
Loewenstein's usual precision in his writings the formulation "it causes these 
thoughts to be translated" is strikingly vague. It says nothing about what we 
may want to know here: What is the nature of this causal relation between 
analysis and these thoughts? Who is doing the translating? What are the 
respective contributions of patient and analyst? And are there rules that apply 
to these translations, i. e. are there ways of assessing whether a translation 
was correct or not? 
Having based the psychoanalytic method on interpretation as a process of 
translation of the patient's speech Loewenstein concedes 
the importance of the immediate understanding of the unconscious between 
two people, of the intuitive grasping of nonverbal forms of emotional 
expressions; and these important ways of communication might lie quite 
outside the realm of verbalization. They even may play a part in the analyst's 
understanding of his patient. However, the essential factor in the investigative 
and therapeutic function of psychoanalysis is based upon the use of speech 
between patient and analyst. To be sure, not all relevant processes during an 
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analysis occur on the level of consciousness; nor are all of them verbalized. 
And yet, without verbalization on the part of the patient, without 
interpretations, without gaining insight, there would be no analysis and thus 
no such processes. (ibid. p. 65) 
There seems to be a degree of unease in this paragraph. Whilst claiming not 
to underestimate the importance of intuitive, unmediated, un-verbalised 
understanding of others, but having nothing to say about it, then conceding 
that even in analysis this process may play a part, Loewenstein claims that 
what is essential about the analytic process is that which he is able to give an 
account of in terms of his linguistic theory. One suspects that the unease with 
the intuitive grasp of the patient - Reik's unconscious-to-unconscious 
communication - has to do with Loewenstein's idea of what constitutes 
psychoanalysis as a science, an impression that grows stronger as one reads 
on. 
In Some thoughts on interpretation in the theory and practice of 
psychoanalysis Loewenstein returns to the problem of knowledge and 
understanding. He states that symptoms "can be understood as part of the 
personality only after having been correctly interpreted" (1957, p. 123). It is not 
understanding which generates the interpretation, but the other way round: 
interpretation yields understanding. Ultimately this is based on the knowledge 
of the ways in which symptoms are determined by typical pathogenic conflicts, 
of the libidinal and aggressive drives underlying them, and of the typical 
stages of human development. It is just this reducibility of the symptom to 
common dynamic and genetic factors, that, according to Loewenstein, 
account both for the scientific character of psychoanalysis and the apparent 
monotony of the explanations offered in published case studies. 
The body of knowledge which informs the interpretations given to the present 
patient consists of the explanations which are generalised from the clinical 
work with individual patients and which are presented in the literature "in 
scientific terms". Loewenstein feels it is important to stress that whilst the 
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interpretation offered in the session is based on this knowledge, it differs from 
a scientific application in that it has to be sensitively tailored to the individual 
case in accordance with the precise details of that person's life historical data. 
But is this indeed different from 'science'? Perhaps Loewenstein is concerned 
to dispel the impression that psychoanalysis is too crude a science to be 
humane. Before going on to explicate his idea of psychoanalysis as science 
he distinguishes three levels of interpretation: "(1) interpretations as 
statements of general, explanatory concepts; (2) as statements about the 
results of psychological investigation of a given person; (3) as used in the 
individual therapeutic analysis" (ibid. p. 125). Loewenstein follows Bernfeld 
(1932) who termed psychoanalysis a Spurenwissenschaft, a "science of 
traces". Bernfeld writes that the use of interpretations aimed at helping to 
reconstruct the genesis of neurotic symptoms rests on two essential 
premises. The first one is that the process to be reconstructed must have left 
traces behind it; the second, that some regular, consistent relation must exist 
between specific psychic, personal experiences and the traces they leave. 
Only this link permits the former to be inferred and interpreted from the latter. 
Interpretation as inference drawn from various clues moves psychoanalysis in 
the vicinity of criminology, history and linguistics. Loewenstein returns to the 
idea that at times it is possible to comprehend immediately - i. e. unmediated 
even by preconscious inferences - the unconscious meaning of another 
person's utterances or behaviours (a process he calls perception). Whilst he 
does not doubt, for instance, that an immediate understanding of the mother's 
expressions is possible for the baby and that an "unconscious understanding 
of emotional states of the mother may exist even in older children" (ibid. 
p. 128) he insists that the acquisition of language complicates the process of 
understanding, since the understanding by way of verbal meanings becomes 
superimposed on the direct comprehension of the (m)other's emotional states. 
Loewenstein now suggests that the understanding of another human being 
comes about through the distinct processes of inference, empathy and 
perception. The analyst uses all the ways of obtaining "observational data" 
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which are employed in normal social intercourse; it is however the "objective, 
scientific method of psychoanalytic investigation" which leads to a much more 
"reliable way of knowing about other human beings" (ibid. p. 128). The 
fundamental psychoanalytic methods of free association and subsequent 
interpretation yield additional data, Bernfeld's traces, which are not normally 
accessible. 
On the one hand, this science of traces hinges on the knowledge about the 
existence in every person's past of processes, developments, typical conflicts, 
their vicissitudes, derivatives, transformations, and recombinations they 
undergo in the course of years. It thus hinges, on the other hand, upon the 
acquaintance with signs that permit us to infer their existence. [Footnote: This 
in turn hinges on the assumption, which may not always be justified, that all 
processes leave traces or that there is a regular relation between each 
process and the trace it leaves. ] Information concerning these processes 
derives from reconstructions in other analyzed cases and from direct 
observation. (ibid. p. 131-2) 
In practice, Loewenstein admits, this process of making inferences on the 
basis of signs available to observation is far less scientific than he would like. 
Discussing the example of an interpretation he gave to one patient he writes: 
"[... ] I would be hard put to it to explain on what grounds I made this inference. 
It must have been arrived at by way of many small signs which remained 
preconscious to me, until the conclusion was suddenly brought to my 
conscious awareness by [something the patient said]" (ibid. p. 134). 
Loewenstein recoils from accepting the term intuition to designate this 
process since it moves analysis into "too artistic" and subjective an arena. He 
concedes, however, that "this intuitive, preconscious grasping for clues" (ibid. 
p. 131), which over years of clinical experience leads to a greater 
"acquaintance" with signs that permit inference and thus allows for 
interpretations, have predominance in practice over the more scientific 
method of applying a body of generalised knowledge to the specific case of 
the present patient. 
94 
Furthermore, the communication of an interpretation requires tact, which 
Loewenstein had defined (in his essay The Problem of Interpretation) as "that 
intuitive evaluation of the patient's problems which lead the analyst to choose, 
among many possible interventions or interpretations, the one which is right at 
the moment" (1951, p. 23). The communication of interpretations to a client is 
only the end result of a complex process needing a good deal of preparatory 
intervention, such as facilitating patient communication, and forming and 
corroborating, or amending, provisional hunches. 
Still other steps consist in communicating to the patient some observation 
derived from his associations, hoping that it may group or organize the 
material in such a way as to elicit additional material ultimately leading us to 
an understanding and thus to an interpretation of the patient's behaviour. 
(1957, p. 136) 
Here understanding is not, as it was at the beginning of this essay, that which 
is brought about by interpretation understood as the application of knowledge; 
understanding now emerges almost spontaneously in the analyst as a result 
of the regrouping of the material in the patient's mind which is triggered by the 
analyst's preliminary interventions. Understanding now leads to interpretation, 
rather than the other way round. The process of interpretation is continuously 
influenced by the patient's psychical process. 
It is not, as it may seem, that the analyst knows it all in advance and but 
judiciously chooses the moment and the way to impart this understanding to 
the patient. To be sure, frequently the analyst sees or knows something long 
before the patient is able to remember or to grasp it. But he acquires this 
knowledge gradually from his patient. If the analyst's interpretations enable 
the patient to gain insight, the latter's communications and interpretations, in 
their turn, create insight in the analyst. Moreover, an interpretation is 
meaningless as a one-sided act and acquires its full significance only through 
its counterpart, the effects it produces on the patient. This subtle interaction 
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between patient and analyst is an essential feature of the analytic process. 
(ibid. p. 141) 
Knowledge comes about as a relational process. To begin with the patient 
does not know what needs knowing. He gains this knowledge with the help of 
the analyst who in turn acquires his knowledge as the patient's psychic 
material is "regrouped" (a process helped by tactful verbal interventions) in 
ways that render it understandable. Thus understanding leads to 
interpretation which triggers insight, or knowledge. What the analyst 
contributes to this process is (1) the body of generalised psychoanalytic 
knowledge; (2) clinical experience, acquaintance with the signs; (3) 
acquaintance with the patient, which allows for interventions to be made 
tactfully (empathically, we might say, i. e. in accordance with the patient's 
terms of experience); (4) receptivity to the understanding to which he is 'led' 
by the regroupings of the patient's material. 
Essentially, Loewenstein concludes, psychoanalysis is an "interplay between 
observational data, gathered from clean clinical work, and their interpretation 
within a scientifically valid conceptual framework - be it the one we have now 
or possibly a future, better one" (ibid. p. 144). It is by no means clear what 
safeguards the 'cleanliness' of the analytic work, but it is clear that 
Loewenstein is keen to formulate analysis as an investigative process 
objective enough to merit scientific status. The clinical fact that much of the 
'data' is gathered in ways which are to a considerable extent preconscious 
and arise out of an interpersonal dynamic does not sit easily with the 
assertion of objectivity. 
In Remarks on Some Variations in Psychoanalytic Technique (1958) 
Loewenstein returns to the question of interpretation. He now equates 
interpretation with understanding the patient and making effective use of this 
understanding. The analyst's task is to acquire from the patient the material 
which enables understanding and to formulate and communicate it to the 
patient in such a way that the patient can make use of it, i. e. gain insight into 
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his psychic conflicts. The discussion of what this means in practice brings out 
the tensions between the specific and the general elements involved in 
interpretation, or that between understanding and knowledge. 
Each patient, being a unique individual with a unique combination of traits and 
problems, will present a unique combination of patterns of behaving in 
analysis [... ]. Hence each has to be understood in an individual way and dealt 
with accordingly. These individual differences among patients account for the 
various ways in which we must understand the material. [... ] Hence the 
difficulty of formulating general rules for interpretation. Psychoanalysis 
nevertheless has discovered a general framework of principles governing the 
interpretive work in analysis. However, within this general framework a large 
number of variations are inevitable. (1958, p. 156) 
There is clearly an issue here how much relative weight the generalisations 
have as against the particulars of a specific case. To put the same question 
differently: To what extent can the particulars of the unique patient be 
understood in the terms of an established body of generalised knowledge? 
It is not as if the analyst knew everything and merely had to convey this 
knowledge via interpretations, according to rigidly established rules. In actual 
fact, during the analytic process the analyst gradually learns from his patient 
while attempting to convey to him what he thus learns, so that the process of 
gaining insight and conveying it is reciprocal to some extent. (ibid. p. 156) 
Knowledge here appears not as something the analyst brings to the patient, 
but something he gains from being in dialogue with him. However, on the 
same page, discussing the question of the correctness of interpretations, 
Loewenstein takes up again Bernfeld's (1932) idea of the "science of traces". 
It is taken for a "fact that past psychic processes leave traces behind them. As 
a technique, psychoanalysis proceeds to uncover the traces, to bring them to 
the fore and to interpret them correctly. As a body of knowledge, it enables 
the analyst to reconstruct past psychic processes out of such traces" (ibid. 
p. 157). The body of generalised psychoanalytic knowledge posits that there 
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are traces of this kind and that they can be 'followed back' to certain crucial 
psychic events in the past; it prescribes, by the same token, how the material 
presented by the patient is to be correctly understood. 'Correctness' here can 
only mean that the interpretation of what is 'learned from the patient' coincides 
with the body of analytic knowledge, which is to say that what was understood 
as unique, and therefore new, is explained in the terms of what was already 
generally 'known'. At issue here is the circularity of understanding: that which 
needs understanding appears to be already understood by the terms guiding 
the investigation. This phenomenon, known in philosophy as the `hermeneutic 
circle', will be further discussed below. 
It appears that Loewenstein is caught up with an idea of science which 
actually hampers his efforts to account for the complexities involved in 
interpersonal understanding. He tends to downplay considerably the intuitive, 
preconscious, interpersonal aspects of this process in order to safeguard 
psychoanalysis' respectability as science, only to have to re-introduce these 
aspects `through the backdoor' in order to avoid too mechanistic and reductive 
a description. The tensions which run through his work between 
observation/explanation and intuition, objective and subjective methods, 
knowledge and understanding - and, at one point, between science and art - 
present an obstacle to a fuller account of the intricacies and problems of 
understanding, rather than contributing a great deal to their clarification. 
Sullivan: Participant-observation 
Harry Stack Sullivan was an American psychiatrist who, although he had been 
psychoanalytically trained, developed an approach to psychotherapy which 
was in many ways discontinuous with the European tradition. Sullivan had 
been in training analysis with Clara Thompson, who in turn had studied with 
Ferenczi. He was greatly influenced however by American pragmatism and 
emphasised in his work lived experience, and practical, social reality. His 
clinical work was mainly with schizophrenic patients, and he pioneered 
psychotherapeutic work in 'therapeutic communities'. 
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Sullivan defines the field of psychiatry, which includes all psychotherapy, as 
"the field of interpersonal relations, under any and all circumstances in which 
these relations exist" (1940, p. 10). Personality for him "can never be isolated 
from the complex of interpersonal relations in which the person lives and has 
his being" (ibid. ). He maintains nevertheless that it is a "valid area for the 
application of the scientific method", so long as it is understood that "the data 
of psychiatry arise only in participant observation" (1970, p. 3). Psychotherapy 
only exists in a relational context. 
The psychiatrist cannot stand off to one side and apply his sense organs, 
however they may be refined by the use of the apparatus, to noticing what 
someone else does, without becoming personally implicated in the operation. 
His principal instrument of observation is his self - his personality, him as a 
person. The processes and the changes in processes that make up the data 
which can be subjected to scientific study occur, not in the subject person nor 
in the observer, but in the situation that is created between the observer and 
his subject. (ibid. p. 3) 
Understanding of another person's functioning cannot be gained by turning 
this individual into a unit of study. The only data available to observation are 
interactional events, not to be sought in or allocated to one of the participants, 
but attributable to the 'between' of the interpersonal situation. Sullivan asserts 
that what is treated as data in psychiatry (e. g. the patient's behaviour, the 
content and manner of his expressions, information about him provided by 
third parties, the therapist's feelings and behaviour in the session) can be 
subjected to consensual validation, but, he insists, this information needs to 
be understood in the context in which it was 'gathered'. He stresses that the 
concepts used to explain clinical phenomena should be demonstrable with the 
evidence at hand, and expressed strong suspicions of any presumed 'inner 
entities such as drives, structures, unconscious fantasies etc. 
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Sullivan defines the aim of psychotherapy as "elucidating characteristic 
patterns of living" (ibid. p. 13), which are sedimented in the patient's 
personality and their habitual relational behaviour. Due to the multiplicity of 
factors contributing over time to the development of personality organisation it 
is not possible to isolate pathogenic causes. To get to know the other's 
problems it is important to understand the person, and to understand the 
person one must understand his dealings with others. 
Thus there is no such thing as learning what ails a person's living, in the 
sense that you come to know anything definite, without getting a pretty good 
idea of who it is that's doing the living, and with whom. In other words, in 
every case, whether you know it or not, if you are to correctly understand your 
patient's problems, you must understand him in the major characteristics of 
his dealing with people. (ibid. p. 13) 
Sullivan proposes that we don't normally know how much we know about the 
people in our social environment. Most of this knowledge is not easily 
accessible since it is not usually formulated verbally. Whilst in ordinary social 
relations there is no need for this, a therapist has to make his knowledge of 
the other person accessible to himself so it can be used for the purposes of 
the therapeutic work. Sullivan thus operates a distinction between a tacit and 
a symbolised kind of knowledge. 
The psychotherapist as participant observer is inextricably involved in 
everything that goes on in the session. This is so not just because of the 
interlinked-ness of expressions, where every expression can be understood 
as a response to what has been said or done by the other person, but also 
because of the way meaning comes about. 
The fact is that we cannot make any sense of, for example, the motor 
movements of another person except on the basis of behavior that is 
meaningful to us - that is, on the basis of what we have experienced, done 
ourselves, or seen done under circumstances in which its purpose, its 
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motivation, or at least the intentions behind it were communicated to us. 
(ibid. p. 19) 
It is only on the basis of this background experience that meaning can be 
deduced. The therapist's own personal history, his sense of himself, the 
customs and proscriptions of his particular culture, the highly conventional 
patterns of language usage etc. together form a backcloth which plays a 
considerable role in the process of ascribing meaning to the patient's 
behaviours and expressions. Since this is inevitably so it needs to be taken 
into the equation, because to ignore this influence hampers understanding. 
Sullivan asserts, "[... ] to the extent that he [the psychiatrist] is unconscious or 
unwitting of his participation in the interview, to that extent he does not know 
what is happening" (ibid. p. 19). 
The other person is knowable only through the observation of behaviour - and 
all behaviour, certainly in the consulting room, is social interactions. The 
therapist can observe the patient's interactions with himself, and observe his 
own responses and behaviours toward the patient; he can focus intently on 
the patient's communications (by no means all verbal) and reflect on these 
perceptions in order to gain understanding; what he cannot do is gain direct 
undistorted access to the psychic reality of the patient. Since everything that 
is knowable about the other person comes about in the interpersonal field 
everything that is formulated as such knowledge is imbued with the meanings 
of the one who 'knows'. Interpersonal perception does not exist - interference- 
free, as it were - outside the complications introduced by the past experiences 
and established meanings of the observer. 
This argument problematises the circularity that threatens to undermine 
objective understanding. Sullivan too flags up the problem of the implicated 
investigator which is so central to the hermeneutic tradition. Whilst he 
stresses that the therapist's personal involvement will inevitably influence the 
ways in which the patient is understood, he treats this as a problem which 
needs to be overcome. The tendency to imbue the patient's expressions with 
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ready-made meanings is a serious obstacle to understanding that needs to be 
actively countered. To do so, Sullivan advocates that one listens to the 
patient's expressions with critical interest, always holding in mind the 
question: "Could that mean anything except what first occurs to me? " (ibid. 
p. 20). Occasionally the therapist needs to clarify the meanings intended by 
the patient, a procedure which might have several positive effects on the 
patient. It communicates the therapist's interest and care, which in itself 
provides relief; it opens up new understandings for the therapist; and, most 
importantly, it helps the patient to clarify his thoughts to himself and bring to 
consciousness aspects of his experience which were so far repressed. 
The necessity to understand the particular ways in which the patient uses 
certain words or expressions flows from Sullivan's view of language. 
Language, he believes, is used by us in a highly idiosyncratic fashion, with the 
meanings of our words and expressions being inextricably linked with the 
original interpersonal contexts in which they were learned. It therefore takes 
time, care and much inquiry to understand more precisely the meanings of the 
patient's words. It is a mistake to assume that the first meaning that occurs to 
the therapist is the one intended by the patient. 
Sullivan's theory of therapy is inseparably liked to his theory of the 
development of personality. Interestingly, empathy plays a central role in his 
account of how personality, and psychopathology, evolves, not however in his 
ideas regarding clinical understanding. 
Empathy is the term that we use to refer to the peculiar emotional linkage that 
subtends the relationship of the infant with other significant people - the 
mother or the nurse. Long before there are signs of any understanding of 
emotional expression, there is evidence of this emotional contagion or 
communion. This feature of the infant-mother configuration is of great 
importance for an understanding of [... ] acculturation or cultural conditioning. 
(1940, p. 17) 
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Empathy is a form of early contagion, a channel through which the caregiver's 
anxiety is imported into the infant's experience. This anxiety cannot be dealt 
with by the child alone, and the caregiver whose help is needed at this point 
cannot be turned to for comfort since she is herself the source of the anxiety. 
The distinction between a "good mother", i. e. a non-anxious mother who can 
be used for need satisfaction, and a "bad mother" who is experienced as the 
source of anxiety, is the first distinction in the infant's mind. Later the child 
learns to interpret the (m)other's feeling states, as they are communicated via 
gestures, facial expression, tone of voice etc., as approving or disapproving 
responses to her own actions. This process gives rise to a distinction in the 
child's mind as to the kind of person she is; a "good me" and a "bad me" come 
into being reflecting, by and large, the messages received (either verbally, 
through behavioural responses or via empathic linkage) from important 
others. Even more seriously, behaviours or experiences on the part of the 
child which regularly arouse very intense anxiety in the caregivers cannot be 
held in mind or remembered; they become dissociated as a "not me" which 
cannot be represented as part of the self. Crucially, in order to gain some 
control over her experience, the child now becomes actively involved in 
shaping her behaviour according to the appraisals received form the (m)other. 
This adaptation aims to reduce the occurrence of anxiety via empathic 
linkage. Furthermore, the child tends to identify with gestures and behaviours 
which give rise to a 'good me' experience and to steer clear of those which 
evoke 'bad me'. Thus self arises as a consequence of restraints introduced 
through early social interaction. "The self may be said to be made up of 
reflected appraisals" (ibid. p. 22). 
Anxiety is thus the central concept in Sullivan's theory of personality. He sees 
anxiety as originating in the (m)other, transmitted to the infant via empathic 
linkage, and defended against through the evolution of what he terms the 
"self-system". The dissociation from and disavowal of anxiety-provoking 
experience is the cause of psychopathology. Psychopathology hence is due 
to failures in the care-taking (primarily maternal) environment. In contrast to 
Freud, but echoing thoughts of the later Ferenczi, psychic conflict is not 
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inevitable, and pathology comes about in response to actual problems in early 
relationships. The defensive aspects of the psyche are countered by 
integrative, satisfaction-seeking tendencies which promote psychic growth. In 
terms which foreshadow core assertions of humanistic psychotherapy 
approaches (briefly discussed in chapter 4) Sullivan maintains, "the basic 
direction of the organism is forward" (ibid. p. 97), and "[... ] there is a tendency 
to achieve mental health" (ibid. p. 99). 
The aim of psychotherapy is to facilitate the reintegration of the "dissociated 
motivational systems", a task which involves the dissipation of the continuing 
influences of the patient's unresolved past relational experience. This is the 
crux of psychotherapy, according to Sullivan. "One achieves mental health to 
the extent that one becomes aware of one's interpersonal relations" (1940, 
p. 207). The understanding how the self and one's relations to others are 
structured by earlier relational experience is "the necessary formula to which 
everything must be assimilable, if it is therapy" (ibid. ). 
It is those parts of the patient's experience that are excluded from the self (i. e. 
that which the patient mustn't know), as well as those parts which are 
knowingly suppressed (that which the patient will not say) which need to be 
brought to light and into interpersonal contact. 
Remembering that the self dynamism is a growing integration useful in 
dealing with others for obtaining satisfactions and avoiding anxiety; knowing 
that its growth is restricted by the function of anxiety which excludes from 
awareness all the data which would expand the self at the cost of insecurity; it 
must be evident that the patient cannot know enough to explain his present 
difficulties. What with the witting suppression of some considerable part of 
that which does appear in the patient's awareness, it must also be clear that 
far more than an interrogation is needed if one is to secure relevant and 
highly significant data about the sources of peculiarity in a. patient's 
interpersonal relations. (ibid. p. 184) 
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The therapist's task is to study a number of the interpersonal relations of the 
patient in detail to infer the nature of the important interpersonal events. The 
therapeutic investigation focuses primarily on the patient's external past and 
present relationships; the aim is to discover and dissolve distortions of present 
relationships in terms of past ones. The relationship with the therapist is 
looked at as one instance of the patient's relational pattern, but does not have 
the priority it is afforded in classical psychoanalysis. The therapist remains 
participant-observer, an expert on the observation of the relationship he 
participates in with his patient; he does not get drawn deeply into a personal 
relationship with his patients, and does not encourage this depth of 
engagement on the part of his patients. 
The therapist's focus is on the detection of dissociated experience and its 
eventual verbalisation. Dissociation is in part explained as a consequence of 
experience not being formulated in language. "[... ] one has information about 
one's experience only to the extent that one has tended to communicate it to 
another - or thought about it in the manner of communicative speech" (ibid. 
p. 185). The process of regaining suppressed past experience, which leads to 
an expansion of the self, involves communication, i. e. finding the words and 
relating these to an other. Verbalisation is thus attributed a curative role which 
seems somewhat at odds with a view of the personality as socially 
constituted. In contrast to the relevance of the personality of the early 
caregiver for the development of the self-system, the relationship to the 
person of the therapist is not afforded a central role. The process of gaining 
insight into past relational patterns, in which the therapist seems to play a 
rather `external' role, is thought to be sufficient to undo a structure which had 
been interpersonally constituted. 
Language, in Sullivan's view, is not however just a medium for self- 
expression, it is also one of disguise. This is the consequence of the self- 
system's tendency to steer away from anything which might cause anxiety. 
Anxiety gives rise to the security operations of the self-system: the patient will 




provoking situations in ways which guard him against his own experience. 
The understanding of the relational patterns of the patient therefore has to be 
sought through the very detailed inquiry into what the patient does, says and 
feels in his important relationships. This information is not volunteered by the 
patient, or offered via free association, it has to be looked for by the therapist 
in the details of the patient's interactions. Sullivan is scathing about the idea of 
free association (1940, p. 186 and 190); he is equally dismissive of the 
"charming naivety" (ibid. p. 186) of therapists who endow with great 
therapeutic significance their own reveries during sessions (what has 
subsequently become known as countertransference technique). In contrast, 
Sullivan maintains that in order to get hold of the relevant material it is vital 
that the patient be instructed to co-operate in particular ways which are 
designed to bring to awareness those areas excluded from the self-process: 
the noticing of changes in his/her bodily states and actions; the noticing of 
marginal thoughts; and the prompt statement of all that comes to mind (ibid. 
p. 200ff). 
Sullivan's account of psychotherapy contains a considerable amount of 
vacillation regarding his investigatory stance. On the one hand he stresses 
that the position of the therapist is always that of an involved participant. As 
such he is inside and part of the experience of the patient which constitutes 
the focus of the inquiry. One corollary of this involvement is the therapist's 
influence on the patient's behaviour. Another is the likelihood, if not the 
necessity, that the therapist's own personal experience and history influences 
the meanings ascribed to the patient's behaviour. This would lead to the 
conclusion that understanding is an interpersonal process, where the 
emerging meanings are shaped by the two participants. This is not, however, 
the conclusion which Sullivan draws. The other side of his methodology, the 
observational aspect, demands that the therapist stays out (or gets out) of this 
interpersonal field to take up a position which is presumed to enable objective 
observation yielding data that can be subjected to "consensual validation". His 
concept of distortion, for instance, implies a view of reality as objectively 
knowable (measured against which a perception can be judged to be 
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`distorted'). This reliance on an idea of objective knowledge contrasts with a 
view which holds that one's reality is always codetermined by features of the 
external world and personal ways in which these are organized into 
meaningful experiences. 
Thus Sullivan's therapist as participant-observer is a participant trying to get 
out of the circularity which his involvement imposes on his understanding of 
the situation. As a result, his style of clinical engagement is marked by an 
emphasis on interpersonal separateness and emotional detachment. For him 
knowledge of the other arises not out of intersubjective participation but 
through the observation of the patient's interpersonal behaviour and the 
investigation of his idiosyncratic linguistic meanings. His emphasis on 
language - and the curative role of verbalisation of dissociated experience - 
is in tension with those aspects of his theory stressing the social constitution 
of the self. In the following chapter I will turn to developments within 
psychoanalysis which focus in a more coherent fashion on the technical 
ramifications of theories of social constitution of personality/self. 
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Chapter 3 
Countertransference, Intersubjectivity, Empathy 
The introduction of the centrality of the relationship into psychoanalysis 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we could observe a growing recognition in the 
psychoanalytic literature of the therapist's interaction with the patient. The 
start of a shift towards an increasing consideration of the interactive, 
interpersonal character of the analytic process, which was implied but 
'stemmed' in Freud's ideas, was more whole-heartedly embraced and 
elaborated in subsequent, explicitly relational formulations of psychoanalysis. 
In what ways and to what extent this interactive aspect of the process involves 
the analyst's subjectivity, and what such an subjective engagement might 
mean for the status of psychoanalysis, these questions are being asked with 
increasing urgency and lead to a number of new formulations of clinical 
understanding. 
The analyst's countertransference in particular is being investigated with 
much interest and is ascribed a constructive role in the analytic process. 
Empathy too receives more attention and is conceptualised in a much more 
complex and interactive fashion. In the work of an increasing number of 
analysts both countertransference and empathy gain centrality for analytic 
understanding and are recognised as important aspects of the analytic cure. 
In this chapter I will show how the investigation of the analyst's mental 
processes in the therapy session led to a re-conceptualisation of the analytic 
work as an interpersonal process. Countertransference, originally deemed an 
obstacle to the work, was developed, particularly within British 
psychoanalysis, into one of the most important 'tools for understanding'. 
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Schafer (1959) formulated perhaps the most sophisticated conceptualisation 
of empathy in the analytic literature. In the context of the analytic work, he 
claims, empathy is much more than a process of one person understanding 
the subjectivity of another. It is instead a highly complex process which, over 
time, leads to important psychic changes in both participants in the analysis, 
and as such has a `generative' function. In Kohut's writings too empathy gains 
an ever more central role: it started off defining the field of psychoanalysis and 
was pronounced the analytic method of data-gathering; it ended up making a 
major contribution to the analytic cure. 
The reformulations of psychoanalysis suggested by those writers focussing on 
countertransference technique and empathy imply changes in the position of 
the analyst vis-ä-vis his patient. Analysis is seen as a much more interactive 
communicational process than was originally thought, and the idea of it 
operating as an objectivist science loses further ground. One approach which 
sets out to elaborate in a coherent fashion the consequences from these 
changes in view is the 'intersubjectivity theory' put forward by Stolorow and 
his group of collaborators. Intersubjectivity theory views psychoanalysis as 
interpersonal and mutual to an extent that the idea of the analyst taking his 
patient as an object of knowledge breaks down completely. Stolorow et al. 
redefine analytic understanding as one subjectivity understanding another; it 
arises from the dialogue of "two personal universes' and can only be 
understood as a result of their mutual engagement. In its intersubjective 
variant psychoanalysis has become psychological, personal and participatory 
in a way never envisaged by Freud. 
Countertransference theory 
The term countertransference came to be used in two rather distinct ways, 
which Kernberg (1965) distinguished as the classical and the totalistic 
positions. The first one refers to the narrower definition introduced by Freud 
which views countertransference as originating in the analyst's own neurotic 
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conflicts. The second group of perspectives tends to view countertransference 
as the totality of the analyst's experience with the patient and as such 
comprises both pathological and non-pathological components. The first 
regarded countertransference primarily as an obstacle that needed to be 
overcome, the second saw it as a new route to clinical understanding. For 
Freud countertransference was certainly not a technique; the term 
countertransference technique will be reserved for the second meaning. 
Freud introduced the term Gegenübertragung, countertransference, in just 
one paragraph of his introductory lecture to the Second International 
Psychoanalytic Congress in 1910 where he addresses new developments in 
analytic technique (the lecture was published under the title Die zukünftigen 
Chancen der psychoanalytischen Therapie; English The future prospects of 
psychoanalytic therapy). The paragraph reads: 
Andere Neuerungen betreffen die Person des Arztes selbst. Wir sind auf die 
'Gegenübertragung' aufmerksam geworden, die sich beim Arzt durch den 
Einfluß des Patienten auf das unbewußte Fühlen des Arztes einstellt, und 
sind nicht weit davon, die Forderung zu erheben, daß der Arzt diese 
Gegenübertragung in sich erkennen und bewältigen müsse. Wir haben, 
seitdem eine größere Anzahl von Personen die Psychoanalyse üben und ihre 
Erfahrungen untereinander austauschen, bemerkt, daß jeder 
Psychoanalytiker nur so weit kommt, als seine eigenen Komplexe und 
inneren Widerstände es gestatten, und verlangen daher, daß er seine 
Tätigkeit mit einer Selbstanalyse beginne und diese, während er seine 
Erfahrungen an Kranken macht, fortlaufend vertiefe. Wer in einer solchen 
Selbstanalyse nichts zustande bringt, mag sich die Fähigkeit, Kranke 
analytisch zu behandeln, ohne weiteres absprechen. (1910b, pp. 126-7) 
Other innovations concern the person of the doctor himself. We have become 
alerted to the 'countertransference' which arises in the doctor as a result of 
the patient's influence on his unconscious feelings, and we are not far from 
demanding that the doctor must recognise this countertransference within 
himself and overcome it. Since a larger number of people practise 
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psychoanalysis and exchange their experiences, we noticed that each 
psychoanalyst can only proceed as far as his own complexes and internal 
resistances allow, and we therefore insist that he begin his work with a self- 
analysis and continue to deepen this whilst gathering experience with 
patients. Anyone who does not produce results in such a self-analysis may as 
well give up on their capability to treat patients analytically. 
id thought that the countertransference evoked in analytic practice was 
to the analyst's own unconscious conflicts which were being stimulated by 
the patient's material. The presence of countertransference thus constituted 
an obstacle to the analytic work which had to be addressed and overcome in 
the practitioner's own analysis. The recognition of the phenomenon of 
countertransference led directly to the demand for the analyst to have 
undergone analysis himself. Freud did not continue to be convinced that a 
self-analysis would suffice. 
There are only very few references to countertransference in Freud's work. 
His technical papers do, however, address the problem of the analyst's own 
emotional responses in the course of his work. Most of the recommendations 
offered in these papers are, as we have already seen, negative, promoting an 
attitude guided by the 'three golden rules' of analysis, all of which can be said 
to refer to 'absences' on the part of the therapist: anonymity, neutrality and 
abstinence. 
The injunction to push to one side all of one's affective responses seems to 
contradict Freud's recommendation that the analyst let go of any censoring 
process in his own mind and to assume an attitude which parallels the 
Grundregel of free association which the patient is asked to follow. Only in the 
absence of a censor can the analyst's unconscious mind function as the 
'telephone receiver to the patient's unconscious. 
Wenn der Arzt aber imstande sein soll, sich seines Unbewußten [... ] als 
Instrument bei der Analyse zu bedienen, so muß er selbst eine 
F 
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psychologische Bedingung in weitem Ausmaße erfüllen. Er darf in sich selbst 
keine Widerstände dulden, welche das von seinem Unbewußten Erkannte 
von seinem Bewußtsein abhalten, sonst würde er eine neue Art von Auswahl 
und Entstellung in die Analyse einführen, welche weit schädlicher wäre als 
die durch Anspannung seiner bewußten Aufmerksamkeit hervorgerufene. 
(1912b, p. 176) 
For the physician to be in a position to use his unconscious [... ] as an 
instrument for the analysis he himself needs to meet a psychological 
condition to a large degree. He is not to tolerate within himself any 
resistances which keep from consciousness that which his unconscious 
comprehended; otherwise he would introduce into the analysis a new kind of 
selection and distortion, which would be far worse than the one resulting from 
the strain of his conscious concentration. 
In Bemerkungen über die Übertragungsliebe, where Freud addresses the 
problem how to respond to a patient who has fallen in love with the analyst, 
he concludes one paragraph with the following remarkable statement: "Ich 
meine also, man darf die Indifferenz, die man sich durch die Niederhaltung 
der Gegenuebertragung erworben hat, nicht verleugnen. " (1915[1914], p. 224) 
"I am of the opinion that one must not deny the indifference which was 
attained via the suppression of the countertransference". Clearly, Freud 
believes that the indifference which results from the suppression of the 
analyst's emotional response is the attitude required for the work of analysis. 
The emotional truth of the analyst must be kept from the patient; - but, in the 
name of the 'strict truthfulness' on which psychoanalysis is founded, the truth 
of the resulting indifference must not be denied. 
Freud saw countertransference as a phenomenon arising within the psyche of 
the analyst, a disturbance of his objective perspective due to influences of his 
own unresolved neurosis. As such it is a largely intra-psychic process 
occurring in the analyst. It is however counter to something in the patient (at 
one point Freud uses the curious term Gegenliebe, counter-love) and 
therefore has an inter-personal aspect. As far as Freud was concerned 
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countertransference was an obstacle to analysis, never a tool for 
understanding. He thought it was paramount to reduce as much as possible 
the emotional reactions of the analyst through his personal analysis, thus 
leaving the psychoanalytic situation free to be structured by the patient's 
transferences. The alternative to the removal of countertransference was to 
make use of it for the understanding of the patient's unconscious 
communications. This avenue led to the formulation of countertransference 
technique, the development of which I wish to outline next. 
Countertransference technique 
Between Freud's first introduction of countertransference in 1910 and the 
surge in interest that this concept aroused from around 1950 onwards hardly 
anything was written on this subject. The exceptions were (apart from Freud's 
own rare comments which do not develop the concept further) the 1926 article 
by Helene Deutsch (already quoted in chapter 1, in connection with Freud's 
telephone metaphor) and Ferenczi's 'Clinical Diaries' from 1932. 
Deutsch argued that countertransference was not just a pathological response 
but also a process of unconscious identification of the analyst with her patient. 
Memory traces of the analyst's own early experience are revived by the 
material of the patient. The similarity of the experiences gives rise to empathic 
identification, not only with the patient's ego, but also with his "original 
objects". Deutsch suggests that a "complementary attitude" could be evoked 
in the analyst when the patient directs those "infantile-libidinous wishes" at her 
that were originally directed towards the parents. Both types of identification 
(with the ego and the objects of the patient) lead to the stimulation of the 
"intuitive empathy" of the analyst. Her ideas on empathy and identification 
foreshadow Racker's (1957) concepts of "concordant" and "complementary 
countertransference". 
113 
Reik's contribution too can be viewed as important to the development of the 
concept of countertransference. Reik insisted after all that the analyst must 
pay very close attention to the affective signals emanating from within, since 
they constitute one of the most important routes towards the understanding of 
the patient. The perception of the patient's unconscious was only possible via 
the analyst's inner perception of his own affective state which allowed the 
comprehension of the unconscious impulses set off by the patient's 
unconscious. Fliess, who, as we saw, followed Reik's ideas in many ways, 
thought that his own model of understanding could safeguard against the 
dangers of countertransference (in Freud's sense) whilst still drawing on a 
process of intersubjective participation ("trial identification") as an 
indispensable aspect of clinical understanding. His stipulation that the 
identification with the patient's unconscious be brief, low in intensity and 
rapidly neutralised helped to make the idea acceptable that the analyst's 
ability to do clinical work did not depend on him being entirely unaffected by 
the patient. Furthermore, it still left intact Freud's concept of 
countertransference which, in Fliess' distinction, applied to intense and 
longer-lasting identifications. 
Since the early 1950's interest in countertransference phenomena increased 
considerably. Countertransference was investigated by a number of writers 
and was identified not only as an inevitable part of the analytic process, but 
also as an aspect of the analyst's experience which had distinct uses for the 
analytic work. 
Paula Heimann's paper On Counter-transference (1950) is widely credited as 
the first formulation in the literature of the constructive role 
countertransference can play in the analytic work. The analyst's responses to 
the patient can, she suggests, be used as a means for understanding the 
patient. "My thesis is that the analyst's emotional response to his patient 
within the analytic situation represents one of the most important tools for his 
work. The analyst's counter-transference is an instrument of research into the 
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patient's unconscious" (ibid. p. 140). The therapeutic situation is described as 
"a relationship between two people" (ibid. ) both of whom have feelings. 
Heimann maintains that there exists a climate of fear and guilt regarding the 
affective responses of the analyst. This produces a pressure to push to one 
side those feelings, with the result that the analytic work turns mechanistic 
and over-intellectual. The difference between patient and analyst is not that of 
presence and absence of emotions, but between the ways in which these 
feelings are attended to and used for the work. The analyst needs "to sustain 
the feelings which are stirred in him, as opposed to discharging them (as the 
patient does), in order to subordinate them to the analytic task in which he 
functions as the patient's mirror reflection" (ibid. p. 140). The analyst should 
employ Freud's technique of "evenly hovering attention" which allows him to 
listen on a variety of levels "with a freely roused emotional sensitivity" 13 
Heimann starts from the premise that normally understanding does not 
present a problem. "[The] basic assumption [is that] the analyst's 
unconscious understands that of his patient. This rapport on the deep level 
comes to the surface in the form of feelings which the analyst notices in 
response to his patient, in the countertransference" (ibid. ). Furthermore, his 
conscious mind understands the patient's verbal meanings. Consequently, the 
analyst's feelings do not require work in order to be understood. 'But often the 
emotions roused in him are much nearer to the heart of the matter than his 
reasoning, or, to put it in other words, his unconscious perception of the 
patient's unconscious is more acute and in advance of his conscious 
conception of the situation" (ibid. p. 141). Only if there is a discrepancy 
between what is readily understood and the analyst's emotional response 
does countertransference occasion further thought. The feelings stirred up in 
the process are viewed as superior guides to understanding compared with 
the analyst's rational mind. 
13 The ideas Heimann presents in this short paper to a large extent echo Reik's formulations 
published two years earlier. Reik's influence may have been overlooked due to the fact that 
he did not use the term countertransference in his work. 
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Heimann, like Freud and Reik before her, implies that if the analyst's 
unconscious understands the patient, then this understanding is as readily 
available for the analytic work as any conscious understanding. There does 
not appear to be a problem for the analyst to get hold of her own unconscious, 
which, as I have argued before, seems to render the distinction between 
unconscious and conscious thoughts rather redundant - at least as far as the 
analyst goes. 
Margaret Little (1951) picks up on the problems caused by the analyst's 
"paranoid or phobic" attitude towards his own feelings or thoughts. Whilst she 
retains the first, narrower definition of countertransference she advocates that 
the analyst should be granted much more humanness, an attitude which 
allows his countertransferential responses to be made useful for the 
therapeutic work. Understanding of the patient proceeds largely on the basis 
of empathy, a process of introjective (never projective! ) identification which 
needs to contain an element of distance or separateness on the analyst's 
part. Countertransference becomes a problem when the analyst loses the 
difference (of time and space) and identifies with the patient's unconscious in 
the present moment. When this occurs Little advocates that this "mistake" is 
admitted to the patient, unless such self-disclosure seems contra-indicated in 
the particular case. These still rather revolutionary technical recommendations 
(in spite of, or perhaps because of, Ferenczi's clinical experiments) follow 
from her highly interactive conception of the analytic process. Understanding 
the unconscious is not a one-way traffic. The patient too is sensitive to the 
analyst's defensiveness and tends to become increasingly resistant to 
analysis unless this aspect of the process is openly acknowledged. For the 
therapist not to admit his countertransference is "tantamount to denying its 
existence, or forbidding the patient to know or speak about it" (1951, p. 149). 
The analytic process is characterised by an extremely complex interaction 
between the psyche of the patient and that of the analyst: 
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[... ] transference and counter-transference are not only syntheses by the 
patient and the analyst acting separately, but, like the analytic work as a 
whole, are the result of a joint effort. We often hear of the mirror which the 
analyst holds up to the patient, but the patient holds one up to the analyst too, 
and there is a whole series of reflections, repetitive in kind, and subject to 
continual modification (ibid. p. 148). 
The analytic cure proceeds as the gradual disentanglement from this hall of 
mirrors which cannot succeed unless the analyst is prepared to be seen to be 
real, i. e. human, by the patient. Countertransference is perhaps the most 
important way in which her humanness manifests in the session. 
Racker, who writes from a Kleinian perspective and consequently thinks about 
countertransference mainly in terms of internal object relations, was very 
influential in broadening the concept. His discussion of countertransference 
focuses, to a large degree, on the interaction between the patient and the 
analyst, that is, he sees transference and countertransference impacting upon 
each other in the complex interplay of the analytic process. Like the 
transference of the patient, "countertransference is always present and 
always reveals its presence, although, as in the case of transference, its 
manifestations are hard to perceive and interpret" (1953, p. 313, italics in 
orig. ). The denial of countertransference increases the likelihood that a 
countertransference neurosis develops which entails the danger that the 
analyst's pathology becomes "grafted onto" the psyche of the patient, turning 
analysis into a malignant rather than a curative process. Only the 
acknowledgement of countertransference reactions makes it possible that 
these might be used in the service of analysis, even if they contain elements 
of the analyst's own pathology. 
Racker (1957) defines countertransference as "the expression of the analyst's 
identification with the internal objects of the analysand, as well as with his id 
and ego, and may be used as such" (ibid. p. 179). Following Deutsch (1926) 
Racker introduces a distinction between concordant and complementary 
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countertransference. The former refers to an identification with the patient's 
self, the latter to identifications with the patient's internalised objects 
(important relationships from the past). Concordant identification is pretty 
much equated with empathy, which in turn is linked to the analyst's attempt to 
understand the patient. Racker describes it as a "resonance of the exterior in 
the interior" (1957, p. 181). The understanding thus attained is, however, by 
now means free from 'distortions', admixtures deriving from the analyst's own 
(to some degree neurotic) personality. "[The] analyst's concordant 
identifications (his `understandings') are a sort of reproduction of his own past 
processes, especially of his own infancy, and [... ] this reproduction or re- 
experience is carried out as response to stimuli from the patient [... ]" (ibid. 
p. 182). Complementary identifications are "produced by the fact that the 
patient treats the analyst as an internal (projected) object, and in 
consequence the analyst feels treated as such; that is, he identifies himself 
with this object" (ibid. ). 
Racker thinks of countertransference as being "induced" by the patient; every 
transference on the part of the patient has the potential to draw out a 
matching emotional response from the therapist. It is of paramount 
importance that the therapist maintain "deep and continuous" contact with his 
own internal processes both to be aware of these responses and to safeguard 
against the danger that a relational scenario from the patient's past becomes 
simply re-enacted in a complementary countertransference scenario. The 
patient's transference, one could say, constitutes an invitation to engage in 
such a repetition. The therapist can use his countertransference response to 
alert himself to the presence of such a `call' and identify the nature of the 
relationship scenario `on offer'. It is important to resist the pressure to actively 
participate in the patient's drama, and to use the insight gained from being 
subjected to such pressure to interpret the unconscious psychic content. In 
the absence of an awareness of such powerful intersubjective forces the 
analyst is in danger of "drowning" in countertransference and of unwittingly 
undermining the analytic effort by a re-enactment of the original pathogenic 
scene. 
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The analyst's countertransference reaction is viewed as "the living response 
to the transference situation" at any given moment of the process. It is the 
main clue to the understanding of the transference and guides the decisions 
regarding the content and timing of interpretations. The understanding of the 
patient in countertransference technique arises from being drawn into 
participating in a relational interaction, a 'drama' or a 'dance' of a particular 
kind. The therapist is being acted upon by the patient in both verbal and non- 
verbal, conscious and unconscious ways, and thus "induced" to take up a 
particular emotional position toward the patient. To understand the particulars 
of this positioning and the functions it serves in the mental life of the patient is 
to understand perhaps the most important thing about the patient, that is, the 
way in which his mind is structured by internal object relations. 
Understanding, then, is about positioning; it is essentially participatory 
understanding. 
The analyst, in Racker's view, is not free from the influences of her own 
unconscious, and therefore the patient is not the only 'neurotic' in the 
consulting room. Given this basic recognition, together with the highly 
interactive conception of the analytic process, it is not surprising that Racker 
attacks "the ideal of the analyst's objectivity" (ibid. p. 180). The analyst's 
subjectivity is inevitably implicated, and it is, as we have seen, vitally 
important for the understanding of the patient. These insights give rise to a 
reformulation of objectivity as it pertains to the analytic work: 
The analyst's objectivity consists mainly in a certain attitude toward his own 
subjectivity and countertransference. The neurotic (obsessive) ideal of 
objectivity leads to repression and blocking of subjectivity and so to the 
apparent fulfilment of the myth of the 'analyst without anxiety and anger'. The 
other neurotic extreme is that of 'drowning' in the countertransference. True 
objectivity is based upon a form of internal division that enables the analyst to 
make himself (his own countertransference and subjectivity) the object of his 
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continuous observation and analysis. This position also enables him to be 
relatively `objective' toward the analysand. (ibid. ) 
The revision of the analyst's position within the therapeutic process as it 
emerges from this new concept of countertransference had a dual effect 
which shifted the problematic of proper understanding in a new direction. 
Whilst the new attitude towards the analyst's affective states helped to lessen 
the anxieties and tendencies to avoid this aspect of the analytic process it 
also presented the opposite problem of a potentially too ready acceptance of 
the therapist's pathological responses. Does too much reliance on the 
analyst's countertransference not blur the perceptive field to a hopeless 
extent? Furthermore, the suspicion has to be faced that the explanation of the 
analyst's affective disturbances in terms of the mental state of the patient 
could be used to cover own personal problems or deficiencies in 
understanding or technique. After all, how can a therapist know with any 
degree of certainty whether an intense emotional reaction to a patient is due 
to features of his own personality or is indeed a clue to his patient's mental 
process? Clearly, there are dangers that the understanding of these emotional 
reactions as 'belonging' to the patient can be used by therapists in defensive 
and self-serving ways. These dangers seem to roughly match the dangers 
inherent in the classical position on countertransference, i. e. the potential loss 
of interpersonal connectedness, and of the understanding of the patient 
derived from the impact he has on the analyst's subjectivity. 
Further elaborations of empathy 
Following the surge of interest in countertransference in the 1950's, there was 
another hiatus in its theorisation during the 1960's. The concept of empathy 
however underwent further important modifications. To illustrate some of the 
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most important developments I will draw on Roy Schafer's early work14 and on 
Heinz Kohut's `self-psychology'. 
Schafer (1959) observes how little the concept of empathy is actually 
investigated, in spite of the insistence on its central role by many authors; as a 
consequence, it has remained inadequately defined. Schafer defines empathy 
as "the inner experience of sharing in and comprehending the momentary 
psychological state of another person", specifically the hierarchic organisation 
of psychic contents as it exists in the particular life situation, with its particular 
history, of this patient. He uses the term generative empathy to denote the 
highly organised psychic response of the therapist to his patients. Empathy, 
as it operates within the analytic work, is not only about understanding the 
patient, it is "a process that initiates and promotes growth in the subject, the 
object, and the relationship between them" (ibid. p. 344). Thus, for the first 
time, empathy is conceptualised as a growth promoting or curative factor in its 
own right. 
Schafer describes empathy as Na subtle and relatively conflict-free interplay of 
projective and introjective mechanisms [... ], enhancing the object of 
contemplation as well as the subject's experience; thus the relationship 
between the two. " Empathic comprehension is a process which evolves over 
time, with equally important cognitive and affective aspects. 
Empathy involves experiencing in some fashion the feelings of another 
person. This experience can only be approximate or roughly congruent, since 
the other self is not directly or fully knowable. The shared experience is based 
to a great extent on remembered, corresponding affective states of one's 
own. Observing a patient's life at any one point, we tentatively project onto 
him the feelings we once felt under similar circumstances, and then test this 
projection by further observation. (ibid. p. 347) 
14 By this I mean the work he produced when he was still writing from an ego-psychology 
perspective. I will return to Schafer's later 'narrative' theory in chapter 6. 
I. 
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The empathic response of the therapist, however, needs to be monitored and 
questioned from a countertransference perspective, both in order to discern 
what part of the patient's psyche (or what internal object representation) is 
alive in the therapist's mind at this moment and to what extent the affective 
responses of the therapist become in turn active stimuli for the patient. The 
affective aspect of empathy effects not only a re-creation in the therapist's 
mind of emotions approximating those of the patient, but also an affective 
response to these emotions which can be communicated back to the patient. 
Passive and active, projective and introjective processes are intermingled to 
an extent that the empathic response "amounts to carrying on a relationship 
with another person internally, and with a relatively high degree of cathexis" 
(ibid. P. 348). 
The cognitive, even if largely preconscious, component of empathy is in 
operation as the therapist pays attention to subtle, often non-verbal cues, the 
detection of inferences, causal 'feels' etc. It also counteracts the danger that 
'inside knowledge' is solely based on an experience of fusion with the 
patient's mental state. Empathic knowledge is on the "level of 'I know what 
you feel because I know that I once felt something like it and I know how you 
make me feel"' (ibid. p. 349). A degree of separateness is maintained which 
allows that "the empathic and interpretative process [... ] be carried to 
completion through renewed observation and interaction" (ibid. ). Empathy 
thus is distinguished from an automatically joining in the other's feelings. It 
"requires oscillation between the observing and experiencing part of the ego" 
(ibid. p. 350). 
In the course of the analytic process the therapist gains increasingly detailed, 
felt knowledge of his patient. in achieving familiarity with the characteristic 
drift of the patient's associations, affects, and expressive movements, and 
with his history, current life situation, and future prospects, the analyst builds 
up a temporarily articulated internal image of the patient's world" (ibid. p. 356- 
7). A different concept of knowledge is evoked here - knowledge as familiarity 
or acquaintance, which enables the therapist to hold an increasingly 
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developed representation of the patient in his mind. Good acquaintance with 
the patient's mental functioning can lead to a correspondence in associations 
which can be understood, on one level, as a fit between the therapist's and 
the patient's inner world and, on another level, as a correspondence of the 
(always to some degree hypothetical) image the analyst has of the patient and 
the reality of this person. 
In building this image, in establishing the patient's world in his own inner 
world, the analyst approaches a position where he is often able to fantasy and 
feel (in affect and body) as the patient does. He becomes increasingly able to 
anticipate the course of the material, including the patient's response to one 
or more conceivable interventions. [... ] The building up of this image of the 
patient is based on a series of partial introjections, emotional reactions, and 
revival of memories concerning oneself and the object; this is followed by (or 
alternates with) re-extemalisations or projections onto the patient and by 
reality testing to check the validity of the image thus far developed. The 
hypercathected internal image is thereby increasingly enriched, focused, 
hierarchically organized, and stabilized. It becomes a substructure within the 
analyst's ego, which means it does not need to be re-created anew on each 
occasion of stimulation but remains steadily available. (ibid. p. 357) 
Schafer insists that an identificatory process is in play here, since the ego of 
the empathizer undergoes a temporary modification. Whilst the identification 
"remains segregated within the ego as an object of actual and potential 
contemplation", it is more than an internal object representation or introjection. 
It is important to note that, whilst there is great emphasis placed on describing 
the process of empathy as one of getting to know the patient, in the sense of 
developing an increasingly correct image of the person, this process requires 
another form of knowledge which is meant to lend support to the correctness 
of this image. Schafer evokes the notion of "reality testing" which supposedly 
allows the analyst "to check the validity of the image". The nature of this 
process and what constitutes in turn its validity is not further explained. 
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Kohut's self-psychology 
Heinz Kohut, a psychoanalyst who became hugely influential, particularly in 
America, made empathy central in a way which constituted his psychology as 
a radical departure from much of Freud's psychoanalysis. To understand the 
theoretical shift his concept of empathy introduces requires a brief introduction 
of self-psychology, the name Kohut gave to his theory when its divergences 
from classical psychoanalysis became more fully developed. Kohut gives 
centrality to the self as "a center of initiative and a recipient of impressions" 
(1977, p. 99). Contrary to classical psychoanalytic theory the self in no longer 
a representation, i. e. a product of the activity of the ego, but becomes an 
active agent itself. Furthermore, in parallel to the developmental theories of 
British object relations approaches, the self is seen as growing out of the 
infant's interpersonal matrix. 
The development of a cohesive self is the central issue for Kohut. Healthy 
development hinges on the infants relations with its self-objects, the term 
Kohut introduces for the parental care-givers to indicate the central role they 
play in the formation of the self. In the early years self-objects fulfil vital 
psychological functions for the child, functions the child will take over as the 
self coalesces. Much of psychopathology is linked to deficiencies in self-object 
relations which hamper the constitution of a healthy self. The task of the self- 
psychology therapist becomes the reparation of the self via the provision of a 
better self-object. It is here that empathy takes up its increasingly central role. 
The therapeutic process focuses primarily on the subjective experience of the 
patient and empathic inquiry becomes the predominant orientation of the 
therapist. In the following I will outline the development of empathy in Kohut's 
work and discuss some of the problems his contributions to a theory of clinical 
understanding run into. 
Early in his career, when he still adhered to the central tenets of classical 
psychoanalysis, Kohut posits introspection and empathy (which he terms 
"vicarious introspection") as "the essential constituents of psychoanalytic fact 
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finding" (1959, p. 465). He maintains, furthermore, that this "primary method of 
observation" indeed defines the contents and the limits of the observed field. 
"Only a phenomenon that we can attempt to observe by introspection or by 
empathy with another's introspection may be called psychological" (ibid. 
p. 462). Whilst he concedes that the psychoanalyst also employs other modes 
of observation (in particular the patient's verbal behaviour in free association) 
Kohut stresses that "the final and decisive observational act [... ] is 
introspective or empathic" (ibid. ). Only through empathy, i. e. the mental move 
of placing oneself inside the other person's experience, can we establish 
psychological facts about this person, that is, understand something about his 
motives and the possible meanings of his experience, his actions and 
expressions. 
Kohut makes the important observation that psychological understanding, 
since it requires empathy, is relative to the cultural distance between the 
observer and his subject. The actions, expressions, desires and sensitivities 
of another person are more easily understood if they share our cultural 
background, since our acquaintance with the clues we receive from them 
facilitates our empathising with their experience. Yet even with people from 
different backgrounds we normally assume that there are sufficient 
commonalities to allow us some understanding. " 
Kohut believes that the centrality of introspection and empathy for 
psychological understanding is so clearly demonstrable that he does not 
hesitate to pronounce Breuer and Freud as the "pioneers" in their scientific 
usage. The psychoanalytic method as developed by Freud is portrayed as the 
introduction of "the consistent use of introspection and empathy as the 
observational tool of a new science" (ibid. p. 464). Whilst recognising that free 
association and the analysis of resistance are the principal techniques of 
psychoanalysis, Kohut still insists that these should be considered as 
15 This question of the relative cultural positioning of the analyst and her patient will be further 
discussed in the context of Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy where it gains central 
importance. 
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"auxiliary instruments, employed in the service of the introspective and 
empathic method of observation" (ibid. ). The domain of psychoanalysis in 
Kohut's definition is thus coextensive with whatever introspection and 
empathy can reveal. Kohut fully subscribes to Freud's drive theory, yet he 
starts to re-interpret psychoanalysis as the understanding of "inner 
experience". His definition of psychoanalysis by the introspective and 
empathic method leads him to re-appraise some of the key psychoanalytic 
concepts, giving primacy to concepts which are derived from introspective and 
empathic observations over "biological speculation". 
Kohut further developed his clinical and theoretical amendments of the 
classical Freudian position in his writings on his work with narcissistic 
patients. He now maintained that the origins of narcissistic disturbance were 
prior to the Oedipal phase and he shifted the focus on to the earlier child- 
mother (maternal caretaker) relationship. The pathogenic role of deficient 
parenting (i. e. environmental failure) was seen as more important than 
intrapsychic conflict as suggested by Freud. Consequently, Kohut held that it 
was not sufficient to apply Freud's explanatory framework to these patients. 
He came to believe that it was essential to place the focus on the experience 
of the person who lived through it, i. e. the patient's subjectivity. Increasingly, 
he became convinced that, in order to understand how people come to 
experience themselves as selves, it was important to study the kind of 
attention and care that they had received during infancy. For healthy 
development to take place, the child needs objects who, by relating to the 
child in certain ways, affirm first of all his healthy narcissism and in doing so 
assist the child in the establishment of self-organisation, self-feeling, and self- 
esteem. Healthy development requires the availability of self-objects, i. e. 
objects which the child can make use of for the constitution of his own sense 
of self. 
The healthy self requires for its development a milieu of three particular kinds 
of self-object experiences, which, in the context of the psychoanalysis of a 
narcissistic patient, reappears in the form of three kinds of self-object 
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transference. Firstly, self-objects are required who "respond to and confirm 
the child's innate sense of vigour, greatness, and perfection" (Kohut & Wolf, 
1978, p. 414), and who, through their approving and admiring gaze, support 
the child's expansive movements. These self-object were thought to provide 
essential "mirroring functions'. Secondly, experiences of self-objects are 
needed "to whom the child can look up and with whom he can merge as an 
image of calmness, infallibility, and omnipotence" (ibid. ); Kohut called these 
"idealizing self-object experiences". Finally, experiences are required in which 
the self-objects provide, through their accessibility to the child, experiences of 
similarity between the child and themselves, giving rise to an experience of 
the self-object as "alter ego'. The corresponding three types of self-object 
transference Kohut calls mirroring transference, idealizing transference, and 
alter ego or twinship transference respectively. 
Healthy narcissism for Kohut is not, as Freud thought, opposed to and does 
not detract from object love; on the contrary it takes a good dose of it to seek 
and be able to sustain intimate relationships. 16 His work with narcissistic 
patients led him to believe that the narcissistic needs of neither child nor 
patient must be confronted too early or too harshly if damage to the healthy 
narcissism, which is required for the maintenance of good self-esteem, is to 
be prevented. Instead of confrontation Kohut proposes a gradual process of 
"optimal frustrations', which enable a process of "transmuting internalisations" 
to take place. The patient is thought to attempt to revive a disrupted 
developmental process and must be allowed to experience the analyst in the 
ways his self-object needs dictate. This approach entails less absolute 
reliance on interpretation as the primary curative factor, and more emphasis 
on empathic responsiveness. Interpretations run the risk of pointing out the 
psychological separateness of the analyst and, in doing so, interfere with his 
important function as self-object. The patient's transference experience is 
clarified and accepted, rather than confronted through interpretation. 
16 The question arises to what extent Kohut's notions of healthy narcissism and the value of 
intimate relationships are informed by - and in turn play a role in promoting - the rather 
wholesome philosophy of the 'American way of life'... 
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Empathy for Kohut came to include an affective relationship with the patient, 
where understanding was not only sought to explain the origins of pathology, 
but included a communication of the analyst's acceptance of the patient's 
wishes and behaviours. The idea that the analyst should meet the patient's 
developmental needs brought Kohut's approach in conflict with the then 
predominant mode of American psychoanalysis, ego psychology, which 
prescribes the interpretation and dissolution of transferences rather than their 
gratification. His call for "sustained empathic immersion in the patient's 
subjective reality" is difficult to integrate with demands to follow the rule of 
non-gratification. The inherent conflict between these two clinical strategies 
echoes, without being referred to explicitly by Kohut, the disagreements 
between Ferenczi and Freud. Kohut, similar to Ferenczi, shifts the emphasis 
from the objectivism and rationalism of the Freudian analyst to subjectivity 
and personal meaning. Interpretive understanding (explanation) has become 
less important than reality and meaning as experienced by the patient. 
Kohut (1971) presents his contributions still as a development of classic 
Freudian drive theory. Narcissistic love, rather than being superseded by 
object love, coexists as a third route for libido throughout life. Kohut, rather 
than criticise drive theory, tries to accommodate his propositions within the 
then predominant psychoanalytic model by suggesting a sequential 
integration; his reformulation of psychoanalytic theory is meant to be relevant 
for the pre-Oedipal period during which the infant differentiates himself from 
the other as other. Kohut thought initially that in doing so he could leave the 
main edifice of psychoanalytic theory unchanged. 
In 1977 however he makes a decisive move away from classic drive theory, 
applying a broader definition of the self, which is now seen not just as a 
representation within the ego, but given centrality as the structure which 
organises personal experience. The formative period of the self, which is 
equated with what had become known as the `pre-Oedipal' stage, is regarded 
as the crucial period for healthy psychological development. The Oedipal 
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phase, to the extent that it is fraught by the very strong sexual and aggressive 
desires described by Freud, is seen as a consequence of failures in the 
management of earlier self-object needs. Whilst this seems a very clear 
rejection of some fundamental psychoanalytic ideas, Kohut avoided pitching 
himself against Freud in clear-cut opposition. He maintained that most clinical 
material could be interpreted in either classical Freudian manner or from the 
viewpoint of self-psychology. He suggested a principle of complementarity in 
an attempt to resolve the problem of integrating these by now very diverse 
theories. 
The shift that Kohut's theory underwent between 1971 and 1977 concerns 
centrally the role empathy plays in the analytic process. In 1971 Kohut writes, 
"Empathy is a mode of cognition which is specifically attuned to the perception 
of complex psychological configurations" (ibid. p. 300). 
In scientific psychology, too, empathy is restricted to being a tool for the 
gathering of psychological data; it does not by itself bring about their 
explanation. In other words: it is a mode of observation. The gathering of data 
must be followed by their ordering, by a scrutiny of the (for example, causal) 
interconnections of the observed phenomena in terms that are removed from 
the observations themselves [... ]. Therefore, if empathy, instead of limiting its 
role to that of a data-collecting process, begins to replace the explanatory 
phases of scientific psychology (which is then only verstehend [... ] without 
also being erklärend), then we are witnessing the deterioration of scientific 
standards and a sentimentalizing regression to subjectivity, i. e., a cognitive 
infantilism in the realm of man's scientific activities. (ibid. pp. 300-1) 
This quote demonstrates the importance to Kohut of the notion of 
psychoanalysis as a scientific, and thus 'mature', activity. Empathy is here 
portrayed as a mere tool of data collection, like a net which is cast into the 
inner world of the patient's mind, capable of hauling back the raw, i. e. non- 
interpreted, material which subsequently becomes the object of scientific 
enquiry. The notion of collecting data here seems to suggest a mere listing of 
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isolated, non-interpreted facts, as if the act of collecting did not always already 
bring these data into a prefigured unity. 'Subjectivity' is something a scientist 
must not succumb to, and the idea of hard 'data' lends strength in the fight 
against any affective and regressive (which seem intrinsically linked here) 
tendencies. Kohut does not, however, face the problem of how these 'data' 
become constituted. Empathy is presented here as the experience-near 
observational stance which the therapist needs to employ at the start. 
Subsequent to data gathering, it becomes crucial to go "beyond empathy" in 
order to formulate hypotheses which alone are capable of providing an 
explanation of the material. Empathy is thus a method which the therapist 
needs to be able to employ, but then to relinquish. It is however hard to see 
how the act of collecting data - and in this act already (pre)understanding 
them - can be brought off without bringing to bear preconceptions inherent in 
the theories which are 'subsequently' used to order and explain the material 
'objectively'. 
What was, in 1971, a scientific methodology became, by 1977, intrinsically 
linked to Kohut's developmental theory and therapeutic approach: 
The child who is to survive psychologically is born into an empathic- 
responsive human milieu (of self-objects) just as he is born into an 
atmosphere that contains an optimal amount of oxygen if he is to survive 
physically. And his nascent self 'expects' [... ] an empathic environment to be 
in tune with his psychological need-wishes with the same unquestioning 
certitude as the respiratory apparatus of the new-born infant may be said to 
'expect' oxygen to be contained in the surrounding atmosphere. When the 
child's psychological balance is disturbed, the child's tensions are, under 
normal circumstances, empathically perceived and responded to by the self- 
object. (1977, p. 8) 
These developmental ideas relate to clinical technique in the following way: 
The importance of the two-step sequence - step one: empathic merger with 
the self-object experience (... ); step two: need satisfying actions performed by 
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the self-object - cannot be overestimated; if optimally experienced during 
childhood, it remains one of the pillars of mental health throughout life (... ). 
The fact psychoanalysis is a psychology that explains what it has first 
understood is intimately connected with the two-step principle that defines 
human psychological functions ab initio. (... ) Every interpretation, in other 
words every reconstruction, consists of two phases; first the analysand must 
realize that he has been understood; only then as a second step, will the 
analyst demonstrate to the analysand the specific dynamics and genetic 
factors that explain the psychological content he had first empathically 
grasped. (ibid. pp. 87-8) 
In his earlier writings Kohut suggested that the empathic perception of the 
analyst is just a first and, as it were, preliminary step followed by 
interpretation. In his last book (1984), which was published posthumously, he 
asserts that empathy makes a crucial, if essentially incomplete, contribution to 
the analytic cure: "[The] analyst's more or less accurate empathic 
understanding of the current condition of the analysand's self (phase one of 
the therapeutic unit) promotes the movement towards health and leads to the 
laying down of new psychological structure [... ]" (p. 105). The psychological 
growth initiated by empathy has to be supported and consolidated via the 
explanatory framework offered as a second step in the analyst's 
interpretations. 
In an interesting discussion of the case of a patient who reacts very anxiously 
and defensively to the therapist's absence Kohut demonstrates that different, 
but roughly equally convincing explanations can be offered depending on the 
theoretical orientation of the analyst. Whilst clearly not all these mutually 
exclusive interpretations could be right, Kohut insists that they all could be 
experienced by the patient as a helpful understanding if the analyst correctly 
grasps the emotional state of the patient. Kohut holds that there can be 
accurate understanding without accurate explanation - even an inaccurate 
explanation does not preclude accurate understanding. An accurate 
explanation however must be preceded by correct empathic understanding. 
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Where accurate empathy is present it becomes possible that "(correct) 
understanding [can be] transmitted through the vehicle of an (incorrect) 
interpretation, that is, an incorrect explanation" (1984, p. 95). Kohut can thus 
claim that "given the analytic situation and the analyst's reliable 
responsiveness to his analysands, good - if not optimal - therapeutic results 
can be achieved even though the theories that guide the analyst in his 
assessment of the patient's psychopathology and in his understanding of the 
therapeutic process may be in error" (ibid. p. 91). In this sense empathic 
understanding of the patient is more important than the explanation of his 
psychic state. 
The fact that Kohut can see a situation where the intervention can be 
therapeutic although the content of the interpretation is wrong throws some 
more light on his concept of empathic understanding. Empathy is mainly a 
communication of understanding of the patient's emotional state, his mood, so 
to speak. Moods can be responded to accurately whilst giving wrong 
explanatory contexts only because the emotional message is communicated 
largely through non-verbal means. Tone of voice, facial expressions and other 
bodily behaviours can after all communicate an empathic response no matter 
what the verbal message, the interpretation, is. 
There is, however, a certain amount of ambiguity even in Kohut's latest book 
regarding the status of empathic perception and understanding. Whilst he 
expresses a belief in "the capacity to employ empathy in a way that facilitates 
the collection of undistorted data, particularly in the area of scientific depth 
psychology", he points out that this capacity is dependent on many factors - 
"biological equipment and [... ] childhood experience" amongst them. Kohut 
calls empathy an "irreplaceable but by no means infallible depth-psychological 
tool" (1984, p. 83). This tool is not particular to his self-psychological 
amendments of psychoanalysis, rather, he says, this "broadened theoretical 
grasp [... ] has expanded the potential range of application of this instrument of 
observation. Via the theories of self-psychology [... ] the self-psychologist can 
empathically perceive configurations that would otherwise have escaped his 
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notice" (ibid. p. 84). Kohut would clearly like to give the impression that all he 
was doing was to shine the 'empathy torch' into a so far neglected corner of 
the patient's psyche - and what he found there were 'self-object needs'. It is 
apparent however that empathy as employed by a self-psychologist leads to 
the discovery in the patient of the kinds of things self-psychology theory 
predicts. Later, Kohut concedes this somewhat reluctantly: "[... ] we must admit 
that, strictly speaking, there can be no observation without theory. The 
number of different explanatory configurations available to an analyst [... ] will 
influence the scope of his observations vis-ä-vis a given patient" (ibid. p. 96). 
This, of course, holds true for all theory and is thus not an argument against 
self-psychology. It does however undermine the belief in "undistorted data". 
Theory determines what is considered "data" and their "range", and it 
prefigures their interpretation. 
It is also worth noting that Kohut's preoccupation with undistorted data 
constitutes a problematic very different from the one Freud was dealing with. 
For Freud the central problem was always interpretation, i. e. the problem of 
deciphering the meaning underlying the manifest 'text'. Freud's question was, 
therefore, how do you decipher, as opposed to Kohut's question, how do you 
find data which do not require deciphering since they show 'undistortedly' 
what is there. 
Kohut's early view of empathy as a mainly data-gathering function makes it 
preliminary to the decisive step of interpretation. Here the distancing, 
interpretative-explanatory second step is regarded as crucial for the 
therapeutic process. Furthermore, he seems to have hoped that this way of 
construing empathy would protect psychoanalysis from charges of immature 
and sentimental subjectivity and thus safeguard its status as a science. In his 
later (1984) view the explanatory second step can be wrong (or inter- 
changeable with other right/wrong interpretations) whilst the communication of 
empathic responsiveness to the patient (getting the feeling state right and 
attending to it in an accepting manner) can make the patient feel understood 
and thus in itself have a therapeutic effect. The second, interpretive step 
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appears here as secondary also in terms of the curative function. This change 
constitutes a significant shift in terms of the relative weighting of the patient's 
subjective experience and the insight gained through interpretation. Kohut's 
later stress on the need for the therapist to understand and accept the 
patient's subjectivity led him to an increasingly interpersonal formulation of the 
analytic process. The quality of the therapeutic relationship as it is 
experienced by the patient now plays an important role in the cure. 
With regard to the two definitions of countertransference however Kohut 
remained a "Freudian'. Throughout his career Kohut maintained a negative 
view of countertransference, using this term only to refer to the manifestations 
of the analyst's neurotic disturbances in the analytic process. Consequently, 
he warned of the ways in which countertransference hinders the development 
and analysis of the patient's self-object transferences. "Clearly, we must keep 
the lenses of our magnifying glasses clean; we must, in particular, recognize 
our countertransferences and thus minimize the influence of factors that 
distort our perception of the analysand's communications of his personality" 
(1984, p. 37). Kohut denied that the observer inevitably influences the 
observed and insisted that difficulties in understanding arose from the 
analyst's "shortcomings as an observing instrument" (ibid. p. 38). 
Kohut maintained that psychoanalysis can and must be practised in a non- 
idiosyncratic fashion. Since countertransference is by definition harmful, the 
analyst's personality should be kept out. At the same time, Kohut knew that 
the analyst's sustained empathy is not a neutral stance as required by 
classical psychoanalysis. Thus, throughout his writings, a tension persists 
between his wish to redefine psychoanalysis as an activity which is 
determined by interpersonal factors and his efforts to keep it "clean" from the 




Intersubjectivity theory, a relatively recent strand within American 
psychoanalysis, had begun independent of self-psychology, but, since it 
contains important overlaps with Kohut, is sometimes regarded as an 
expansion of his work. Giving, like Kohut, centrality to the method of 
"sustained empathic immersion' in the patient's subjectivity, Robert Stolorow 
and his collaborators attempt to develop a more comprehensive relational 
paradigm for psychoanalysis. The central shift in emphasis their work 
introduces is away from the individual, isolated self to the fully contextualised 
reciprocal interaction between the subjectivities of patient and therapist. 
Intersubjectivity theory arose out of a reformulation of the positioning of the 
therapist vis-a-vis his patient which contrasted radically with Freud's classical 
scientific ideal of the analyst as an objective observer taking the patient's mind 
as his object. Intersubjectivity theory sees the therapist as intrinsically and 
inescapably engaged with his patient in a relationship which for both 
participants is personal to such an extent that their interrelatedness colours 
everything that is said or thought within (and about) the therapeutic process. 
Intersubjectivity theory is thus one of the strands within psychoanalytic 
thinking developing the consequences of the radical re-conceptualisation of 
countertransference. 
Atwood and Stolorow (1984) attempt to formulate a psychoanalytic 
phenomenology which uses for its discourse experience-near concepts and 
aims to "illuminate the structure, significance, origins and therapeutic 
transformations of personal subjective worlds in all their richness and 
diversity" (p. 1). They declare their philosophical basis as hermeneutics, 
aspects of existential-phenomenological philosophy, modern structuralism 
and "certain trends in contemporary Freudian thought" which redefine 
psychoanalysis as pure psychology, i. e. primarily Kohut. The authors 
formulate the psychoanalytic investigation as a hermeneutic process unfolding 
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in a field which is, following Kohut, delineated by the methods of introspection 
and empathy: 
All psychoanalytic understanding is interpretive understanding, in the sense 
that it always entails a grasp of the meaning of something that has been 
expressed. This meaning belongs to an individual's personal subjective world 
and becomes accessible to understanding in the medium of the analyst's 
empathy. Empathy arises as a possibility [... ] because of the common bond of 
humanity shared by the observer and the observed. The inquiry concerns an 
experiencing person, who stands in turn within the experiential field of the 
analyst, and empathy is implicit in the attempt to understand a person's 
communications and actions from the standpoint of his own subjective frame 
of reference [... ]. (1984, p. 4) 
One person's subjective experience of himself and his world, as it becomes 
manifested in the meanings of his expressions and actions, is accessible, 
mediated through the process of empathy, to the subjective experience of the 
other. Meaning is thought to reside in the individual's subjectivity. It becomes 
comprehensible to the therapist via empathy due to the commonality of their 
experience. The authors repeatedly emphasise the personal, subjective 
nature of each person's frame of reference however, thus pointing to the 
difference of experience and 'standpoints'. 
The development of psychoanalytic understanding may be conceptualized as 
an intersubjective process involving a dialogue between two personal 
universes. The goal of this dialogue is the illumination of the inner pattern of a 
life, that distinctive structure of meaning that connects the different parts of an 
individual's world into an intelligible whole. (ibid. p. 5) 
Two personal universes, linked through the common bond of humanity and, in 
this case, the psychoanalytic situation where the patient stands within the field 
of inquiry of the analyst. Their communication is conceived of as a dialogue in 
the course of which the analyst forms hypotheses regarding the possible 
meaning of the patient's expressions, which are then subjected to 
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comparisons and cross-referencing with other hypotheses arising from further 
communications. Thus "a field of provisionally identified meanings" becomes 
established which allows for the assessment of the validity of individual 
hypotheses according to the "degree of coherence" they show with the 
analysis as a whole. This is the hermeneutic circle in action. The individual 
hypotheses give rise to the whole field of established and possible meanings, 
which in turn provides the context for the evaluation of single insights. 
The structure of meaning disclosed by this mode of investigation becomes 
manifest in invariant thematic configurations that are repeated in different 
sectors of the person's experiences. The elucidation of such invariants forms 
the counterpart in the interpretive sciences of psychoanalysis to the doctrine 
of replication of observations in the sciences of nature. (ibid. p. 5) 
Psychoanalysis as a pure psychology uses interpretive procedures throughout 
and accordingly evaluates the validity of its findings by hermeneutic criteria. 
These include "the logical coherence of the argument, the 
comprehensiveness of the explanation, the consistency of the interpretations 
with accepted psychological knowledge, and the aesthetic beauty of the 
analysis in disclosing previously hidden patterns of order in the material being 
investigated" (ibid. p. 6). Whilst these criteria open up the possibility of 
evaluating the merit of different accounts, it is understood that the process of 
interpretation, which takes place within the "specific psychological field 
located at the point of intersection of two subjectivities" (ibid. ), is always 
relative to the whole of the context of both participants. Since interpretation is 
relative to the personal, cultural, and theoretical background of the analyst 
there is always a plurality of meanings. 
The relativity of interpretation is inescapable; all understanding is "grounded 
on and limited by the finite perspectives of [the analyst's] own personal world" 
(ibid. ). This fact, which, in the authors' minds, makes psychoanalysis as a 
pure psychology unacceptable to anyone committed to a natural science 
framework, is given by the intersubjective nature of inquiry in the analytic 
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situation. The plurality of meanings has to be faced by every analyst and is 
occasion for continued critical self-reflection. To acknowledge that the person 
of the analyst is always implicated in the direction the analysis takes 
necessitates, as part of this self-reflection, the consideration of alternative 
ways of understanding the patient. 
The intersubjective context in which psychoanalysis takes place is so 
fundamental to everything that emerges from this situation, that 
psychoanalysis itself is redefined as the study of intersubjectivity. "In its most 
general form, our thesis [... ] is that psychoanalysis seeks to illuminate 
phenomena that emerge within a specific psychological field constituted by 
the intersection of two subjectivities - that of the patient and that of the 
analyst" (ibid. p. 41). Psychoanalysis is neither a science of the presumed 
'inner', the intrapsychic realm of the mind, nor is it a science of 'the social' 
which studies 'behavioural facts' from a position presumed to be outside the 
observed. 
Rather, psychoanalysis is pictured here as the science of the intersubjective, 
focussed on the interplay between the differently organized subjective worlds 
of the observer and the observed. The observational stance is always one 
within, rather than outside, the intersubjective field [... ] being observed, a fact 
that guarantees the centrality of introspection and empathy as the methods of 
observation [... ]. Psychoanalysis is unique among the sciences in that the 
observer is also the observed. (ibid. pp. 41-2) 
Psychological phenomena are viewed not as products of mechanisms which 
take place in some isolated sphere 'inside the mind', but as forming as part of 
the interaction between subjectivities. They arise at the interface of 
reciprocally interacting subjectivities. 
The description of the psychoanalytic situation as a field of mutual influence 
and regulation leaves no room for the analyst to maintain a privileged position 
of objectivity and neutrality. The analyst has no immediate access to reality, 
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and there is no stance or mechanism available to him which can insure him 
against the potential effects aspects of his own subjectivity might have on the 
analytic process. In consequence of this view some of the theoretical 
constructs which have been foundational to psychoanalysis undergo radical 
transformations. As an example of this I want to briefly discuss the 
reformulation of transference suggested by Atwood and Stolorow. 
Experience, if it is to be given any meaning at all, has to be organised in 
accordance with some principles. The experience of reality is therefore always 
as constituted by one's subjective organisation (which in turn is shaped by the 
patterning of one's early interpersonal transactions). These organising 
principles are largely outside consciousness, not necessarily because they 
were repressed, but because they were mostly 'too close' to come into view. " 
There is no access to reality except via the use of such organising principles; 
consequently, there is no such thing as 'undistorted reality'. This means, 
within the context of the psychoanalytic process, that there cannot be a final 
point when transference (the 'distortion' of the perception of the analyst in 
terms of the organising principles of the past) is dissolved at last and the 
analyst is recognized for who he is in reality. It also means that the analyst 
himself has no way of determining when he is 'correctly' or 'realistically' 
perceived by the patient; he too can only entertain a version of himself, have a 
self-image, which is construed according to his own organising principles. '8 
The issue of transference and countertransference thus becomes a question 
of how the subjectivities of both participants are structured in terms of their 
respective previous experience and how these two subjectivities interact with 
each other. Instead of asking how the patient can be rid of his distortions, this 
perspective gives rise to a different set of, structuralist, questions: How is the 
patient's subjective world organised? What are the repeated patterns? Which 
experiences are emphasised, which are systematically excluded? How stable 
17 This is in line with an implicit notion of 'the unconscious' in Heidegger as that which we 
cannot see because we are wholly embedded in it - immersed in it, as it were, like fish in 
water. 
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on the one hand, how rigid on the other is the structure of the person's 
subjective world? 
Atwood and Stolorow draw on Piaget's concepts of accommodation and 
assimilation to show how the "structures of subjectivity" can be illuminated 
without falling back on what has become, in their eyes, an untenable 
objectivist position. Piaget writes: "Psychologically (behaviorally) considered, 
assimilation is the process whereby a function, once exercised, presses 
toward repetition, and in 'reproducing' its own activity produces a schema into 
which the objects propitious to its exercise, whether familiar [... ] or new [... ], 
become incorporated" (1970, p. 71). Assimilation eventually gives rise to the 
general schemata called structures, and it maintains these structures through 
its continual functioning. Accommodation, in contrast, refers to "the process 
whereby the schemes of assimilation themselves become modified in being 
applied to a diversity of objects" (ibid. p. 63). Piaget's concepts - whilst not 
necessitating a judgement of the kind: are the mental representations of the 
patient in accord with external reality - still yield criteria for the assessment of 
psychological health or pathology. How easily can new experience be 
accommodated into the existing framework, or alternative views entertained, 
without the self losing its sense of coherence and continuity, i. e. its identity? 
These ideas lead Atwood and Stolorow to a reformulation of the task of the 
analyst: 
[... ] the essential work of interpretation is to elucidate the nature, 
developmental origins, and functional significance of the psychological 
structures that pre-reflectively organize the patient's subjective experiences in 
general and thematise the transference relationship in particular (1984, p. 46). 
It is however not primarily insight into the mental structures which engenders 
therapeutic change. The patient's experience of his relationship with the 
therapist is most important for the generation of new psychic structures, which 
t8 I will return to the discussion of transference in chapter 6. 
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in turn allow for an increase in the range of available experiences and in the 
capacity for consideration of alternative meanings. 
Successful psychoanalytic treatment, in our view, does not produce 
therapeutic change by altering or eliminating the patient's invariant organizing 
principles. Rather, through new relational experiences with the analyst in 
concert with enhancements of the patient's capacity for reflective self- 
awareness, it facilitates the establishment and consolidation of alternative 
principles and thereby enlarges the patient's experiential repertoire. More 
generally, it is the formation of new organizing principles within an 
intersubjective system that constitutes the essence of developmental change 
throughout the life cycle. (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992, p. 25) 
This formulation of the analytic cure defines the therapeutic factor no longer 
as an intrapsychic event brought about by insight (the renunciation of infantile 
wishes brought about by the analysis of transference resistance), but places it 
into the interpersonal domain. Therapeutic change has become a function of 
the experience of being understood in a particular way. The analyst's 
"sustained empathic inquiry" makes possible the right kind of interpretation, 
but his availability to the patient as a self-object (Kohut) facilitates the 
development of the patient's self-structure via the internalisation of the 
analyst's empathic stance. Empathy itself is credited with "mutative power": 
Structure-forming articulations of experience are directly promoted in the 
facilitating medium of the analyst's empathic communications. Thus the 
cumulative experience of being understood in depth leads both to the 
crystallization of a sense of the self that has been comprehended and to the 
acquisition of the capacity for empathic self-observation. (ibid. p. 61). 
Whether this endeavour is successful or not depends to a large degree on the 
capacity of the analyst to 'decentre' (Piaget 1970), i. e. gain the kind of 
reflective self-awareness which brings into view the structures governing the 
organisation of his experience of the patient and, by the same token, opens 
up the possibility of alternative understandings. Whilst, as was already pointed 
141 
out, the countertransference of the analyst is seen as inescapable in that he 
will always organise his understanding in some particular ways which accord 
with his own subjective world, the attainment of a decentred perspective is 
seen as vital if unconscious identifications with the patient and subsequent 
countertransference enactments are to be avoided. 
However, the idea of decentring begs the question where it is that the analyst 
'steps' in his mind to attain a point of view from which to perceive his own 
idiosyncratic subjective world (his 'centre'). 'Decentring' seems to imply that it 
is possible somehow, in spite of all the protestations regarding the subjective 
organisation of experience, to step 'outside' and bring this personal 
perspective into a more impersonal view. If intersubjectivity theory were to 
remain consistent on this point, it would have to renounce the possibility of 
this move. Any possible 'self-reflective', 'decentred' position is subject, in 
principle, to the same contingencies and limitations as the original 'centred' 
one. The difference alternative perspectives can make seems to me rather 
more limited. By adding one (or more) position(s) any precipitant ideas 
regarding the truth-value of the first (or second, or third) position can be 
suitably revealed as contingent. 
A similar point can be made with regard to intersubjectivity as a theory. Whilst 
proposing that experience is structured in such a way that any claims 
regarding access to external, objective reality are ruled out, Stolorow and his 
collaborators put forward a developmental theory which, since it is designed 
to explicate the origins, functions and scope of subjectivity, makes claims 
pertaining to all subjectivities. In doing so they of course enter the domain of 
objectifying science without explaining how this should become possible. 
The discussion of intersubjectivity theory concludes the review of 
psychoanalytic formulations of clinical understanding. The shift I have 
described in the last three chapters from a detached objectivist position to 
more subjectivist and relational concepts will be followed through in the next 
142 




The Patient as Client 
Mutuality in humanistic psychotherapies 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapters I have focussed on -the development of 
psychoanalytic ideas of clinical understanding. I have described an overall 
trajectory beginning with Freud's objectivist programme and driving, over time, 
further and further into the domain of interrelatedness, intersubjectivity and 
mutuality. In this chapter I will present some formulations of clinical 
understanding from within the field of humanistic psychotherapy, a broad 
range of approaches which followed this trajectory further and, in many cases, 
explicitly severed the connection with much of Freud's vision19. 
Humanistic psychotherapy evolved, primarily in the United States, from the 
1940's onward and gained huge popularity during the late 60's and 70's. 
Humanistic psychotherapy was conceived as a 'third force', in opposition to 
what was seen as the stark determinism and reductionism of both the 
psychoanalytic and the behavioural approaches dominating psychology after 
World War II. Humanistic psychology, as it emerged from the work of Allport, 
Maslow, Rogers, Perls and others, put forward a vision of human nature 
emphasising its positive, creative, self-determining, growth-promoting 
aspects. It stresses the uniqueness of the individual who is seen as the only 
true `expert' of his, essentially private, subjective experience and who is taken 
to be capable of leading a life in freedom according to his own volitional 
choice. Freedom, privacy, uniqueness, self-determination, self-transparency, 
19 This is certainly the case for the two main humanistic authors discussed in this chapter. 
Both Rogers and Perls had psychoanalytic training of one form or another, and both explicitly 
distinguish their respective therapy approaches from psychoanalysis (see e. g. Raskin and 
Rogers 1989, and Perls et al. 1951). 
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choice, self-actualisation, personal growth - these are some of the key terms 
which are used in both descriptive and prescriptive ways. 
The valorisation of the uniqueness of the experience of each person and the 
fulfilment of her personal potential over and above the established cultural 
norms affected also the way in which the therapeutic process was conceived. 
Since nobody can be an expert on what is unique, the authority of the 
therapist as 'doctor, relying as it does on generalised notions of mental illness 
and health, is to be utterly distrusted. Therapy is now not the 'treatment' of 
patients, but the 'facilitation' of the growth of the individual client, shifting away 
from the perceived power differential of the medical paradigm towards ideas 
of relations of equality and mutuality. 
In the following I will focus on Carl Rogers' 'person-centred' approach and on 
Gestalt psychotherapy as it was first conceived of by Fritz and Laura Pens 
and later amended into a 'dialogic' method by some of its contemporary 
practitioners. Since both Rogers and the Gestalt theorists claim to embrace, 
to a greater or lesser extent, aspects of Buber's existentialist philosophy I will 
start this chapter with an outline of his work as far as it pertains to my thesis. 
Buber's dialogic philosophy 
Martin Buber (1878-1965), existentialist philosopher and Jewish theologian 
who had studied with Dilthey and Simmel, became widely known for his book 
Ich und Du (1923; translated in English as I and Thou, 1970). Buber's central 
thesis that our humanity can only be fully realised in reciprocal dialogic 
encounter with the other had immense influence both within philosophy and 
modern theology. In Ich und Du Buber distinguishes two basic and radically 
different kinds of relations we have to our world, the I-It and the I-Thou. 
Depending on the nature of the relation we are engaged in with the other both 
our selves and the other are constituted in fundamentally different ways. 
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There is no 'I' as such, 'I' only comes into being in meeting the other in either 
one of those two basic modes. 
In the I-it relation the subject stands back from the other to view 'it' objectively 
and from the outside, as it were, in terms of possible uses, and of causes and 
effects. Whilst the 'it' can designate both things and persons, the point is that 
in the I-it mode people too are related to as if they were things, that is, objects 
to be studied, manipulated, used or controlled. Whilst the I-it is the relation 
between a subject and an object that can be viewed in some independent 
way, the I-Thou is conceived of as a reciprocal and mutual relationship 
between two subjects. The I-Thou refers to an attitude of fully turning towards 
the other, seeking an interpersonal meeting characterised by presence and 
openness. The otherness and uniqueness of the other person are seen as 
givens which call for respect and understanding. Authenticity, responsiveness, 
mutuality and genuine present-ness are key characteristics of this attitude. 
Buber maintains that it is only in this type of meeting that man realises his full 
humanity. It is in meeting the Thou that the I realises itself. The 'other of the (- 
Thou is not necessarily another person; it is possible to enter into I-Thou 
encounters with nature, or ideas and works of art. God is the eternal Thou 
who can only be known when addressed in this open, living, dialogic manner. 
We can get glimpses of God's existence in the I-Thou encounters with others 
who make up our everyday world. 
Thus, the difference between the I-Thou and the I-it concerns the quality of 
the relation itself, not just the terms related to each other. Whilst the I-it is 
based on a distinction between subject and object, the I-Thou is conceived as 
intersubjective to such an extent that is becomes wrong to speak about 
subjectivity as something 'inner' belonging to one person. Buber further 
explicates this distinction in terms of the difference he introduces between his 
notions of participation or relation (Beziehung) on the one hand, and 
experience (Erfahrung) on the other. "Those who experience don't participate 
in the world. For the experience is 'in them' and not between them and the 
world. The world does not participate in experience. " (1923, P. 56) In 
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experiencing we distance ourselves from the other, we take up a position from 
which we observe and reflect on our observations of an object. This mode 
allows the gathering of knowledge of objects, their classification and 
generalisation. In contradistinction, the I-Thou is characterised by relationship, 
in-between-ness, participation, concern, and reciprocity. 
Buber obviously uses the terms Erfahrung and Beziehung in a very particular 
fashion20. Beziehung for Buber operates only when the sedimentations of the 
past fall away to allow the openness of the present encounter. The Beziehung 
of the I-Thou Buber believes to take place uncontaminated by the 
preconceptions and intentions of the persons involved. 21 
The relation to the You is unmediated [... ]. Nothing conceptual intervenes 
between I and You, no prior knowledge and no imagination; and memory 
itself is changed as it plunges from particularity into wholeness. No purpose 
intervenes between I and You, no greed and no anticipation; and longing itself 
is changed as it plunges from the dream into appearance. Every means is an 
obstacle. Only where all means have disintegrated encounters occur. 
(ibid. pp. 62-3) 
In contrast, experience, in Bubers use of the term designating objectifying 
distance, prevents the full encounter with the Thou. Whilst there is a moral 
obligation implied in his insistence that the I-Thou is the mode of relating that 
realises our true humanity, Buber emphasises that it is transient and has to 
give way again to the I-It. "Every You in the world is doomed by its nature to 
become a thing or at least to enter into thinghood again and again" (ibid. 
p. 69). It is the "sublime melancholy of our lot" that every loving encounter, 
every contemplation, every actualisation of work runs its course and ends in 
its loss, at which time the You has "again become describable, analyzable, 
classifiable", i. e. has become the object of experience and, potentially, 
20 His use of the term relation for instance differs from Simmel, who uses this term to 
designate social relations which have become sedimented and objectified 
21 The possibility of entering into a relation of understanding free from preconceptions and 
intentions is denied by the philosophers I draw on in Part II. 
I 
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knowledge. Buber sees this loss as inevitable; he admits it is also necessary, 
both in the domain of the everyday and in the pursuit of the development of 
science. Just how distrustful Buber remains, however, of what he calls 
"conceptual knowledge", how mindful he is of the danger that knowledge 
might kill its objects, is apparent in the following paragraph: 
Knowledge: as he beholds what confronts him, its being is disclosed to the 
knower. What he beheld as present he will have to comprehend as an object, 
compare with objects, assign a place in an order of objects, and describe and 
analyze objectively; only as an It can it be absorbed into the store of 
knowledge. But in the act of beholding it was no thing among things, no event 
among events; it was present exclusively. It is not in the law that is afterward 
derived from the appearance but in the appearance itself that the being 
communicates itself. That we think the universal is merely an unreeling of the 
skeinlike event that was beheld in the particular, in a confrontation. And now it 
is locked into the It-form of conceptual knowledge. Whoever unlocks it and 
beholds it again as present, fulfils the meaning of that act of knowledge as 
something that is actual and active between men. But knowledge can also be 
pursued by stating: 'so that is how matters stand; that is the name of the 
thing; that is how it is constituted; that is where it belongs. ' What has become 
an It is then taken as an It, experienced and used as an It, employed along 
with other things for the project of finding one's way in the world, and 
eventually for the project of'conquering' the world. (ibid. pp. 90-1) 
Two kinds of knowledge are juxtaposed here, one. arising from the I-Thou, the 
other from I-It relations. The former is characterised by terms like beholding, 
confronting, disclosing, unlocking, communicating, actual, active, particular 
and present; the latter is described in terms of comparing, analysing, naming, 
locking in, conquering, objects, matter, things, stores and universals. Buber's 
preference is clear, especially when it comes to interpersonal understanding. 
Only to the extent that I-It type knowledge is absent can the other person's 
communication have the kind of impact which leads to the disclosure of his 
being. This occurs in "genuine dialogue - no matter whether spoken or silent 
- where each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their 
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present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of 
establishing a living mutual relation between himself and them" (1947, p. 19). 
Buber stresses that it is precisely the uniqueness and immediacy of the truly 
dialogic encounter that leaves the I without any conceptual or other readily 
available `handles' to manage the meeting of the You. The I is left fully 
exposed to the impact of the other: 
What occurs to me says something to me, but what it says to me cannot be 
revealed by any esoteric information; for it has never been said before nor is it 
composed of sounds that have ever been said. It can neither be interpreted 
nor translated, I can have it neither explained nor displayed; it is not a what at 
all, it is said into my very life; it is no experience that can be remembered 
independently of the situation, it remains the address of that moment and 
cannot be isolated, it remains the question of a questioner and will have its 
answer. ' (ibid. p. 29) 
It is clear from this paragraph that Buber has in mind a meeting of great 
interpersonal impact that defies one's preconceived (and present) ideas, a 
meeting that leaves one reeling just because of what has happened is 
somehow in excess of what can be put into available words. The event of 
meeting the other defies interpretation and translation; understanding is not 
mediated by a language which is already known. It is hard to see, however, 
how anything that is said which was not "composed of sounds that have ever 
been said" and which seems to escape entirely an understanding governed by 
the rules of language can convey meaning. Given the extent to which some of 
his main concepts refer to speech, it is clear that Buber did not believe 
language played no part in understanding. In his essay The Word that is 
Spoken (1965) Buber writes at length about the importance of speech and the 
need for one's spoken words to be understood (for only through the 
understanding by a You is the I realised). For Buber language is fundamental 
to the being of man, and it operates primarily in the mode of dialogic 
exchange of spoken words, i. e. addressing an other and awaiting a response. 
Language always already exists, which is to say that the other who is 
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addressed (in speech or in thought) co-constitutes the one who speaks or 
thinks. Whilst any utterance or thought of course draws on existing language 
(and in so far consists of sounds already heard) the otherness of the other, 
coming up against which is central to the I-Thou relation, is encountered only 
to the extent that what is heard has been un-heard of. The otherness of the 
other (a concept which implies the multiplicity of particular others) breaks 
open the realm of existing meanings. What is communicated and understood 
in the I-Thou relation goes beyond what either of the participants were 
capable of saying or understanding prior to their meeting. The force of the (- 
Thou meeting is due to its newness and unexpectedness (it cannot be 
expected). What is said and understood results from this dialogue which, sui 
generis, exceeds the sum total of the words of the speakers. Dialogue is not 
produced by two speakers, it is that which happens in "the between", the 
sphere that exists between the speaking persons. 
Buber's I-Thou relation is a meeting between two parties which is essentially 
private and exclusive of anything 'third' that might impinge on its immediacy. It 
is a two-person relationship that unfolds oblivious of any other persons or its 
social context. The stress is on the present and unique to an extent that any 
prior ideas or meanings brought to this meeting, including of course the entire 
realm of linguistic meanings, are seen as detracting from its impact. 
Furthermore, since the I-Thou can be 'read' equally from both participating 
sides, its mutuality results in a formal symmetry. Privileging the couple the 
participants of which constitute each other and only refer to each other 
Buber's I-Thou operates on an entirely level playing field. The relation to the 
other is conceived as free of any differences of power or responsibility. 22 
Relationships which are structured with the aim in mind that one (or some) of 
its participants are helped in some fashion, e. g. therapeutic or educative 
relationships, rely for the fulfilment of that aim on elements of the I-Thou, yet 
22 Levinas' (1989) rejection of this symmetry constitutes his central disagreement with Buber. 
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there are ineluctable limitations to their mutuality. In the post-script to I and 
Thou Buber takes up this problem, first in relation to the task of the teacher: 
The teacher who wants to help the pupil to realize his best potentialities must 
intend him as this particular person, both in his potentiality and in his actuality. 
More precisely, he must know him not as a mere sum of qualities, aspirations, 
and inhibitions; he must apprehend him, and affirm him, as a whole. But this 
he can only do if he encounters him as a partner in a bipolar situation. And to 
give his influence unity and meaning, he must live through this situation in all 
its aspects not only from his own point of view but also from that of his 
partner. He must practice the kind of realization that I call embracing 
[Umfassung; my note]. (1923, p. 178) 
What is required here is rather complex and makes conflicting demands on 
the teacher. She is asked to 'intend' the pupil both as the person he is and as 
that person who has realised his best potentialities. This demand is further 
explained as "apprehending and affirming the pupil as a whole", something 
which can only be achieved in a bipolar partnership. Furthermore, the teacher 
needs to be able to see things also from his, the pupil's point of view; she 
needs to have an understanding of the pupil which is, in part, informed by 
empathy. 
The aim to realise the pupils best potentialities implies a hierarchy of 
potentialities and the privileging of some potentialities over others; it also 
implies someone who makes this choice, the teacher, who 'intends' the 
potential person of the pupil. This seems to contradict the requirement to 
apprehend and affirm the whole of the person of the pupil, which by definition 
includes his worst potentialities. The apprehending of the whole person that 
Buber advocates in the spirit of the I-Thou in this instance looks more like the 
'intending' of the one possible versions of the future person which coincides 
with the moral values of the teacher. The intention to influence the child (no 
doubt an inevitable part of the task of a teacher), which according to Buber's 
definition has to be subsumed under the I-It relationship, looks to take 
151 
precedence over the ideal of the I-Thou. Whilst the pupil is also required to 
'intend' the teacher as the teacher he is, Buber stresses that it is vital for the 
achievement of the educational task that the mutuality of this relationship 
stays incomplete. 
Similar restraints on mutuality are in operation in psychotherapy, and yet, like 
the teacher, the therapist can achieve his aims only if he enters into a 
personal I-Thou "confrontation" with the other he is concerned with. 
[His] true task, which is the regeneration of a stunted personal centre [... ] can 
only be brought off by a man who grasps with the profound eye of a physician 
the buried, latent unity of the suffering soul, which can be done only if he 
enters as a partner into a person-to-person relationship, but never through the 
observation and investigation of an object. In order to promote coherently the 
liberation and actualization of this unity in a new situation in which the other 
person comes to terms with the world, the therapist, like the educator, must 
stand not only at his own pole of the bipolar relationship but also at the other 
pole, experiencing the effects of his own actions. Again the specific 'healing' 
relationship would end as soon as the patient decided to practice the art of 
embracing and actually succeeded in experiencing events also from the 
doctor's point of view. Healing, like educating, requires that one lives in 
confrontation and is yet removed. (ibid. p. 179) 
Whilst Buber's concept of embracing (Umfassung, also translated as 
inclusion) introduces an idea similar to empathy, he insists that the 
acceptance of "the strictness and depth of human individuation, the elemental 
otherness of the other" (1965, p. 59) is the foundation of every "genuine 
conversation". In such a conversation the other needs to be respected in his 
otherness, no matter how radical the difference in the views expressed might 
be. When it comes to the discussion of disagreements, 
everything depends so far as human life is concerned, on whether each 
thinks of the other as the one he is, whether each, that is, with all the desire to 
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influence the other, nevertheless unreservedly accepts and confirms him in 
his being this man and in his being made in this particular way. (ibid. ) 
The other is not held at bay as the other, but turned to and "made present". 
Making present of the other becomes possible in virtue of a particular 
capacity, 
a capacity possessed to some extent by everyone, which may be described 
as 'imagining' the real: I mean the capacity to hold before one's soul a reality 
arising at this moment but not able to be directly experienced. Applied to 
intercourse between men, 'imagining' the real means that I imagine to myself 
what another man is at this very moment wishing, feeling, perceiving, 
thinking, and not as a detached content but in his very reality, that is, as a 
living process in this man. (ibid, p. 60) 
In making another person fully present, what is imagined "is joined in the act 
of imagining", so that the I experience something that the other experiences 
not just in a general, but in a quite specific manner. "This making present 
increases until it is a paradox in the soul when I and the other are embraced 
by a common living situation, and (let us say) the pain which I inflict upon him 
surges up in myself, revealing the abyss of contradictoriness of life between 
man and man" (ibid. p. 60). 
Thus Buber's concept of 'making present', to the extent that it involves a 
process of experiencing the experience of the other, contains an element of 
empathy based on imagination. Buber is very keen however to emphasise 
that this is a bi-polar situation, i. e. the other is still faced in his otherness. It is 
thus not an empathic movement in which two become one, nor is it a 
detached observation of the other as a separate object. Buber writes: "I prefer 
the name 'imagining the real', for in its essential being this gift is not a looking 
at the other, but a bold swinging - demanding the most intensive stirring of 
one's being - into the life of the other' (ibid. p. 71). Through this act of 
imagination the other can be known "in his wholeness, unity, and uniqueness, 
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and with his dynamic centre" (ibid). 'Making present' thus gives rise to a 
knowledge of the person which is totally different in kind from the knowledge 
arrived at by the observational and analytical methods of the human sciences. 
Buber also uses the term Umfassung (translated as inclusion or embracing) 
for this 'bold swinging', and, whilst distinguishing it from empathy, gives it 
centrality for his concept of the dialogical. Empathy, for Buber, 
means, if anything, to glide with one's own feeling into the dynamic structure 
of an object [... ]; it means to 'transpose' oneself over there and in there. Thus 
it means the exclusion of one's own concreteness, the extinguishing of the 
actual situation of life, the absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in 
which one participates. Inclusion is the opposite of this. It is the extension of 
one's own concreteness, the fulfilment of the actual situation of life, the 
complete presence of the reality in which one participates. Its elements are, 
first, a relation, of no matter what kind, between two persons, second, an 
event experienced by them in common, in which at least one of them actively 
participates, and, third, the fact that this one person, without forfeiting 
anything of the felt reality of his activity, at the same time lives through the 
common event from the standpoint of the other. A relation between persons 
that is characterized in more or less degree by the element of inclusion may 
be termed a dialogical relation. (1947, pp. 124-5) 
The terms making present, imagining the real and inclusion or embracing 
seem to be used pretty much synonymously, and they define dialogical 
relations (ibid. p. 97). The central idea is of an intense dual relationship, where 
both poles of the duality can be experienced with almost equal power without 
ever merging into one. Understanding is not achieved from a position of 
disinterest by a spectator of an 'external' other. As we saw Buber rejected 
'observation' as a route to interpersonal understanding. Contra 'empathy', 
Buber retains the radical otherness of the other. Neither objectification nor 
identification can be allowed to eradicate the independence and difference of 
the people involved in the dialogic meeting. Understanding comes about 
through a commitment to the other in which the other remains other. This 
commitment is a strictly personal affair. 
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It is interesting to note that Buber, for whom mutuality was such an important 
aspect of the fully-fledged I-Thou encounter, was very clear about the 
incompatibility of this relationship dimension with psychotherapy. In 
acknowledging the fact that the therapeutic relationship could never be fully 
mutual Buber, who never practiced psychotherapy, saw an essential 
distinction which Carl Rogers refused to accept. In a public dialogue between 
the two men conducted in 195723 Buber stresses the difference in position and 
intention between therapist and client, a difference which Rogers seeks to 
eliminate. In Buber's view the client cannot practice (and has no intention of 
practicing) the inclusion that characterises the central mental movement on 
the part of the therapist. The client is after all concerned with his problems, 
and the focus on this concern constitutes the therapeutic situation. The help 
seeking/giving dimension of the therapeutic process structures the 
relationship in an asymmetrical manner. Rogers claims that the therapeutic 
relationship is, at least in its important, change promoting moments, one of 
equality and is experienced by the two participants in the same way. Buber 
denies this possibility, pointing to the reality of the situation: both client and 
therapist look at the client's situation, not at that of the therapist. In relation to 
therapy Buber insists, "You are not equals and you cannot be" (Rogers, 1989, 
p. 50). 
Rogers' theory of therapy, which takes the ideas of equality and mutuality a 
considerable distance, gives empathy a central role in the therapeutic 
process. The shift introduced in his work towards a radical individualism and, 
concomitantly, an exclusive focus in therapy on the client's subjectivity will be 
discussed in the following section. 
23 The dialogue between Buber and Rogers took place in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on 18 April 
1957, at a conference on Buber's work organised by the University of Michigan. The dialogue 
was moderated by the American philosopher Maurice Friedman. 
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Rogers: The primacy of empathy 
Carl Rogers came to psychotherapy via a psychoanalytically oriented child 
guidance training and was influenced early on in his career by the work of 
Otto Rank and his followers who he met at the University of Pennsylvania 
School of Social Work and the Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic. Rogers, 
who published an early version of his approach to psychotherapy in 1940, 
claimed that it was Rank who first made him realise the importance of 
concentrating entirely on the feelings expressed by the client and of 
responding to him in a wholly accepting manner. Professing a strong belief in 
the positive, health and growth seeking aspects of the human psyche, Rogers 
promoted a conceptually rather simple, if not simplistic, form of 'person- 
centred' psychotherapy. Perhaps due to the optimism it expressed, his work 
became hugely popular from the 1960's onward. 
Central to Rogers' theory is what he calls the actualising tendency in man24, Na 
trust in a constructive directional flow towards the realization of each 
individual's full potential" (Raskin and Rogers, 1989, p. 155). Positive 
development, so Rogers' main thesis, will occur once certain interpersonal 
conditions are in place. "I can state the overall hypothesis in one sentence, as 
follows. If I can provide a certain type of relationship, the other person will 
discover within himself the capacity to use that relationship for growth, and 
change and personal development will occur" (1961, p. 33). To seek fulfilment 
of personal potential is human nature. 
The individual has within himself the capacity and the tendency, latent if not 
evident, to move forward toward maturity. In a suitable psychological climate 
this tendency is released, and becomes actual rather than potential. It is 
evidently in the capacity of the individual to understand those aspects of his 
life and of himself which are causing him pain and dissatisfaction, an 
understanding which probes beneath his conscious understanding of himself 
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into those experiences which he has hidden from himself because of their 
threatening nature. It shows itself in the tendency to reorganize his 
personality and his relationship to life in ways which are regarded as more 
mature. Whether one calls it a growth tendency, a drive toward self- 
actualization, or a forward-moving directional tendency, it is the mainspring of 
life, and is, in the last analysis, the tendency upon which all psychotherapy 
depends. (ibid. p. 35) 
Impairment in psychological functioning is seen as wholly due to deficiencies 
in the social environment, especially where the provision of early care is 
linked to externally imposed "conditions of value", creating a conflict in the 
child between its need for loving care and its "organismic valuing process". If 
psychopathology is caused by external obstacles to self-experience and self- 
expression, then, Rogers follows, all that needs to happen is to provide an 
interpersonal climate free of these constraining elements, and the arrested 
developmental process can resume. Rogers centrally believes that "a self- 
directed growth process would follow the provision and reception of a 
particular kind of relationship characterized by genuineness, non-judgemental 
caring, and empathy" (Raskin and Rogers, 1989, p. 155). These three 
characteristics, which most often are termed congruence, unconditional 
positive regard and empathy, are the key qualities the therapist needs to 
possess and to demonstrate to the client. In 1957 Rogers claims that they 
constitute the "necessary and sufficient conditions" of therapeutic 
effectiveness. 
Congruence (also: genuineness) refers to the correspondence between the 
therapist thoughts and his behaviour towards the client. For the therapist to be 
genuine means to be aware of his feelings, and to be willing to be in touch 
with and express the various feelings and attitudes which exist in him. The 
therapist does not put up a professional front or personal facade. "It is only by 
24 The concept of self-actualisation was advanced by Kurt Goldstein (1939), whose holistic 
theory of personality was very influential within humanistic psychology. See below for his 
influence on Fritz Perls. 
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providing the genuine reality which is in me, that the other person can 
successfully seek for the reality in him. It seems extremely important to be 
real" (1961, p. 34). Rogers thought that congruence was the most basic of the 
three conditions. 
Unconditional positive regard refers to a fundamental attitude of acceptance 
and appreciation of the client as a person of intrinsic self-worth. Other terms 
used for this aspect are non-possessive caring, prizing and warmth. 
Unconditional regard is that element in the therapist which safeguards that the 
therapeutic relationship is one of "warmth and safety, [... ] the safety of being 
liked and prized" (1961, p. 34). In the presence of this condition Rogers 
thought therapeutic progress was likely. 
Empathy, the condition which Rogers thought was most trainable of the three, 
seeks to understand 'from inside' the client's feelings and communications as 
they seem to him at that moment. Empathy refers to the therapist's familiarity 
with the client's subjectivity, but it also includes the communication of this 
understanding to the client. Importantly, empathy is only empathy if it is 
received as such by the client. Thus, it is essentially a communicative 
process. 
Empathic understanding. When the therapist is sensing the feelings and 
personal meanings which the client is experiencing in each moment, when he 
can perceive these from "inside", as they seem to the client, and when he can 
successfully communicate something of this understanding to his client, then 
this third condition is fulfilled. (1961, p. 62) 
Rogers contrasts this empathic approach, which he thinks of as 
phenomenological, with other types of understanding, e. g., 
I understand what is wrong with you'; I understand what makes you act that 
way", or 'I too have experienced your trouble and I reacted very differently'; 
these are the types of understanding which we usually offer and receive, an 
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evaluative understanding from the outside. But when someone understands 
how it feels and seems to me, without wanting to analyze me or judge me, 
then I can blossom and grow in that climate. And research bears out this 
common observation. When the therapist can grasp the moment-to-moment 
experiencing which occurs in the inner world of the client as the client sees it 
and feels it, without losing the separateness of his own identity in this 
empathic process, then change is likely to occur. (ibid. p. 62) 
Empathy is not just and not primarily the process of the therapist gaining 
understanding of the client; it is one of the key factors in the change process 
itself. Truax and Carkhuff (1967), two close collaborators of Rogers, link this 
concept of empathy to Fliess' concept of trial identification. 
[Empathic] understanding means that the therapist has to a great degree 
successfully assumed the internal frame of reference of the patient [... ] this 
"trial identification", where the therapist steps into the patient's shoes and 
views the world from this emotional and perceptual vantage point, allows him 
for the moment to experience the world, events, and significant people as if 
he were the client himself. To be "inside" the client, and yet to remain 
"outside", lets the therapist sense the meaning of the anger or the fear, its 
antecedents and its consequences, without being overwhelmed by the 
experiencing. Thus he can contribute to the expansion and clarification of the 
patient's own awareness of experiences and feelings. This is the essence of 
the fine balance between identification and objectivity that the therapist must 
achieve to become effective. (ibid. pp. 285-6) 
Empathy is a conscious and intentional joining in the client's subjective 
experience, not more and not less. The understanding that is gained through 
empathy is thought to be an understanding with rather than an understanding 
of the client. Empathy for Rogers is not about the therapist comprehending 
the client in ways he cannot comprehend himself. Empathic understanding is 
of the client's conscious subjectivity; it is the duplication of the client's 
subjectivity in the therapist's mind. For psychoanalytic formulations of 
empathy the task of understanding the patient's unconscious is central; in 
159 
person-centred psychotherapy this task is replaced by that of understanding 
the client's subjective experience (as it is known, i. e. conscious, to the client). 
The emphasis is on communicating the willingness and the capacity to 
understand the client as she understands herself. The ensuing subjective 
feeling of being understood and accepted supports the client's ongoing and 
deepening self-exploration and self-acceptance. 
The therapist's relational attitudes help reduce the client's interpersonal 
anxiety (including his fear of the therapist); this facilitates the reflection on 
intrapsychic anxieties. Reduction in anxiety is thought to enable greater self- 
awareness, allowing access to an increasing range of experience. 'New 
knowledge' comes from 'inside' the client, it is not offered by the therapist on 
the basis of his expert knowledge. 
Empathy is conceived not so much as a cognitive process as a participation in 
the client's conscious subjectivity, stressing in particular the affective 
components of the client's experience. And yet, there is, in Rogers' concept of 
advanced empathy, a blurring of the distinction between empathic 
communication and what might in psychoanalysis count as an interpretation of 
unconscious mental content. This is what Rogers says about advanced 
empathy: "When the client's world is clear to the counsellor and she can move 
about in it freely, then she can both communicate her understanding of what 
is vaguely known to the client, and she can also voice meanings in the client's 
experience of which the client is scarcely aware" (1962, p. 93). Here the 
therapist can see more, understand more than the client, and can through 
verbal communication add to her self-awareness and self-knowledge. 
Contra psychoanalysis Rogers insists that this understanding must not be 
subjected to explanations drawing on theoretical constructs but needs to 
remain within the terms of the client's own experience. Also, the 
communication of understanding has to be embedded in a relationship which 
is full of warmth and acceptance. It is on these grounds that Rogers takes 
issue with the use of empathy by Kohut. In an article written in 1968, shortly 
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before his death, he criticises Kohut for his cold and impersonal use of 
empathy as a method of collecting information about the client's inner life, and 
he reaffirms his life-long conviction that empathy is a powerful healing agent 
in its own right. "It is one of the most potent aspects of therapy, because it 
releases, it confirms, it brings even the most frightened client into the human 
race. If a person can be understood, he or she belongs" (1986, p. 129). 
Empathy induces the experience of being understood which in turn leads to a 
sense of belonging. The breaking down of the perceived barriers alienating 
the client from the world inhabited by others and, by the same token, from 
himself is the primary function of a therapy in the person-centred mode. 
The therapist's knowledge has no place in this scheme of things, and 
interpretation has become an anathema. 
No approach which relies upon knowledge, upon training, upon the 
acceptance of something that is taught, is of any use [... ] It is possible to 
explain a person to himself, to prescribe steps which should lead him forward, 
to train him in knowledge about a more satisfying way of life. But such 
methods are, in my experience, futile and inconsequential. (1961, p. 33) 
Rogers goes as far as suggesting that it takes no expert knowledge, and 
hence no prolonged course of study or training, to become a psychotherapist. 
After all, "the client is his or her own therapist" (Raskin and Rogers, 1989, 
p. 161). The function of the psychotherapist is merely to facilitate the process 
of self-exploration and self-actualisation, and this function is provided through 
the relational attitudes of the person of the therapist. 'Knowledge' and the idea 
of expertise which accompanies it can only get in the way of the kind of 
person-to-person meeting that Rogers thought was the condition for healing 
and growth. And yet, if the therapist can add to the client's self-knowledge, as 
Rogers suggests in introducing the notion of advanced empathy, the question 
arises where this new knowledge comes from. Rogers does, after all, smuggle 
in an element of interpretation whilst claiming to stay within the reach of 
empathy, thus creating a conflict regarding what is admitted as knowledge. 
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There is a question, furthermore, whether Rogers' three core conditions do 
not pose rather conflicting demands on the therapist. To the extent that the 
therapist is required to be genuine, he is meant to be in touch with and 
(discerningly and considerately) give expression to his own personal thoughts, 
feelings, and responses. At the same time, he is required to demonstrate, at 
all times and regardless of what the client presents him with, a warm and 
accepting attitude, whilst conducting the subtle phenomenological task of 
empathic enquiry. These demands are hard to reconcile with each other, and 
at times must appear contradictory. It seems difficult to believe that any 
therapist might genuinely have only warm and accepting feelings towards his 
clients. Furthermore, a person who can equally accept and appreciate all 
manner of characteristics and behaviours in other people surely needs to be a 
person not only without internal conflict, but also without preference and 
prejudice -a person from nowhere, so to speak, who is hardly a person at all. 
Also, the demand to be both genuine and empathic requires that the therapist 
be both inside his own subjectivity and that of the client. Again, to be truly 
genuine could very easily clash with the empathic mode. In contrast to 
Buber's concept of inclusion (his bold swinging between the two positions), 
Rogers' theory is ambiguous as to whether it wants to be a one-person or a 
two-person psychology. 
Rogers thought his therapy, when successful, operated in the I-Thou mode as 
defined by Buber. As we saw however, Buber was rather critical of empathy 
since it tends to eradicate the other person's fundamental otherness. 
Furthermore, he insisted that the mutuality central to the I-Thou could not 
exist in a relationship which is structured so one person can be helpful to the 
other (and not the other way round). The immediacy and openness of the 
encounter that Buber has in mind has to be compromised by the non- 
reciprocal empathic focus necessary to do therapy. 
The 1957 dialogue between the two men ends with Buber stating quite plainly 
what he sees as another essential difference to Rogers' philosophy of the 
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person, putting forward an argument that amounts, in my mind, to an even 
more fundamental criticism. Buber asserts that a distinction should be made 
between the concept of "persons" and that of "individuals". The stress on the 
uniqueness and private-ness of the individual tends to run counter to the 
recognition of the essential social connectedness and reciprocity of the 
person. It is very clear that he criticises what is for Rogers the core concern: 
the self-referential, individualising character of the actualising tendency with 
its stress on uniqueness and private fulfilment. "I am against individuals and 
for persons" (in Rogers, 1989, p. 63) are Buber's last words in this debate. 
Given the rather extreme emphasis on individuality and privacy of experience 
in Rogers' theory of personality, there is indeed the question, what provides 
the basis for the possibility of empathy. Does empathy not require that 
recognise in the other something I know in myself? Is it hence not based on 
sameness or at least great areas of overlap, i. e. similarities of experience? If 
experience is essentially unique and private, everybody is indeed the (only) 
'expert' on him/herself, and nobody could hope to find the kind of access to 
another person deserving the name 'understanding'. 
For a rather different vision of the person, and consequently of the process of 
understanding in the psychotherapeutic process, also from within the 
humanistic psychotherapy arena, I will now turn to a discussion of Gestalt 
therapy as it was developed by the Perls' and their collaborators. 
Gestalt therapy: Contact at the boundary 
Founded by Fritz and Laura Perls in the 1940's Gestalt therapy is based on 
principles adopted from Gestalt psychology and incorporates elements of 
phenomenological and existential philosophy. Gestalt psychology originally 
grew out of the convergent researches of Wolfgang Köhler, Max Wertheimer 
and Kurt Koffka. It first developed as a theory of perception in opposition to 
the more classical theory of perception dominant at the end of the 19th 
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century; later it was extended to social psychology by Kurt Lewin and his 
pupils. Originally resolutely naturalistic in its orientation, it emphasised, like 
phenomenology, the inseparability of subject and object. 
Gestalt psychologists pointed to the inherent structures in complex perceptual 
units (like a melody or a person's physiognomy); they thought that such acts 
of perception possessed Gestaltqualitäten as perceptual realities supervening 
and imposed on sensation. These inherent qualities entailed that such 
structures had to be viewed as organized wholes, a concept which was used 
to undermine the belief in the existence of 'sensation as such'. It is not the 
sensations which are primarily given as the raw material of perception and 
subsequently organised into perceptual wholes, as associationist theory 
claimed. Sensations, Gestalt psychology maintains, can be determined only 
secondarily as elements within the Gestalt. It is always the already organised 
whole which is primarily perceived. 
Gestalt psychologists concluded that the perception of complex structures as 
wholes had to be explained as evidence of pre-wired patterns and laws of 
perception. The concept of the figure/ground relation plays a central role in 
this context. The figure stands out from the surrounding ground; it appears to 
have a more definite surface and clearer boundaries which makes it capable 
of being definitely perceived and recognized. The ground lends the backdrop 
for the figure but appears itself as less definite. The figure is termed by the 
German word Gestalt which translates, somewhat unhappily, into the English 
'shape' or 'configuration'. Gestalt psychology implies that the brain has an 
inbuilt tendency to detect meaningful whole Gestalten, making perception a 
much more active process than previously thought. Köhler additionally put 
forward that the figure/ground relationship within the perceptual field changes 
in accordance with the fluid rhythms of the organism's need satisfaction cycle. 
Fritz Perls came into contact with Gestalt theory early in his career through his 
work in Frankfurt as an assistant of Kurt Goldstein, a physician and 
psychiatrist who was also a leading Gestalt Psychologist. Perls was 
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impressed by Goldstein's concept of the organism-as-a-whole, which posited 
the organism/environment interface as the basic variable. For Goldstein all 
parts of the organism are dynamically interrelated and can only be understood 
as part of this dynamic whole. 25 Perls subsequently trained as a 
psychoanalyst - he was an analysand of Wilhelm Reich in the 1930's, and 
later of Karen Horney. From Reich he adopted the emphasis on the psyche- 
soma link. For the 'middle-period' Reich psychological rigidity, i. e. neurosis, is 
manifested and supported by postural-muscular rigidity. Any psychological 
change must be accompanied by modification of this physical 'armouring', 
implying a functional identity of 'character and bodily posture. As further 
important influences Penis quotes Kurt Lewin's field theory and Jan Smuts' 
(1926) holism. 
Perls published his first book on what came to be known as Gestalt therapy in 
1947, after his arrival in the US from South Africa26. Whilst Fritz Perls 
appeared as the founding father of Gestalt therapy, whose charismatic 
presence dominated the Gestalt scene to such an extent that this approach 
became identified with his books and his demonstration techniques, some 
writers claim that his wife Laura had a major influence on the development of 
this method and wrote (or co-wrote) some of the material which was published 
in her husbands name (see Yontef and Simkin, 1989). In the few publications 
under her own name she appears to promote a Gestalt therapy somewhat at 
variance from that of Fritz Perls. Her criticisms of the increasingly 'gimmicky' 
practice of Gestalt and her emphasis on the dialogic engagement make her 
increasingly influential with contemporary theorists. I will return to Laura Perls' 
contributions and the moves towards a dialogic Gestalt therapy after I have 
outlined some of the central ideas publicised by Fritz Penis and his 
collaborators. 
25 Goldstein himself was influenced by biologist J. von Uexkuell, whose suggestion that the 
internal structure of an organism comes about via the internalisation of external structure was 
also taken up, in very different ways, by K Lorenz and Lacan. 
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A central concept of Gestalt therapy is awareness; Perls states that the main 
goal of Gestalt is the increase of awareness on the part of the client. Gestalt 
focuses on the here and now experiences of the client and the therapist in an 
attempt to get hold of what is 'actually' sensed and felt by the client. This 
focus on the 'raw data' of experience is designed to reach underneath the 
habitual thought and behaviour patterns, preconceived ideas, and neurotic 
inhibitions of the client. Gestalt therapy uses focussed awareness and 
experimentation, and endeavours to stay clear of explanation and 
interpretation. 
Two further key concepts are experience and the contact boundary. Pens et 
at. (1951) elaborate these in relation to a generalised idea of the organism. 
The organism is viewed as wholly immersed in its environment; it constantly 
interacts with it to such an extent that it does not make sense to speak about 
its organisation, its capacities or its functions without keeping its environment 
in mind. Perls et al. therefore propose to speak only of the 
organism/environment field. Even when referring to psychological constructs, 
such as impulses, drives etc., which tend to imply the isolation of the 
individual organism, it should not be forgotten that they are always functions 
within an interacting field. Experience is the experience of this interaction, it is 
the experience of the contact boundary. 
Experience occurs at the boundary between the organism and its 
environment, primarily the skin surface and the other organs of sensory and 
motor response. Experience is the function of this boundary, and 
psychologically what is real are the 'whole' configurations of this functioning, 
some meaning being achieved, some action completed. The wholes of 
experience do not include 'everything', but they are definite unified structures; 
and psychologically everything else, including the very notions of an organism 
or an environment, is an abstraction or a possible construction or a 
potentiality occurring in this experience as a hint of some other experience. 
In 'Ego, Hunger and Aggression' (1947) Perls called his new type of therapy 'concentration 
therapy'. The name Gestalt therapy was later suggested by Laura Perls, who in fact had 
written parts of the book without being named as one of its authors. 
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We speak of the organism contacting the environment, but it is the contact 
that is the simplest and first reality. (1951, p. 273) 
Accordingly, Perls et al. define psychology as the study of "the operation of 
the contact-boundary in the organism/environment field". This is further 
explained as follows: 
When we say 'boundary' we think of a 'boundary between'; but the contact- 
boundary, where experience occurs, does not separate the organism and its 
environment; rather it limits the organism, contains and protects it, and at the 
same time it touches the environment [... ]; the contact-boundary - for 
example, the sensitive skin - is not so much a part of the 'organism' as it is 
essentially the organ of a particular relation of the organism and the 
environment. [... ] What one is sensitive of is not the condition of the organ 
(which would be pain) but the interacting of the field. Contact is awareness of 
the field or motor response in the field. (ibid. p. 275) 
Thus, any experience, all psychic reality occurs at the contact boundary; it is 
the awareness of the interaction between the organism and the surrounding 
field. "Consciousness' (a term used usually in inverted commas), it is 
suggested, is "a special kind of awareness, a contact-function where there are 
difficulties and delays of adjustment" (ibid. p. 276). Amongst the most 
important functions of the contact-boundary are the maintenance of the 
difference of the organism from its environment, and the exchanges with the 
environment which supply the organism with whatever it needs. Importantly, 
both the intake of nourishment and expulsion of toxins occur across the 
boundary; the environment is taken in but also rejected according to the 
needs of the organism. Both ingestion and expulsion are seen as life 
preserving functions of creative adjustment which enhance the further growth 
of the organism. Thus the contact boundary is defined as the location where, 
physically but also psychologically, difference is maintained and negotiated. 
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It is the quality of the functioning of the contact-boundary, the degree to which 
the organism can respond to the environment in flexible, adjustive and 
creative ways, which define psychological health or ill-health. Gestalt therapy 
focuses on the analysis of the current experience of the client with the 
emphasis being placed not on the content of the experience, but on the way in 
which experience is structured, that is, the way in which the contact-boundary 
operates. 
By working on the unity and disunity of this structure of the experience here 
and now, it is possible to remake the dynamic relations of the figure and 
ground until the contact is heightened, the awareness brightened and the 
behaviour energized. Most important of all, the achievement of a strong 
gestalt is itself the cure, for the figure of contact is not a sign of, but is itself 
the creative integration of experience. (ibid. pp. 278-9) 
Perls rejects the idea that the person is structured internally in a fixed or 
stable way, and he opposes any concept of a core of the personality. There 
are only the fluctuating experiences of the contact-boundary with different 
gestalts forming and dissolving according to the needs and interests arising 
within the individual in relation to the stimulations and challenges that the 
environment presents. 'Self, another term frequently used in inverted 
commas, is understood as a "temporal process" (ibid. p. 426), "the system of 
contacts at any moment" (ibid. p. 281). 
As such, the self is flexibly various, for it varies with the dominant organic 
needs and the pressing environmental stimuli; it is the system of responses; it 
diminishes in sleep when there is no need to respond. The self is the contact- 
boundary at work; its activity is forming figures and grounds. (ibid. p. 281) 
Self may be regarded as at the boundary of the organism, but the boundary is 
not itself isolated from the environment; it contacts the environment; it 
belongs to both, environment and organism. (ibid. p. 427) 
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'Self thus arises at the boundary as and when there is interaction between 
the person and their environmental field. As a consequence of this move of 
the locus of self from a position of presumed centrality to the very periphery of 
the person, it becomes "absurd" to ask what a person's 'real self is. It is 
always the response to a present situation, even if the response is to keep 
something out of awareness. Whilst the self cannot be meaningfully discussed 
apart from its environment and is conceptualised as constantly changing 
according to the person's internal and external conditions, Perls et al. insist 
that it is a highly active and, at least in healthy functioning, creative process. It 
integrates the organism's various physical, mental and emotional functions, 
and directs attention and activity according to the organism's needs. It is the 
process by which meaning is created and behaviour is organised as a 
meaningful response to the presenting situation. 
Self as a function, or manifestation, of contact with the external world relies on 
stimulation, that is otherness, for its existence; and it is the degree of 
otherness which determines the intensity with which it comes into being. For 
example, skin, whilst always part of the organism, becomes only part of the 
self-experience when stimulated through touch or heat. The authors 
paraphrase Aristotle: "When the thumb is pinched, the self exists in the painful 
thumb" (ibid. p. 427). The intensity of self-experience is in direct proportion to 
the intensity of the confrontation with otherness: "In brief, where there is most 
conflict, contact, and figure/background, there is most self; where there is 
'confluence' (flowing together), isolation, or equilibrium, there is diminished 
self' (ibid. p. 429). Confluence refers to the loss of differentiation between the 
person and his 'other'/object. Processes like adaptation and habit formation 
lead to the decrease of stimulation and, as a result, to the diminishing of the 
sense of self. Similarity is a weak experience, sameness a non-experience. 
Confluence is defined as "the condition of no-contact (no self-boundary)" (ibid. 
p. 510) and is seen, if habitually used, as one of the neurotic defensive 
169 
mechanisms27 which Perls terms "interruptions to contact". It is the prevention 
of self-experience by means of avoidance of the excitation which results from 
confrontation with otherness. In this model, self and other can only be 
experienced a) together and simultaneously, since experience is bipolar by 
nature and comes about only in the contact of self and other; and b) to the 
extent that the other is different, since sameness is not considered to make 
the kind of impact that gives rise to experience. 
This theory of the person has important consequences for the 
conceptualisation of the psychotherapeutic process. The therapist 
experiences and can come to know the client to the extent that the client is 
other than him or her; the same holds true for the client, who can experience 
both therapist and self only in their different-ness. Otherness is a precondition 
for experience, and hence for knowledge. Furthermore, contact, awareness, 
self-experience, figure/ground formation etc, that is, all qualities which play a 
crucial role in the definition of psychological health, come about and are 
heightened by the experience of otherness. Consequently, Perls saw it as the 
therapist's task to increase the experience of otherness, leading, of course, to 
a more confrontational therapeutic style. From Perls et al. 's statement "Every 
healthy contact involves awareness (perceptual figure/ground) and excitement 
(increased energy mobilization)" follows a therapeutic strategy which is 
primarily 'counter-confluence'. Experiences of sameness or identification 
cannot be said to be experiences at all; rather they are states of non- 
experience the whole neurotic point of which might be exactly the avoidance 
of otherness. Since Perls subsumes empathy under the concept of 
confluence, empathy is highly suspect to him: 
If the therapist withholds himself, in empathy, he deprives the field of its main 
instrument, his intuition and sensitivity to the patient's ongoing processes.... 
He must have a relational awareness of the total situation, he must have 
contact with the total field - both his own needs and his reactions to the 
27 Perls uses 'defence mechanism' in a non-psychoanalytic way, i. e. his understanding of 
defences does not rest on a notion of the unconscious. 
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patient's manipulations and the patient's needs and reactions to the therapist. 
And he must feel free to express them. (1973, p. 105) 
Empathy was consequently rejected as a modality of understanding. It only 
resurfaces within Gestalt theory in its more recent 'dialogic' re-formulations, 
first as an aspect of 'inclusion' (Yontef 1991) and later under its own name 
(Hycner and Jacobs 1995). Some of these developments I will discuss below, 
after considering briefly some questions regarding the Gestalt concept of the 
self so far presented 
The self, according to one strand in F. Perls' writings, cannot be thought of as 
a separate entity; it is conceptualised as always co-created by the present 
situation, or social relationship. There is no account of what might give 
stability and coherence over time to the self, apart from neurotic 
sedimentations and acquired 'confluent' habits. The healthy I is constantly 
changing. This idea has a certain appeal given the challenge it poses to ideas 
of the person as a much more fixed and historically (or genetically) 
determined entity. It is however rather counter-intuitive, and it gives rise to a 
number of questions, which I will pose here without being able to discuss 
them in any detail. 
If the self were such a transient phenomenon, and the function only of the 
contact with the other, what is it that constitutes the otherness of the other that 
gives rise to this experience of contact? It cannot really be the other's self? 
Furthermore, if the idea of 'real self is absurd, how can it said to be 'authentic' 
(authenticity being another important value espoused by Perls)? Finally, there 
is the question of understanding, which is obviously the most relevant for this 
thesis: If the self is constituted only through the experience of difference to an 
other, how is interpersonal understanding possible? Understanding cannot, 
after all, proceed on the basis of irreducible differences between individuals. 
Even to understand the idea of difference presupposes some identity. This 
objection will become clearer in the following chapter where I will turn to the 
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discussion of the preconditions of understanding as elaborated by 
hermeneutic philosophy. 
There is in the Gestalt theory of Fritz Perls and his collaborators a strong 
tension, if not contradiction, between an idea of the person who is only 
thinkable in terms of her interaction with the environment and an individualism 
which, over time, became radical to the point of absurdity. In sections of his 
writings Perls portrayed the self as coming into existence only in relationship, 
using a strongly 'Buberian' language - as for example in the following quote 
which describes the relationship between client and therapist as an existential 
dialogue: 
[... ] the We which is different from the I and You. The We doesn't exist, but 
consists of I and You, is an everchanging boundary where two people meet. 
And when we meet there, the I change and you change, through the process 
of encountering each other. (1969, p. 7) 
Perls asserted the fundamental importance of the I-Thou relationship also in 
Levitsky and Perls (1970). In 1969, however, Perls writes: "responsibility 
means simply to be willing to say 'I am I' and 'I am what I am"', thus 
advocating an individualism which sheds responsibility for and dependency on 
others and refuses to adapt to society's (or any other person's) demands. The 
contact boundary, which had originally been conceptualised as the place of 
the 'between', is increasingly interpreted as the line which delimits the 
individual self. The person who was originally conceptualised in entirely 
interactive terms as part of a person/environment process became - for 
reasons which do not seem to flow from the development of the original 
founding concepts - increasingly separated from his embedded-ness in its 
field and ended up, at least in F. Perls' later view of the mature, self- 
supporting adult, as highly individualised and defined almost in opposition to 
their social ties. In 1975 Perls writes: "I define maturity as the transition from 
environmental support to self-support" (in Stevens, 1975, p. 5), suggesting the 
person can support himself independently from his environment. 
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This individualism erodes the relational and dialogic aspects of the person 
and, consequently, of the therapeutic process. The other person, in Fritz 
Perls' writings, remains rather opaque when s/he appears at the contact 
boundary. Perls' main interest seems focussed on the ways this meeting 
enhances the definition and gratification of the self. Whilst his emphasis on 
freedom, choice, personal responsibility and authenticity show the influence of 
existentialist thought, this is not the existentialism of Buber28. The deep 
dialogic engagement with the other was sacrificed in favour of the 
actualisation of a self to whom the other became rather incidental. 
Perls' radically individualistic views and his increasing reliance on often very 
provocative experiments, which he conducted in one-off demonstration 
sessions in front of large audiences, came under attack from some Gestalt 
practitioners who tried to salvage some of the original ideas. Yontef (1991) for 
instance is keen to draw a distinction between Gestalt and what he terms 
'Perlsism'. Laura Perls was among those who felt that there was much too 
much emphasis on technique in Gestalt therapy and that many practitioners 
made the mistake of trying to copy the highly experimental demonstration 
style of Fritz Perls at the cost of the relationship with their clients. Laura Perls 
wrote of the deep influence that a personal meeting with Buber had on her: "I 
think that Buber and Tillich were of much greater influence on me in the long 
run than analysis and Gestalt psychology, because it was an immediate, 
direct, existential approach to life" (1989, p. 17). She also voiced opposition to 
the increasingly technical, not to say 'gimmicky' style of many `Perlsian' 
practitioners: 
A Gestalt therapist does not use techniques; he applies himself in and to a 
situation with whatever professional skill and life experience he has 
accumulated and integrated. There are as many styles as there are therapists 
'8 Both Fritz Perls' and his later 'dialogic critics' present Gestalt as an existentialist 
psychotherapy (Perls 1976, Hycner and Jacobs 1985, Yontef and Simkin 1989). 
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and clients who discover themselves and each other and together invent their 
relationship. (1976, p. 223) 
Whilst Laura Pens asserts the importance of Buber for her concept of Gestalt 
therapy there is not much reference in the literature to the I-Thou relationship 
before the mid-1970's, when particularly Yontef and later also Jacobs started 
discussing the I-Thou relationship much more extensively (Yontef 1975,1979; 
Jacobs 1978). Yontef (1983,1984) began to refer to Gestalt therapy as a 
"dialogic method", whilst Hycner (1985) suggested that the dialogic approach 
within Gestalt therapy needed to be made explicit. This marked increase in 
the importance ascribed to the therapeutic relationship sought to address the 
problem, identified by a number of practitioners, not only of an over-reliance 
on technique but also of the strong emphasis on individualism in Gestalt 
therapy. 
Gestalt therapy as dialogue 
Relatively recently there has been a strengthening of the current within 
American Gestalt theory which gives centrality to the therapeutic relationship 
defined as a dialogic existentialist encounter. Yontef (1993), suggests that 
Gestalt therapy is a "dialogic method", whilst Hycner and Jacobs (1995) 
develop a dialogic approach which is in -essence an attempt to transpose 
Buber's philosophy of the I-Thou into clinical practice. 
Jacobs sees two main strands running through Gestalt; one, going back to 
Perls et al (1951), emphasizing awareness; the other focussing centrally on 
contact. Regarding the first strand Jacobs observes rightly that, to the extent 
that Gestalt is practiced as a diagnosis of functions and application of 
techniques, the therapist's stance is that of an observer/expert and as such 
closer associated with a medical model, rather than a dialogic one. The 
contact boundary, whilst defined as an interactive function, is studied by Perls 
et al. from an observer position, rather than from the point of view of the 
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experiencing subject. The contact boundary which is thus observed must be 
different from the one that the client experiences. Thus, whilst claiming to take 
an existentialist stance, the approach to the study of the contact boundary is 
that of the natural scientist. 
The dialogic approach advocated by Hycner and Jacobs takes the openness 
of the interpersonal encounter, which is defined closely following Buber's 
ideas, as an irreducible human need and consequently places it at the centre 
of the therapeutic process: 
The human heart yearns for contact - above all for genuine dialogue. 
Dialogue is at the heart of the human. (... ] The paradox of the human spirit is 
that I am not fully myself till I am recognized in my uniqueness by another - 
and that other person needs my recognition in order to fully become the 
unique person she or he is. (1995, p. ix) 
By the dialogical is meant the overall relational context in which the 
uniqueness of each person is valued and direct, mutual, and open relations 
between persons are emphasized, and the fullness and presence of the 
human spirit is honoured and embraced. (ibid. p. 4) 
'The dialogical' as the ideal of human interpersonal connectedness becomes 
an implicit goal of the therapeutic process. The therapist becomes the 
"steward of the dialogical"; this entails that "the individuality of the therapist is 
subsumed (at least momentarily) in the service of the dialogical' (ibid. p. 13). It 
is the therapist's task to become aware of what is missing from the dialogic 
situation and to work towards the supplementing of this lack. Increased self- 
knowledge of the client, which is central to so many conceptions of the 
therapeutic process, can only come about through dialogic relation. 
The therapist's dialogic stance vis-ä-vis the patient is characterised by 
presence, open communication, and inclusion, paralleling Buber's definition of 
the I-Thou relationship. Presence refers to Buber's existential turning toward 
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the other as the basic stance. The therapist is meant to bring all of him/herse/f 
("as the person s/he is") to bear in the meeting; this is seen as a precondition 
for the client's bringing all of him/herself to the session ("as the person s/he 
is"). Preconceptions, expert knowledge and technique are seen as obstacles 
to presence. 
The condition of genuine and unreserved communication demands of the 
therapist to be honestly and unreservedly involved, yet not to say 
indiscriminately everything that comes to mind. What should be unreservedly 
said however is everything that occurs to the therapist "in the process of the 
dialogue", which implies a concern for the client and sensitivity to his present 
psychological state. Authenticity, spontaneity and immediacy are valued since 
it is believed that their expression furthers the task of therapy, both by helping 
the client to `take the next step' and by safeguarding the therapist's capacity 
to "remain available for contact" (ibid. p. 66). 
Inclusion is, as we have seen, Buber's term for "imagining the reality of the 
other". In contrast to empathy, Buber asserts, this involves a "bold swinging" 
between the different vantage points of the two participants in the dialogic 
meeting. Two poles are to be held in mind, rather than 'going over to the 
other side. Jacobs maintains that this inclusion can be practiced in a one- 
sided way. The client's capacity for the dialogic meeting is likely to be limited 
(presumably this makes him/her the client in the first place), in which case it is 
left to the therapist to "appreciate" the client in a "dialogue without mutuality". 
"One person, the therapist, can be present and 'imagine the reality' of the 
other. This is the dialogic attitude. The dialogic attitude is an expression of the 
latency of the I-Thou" (ibid. p. 74). 
The emphasis on the otherness of the other person is understood to imply 
that any knowledge the therapist brings to the session, since it is always 
knowledge of something prior to the present situation, is of very limited value. 
Knowledge can neither predict nor fully explain the other as he is met in the 
dialogic encounter. Consequently, not-knowing and the element of surprise 
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are emphasised; knowledge can at best lend some "support" in the 
therapeutic engagement. 
The therapist doesn't ignore all the knowledge she has, but rather this 
knowing is shaped by her overall sense of the client and what that person 
needs at the time. Throughout the therapy there is the art of knowing when to 
emphasize the 'general' or the unique. (ibid. p. 15) 
This 'art' remains, unsurprisingly, unspecified; it is unclear how this overall 
sense of the client comes about. The idea that seems to be in play here is one 
of 'the whole being' of the therapist acting like an organ that can sense 'the 
whole being' of the other and know their psychic state when this sense 
impression links up in some way with the therapist's body of knowledge and 
experience. 'The art of knowing' is evoked presumably to fill some conceptual 
gap. Resonance, following the lead of the client in the dialogic 'dance', 
learning how to move to the rhythm of the client, tracking the moment-to- 
moment experience of the client are some of the key metaphors used to 
describe the therapist's mode of operation. 
In accordance with the phenomenological rule of 'bracketing' or 'reduction'29 
the therapist is required to suspend personal biases, as well as any general 
knowledge about people, psychological processes or diagnostic categories, 
and to attend instead to the unique person in front of him, in a manner as 
open and interested as possible. Theories, training and clinical experience are 
necessary and not to be forgotten, but to be put to one side to let something 
new and unforeseeable happen. General knowledge and prior experience, i. e. 
all that which makes up the body of therapeutic knowledge, is to move into the 
background in order for the person of the client to become the only figure. 
Bracketing off one's preconceptions and allowing the "sensory processes to 
discover whatever is revealed by the self and the situation" (ibid. p. 61) is 
meant to bring to light the relevant aspects of the client's experience and, at 
29 These terms originate from E. Husserl's phenomenology. 
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the same time, safeguard its acceptance. Phenomenology implies 
acceptance, which in turn, in the context of the therapeutic dialogue, has an 
important curative function. 
This phenomenological attitude implies acceptance. Patients who can accept 
themselves will have no need to judge and deny their experience. In the 
therapy relationship, the therapist's acceptance seems to open for patients 
the possibility of self-acceptance, and this permits patients to deepen their 
own awareness. (ibid. p. 61) 
In spite of Buber's insistence that any intention to change or to manipulate the 
other is entirely incompatible with the dialogic ethos, technique has always 
played an important role in Gestalt therapy and is not dismissed by Hycner 
and Jacobs. In dialogic therapy, however, the in-between of the meeting is 
meant to give rise to any particular therapeutic interventions. "Techniques' 
arise within the context of the relationship [... ] If the therapist is really in good 
contact with the client, so-called techniques will be suggested by in [sic] the 
therapeutic context where this person and the therapist are at any given time, 
(ibid. p. 25). An example given by Yontef (1976) allows the discussion of some 
of the tensions and problems this assertion entails. Yontef writes: 
Techniques arise out of the dialogue between I-Thou and the I-Thou 
sometimes requires a technological intervention. Example: Patient talks 
without looking at the therapist. The dialogue has been interrupted in that the 
patient talks, but to no one in particular. A real dialogue now would require a 
vigorous response by the therapist. Possibilities: 1. ) 'You aren't looking at 
me, ' 2. ) 'I feel left out, ' 3. ) 'I suggest an experiment: Stop talking and just look 
at me and see what happens'. (ibid. p. 72) 
In what sense these techniques "arise" out of the dialogue is not clear. Not 
only could it be argued that they were brought to the encounter by the 
therapist, as his values, diagnostic ideas and methods; it is also notable that 
this one 'between' throws open a variety of possible responses (it would be 
easy to add more) from which the therapist, and not 'the between', chooses. 
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A number of issues already flagged up in the foregoing discussion of Gestalt 
therapy can be highlighted via this example. The first concerns the tensions 
between the therapist's basic mode of acceptance of the client as she is and 
his intention to produce change. It is easy to imagine the quoted interaction 
being experienced by a client not as an enhancement of the dialogic quality of 
the meeting, but as a pressure to comply with the ideas, needs and values of 
the therapist, i. e. as just the sort of imposition of the therapist's agenda which 
could be seen to interfere with the client's autonomy and otherness. The (- 
Thou quality of the meeting might well be compromised by the therapist's 
technical response resulting from the diagnosis of an aspect of the client's 
functioning. This question of the tension between the openness of the 
interpersonal encounter and the therapist's intention to be of help in essence 
repeats Buber's point that the therapeutic relationship cannot ever be fully in 
the register of the I-Thou. 
A further point relates to the question of who the client is talking to anyway. If 
the client was not talking directly to the therapist, a fact which Yontef took to 
mean that the client was talking to "no-one in particular", who was the client 
addressing? This question, which is a central question in psychoanalysis, is 
not posed in the dialogic approach. It is taken for granted that if the therapist 
is talked to/looked at (or not) by the client, the person of the therapist is the 
addressee meant by the client's communications. This point is, in one sense, 
only one of the questions thrown up by the explicit readiness of Gestalt 
practitioners to take 'for real' what is apparent to perception. 
This leaves us with two main conclusions about Gestalt therapy. Firstly, 
throughout the writings of dialogic Gestaltists there is a tension between, on 
the one hand, acceptance, confirmation, I-Thou, healing through meeting etc., 
and, on the other hand, change, intention, pressure, technique, confrontation, 
manipulation, I-It. Jacobs, for instance, speaks of the "recovery of ego skills 
through awareness techniques" and "corrections to the contacting process" 
(ibid. p. 77), whilst maintaining that, true to her understanding of the 
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phenomenological approach, "goals and judgements are held aside, and 
attention is directed simply to what is happening" (ibid. p. 78). This tension 
between - to keep using Buber's language - the I-Thou and the I-It 
dimensions of the therapeutic relationship remain unresolved. 
Secondly, the so-called 'phenomenological' presupposition that the important 
aspects of the client's reality are directly accessible to the therapist via sense 
perception leaves Gestalt theory with a simplistic and impoverished account 
of clinical understanding. In the end, there is a remarkably naive reliance on 
the therapist being able to simply see "what is happening". The first of the two 
central Gestalt "axioms" stated by Polster and Polster (1976) is that "What is, 
is"; it is implied that the therapist can gain direct and un-compromised access 
to this reality. (The second axiom is "One moment flows into the next"... ). The 
attendant injunction not to interpret but to focus on 'what is' (given directly to 
the senses) ignores the insight suggested by Gestalt psychology that the 
perception of anything focal is always the result of the organisation of 
particulars into meaningful wholes. Hermeneutic philosophy concludes, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, that, therefore, there can be no meaning in the 
absence of interpretation. Nothing can ever be said to be simply knowable for 






To understand is to understand differently 
Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy 
Introduction 
In Part II have reviewed sections of the psychotherapy literature in order to 
draw out the ideas used to formulate clinical understanding. I have discussed 
these ideas largely in terms used within psychotherapy discourse, only 
occasionally questioning their larger underlying assumptions. In Part II of this 
thesis I intend to overcome this naivety by using a 'philosophical lens' in order 
to take another, different look at the problems of understanding encountered 
in Part I. 
In terms of the therapist's position vis-ä-vis his patients a detached attitude 
linked to an idea of objective observation is often seen as opposed to a 
participatory stance linked to ideas of (inter) subjective understanding. This 
kind of opposition establishes a polarisation between a view of the therapist 
as some version of a scientist and a therapist who understands because he 
gets emotionally involved. Affective and cognitive aspects of the therapist's 
mental activity are often seen as distinct, if not opposed (even by some 
authors who maintain that both play a role in understanding). It is, in my mind, 
doubtful however whether these kinds of polarisations are as helpful as they 
may seem. For instance, the analyst's detachment is never absolute; even 
where objectivity is an aim the analyst's stance is formulated in ways which 
makes possible participation of a certain type. Explicitly 'participatory' 
formulations too rely on an element of 'detachment' where they seek to 
theoretically ground intersubjective understanding. Furthermore, the 
'scientist'-analyst is not not also a 'carer, as perhaps Freud's (in)famous 
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metaphor of the `disinterested surgeon' implies. 30 The question which is 
central here - Does involvement preclude understanding or is it a condition of 
it? - cannot be satisfactorily addressed with the conceptual tools customarily 
brought to this task. There appears to be a danger that the metaphors used to 
understand understanding get in the way of a clarification of the complexities 
involved. 
A further recurring issue in Part I was the problem of difference and 
sameness/commonality. The question kept arising whether difference needs 
to be and can be understood as difference or whether understanding of 
difference can only proceed as assimilation, that is, on the basis of sameness. 
Most authors relied for their concepts of understanding on some common 
ground, either dismissing the issue of difference altogether or failing to 
address it as a problem of understanding. As to what this shared ground is 
made up of, 'common humanity' is invoked by some writers - either referring 
to a shared biological (instinctual) base in the case of some psychoanalytic 
writers, or to some other often less well specified notion of 'human nature' - 
whilst for other theorists shared socio-cultural experience plays a more or less 
important role. Most authors reviewed here rely for their conceptualisation of 
clinical understanding on some form of 'inner' psychological process (such as 
projection, introjection, the transmission of unconscious impulses or ideas 
etc. ), whilst the role of language seems often limited to the communication of 
conscious mental contents. 
Thus the two questions, what is the important aspect of human functioning 
that needs to be the focus of clinical understanding and what processes 
mediate this understanding, have been answered in very diverse ways. 
Shared biology, a common structure of the mind, shared mental contents due 
to a similarity in early interpersonal experience, and common socio-cultural 
experience have been suggested as primary candidates for understanding. 
30 Surgery is after all not performed by standing back. The incisiveness implied by the image 
of the surgeon could 
be taken as a far greater involvement than that offered, say, by a 
Kohutian analyst who operates as a (self-object) 'mirror. 
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The questions however, what is it to understand, how can understanding 
proceed at all, do not seem to get addressed in a satisfactory manner. This is 
unsurprising perhaps, since these questions are not strictly speaking 
psychological questions, but philosophical ones. 
Within philosophy it is in particular the tradition of hermeneutics which 
addressed the problem of understanding and the conditions under which 
interpretation can proceed. The subject matter of hermeneutic philosophy is 
human expression and production, taking the understanding of meanings 
rather than the knowledge of facts as its aim. Hermeneutic philosophers 
share a rejection of the objectivist project, certainly in the domain of the 
Geisteswissenschaften, that is, they reject the idea that the central aim and 
the methodology of the natural sciences apply to the study of cultural objects 
or other forms of human communication. In the Geisteswissenschaften the 
inquiring mind does not meet its objects 'from the outside', as 'scientific' 
methodology is commonly thought to do. What is studied are the expressions 
of human experience, that is, of lived life, replete with the complexities of 
multiple motivations and inseparable from the contingencies of society and 
history. In this kind of inquiry objectivity in relation to the object of study is 
seen as an immensely problematic or even impossible aim. The meaning of 
an expression, a central focus of hermeneutic inquiry, can only be established 
via a process of interpretive engagement, which is in turn mediated by other 
linguistic expressions. One of the consequences of this situation is that 
meaning is increasingly taken to be multiple. 
I will be mainly drawing on the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer for whom the situatedness of both 'subject' and 'object' of 
interpretation is the central concern. Gadamer sees understanding arising out 
of the participation in a dialogue, in which language mediates the distance to 
the other. To prepare the extensive exposition and discussion of his work, 
will first give a very brief overview of the earlier history of hermeneutics 
focussing more detail on its development in the 20th century. Some of 
Heidegger's concepts relevant to my enquiry will also be introduced. The 
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discussion of Gadamer's philosophy will be assisted by a brief paralleling and 
contrasting look at the philosophy of language developed by Mikhail Bakhtin. 
Finally, I will present some of the thoughts of the American philosopher 
Richard Rorty who has drawn some rather radical conclusions from what he 
found 
. to 
be implied in the work of, amongst others, his hermeneutic 
predecessors. The relevance of the ideas derived from hermeneutic 
philosophy for the problem of clinical understanding will be developed in the 
last chapter. This chapter aims to prepare some conceptual tools for a re- 
thinking of my central problematic. 
Methodological hermeneutics 
Hermeneutics, the art of interpretation, arose as a methodological response 
by., Christian scholars to the problem of the determination of the proper 
meaning of difficult religious texts - the ultimate task was to learn to decipher 
the Word of God. Hermeneutics became 'secularised' in the Romantic period 
when literary texts first became an object of systematic study. At the 
beginning of the 19th century Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) stated 
that the interpretation of an alien text always poses a problem since a reader 
is likely to impose his own meanings which lead to a misunderstanding of the 
text. This danger of misinterpretation is also given in complex conversation, 
an insight which greatly broadens the field to which hermeneutics applies. 
Whilst stressing the impossibility of ever getting a complete understanding 
Schleiermacher developed hermeneutics as a methodology of interpretation in 
order to gain the fullest understanding possible. 
According to Schleiermacher a text is to be approached from two `sides': the 
objective linguistic side, which takes into account other texts produced by the 
same author as well as texts by different authors which might have a bearing 
on the understanding of the 'field' surrounding the present text; and the 
subjective psychological side which aims to reproduce the intentions of the 
author. Schleiermacher demands that the process of interpretation move 
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between these two aspects in order to reconstitute in the mind of the 
interpreter as much as possible of the outer (linguistic) and inner 
(psychological) conditions of the author at the time of producing the text. 
Understanding of the text thus results from the reconstruction of its author's 
intended meanings. To achieve this it is necessary that the interpreter leaves 
his own individuality behind and identifies, through an "operation of equation", 
with the author - "indem man sich selbst gleichsam in den anderen 
verwandelt" ("by transforming oneself into the other, as it were"; cit. in Gad. 
1960, p. 193). This identification is made possible by our shared humanity, i. e. 
because "each one of us carries inside himself a minimum of the other and 
the divination is stimulated through comparison with oneself" ("jeder von 
jedem ein Minimum in sich traegt und die Divination wird sonach aufgeregt 
durch Vergleichung mit sich selbst"; ibid). 31 In the case of the interpretation of 
an old text the historical task of establishing the objective linguistic conditions 
is mainly in preparation for this second psychological step of identifying with 
the mental state of the author. In this model the meaning of the production is 
thought to be coextensive with the intentions of its author. The interpreter's 
task is to disappear. Whilst this concept of understanding relies heavily on 
something akin to empathy, it is Schleiermacher's contention that the 
interpreter should try to understand the author better than he understood 
himself. This becomes possible because in this act of reproduction some of 
the aspects of the creative process (e. g. the contingencies introduced through 
language) which had remained unconscious for the author become accessible 
to the hermeneutic reader. Conflicting with what empathy (as the duplication 
of conscious intention) requires as its condition for understanding, the author 
is not altogether transparent to himself. 
Another important milestone in the history of hermeneutics was 
Schleiermacher's first formulation of the concept of the `hermeneutic circle'. 
31 Bowie (1997) criticises Gadamer (1960) for reading Schleiermacher primarily in the 
direction of identification with the author's subjectivity. In contrast, Bowie holds that 
Schleiermacher, who was very familiar with the work of the Romantic philosophers Schlegel 
and Novalis on 
language, saw the creation of a text always as co-determined by the 
, universality of language'. 
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This refers to the fact that every understanding progresses as a moving back 
and forth between the anticipation of the meaning of the whole of the object 
and the understanding of its parts. The 'big picture' can only be understood 
once one gets to know about its particularities, whilst these become 
meaningful only in- relation to the whole they together constitute. 
Understanding increases as the interpreter repeatedly proceeds through this 
circle. Schleiermacher saw that this involves the interpreter in an inescapable 
circularity; for him understanding always began in the middle. This insight, 
which was elaborated by Schleiermacher purely on the level of methodology, 
was to have profound consequences for the later development of an 
`ontological hermeneutics'. 
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), who wrote Schleiermacher's biography, 
proposed that the Geisteswissenschaften were a discipline distinct and 
independent from the natural sciences both in subject matter and 
methodology. For Dilthey the former are distinguished from the latter by the 
use of a method of verstehen, understanding, which aims at the 
comprehension of the meaning of a human expression, be it in actions or 
words. Dilthey put forward hermeneutics as the universal methodological 
basis for the Geisteswissenschaften, which hence could claim to be, in their 
different ways, as scientifically rigorous as the natural sciences whose 
paradigm was so overpoweringly dominant in the 19th century. 
Central to Dilthey's thoughts is his concept of life which he saw as all- 
encompassing and impossible to further reduce. Life or the particular life- 
world of a person can only be known from within; it cannot be analysed further 
by breaking it down into its constituent parts. Thus to understand a historical 
event or text requires to transpose oneself into the life-world of its agent or 
author understanding is only achieved when the interpreter's comprehension 
coincides with the self-comprehension of the historical subject. Understanding 
is : thus posited as 
an imaginative projection or transposition of the 
consciousness of the interpreter which aims to erase cultural or temporal 
distance. According to Dilthey's earlier writings life as manifested in historical 
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or social events can only be understood via a kind of empathic reviving 
(Nachleben), in an attempt to grasp the psychological experience and the 
intentions of the persons involved. This strong psychological and subjective 
emphasis was superseded in later years by an attempt to understand an 
event or an expression by placing it within an objective framework of meaning 
made up of cultural context, social climate, language etc. ('objective mind'). 
Thus the subjective experience and intentionality of, for instance, an author is 
grasped by an interpreter through an examination of other cultural objects that 
helps to bring to light the socio-cultural matrix from which the object of study 
emerged. The process of understanding is never completed since the ways in 
which different aspects of meaning "hang together" (zusammenhängen) can 
never be exhausted. 
Dilthey introduces a radical historicity into the process of understanding. The 
sphere of human production and interaction has to be understood in terms of 
meanings and intentions, which can only be comprehended in the context of 
their history and culture. Furthermore, there are no trans-historical systems or 
categories available to ground this process of understanding. The interpreter 
is left without a basis for objective knowledge in this field. "Our understanding 
of life is only a constant approximation; that life reveals quite different sides to 
us according to the point of view from which we consider its course in time is 
due to the nature of both understanding and life" (Dilthey, 1961, p. 109). 
Understanding and historical positioning thus became inextricably linked. In 
contradistinction to the natural sciences Geisteswissenschaften cannot claim 
to take up a position 'outside' of its object of study. This inescapable historicity 
of understanding establishes the hermeneutic circle as its dominant principle 
and puts paid to any claims to universal and objective knowledge. All grand 
philosophical systems are historical products, Weltanschauungen (world 
views), which generate questions of reality, truth and meaning, and answer 
them in terms of their (pre-)conceptions of the world. The abandonment of the 
aim of objective knowledge establishes hermeneutics' radical discontinuity 
from the natural sciences. 
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Ontological hermeneutics 
Whilst so far, hermeneutics was developed as a methodological response to 
problems particular to certain kinds of inquiry, its concerns were taken to have 
universal validity in the ontological phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. 
Heidegger broke with the philosophical tradition by stating that man's primary 
relation to the world is not one of a 'subject' confronted with the separate 
existence of the world, which he takes as the 'object' of inquiry. Rather than 
being epistemic-theoretical, man's primary relationship with the world is one of 
care and action. 'World' as a conception of the world that we are "thrown into" 
is constituted only through this active participation in our natural, cultural and 
social environment. We are always already enmeshed in a totality of 
involvements, and as such we find ourselves always already involved in an 
implicit understanding of ourselves and our surroundings. This primary mode 
of relatedness can reveal our true relation to Sein, it can be an experience of 
openness, a Wahrheitsgeschehen (truth event). The kind of distancing 
relation to the world which views it as an object of knowledge is a secondary 
development, and one which has, since it became the dominant way of 
thinking in our culture, hidden the openness of primary relatedness. 
Truth for Heidegger is therefore not manifested in man's knowledge of the real 
nature of himself or his object-world; truth, rather, is a Geschehen, an event 
which comes about when the conditions are met for the kind of openness in 
which the world can show itself. This openness, or Lichtung, is a telos of 
Dasein. Heidegger's philosophy radically changes the problem of the inquiring 
mind: Instead of continuing to pursue the question What is the true nature of a 
thing and how do I get to know it?, the problem is now What kind of position 
do I have to assume so that the thing can reveal itself to me in this Lichtung? 
The pursuit of objectivity (Heidegger terms it the "theoretical attitude"), which 
strives to isolate and to stand back from the thing under investigation in order 
to get hold of its 'true, undistorted nature', is a secondary move entirely 
dependent on primary relatedness. The fact that objectivity has become the 
central ambition dominating much of Western philosophy and science is, in 
{ 
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Heidegger's view, the consequence of a grave misunderstanding of our being 
in this world and the conditions of understanding. 
Heidegger tackles the question of understanding in Sein und Zeit, in particular 
in the section titled Verstehen und Auslegung (1927, pp. 148-153). 
Understanding and interpretation are processes which are, of necessity and 
all the time, performed by us all in our dealings with the world. According to 
Heidegger, understanding and interpreting are absolutely fundamental to our 
being in the world; we cannot operate even on the most basic level without 
framing the present situation or the "thing at hand" in a particular way. 
Heidegger denies there can be such a thing as schlichtes Sehen (simple 
seeing). All perception is already interpretive; it shares with all other forms of 
understanding the basic structure of understanding something as something 
(else). This as-structure of understanding (Als-Struktur des Verstehens) 
precedes and underlies the act of interpretation. 
Das im Verstehen Erschlossene, das Verstandene ist immer schon so 
zugänglich, daß an ihm sein 'als was' ausdrücklich abgehoben werden kann. 
Das 'Als' macht die Struktur der Ausdrücklichkeit eines Verstandenen aus; es 
konstituiert die Auslegung. (1927, p. 149) 
What is disclosed in understanding, what is understood is always already 
accessible in such a way that in it its 'as what' can be explicitly delineated. 
The 'as' constitutes the structure of the explicitness of what is understood; it 
constitutes the interpretation. (1996, pp. 139-40) 
This structure is so primary and fundamental that any effort to free oneself 
from it (as, for instance, in an attempt to 'perceive directly') cannot result in 
anything but a staring gaze which only yields incomprehension. 
If understanding is, as Heidegger posits, the understanding of something as 
something else this means that the understanding of a given something can, 
strictly speaking, only proceed in terms of what it is not. In the realm of 
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language one term can be understood only in terms of other terms which are 
not synonymous, i. e. the meanings of the auxiliary terms are never co- 
extensive with the meaning of the term they define. The as-structure reveals 
understanding as an essentially metaphorical process. 
Furthermore, the understanding of something always occurs in the context of 
our intentions, our interests, and preconceptions. In Heidegger's view we are, 
as we saw, from the very beginning related to the 'objects' of our 
understanding. We approach them with some idea of what they are like, what 
use they might be; we therefore handle them in a particular way, coming from 
a certain perspective, which is already informed by previous experience and 
pre-formed ideas. Heidegger writes, in his famously idiosyncratic use of the 
German language, of the Vorhabe, Vorsicht and Vorgriff 32 (translated, rather 
painfully, as fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception) with which we 
approach what we understand. "Die Auslegung von Etwas als Etwas wird 
wesenhaft durch Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff fundiert" (1927, p. 150). "The 
interpretation of something as something is essentially grounded in fore- 
having, fore-sight, and fore-conception" (1996, p. 141). Any understanding 
thus emerges out of pre-understandings. The intentionality of our relatedness 
to what we come to take as our 'objects' is so primary and so fundamental 
that Heidegger posits that all understanding has a pre-structure (Vor-Struktur 
des Verstehens). We never start with a clean slate when we inquire into 'the 
nature of objects'. 
The pre-structure places understanding in the dimension of time. Due to our 
preconceptions which are always in play in the process of understanding, the 
present is related to in terms of the past. However, the element of Vorgriff 
introduces the notion of as yet unrealised potentiality and extends the 
32 Vorhabe in German carries the following cluster of connotations: intention, plan, interest, 
having in mind to do; Vorsicht means primarily caution, but also evokes foresight, anticipation 
(of some danger); Vorgriff, literally pre-grasp, evokes anticipation, preparation for action in the 
future. 
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trajectory of understanding into the future. Thus our understanding of 
something is ein Entwerfen33, a project, which at the same time is a projection 
of our pre-understandings; nevertheless, it discloses possible ways of being 
inherent in the object of our understanding. "Im Entwerfen des Verstehens ist 
Seiendes in seiner Möglichkeit erschlossen" (1927, p. 151). "In the projecting 
of understanding beings are disclosed in their possibility" (1996, p. 141). This 
concept of understanding as the disclosure of the potentiality of the object 
parallels Heidegger's conception of Dasein (the conscious, understanding 
subject) which he also analyses as Entwurf (project). The first sentence of 
Verstehen und Auslegung reads: "Das Dasein entwirft als Verstehen sein 
Sein auf Möglichkeiten" (1927, p. 148). "As understanding Da-sein projects its 
own being upon possibilities" (1996, p. 139). Understanding is thus conceived 
as a dialectical process in which both the understanding subject and the 
understood object are 'designed'/projected, i. e. developed into one of their 
possibilities. This dialectic of 'subject' and 'object' is ineluctable: "In jedem 
Verstehen von Welt ist Existenz mitverstanden und umgekehrt" (1927, p. 152). 
"In every understanding of world, existence is also understood, and vice 
versa" (1996, p. 142). This line'of thought leads Heidegger to the following, 
somewhat cumbersome definition of meaning: "Sinn ist das durch Vorhabe, 
Vorsicht und Vorgriff strukturierte Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas 
als etwas verständlich wird" (1927, p. 151; italics in orig. ). "Meaning, structured 
by fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception, is the upon which of the project 
in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something" (1996, p. 142). 
Understanding is not of the meaning of something, but of the something; this 
meaning does not reside in the thing, but 'belongs to' Dasein: "Nur Dasein 
kann ... sinnvoll oder 
sinnlos sein" (1927, p. 151). "Only Da-sein can ... be 
meaningful or meaningless" (1996, p. 142). Heidegger analyses Dasein as 
essentially temporal and historical, i. e. contingent on the world it finds itself 
thrown into. This analysis, together with the insight that meaning does not 
reside in the object but in the relatedness of Dasein 
to it, implies that meaning 
33 Entwerfen means to design, to create, containing werfen, which is, literally, to throw. 
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is multiple and changeable. Heidegger does not elaborate this consequence 
in this context, but it is an insight which has become of central importance to 
later developments of hermeneutic thought. 
The pre-structure of understanding implicates the subject in the process of 
understanding to an extent that there appears to be a serious problem 
regarding its validity. If what is to be understood is already understood in 
some way and there is no direct access to the thing itself, then the subject 
seems trapped in a vicious circle. Heidegger disagrees; he states that to 
deplore this circularity and to attempt to get out of it is to "fundamentally 
misunderstand understanding". For Heidegger the analysis of this 
hermeneutic circle enables us to describe what is essentially involved in the 
process of understanding. He addresses the hermeneutic problem on the 
level of ontology and, rather than deplore the limits of our capacities for 
understanding, gives it a positive meaning. 
Das Entscheidende ist nicht, aus dem Zirkel heraus-, sondern in ihn nach der 
rechten Weise hineinzukommen. Dieser Zirkel des Verstehens ist nicht ein 
Kreis, in dem sich eine beliebige Erkenntnisart bewegt, sondern er ist der 
Ausdruck der existentialen Vor-Struktur des Daseins selbst. Der Zirkel darf 
nicht zu einem vitiosum, und sei es auch zu einem geduldeten, herabgezogen 
werden. In ihm verbirgt sich eine positive Möglichkeit ursprünglichsten 
Erkennens, die freilich in echter Weise nur dann ergriffen ist, wenn die 
Auslegung verstanden hat, daß ihre erste, ständige und letzte Aufgabe bleibt, 
sich jeweils Vorhabe, Vorsicht, und Vorgriff nicht durch Einfälle und 
Volksbegriffe vorgeben zu lassen, sondern in deren Ausarbeitung aus den 
Sachen selbst her das wissenschaftliche Thema zu sichern. (1927, p. 153) 
What is decisive not to get out of the circle, but to get in it in the right way. 
This circle of understanding is not a circle in which any random kind of 
knowledge operates, but it is rather the expression of the existential fore- 
structure of Da-sein itself. The circle must not be degraded to a vitiosum, not 
even to a tolerated one. A positive possibility of the most primordial 
knowledge is hidden in it which, however, is only grasped in a genuine way 
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when interpretation has understood that its first, constant, and last task is not 
to let fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception be given to it by chance 
ideas and popular conceptions, but to guarantee the scientific theme by 
developing these in terms of the things themselves. (1996, p. 143) 
This paragraph defines the task of proper understanding as a programme of 
hermeneutic phenomenology. "The scientific theme" is its aim; yet, as it 
should be clear by now, this approach is based on a conception of science 
which is not in pursuit of a notion of access to the `things themselves'. The 
main contribution of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics can be read as 
the realisation of the programme laid out by Heidegger in the preceding quote. 
Gadamer's horizons of understanding 
Hans-Georg Gadamer was born in Breslau, then eastern Germany, in 1900. 
He studied philosophy in Marburg where he was taught by, amongst others, 
the young Heidegger. He also attended Husserl's seminar at the university of 
Freiburg, where Heidegger was later appointed as Husserl's successor. 
Gadamer taught at the university of Heidelberg since 1949 and was made 
professor emeritus in 1968. After the publication of his magnum opus 
Wahrheit und Methode in 1960 he became the leading modem exponent of 
philosophical hermeneutics. 
In Wahrheit und Methode (1960; published in English as 'Truth and Method', 
1975) Gadamer analyses the phenomenon of understanding as a 
hermeneutic problem, but insists, in distinction to Dilthey, that it is neither a 
purely methodological question nor one which only pertains to the 
Geisteswissenschaften. The hermeneutic problem is encountered in all areas 
of human experience where man reaches for truth, and where truth is 
experienced yet requires legitimation. Following Heidegger, Gadamer 
maintains that understanding is not something we gain possession of, but 
rather a process which is constitutive of our being. Consequently, he sees the 
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hermeneutic problematic as universal. Its analysis, rather than attempting to 
provide a methodology, constitutes a distinct way of understanding 
philosophy; Gadamer calls it philosophical hermeneutics. 
The analysis of the hermeneutic problem as universal is, to an important 
extent, an elaboration of Heidegger's ontological philosophy. Gadamer agrees 
with Heidegger that the hermeneutic circle, rather than being an unfortunate 
obstacle to understanding, in fact constitutes its very condition; consequently 
he focuses his efforts on the task of elaborating how it is that one gets into 
this circle in the right kind of way and seeks to develop the positive potential 
of this analysis. 
Wer einen Text verstehen will, ist [... ] bereit, sich von ihm etwas sagen zu 
lassen. Daher muß ein hermeneutisch geschultes Bewußtsein für die 
Andersheit des Textes von vornherein empfänglich sein. Solche 
Empfänglichkeit setzt aber weder sachliche 'Neutralität' noch gar 
Selbstauslöschung voraus, sondern schliesst die abhebende Aneignung der 
eigenen Vormeinungen und Vorurteile ein. Es gilt, der eigenen 
Voreingenommenheit innezusein, damit sich der Text selbst in seiner 
Andersheit darstellt und damit in die Möglichkeit kommt, seine sachliche 
Wahrheit gegen die eigene Vormeinung auszuspielen. (1960, pp. 273-4) 
Wanting to understand a text one is ready to be told something by the text. A 
hermeneutically educated mind therefore needs to be receptive from the 
beginning for the otherness of the text. However, such receptivity does not 
presuppose factual/objective 'neutrality', let alone self-dissolution, instead it 
includes the ownership of one's pre-conceptions and prejudices which 
constitutes the distance to the text. It is important to be mindful of one's own 
prepossession in order for the text to present itself in its otherness and thus to 
be enabled to play out its factual/objective truth against one's own pre- 
conceptions. (my transl. ) 
Quite apart from the fact that preconceptions enter inevitably into the process 
of understanding, it would be entirely undesirable, indeed counterproductive, if 
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this was not so. If the perspective of the interpreter was not constituted as an 
other precisely on the basis of these different preconceptions the text could 
not communicate anything about itself. The process of understanding 
requires, and presupposes, this distance across which something of the other 
(i. e. something new, previously unknown to the reader) is communicated. This 
is the basis of Gadamer's insistence that we should give up our prejudice 
against prejudice. This is not meant, however, as a justification for us to 
complacently exercise our prejudices and to leave it at that. In order for us to 
understand something of the otherness of our objects, it is crucial that we 
attempt to bring to awareness the ways in which our prejudices limit 
understanding. 
Ein mit methodischem Bewusstsein geführtes Verstehen wird bestrebt sein 
müssen, seine Antizipationen nicht einfach zu vollziehen, sondern sie selber 
bewußt zu machen, um sie zu kontrollieren und dadurch von den Sachen das 
rechte Verständnis zu gewinnen. (ibid. p. 274) 
Understanding which is conducted with methodological consciousness will 
have to strive to not just exercise one's anticipations, but to make them 
conscious in order to control them and in this way gain the right 
understanding of the objects. 
The distance, which is nevertheless a connectedness, between the interpreter 
and his object is central to Gadamer's conception of hermeneutics. It is across 
this distance that the dialectic of familiarity and otherness unfolds which 
eventually yields understanding. The otherness of the object calls for 
understanding and thus poses the hermeneutic problem. Yet, to the extent 
that this call is received and responded to, this otherness is not absolute. The 
interpreter's turning towards the object, with an interest which is already 
shaped to some degree by preconceptions about the object and the nature of 
the question which it poses - this pre-informed motivation for understanding 
constitutes the object of inquiry as one which is, in some ways at least, 
already familiar. 
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Gadamer distinguishes his conception of understanding from a Romantic 
notion of hermeneutics which he reads as centrally focussed on the 
subjectivity of 'the author. 34 Rather than relying on subjective congenial 
understanding of sameness, as does a psychological hermeneutics based on 
a concept of empathy, Gadamer believes understanding becomes possible on 
the basis of a shared historical ground. It is the MitzugehÖrigkeit (the shared 
membership) of the object and the understanding subject to a common 
cultural tradition which allows for the mediation of their difference. 
Understanding, Gadamer writes in Vom Zirkel des Verstehens (a preliminary 
study to Truth and Method) is "not a mysterious communion of souls, but a 
participation in a shared meaning" (1959; in: 1986/1993, p. 58). 
In Gadamer's philosophy the distance of otherness is not something that has 
to be eradicated in order for understanding to take place. Identification with 
the subjectivity of the other does not lead to understanding precisely because 
it eradicates otherness. Otherness establishes a distance which is at the 
same time the precondition for connectedness, allowing a meeting to take 
place on the shared ground of historical-cultural tradition. Distance, rather 
than constituting an obstacle to be removed, is that which opens up the 
possibility for understanding. With regard to historical understanding Gadamer 
writes: "Das Verstehen ist selber nicht so sehr als eine Handlung der 
Subjektivität zu denken, sondern als ein Einrücken in ein 
Überlieferungsgeschehen, in dem sich Vergangenheit und Gegenwart 
beständig vermitteln. " (ibid. p. 295). "Understanding itself is not so much to be 
viewed as an act of subjectivity, but as a slotting into a process of tradition in 
which past and present are constantly mediated. " 
The anticipation of meaning which sets off the hermeneutic circle of inquiry is 
34 These comments refer primarily to Schleiermacher. We have already noted that Bowie 
(1997) disagrees with Gadamer's reading of Schleiermacher. Bowie maintains that a concept 
of interpretation based on empathy was first put forward by Friedrich Ast in 1808. 
Schleiermacher knew Ast's work and opposed it. 
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not primarily a subjective achievement, but is determined by the (historically 
evolving) shared cultural ground between the object and subject of 
understanding. It is on this shared ground that the polarity of familiarity and 
strangeness, of sameness and otherness, unfolds. "In diesem Zwischen ist 
der wahre Ort der Hermeneutik" (ibid. p. 300). "In this in-between is the true 
locus of hermeneutics. " 
Reflection on the particularities of the situation from within which one engages 
with one's object is an important element of the process of understanding. 
One's own situation is, of course, that which one finds oneself in the middle of, 
it is therefore not possible to confront it and to know it as an object. Every 
situation involves the taking up of a standpoint which is limited in terms of 
what is allows one to see. Every standpoint involves its own un-thematised 
field of perception or background of understanding, which Gadamer terms 
Horizont, horizon. In order to understand something which is outside one's 
horizon - and only things outside one's horizon require understanding - one 
has to gain awareness of the implications of this situatedness. However, just 
because one can never fully step outside one's own situation this can only 
ever be achieved to a limited degree. 
On the basis of this awareness of the limitations of one's own horizon one 
needs to try to gain access to the horizon of the object of understanding. This 
process involves a move which Gadamer too calls Sich-hinein-versetzen 
(putting oneself into the position of the other). However, Gadamer 
conceptualises this movement, in the case of reading a text, not just as an 
attempt to identify with the subjectivity of the author. Gadamer's 
understanding of understanding differs from the purely psychological 
comprehension via empathy. Understanding is never only of the other's 
subjective experience and the meanings intended by the other, but, more 
importantly, the reaching of an understanding with the other about something. 
For Gadamer Sich-hinein-versetzen means to transpose oneself, as the 
different person one is, into the horizon of the other precisely in order to 
understand something about the otherness of the other. 
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Man muß [... ] immer schon Horizont haben, um sich dergestalt in eine 
Situation versetzen zu können. Denn was heißt Sichversetzen? Gewiss nicht 
einfach: Von-sich-absehen. Natürlich bedarf es dessen insoweit, als daß man 
die andere Situation sich wirklich vor Augen stellen muß. Aber in diese 
andere Situation muß man sich gerade selber mitbringen. Das erst erfüllt den 
Sinn des Sichversetzens. Versetzt man sich z. B. in die Lage eines anderen 
Menschen, dann wird man ihn verstehen, d. h. sich der Andersheit, ja der 
unauflöslichen Individualität des Anderen gerade dadurch bewußt werden, 
daß man sich in seine Lage versetzt (ibid. p. 310). 
One has [... ] to already have horizon to be able to thus transpose oneself into 
a situation. Because what does it mean to transpose oneself? Certainly not 
just, to ignore oneself. Of course one needs to do this insofar as one needs to 
really imagine [place in front of one's eyes] the other situation. But it is vital 
that one brings oneself into this other situation. Only this fulfils the meaning of 
transposing oneself. If one puts oneself, for example, into the situation of 
another person one will understand him, i. e. one will become aware of his 
otherness, his insoluble individuality even, exactly by putting oneself into his 
position. 
Gadamer's criticism of empathy is that it implies a 'one person psychology' 
whereas he insists that it takes two to understand. The other, of course, has 
to be represented in one's mind; what is required is "to make the other as 
strong as possible so that his statements obtain some intelligibility" (Gadamer 
quoted in Risser 1991, p. 103). The other's position and statements are met 
with an expectation that they are both coherent and have a claim to truth. This 
"Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit" (anticipation of perfection) is essential in order 
for the object to 'come forward' in its otherness; only then will he/she/it be able 
to"make an impact on (have something to say to) the understanding subject, 
and, by the same token, have the power to call into question the prejudices of 
the interpreter. Only if the object is made strong enough to be able to issue 
such a challenge is the interpreter prevented from attributing meaning at will. 
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The interpreter's horizon can be brought to awareness only in contrast to 
other possible horizons (just as to see one's limitations is to be able to see 
beyond them). By the same token, it is crucial that the interpreter does not 
attempt to get out of his horizon (as if that was possible... ), for the other can 
be understood as an other only by virtue of this difference. Gadamer sees the 
hermeneutic task as the development of the tension between one's own 
horizon and that of the other, whilst keeping in mind that this otherness can 
only be understood because it evolves on shared ground. Since any horizon, 
past or present, is never static and never insulated from what surrounds it the 
notion of distinct horizons is ultimately more apparent than real. In the 
moment of understanding there is a Horizontverschmelzung, a fusion of 
horizons, where what appeared as separate and other is revealed as 
belonging to one another. "Verstehen fist] immer der Vorgang der 
Verschmelzung solcher vermeintlich für sich seiender Horizonte" (1960, 
p. 311, italics in orig. ). "Understanding is always the process of fusion of such 
horizons which seem to exist for themselves. " Understanding is thus an event 
where meaning is created in the coming together of the two horizons which, 
up to this point, had seemed to be closed off to each other. In understanding 
the juxtaposition of the distinct horizons is revealed as only a phase of this 
process, which is now understood to take place on the basis of the continuous 
and shared ground of cultural history. Understanding is possible due to the 
continuity of what Gadamer calls "tradition"; language, as we will see, is 
central to this continuity. 
Gadamer's concept of horizon emphasises the historical-cultural situatedness 
of the person; consequently, he stresses that which is shared, referring to a 
background idea of `one culture' leaving little otherness to be mediated 
between the members of a given society. His rather broad view of what 
constitutes a horizon leads to the inclusion into this conceptual frame of 
practically all members of a society, with a 
loss of differentiating power 
between social groups (let alone individuals within these groups). Alternative, 
or additional factors, like the life-historical contingencies of an individual or the 
particular circumstances of a social grouping within a given culture/society, 
200 
are not considered as contributing to the constitution of horizon. 35 From the 
perspectives of the psychotherapy theories discussed in part I 'horizon' would 
be considered as much more individualised - and rendered subjective - by the 
particularities of one's life history. Gadamer's eye is on the 'bigger picture', 
and he therefore sees mainly commonalities rather than differences within a 
culture. This is borne out by his concept of tradition as that which binds and 
unifies meaning. I will return to this question further below in this chapter, and 
again in chapter 6. 
Understanding as dialogue 
Gadamer's understanding of understanding is centrally linked to a concept of 
Erfahrung as negative dialectic. Erfahrung (here translated as 'experience') 
does not refer so much to the 'lived experience' as the totality of subjectivity, 
but rather to the sense of 'having an experience of, which implies a learning 
process. Erfahrung is always made in a particular situation or with a particular 
object, and it is always the Erfahrung of something new. Only a new 
experience is an experience at all. Furthermore, experience is, in Gadamer's 
philosophy, always dialectic in that it necessarily entails a negation. New 
experience (a tautology in this definition) is always the dis-confirmation of 
previous experience, it is the disappointment of anticipation. Experience is a 
process of old experience (the expectation of things being the same as they 
were) coming up against the new and unexpected. This thought can be further 
illuminated using Piaget's concepts of assimilation and accommodation, 
already encountered in chapter 3. A new idea (or fact, or situation) can be 
cognitively appropriated in two distinct ways: Assimilation subsumes the new 
under the existing mental' categories leaving the cognitive structure 
unchanged; the new is absorbed and rendered intelligible in terms of what 
was already understood. Accommodation involves a change of the cognitive 
35 Further down I will discuss the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, who emphasises the multiplicity of 
linguistic sub-cultures within a given society and consequently developed a more 
heterogeneous conception of horizon. 
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structure; the new information cannot simply be absorbed into existing 
categories, it asserts its otherness to the old and its appropriation therefore 
entails a learning process. Only the latter constitutes, in Gadamer's terms, an 
experience. 
New experience opens up the subject's horizon; the new knowledge thus 
acquired changes the object and the knowing subject. In the knowledge of the 
object the subject knows himself. This unity of understanding develops with 
increasing Erfahrung and confirms its dialectic structure. Gadamer sees the 
fulfilment of this dialectic not in some final state of total self-realisation (as 
does Hegel), but in the adoption of an attitude of 'openness in principle' to 
further experience. 
Openness to new experience has the fundamental structure of a question. To 
pose a question presupposes openness since the answer is not yet arrived at. 
At the same time the question approaches its object from a certain 
perspective, the horizon of the question, which already limits its scope. A 
question poses itself with some urgency (drängt sich auf) because an 
experience cannot be assimilated. Since its starting point is the awareness of 
not-knowing, the question too is negatively characterised. The negativity of 
experience implies the structure of the question. Gadamer's hermeneutics 
privileges the question precisely because it safeguards a realm of openness 
for different kinds of answers to emerge. The art of questioning is to create 
space in which one can continue to think, that is, to ask further questions. 
Hence the centrality of the concept of dialogue for Gadamer. "Die Kunst des 
Fragens ist die Kunst des Weiterfragens, d. h. aber sie ist die Kunst des 
Denkens. Sie heißt Dialektik, denn sie ist die Kunst, ein wirkliches Gespräch 
zu führen" (ibid. p. 372). "The art of questioning is the art of questioning 
further, i. e. it is really the art of thinking. Its name is dialectics, because it is 
the art of conducting a real dialogue. " 
Dialogue has the structure of question and answer; it is meant to bring out into 
the open, to prise loose from the fixity of opinions, whatever constitutes its 
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content. Thus dialogue is intrinsically linked to an attitude of openness, which 
implies that the questions asked are genuine questions. "[... ] a dialogue can 
only begin when I too am not sure what to think", says Gadamer in an 
interview (1995). He cites Socratic-Platonic dialectic as the early model case 
for philosophic inquiry. Here the speaker himself is questioned, his opinions 
are being probed until the truth of what is discussed comes to the fore, i. e. 
until the logos succeeds over subjective preconceptions. For Gadamer the 
dialogue, i. e. the live exchange of thoughts in the give and take of question 
and answer in the medium of the spoken word, has primacy over the 
'monologue' of the written text. (He favourably compares Socratic dialogic 
dialectic with the dialectics of Hegel which he describes as a "monologue of 
thought". ) 
Hermeneutics is structurally dialogic - even the interpretation of a historic text 
requires that we "enter into a dialogue" with it. The understanding of a text too 
is a questioning in relation to the text which, in turn, is to be understood as the 
answer to a question. The question that the text answers needs to be made 
relevant to one's own (the interpreter's) situation, and the text's answer needs 
to' become a question for the reader. "Eine Frage verstehen heißt, sie fragen. 
Eine Meinung verstehen heißt, sie als Antwort auf eine Frage verstehen" (ibid. 
p. 381). "To understand a question means to ask it. To understand an opinion 
means to understand it as the answer to a question. " 
The interpreter needs to let himself be reached by what the text asserts. We 
already know what is required in order to understand: man muss sich etwas 
sagen lassen. In Gadamer's philosophy receptivity to the claims of one's 
object of inquiry is linked with a concept of Anwendung (application), which he 
derived from Aristotle's phronesis. Phronesis is a concept of practical reason, 
and as such opposed to a concept of theoretical knowledge based on the 
application of generalised ideas to particular cases. In phronesis knowledge 
comes about as a result of engagement with particular practical situations. 
Gadamer now links this idea of phronetic application to the dialogic structure 
of understanding. Only by applying the claim of the object to the particularities 
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of one's own situation can understanding be furthered of that which the claim 
is about. Truth asserts itself in the application of the claims of the object to the 
particularities of the subject's present situation. This entails a concept of 
practice which has a regulative function regarding the multitude of possible 
interpretations. There is something beyond the text which impacts on the 
process of interpretation. 
In Gadamer's hermeneutics the reader ends up questioning himself, and 
emerges from this dialogue changed (as an other). "Verständigung im 
Gespräch ist nicht ein bloßes Sichausspielen und Durchsetzen des eigenen 
Standpunktes, sondern eine Verwandlung ins Gemeinsame hin, in der man 
nicht bleibt was man war" (ibid. p. 384). "Understanding through dialogue is 
not a mere playing out and asserting of one's own view, but a transformation 
into [transposition onto] what is shared; one does not remain what one was in 
this process. " This coming to an understanding, which is the finding of shared 
ground via the fusion of horizons, is executed in spoken language; it is made 
possible only through language: "[Die] im Verstehen geschehende 
Verschmelzung der Horizonte fist] die eigentliche Leistung der Sprache. " (ibid. 
p. 383; italics in orig. ) "[The] fusion of horizons which takes place in 
understanding [is] the real achievement of language. " 
The object of understanding is approached, as we saw, from within the 
horizon of the interpreter. It is not, however, a super-imposition of the 
interpreter's preconceptions, but rather a "bringing into play" and a "risking" of 
one's own opinions in the dialogue with the object. Understanding happens in 
the medium of language. "Die Sprache ist die Mitte, in der sich die 
Verständigung der Partner und das Einverständnis über die Sache vollzieht" 
(ibid. p. 387). "Language is the middle in which the understanding of the 
partners and the agreement on the subject matter proceeds. " Hermeneutics is 
thus defined as the coming to an understanding with someone about 
something carried out in language. Gadamer uses both the terms Medium, 
Mittel (medium, means) and Mitte (middle, centre), allocating language a 
central role but at the same time a middle ground, a locus between subject 
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and object, in which the process of understanding unfolds as fusion of 
horizons. The finding of the proper language in which understanding can 
come about plays an essential role in the establishment of this middle ground. 
It is not just preparation for understanding by, as it were, getting ready the 
right kind of tools; it is an intrinsic part of understanding. 
Language for Gadamer is not just the application of words to objects, an 
attachment of linguistic signs, in principle arbitrary and only regulated by the 
conventions of the speaking community. In language the objects themselves 
seek to find their proper expression. "Alles Verstehen ist Auslegen, und alles 
Auslegen entfaltet sich im Medium einer Sprache, die den Gegenstand zu 
Wort kommen lassen will und doch zugleich die eigene Sprache des 
Auslegers ist" (ibid. p. 392). "All understanding is interpretation, and all 
interpretation unfolds in the medium of a language which wants to give verbal 
expression to the object but which is nevertheless the particular language of 
the interpreter". 36 
In understanding we start from the position of what is 'own', i. e. the 
particularities of our horizon, our opinions, our language. Yet it is the essence 
of the process of understanding that we appropriate, make our own 
(aneignen), what had belonged to the other. The investigation of the linguistic 
character of understanding repeats all the features of the hermeneutic 
process so far analysed. What the other says to us requires understanding 
only to the extent that it is not fully understood to start with. At the same time, 
we are addressed in a language which is not entirely alien to us. We do 
understand something - we give what is said meaning in terms of the 
preconceptions of our horizon. Understanding is neither mere assimilation of 
the other into what is already given, nor is it a process of psychic transposition 
into the intended meanings of the other person. It is a dialogic process made 
possible only in the medium of language. What is said speaks to us, i. e. 
36 The eigen in eigene Sprache can be translated both as'particular' and as own', as in, one's 
own'. Both meanings seem intended, since they are connotations shared with the 
particularities of the preconceptions of one's horizon. 
/-- 
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asserts its power to mean more than we initially understood. This requires, 
according to Gadamer, that we apply the assertion of the other to our own 
situation. This idea of application (Anwendung) is always involved in 
understanding something about the other. To the extent that we do 
understand, a mediation of our meaning has taken place and our realm of 
possible meanings has been extended by what the other said. This becomes 
possible as the result of a meeting in the "middle of language"; or, to put this 
differently, the finding of a common language created this place of coming 
together and understanding. Interpretation is the execution and elaboration in 
language of the process of understanding. The two processes are intrinsically 
linked; understanding proceeds as interpretation, always already using 
linguistic concepts. Gadamer asserts this is so in spite of the fact that we can 
never entirely bring into conscious awareness the extent to which we are 
steeped in language. 
Questions of validity 
Once the horizon of the interpreter is accepted as an ineluctable constituent 
element of the hermeneutic process, the idea of a single true meaning, even 
of a limited set of true meanings, becomes indefensible. The object gains 
meaning in the process of interpretation, and any interpretation will only ever 
show the object in the light of the terms the interpreter brings to it; therefore, 
any one interpretation will be one amongst other possible interpretations. This 
multiplicity of perspectives is the precondition for the object's continuing 
existence as an object of understanding. At the same time, as I hope to have 
shown, Gadamer does not conceive of interpretation as a subjective or 
random process. The interpreter is not free to impose arbitrary meanings. If 
he is at all receptive to the object, that is, if he is prepared to grant validity to 
the claims his object makes, and if, furthermore, he can bring to the task of 
interpretation a consciousness of the hermeneutic problematic, then 
something Gadamer calls a Wahrheitsgeschehen (truth event) can take place. 
A new meaning of the object, perhaps one which was not accessible from any 
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previous perspective (including the perspective of the 'author' himself), 
asserts its claim to truth. Truth in this sense is, of course, not understood to 
reside in the object itself, nor is it to be found 'inside' its author, it can 
therefore never be said to be finally revealed. New understanding adds to the 
totality of the object's true meanings; this totality, however, remains, in 
principle as well as in practice, inexhaustible. 
The question arises, then, as to what constitutes true meanings, i. e. what 
criteria are suggested to distinguish and evaluate different interpretations. 
What makes one interpretation better than its alternatives? It is in the context 
of the consideration of Gadamer's answer to this problematic that I wish to 
engage in the discussion of his philosophy. Furthermore, I will discuss some 
implications of Gadamer's central assertion that understanding is possible 
only as a participation in shared meaning. For the purposes of this discussion 
I will draw on two further philosophers, Mikhail Bakhtin and Richard Rorty, 
both of whom, whilst sharing with Gadamer some important premises, 
develop contrasting solutions. 
Wahrheit und Methode problematises the notion of truth. It does not set out to 
show us a proper methodology to find truth, but rather to demonstrate how 
every truth discovered depends on the method applied in its discovery. Whilst 
truth is thus contingent on method (in the broad sense which centrally 
includes the concept of horizon), Gadamer does not draw the (postmodern) 
conclusion that truth is altogether arbitrary and therefore does not constitute 
an aim worth pursuing. Gadamer asserts that meaning cannot be imposed at 
will, and he takes up the question of the evaluation of interpretations at 
various points in his writings. 
Wer zu verstehen sucht ist der Beirrung durch Vormeinungen ausgesetzt, die 
sich nicht an den Sachen selbst bewähren. Die Ausarbeitung der rechten, 
sachangemessenen Entwürfe, die als Entwürfe Vorwegnahmen sind, die sich 
'an den Sachen' erst bestätigen sollen, ist die ständige Aufgabe des 
207 
Verstehens. Es gibt hier keine andere 'Objektivität' als die Bewährung, die 
eine Vormeinung durch ihre Ausarbeitung findet. (ibid. p. 272) 
In seeking to understand one runs the risk of being misled by one's 
preconceptions which do not stand the test of the things themselves. It is the 
constant task of understanding to elaborate proper, thing-appropriate 
conceptions, which, as conceptions, are anticipations meant to be yet 
confirmed 'by the things'. There is no other 'objectivity than the confirmation 
which a preconception finds through its elaboration. 
Preconceptions are likely to lead to erroneous understandings, unless they 
are tested and affirmed (or modified) by the object in question. They are thus 
only the starting point (the only starting point there is) for the elaboration of 
concepts which are adequate to the object. The extent to which this adequacy 
to the 'things' is achieved is the closest we get to a measure of 'objectivity'. 
'Objectivity', as Gadamer uses this term here, is the object resisting our 
misunderstandings in the hermeneutic process of elaborating our pre- 
understandings. This implies that the objects themselves have something to 
say which rules on the validity of our interpretations. 
This `verdict' of the object has two aspects, one relating to the 'internal 
structure' of the object (e. g. a text), the other to the things the text is 'about'. 
The first is an ontological development of what used to be (pre-Heidegger) the 
central tenet of hermeneutic methodology and relates to the extent to which 
our understanding achieves a fit between the whole of the object and its parts. 
The second aspect is brought about by application; it refers to that which the 
text asserts about the way things are. It points to the things beyond their 
linguistic representation and thus introduces a notion of practice. I want to first 
address the criterion of the unity of meaning which is elaborated in the 
performance of the hermeneutic circle. Gadamer writes: 
Die Aufgabe ist, in konzentrischen Kreisen die Einheit des verstandenen 
Sinnes zu erweitern. Einstimmung aller Einzelheiten zum Ganzen ist das 
Z-, 
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jeweilige Kriterium für die Richtigkeit des Verstehens. Das Ausbleiben solcher 
Einstimmung bedeutet Scheitern des Verstehens. (ibid. p. 296) 
The task is to expand in concentric circles the unity of the understood 
meaning. Harmony of all the particulars with the whole is the respective 
criterion for the correctness of the interpretation. The lack of such harmony 
signifies the failure of understanding. 
The anticipation of meaning which gets the hermeneutic circle under way 
necessarily implies an expectation to find meaning in perfect unity; this is a 
"formal precondition" of understanding which Gadamer calls "Vorgriff der 
Vollkommenheit" (pre-grasp/anticipation of perfection). He claims that "only 
that is understandable which really constitutes a perfect unity of meaning" 
(ibid. p. 299). Understanding thus is conditional not only on an anticipation of 
perfect sense - which, one might imagine, could also be disappointed through 
understanding -, but also on the realisation of this perfection in the process. 
This precondition of understanding presupposes that the object is indeed a 
unity all the elements of which hang together in a continuous and coherent 
fashion. It raises the question, central to psychoanalytic thought, whether 
objects can be understood that are internally conflicted and perhaps 
contradictory. Gadamer's stipulation seems to rule this out. 
proper understanding culminating in the fusion of the horizons leads to the 
disappearance of the interpretation (ibid. p. 402). In an interview conducted in 
1993 (published 1995) Gadamer makes the following statement regarding the 
judgement on the validity of an understanding: "When I am asked for the 
criterion of a correct interpretation, my answer is that it is the one you can 
forget in rereading the text, or in admiring the work of art. If you can forget it, 
that shows that it was not something artificial, forced or prejudicial. " The 
interpretation disappears because it has ceased to be distant and different 
from the text; the two have met on the shared ground constituted by the 
continuity of the cultural and linguistic tradition. Right interpretation coincides 
ý' 
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with the object anticipated as harmonious; it is indeed right to the extent that it 
succeeds in revealing its perfect unity. 
The understanding of an object via the fusion of horizons results in the 
overcoming of its otherness; the object ceases to exist as an object for 
understanding. The fusion of the horizons, as we have seen, implies a change 
(including centrally a change in the range of meanings words can assume) 
both on the part of the subject and the object of understanding. From the 
position of the newly established shared horizon the object has lost its 
otherness and has become 'of the same kind', as it were, as the interpreter. 
What started out being strange is now 'part of me', or 'one of us'. This 
moment of fusion looks in danger of turning the problematic of otherness into 
something of a 'comedy of errors', where the initial strangeness is revealed as 
only ever having been a kind of cognitive mistake. Whilst Gadamer's 
hermeneutics is clearly imbued by an optimistic assessment of the 
possibilities of bridging the distance to the cultural other - and indeed sees a 
progressive, 'edifying' aspect in its appropriation (further discussed below) - it 
is an essentially dialectic process. The subject who comes to realise the 
commonality with the other, is himself changed by this realisation. He who 
received the impetus of otherness and responded to it with understanding has 
moved on. If understanding is a comedy of errors, Gadamer's hermeneutics 
reveals it is also a Bildungsroman. 
I have argued above that Gadamer's hermeneutics relies rather heavily on the 
idea of the continuity and coherence of the object, a state of affairs which is 
necessarily anticipated by the interpreter and confirmed in the process of 
successful interpretation. Furthermore, the possibility of proper understanding 
rests on yet another continuity, that of the shared cultural-linguistic tradition. 
Whilst Gadamer clearly speaks of a polarity of familiarity and otherness (he 
calls the space between the two poles the "true location of hermeneutics") the 
fusion of the horizons occurs on the ground which is in the process revealed 
as already familiar to both subject and object of understanding. It has to be 
asked, then, what chances of understanding there are if society and 'our' 
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cultural tradition is not viewed as speaking in just one language, but is 
conceived rather as internally disparate and multivocal. Furthermore, 
Gadamer's strong reliance on the internal continuity of the object of 
understanding begs the question what understanding can be gained of 
objects which, like for instance people, do not coincide with themselves so 
harmoniously. In order to bring these issues into sharper relief I am now 
turning, for a contrasting account of dialogic understanding, to the work of the 
Russian linguist, literary theorist and philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin. 
Bakhtin and the question of the fusion of horizons 
Bakhtin's theory of language, which is in fact part of a larger philosophical 
anthropology with language occupying a defining position, contains a number 
of striking similarities with Gadamer's hermeneutics, including a remarkable 
similarity in terminology. Bakhtin, too, has a central concept of `horizon' (the 
shared source probably being Husserl) which emphasises the ineluctable 
situatedness of the person in a historically specific linguistic-cultural 
Lebenswelt. Like Gadamer, Bakhtin holds the dialogic structure of language to 
be the founding condition not only of any verbal production, but also of all 
possibility for understanding and of the constitution of personal identity. This 
stress on dialogism entails a highly critical stance both versus any notion of 
objective knowledge and versus empathic 
identification as routes to 
understanding within the human sciences. 
The subject matter of the human 
sciences is the human subject, which 
is constituted by and lives its life in 
language. For Bakhtin, as for Gadamer, language is first and foremost 
dialogue, which has the essential structure of question and answer. 
in contrast to Gadamer, however, Bakhtin sees language - and, by the same 
token, both society and the individual - characterised not primarily by 
continuity and unity, but as essentially multifaceted, fragmented and in 
conflict. The multiplicity of human (social) experience manifests itself in the 
multiplicity of languages and cannot be adequately understood by reducing it 
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to the meanings of a single unitary discourse. "The object of the human 
sciences is expressive and speaking being. Such a being never coincides with 
itself, that is why it is inexhaustible in its meaning and signification" (c. 1941; 
1979, p. 410)37 
Language as conceived by Bakhtin has its life in the exchanges, pursuits and 
struggles of real people situated in their particular 'real life' circumstances. it 
ceases to be a unitary ideal entity and breaks up into what Bakhtin calls 
heteroglossia, the multiplicity of languages as they are spoken in the different 
historical periods, geographical areas, socio-economic classes, professional 
groupings or social 'sub-cultures' etc. The multiplicity of language is not 
incidental to the stratification of society; language is not only used to express 
these social differences but plays an important role in their constitution. 
Language itself is saturated with different 'ideologies', it is an essential, 
inseparable aspect of the different world views of the members of a given 
society. The concrete, particular language spoken by one social grouping is to 
an important extent constituted by their position within society and in speaking 
this particular language this grouping constitutes itself and asserts their world 
view in contrast to and in confrontation with other contemporary 
languages/world views. The multiplicity of language is thus a manifestation 
and a realisation of an actual 'ideological' struggle. This struggle is not only 
engaged in when language is used to express different political viewpoints, it 
is present in language itself and thus part of every utterance. 
At the heart of Bakhtin's philosophy of language is a fundamental tension 
between two opposing forces operating within language. A centripetal, 
unifying and centralising tendency is confronted by a centrifugal, multiplying 
and decentering force. The centrifugal force gives rise to the diversity of the 
actually spoken languages of a society at any given time; the centripetal force 
resists this fragmenting process and tends to unify language. In contrast to 
37 All the Bakhtin quotes, apart from Bakhtin (1981), are taken from Todorov (1984). Todorov 
uses his own translations of 
Bakhtin's texts, many of which have not been published in 
English. 
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the former, the latter does not find manifest existence as an actually spoken 
language; it exerts its power within the totality of the existing languages. 
A unitary language is not something that is given, but is in its very essence 
something that must be posited - at every moment in the life of a language it 
opposes the realities of heteroglossia, but at the same time the 
(sophisticated) ideal (or primitive delusion) of a single holistic language 
makes the actuality of its presence felt as a force resisting an absolute 
heteroglot state; it posits definitive boundaries for limiting the potential chaos 
of variety, thus guaranteeing a more or less maximal mutual understanding. 
(1981, p. 270) 
The centripetal, unifying tendency is the condition under which a heteroglot 
society can communicate; it refers to an ideal centre which holds the 
multiplicity of meanings together sufficiently to enable understanding. The 
fixity of meaning towards which the centripetal force strives, guarantees the 
necessary overlaps of meanings, the shared linguistic ground without which 
heteroglossia would deteriorate into the mayhem of the tower of Babel. The 
(theoretical) endpoint of the centripetal vector is absolute identification, where 
every term has only one meaning; the centrifugal vector propels language 
towards a (equally theoretical) point where any term has indefinite meanings 
and therefore ceases its function to signify. In Bakhtin's view, however, the 
centrifugal tendencies are stronger than the centripetal ones, resulting in the 
constant development and proliferation of language. 
Meaning is contingent on historical-cultural situatedness and therefore always 
multiple; it is not, however, unlimited. Within the human sciences the tendency 
for single fixed meanings has to be resisted. Correct understanding must not 
therefore be accepted as an aim. "Accuracy presupposes the coincidence of 
the thing with itself (c. 1941; 1979, p. 410). "The limit of accuracy in the natural 
sciences is identification 
(a=a)" (1974; 1979, p. 371). In contrast, for the 
human sciences "the criterion is not the accuracy of knowledge but the depth 
of insight" (c. 1941; 1979, p. 
409). "[In] the human sciences accuracy consists 
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in-, overcoming the other's strangeness without assimilating it wholly to 
oneself (1974; 1979, p. 371). 
To pursue an objectivist agenda within the human sciences (to find the one 
and only language correctly representing reality) is to strive to establish 
domination of 'one voice' (one set of meanings) over other alternative voices. 
To do so is to give primacy to the centripetal forces over heteroglossia and to 
seek a monologic discourse to end dialogic engagement. Centripetal, 
monologising force is exerted as part of the ideological struggle to gain a 
monopoly on 'truth'; as such it is imbued with the political motivation to 
establish one's own view as the only true view. 'Monologue' aims to dismiss 
any competing accounts; as the only voice it shuts down the conversation and 
leaves no room for discussion or doubt. Apart from the political dimension of 
the drive towards unitary language, its pulling power is also a result of its 
epistemological allure. 'Monologue' results from a failure to appreciate the 
difference in the kinds of knowledge available in the natural and the human 
sciences respectively. Hermeneutics has shown us that within the latter one 
language can never suffice. The methodology of the human sciences cannot 
be other than dialogic: 
The shorthand record of the human sciences. It is always the record of a 
dialogue of a particular kind: the complex correlation of the text (object of 
study and reflection) and the context that frames it and which is being created 
(as questions, objections, etc. are raised), where the scholar's knowing and 
evaluating thought accomplishes itself. It is the encounter of two texts: the 
already given text and the reacting text being created, and therefore, it is the 
encounter of two subjects, of two authors. (written 1959-1961; 1979 p. 285) 
Understanding as a setting in relation with other texts and as reinterpretation 
in a new context (mine, that of my epoch, the future's) [ ... ] True 
understanding in literature and literary studies is always historical and 
personal. (1974; 1979, p. 364-5) 
ýý 
214 
As in Gadamer, understanding comes about as new understanding via the 
bringing into dialogue of two linguistic horizons. Understanding cannot be 
achieved unless there is difference/separation. Identification which merges 
two into one is therefore not an option: "The sciences of the spirit: their object 
is not one but two 'spirits' (the studying one and the studied, which must not 
fuse into a single one). Their true object is the interrelation and interaction of 
the spirits" (1970-71; 1979, p. 349). Bakhtin uses the term fusion here to attack 
a subjective notion of empathy, where the interpreter's viewpoint ('text') is 
abandoned in favour of that of the object of interpretation. This criticism of 
empathy is in accordance with Gadamer's rejection of a 'one horizon' 
hermeneutics. However, Bakhtin's insistance that fusion runs counter to the 
task of understanding seems to bring him into opposition to Gadamer's 
hermeneutics, in which, as we have seen, understanding proceeds as a 
fusion of horizons. I will return to this point shortly. 
The dialogue of the texts is steeped in the history of language usage. 
Linguistic expression never starts from scratch; there are 'no first words after 
Adam', nor are there nameless objects. The discourse both of the text and of 
the interpreter are interwoven with the multiplicity of discourses which have 
social currency regarding the present subject matter. Everything that is said is 
'in conversation' with what was said before on the same subject. This dialogic 
dynamic reaches even forward into the future: every utterance anticipates its 
reply. This is a consequence of the fundamental dialectic of question and 
answer which, for Bakhtin as for Gadamer, underlies all verbal expression. 
The dialogue of interpretation thus takes place against a background of voices 
which constitutes its condition and, at the same time, deprives its participants 
of the full possession of its meaning. A single voice can make itself heard only 
by blending into the complex choir of other voices already in play. Dialogue 
thus takes place within an intertextual (Julia Kristeva's term) web of dialogical 
relations. Every utterance, apart from being related to a speaker, a listener, 
and the object it is about, is also in dialogue with previously produced 
utterances. This inescapable presence of the discourse(s) surrounding - and 
in fact enabling - the present dialogue gives it an essentially triadic structure: 
/, - 
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Discourse (as all signs generally) is interindividual. All that is said, expressed, 
is outside the 'soul' of the speaker and does not belong to him only. [... J The 
author (the speaker) may have inalienable rights upon the discourse, but so 
does the listener, as do those whose voices resonate in the words found by 
the author (since there are no words that do not belong to someone). 
Discourse is a three-role drama (it is not a duet but a trio). (1959-61; 
1979, p. 300-1) 
From the point of view of Bakhtin's philosophy with its stress on difference 
and discontinuity, Gadamer's formulation of understanding as a fusion of 
horizons brought about by the finding of the one, shared language looks 
suspiciously like an attempt to collapse heteroglossia - which is the condition 
of dialoguel - and seems to pursue the establishment of the monologic mode 
as the solution to the problem of the other. Whilst I believe this view to be a 
misrepresentation of important aspects of both Bakhtin and Gadamer, it draws 
our attention to a distinction (at least in emphasis) between the two authors 
regarding the question of what happens to 'otherness' in the process of 
understanding. 
Whilst Gadamer insists time and again that the distance which is constituted 
by the difference between subject and object is a precondition of 
understanding, in the fusion of the horizon this difference is revealed as being 
more apparent than real and seems to be reduced to an initial 
misunderstanding. Otherness is overcome as the finding of the shared 
language brings about understanding. This takes place on the basis of what 
Gadamer assumes to be the commonality of 'our tradition, i. e. the continuity 
of 'our cultural and linguistic history. Gadamer's acceptance of tradition as the 
ground on which understanding proceeds introduces into the dialogic concept 
of understanding a danger similar to the one he alerted us to in his criticism of 
both the empathic and the objectivist routes - the danger of losing the 
otherness of the other when the two languages (are said to have) become 
one. 'Tradition' posits something which is defined as 'our background without 
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fully specifying and problematising who this `us' is and, by the same token, 
whom it excludes. In Bakhtin's terms, the other could be said to be 
'monologised', otherness is being subsumed under the categories of the one 
language of tradition, which, we insist, the other shares with 'us'. 
Bakhtin's dialogism, like Gadamer's, depends on the sharing of linguistic 
ground; only to the extent that the multiple languages are within the field of 
gravity of the ideal unitary language is verbal communication possible. 
Bakhtin does not, however, entertain an idea of fusion of the languages in 
coming to understand the other. The centrifugal power is not (and must not 
be) overcome by the force of unification. Whilst the strangeness of the other is 
overcome, the distance to the other is not entirely erased. Tradition with its 
central idea of the shared linguistic background has, in Gadamer's 
hermeneutics, a function similar to that of unitary language in Bakhtin's 
thought. Both concepts guarantee the commonality of linguistic usage which 
provides sufficient stability of meaning to allow understanding at all. Gadamer, 
however, seems to weigh tradition more heavily than Bakhtin does unitary 
language. In Bakhtin heteroglossia prevails, whilst Gadamer's metaphor of 
fusion seems to suggest that difference is laid to rest in the final realisation of 
unification. I believe however that this reading is a misunderstanding of 
Gadamer. Not only does it leave out everything Gadamer said about the 
fundamental openness - and that is, the on-goingness - of the hermeneutic 
inquiry. It also views Gadamer's theory of language as a defence of 
established language usage, which opens his philosophy up to be criticised as 
politically conservative. Some evidence against this reading will be presented 
in the following chapter, where I will return to the discussion of the dialogue 
with otherness in the context of the problematic of clinical understanding. 
Bringing Bakhtin and Gadamer into a hermeneutic dialogue might reveal that 
their differences are, after all, more apparent than real. 
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Rorty and the question of the verdict of reality 
Gadamer uses the terms Anstoss (impetus/prod/push) and umstossen (to 
push over) to give the assertions of the object an almost physical reality. The 
first impetus is given in the experience of the otherness of the object which, 
on the part of the interpreter, constitutes the call for understanding. The 
otherness of the object makes a claim to be understood which can only be 
met if the difference or distance between the object and the interpreter is 
preserved. What is required, first and foremost, is "merely openness" on the 
part of the interpreter for the otherness of his objects. Openness does not 
mean the suspension of one's opinions but their bringing to consciousness as 
opinions. Given this openness the object can assert its otherness in such a 
way as to rule on the appropriateness of one's opinions. The 'things', the 
objects of study, become themselves the gauge for the validity of our 
understandings. Not any reading of a given text, for example, is possible: 
[... ] innerhalb dieser Vielfalt des 'Meinbaren', d. h. dessen was ein Leser 
sinnvoll finden und insofern erwarten kann, ist doch nicht alles möglich, und 
wer an dem vorbeihört, was der andere wirklich sagt, wird das 
Mißverstandene am Ende auch der eigenen vielfältigen Sinnerwartung nicht 
einordnen können. So gibt es auch hier einen Maßstab. Die hermeneutische 
Aufgabe geht von selbst in eine sachliche Fragestellung über und ist von 
dieser immer schon mitbestimmt. Damit gewinnt das hermeneutische 
Unternehmen festen Boden unter den Füssen. Wer verstehen will, wird sich 
von vornherein nicht der Zufälligkeit der eigenen Vormeinung überlassen 
dürfen, um an der Meinung des Textes so konsequent und hartnäckig wie 
möglich vorbeizuhören - bis dies unüberhörbar wird und das vermeintliche 
Verständnis umstößt (1960, p. 273; italics in orig. ). 
[... ] within this multiplicity of 'possible meanings', i. e. that which a reader can 
make sense of and which he can insofar expect, still not everything is 
possible, and someone who does not listen to what the other is in fact saying 
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will not be able in the end to accommodate that which was so misunderstood 
even within his own manifold anticipations of meaning. Thus there is a 
yardstick even here. The hermeneutic task tuns by itself into a factual issue 
and is always already co-determined by it. Thereby the hermeneutic 
enterprise gains firm ground under its feet. Wanting to understand one may 
not give oneself over to the contingency of one's own pre-conceptions in 
order to mishear the meaning of a text as consequently and stubbornly as 
possible - until this meaning becomes impossible to ignore and pushes over 
the presumed understanding. 
Yardstick, terra firma, pushing over - the object asserts itself and puts paid to 
arbitrary interpretations. Misinterpretations will collapse when faced with the 
object's reality. Gadamer approvingly quotes Ranke, the German historian, to 
assert the final authority of reality: Reality ("was ist" - "what is") is that "was 
nicht mehr umzustossen isf', what one cannot push over any more (ibid. 
p. 363). But one's non-truths can be pushed over by what is the case. Given 
the historical situatedness of the interpreter truth cannot be said to be finally 
realised; however, false assertions are pushed over by reality. Verification is 
not on offer, but a properly executed hermeneutic inquiry weeds out wrong 
interpretations by falsification. 
it . is not immediately clear, however, what "the factual issue" ("die sachliche 
Fragestellung") is in relation to the interpretation of a text. Is it 'the matter of 
the text' or 'the matters of which the text speaks'? On the one hand, as we 
saw, there is the idea that the matter of the text will not allow 
misinterpretations.. This resistance on the part of the text will lead to the 
failure, discussed above, to achieve the satisfactory 'fit' of the parts with the 
whole. Unity of meaning cannot be forced, and a thorough and conscientious 
reading of the text will therefore rule out unsubstantiated or contradictory 
interpretations. 
A thorough reading alone, however, will not on its own settle the question of 
interpretation; in a way, it only prepares a proper interpretation. 
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Understanding for Gadamer is, after all, a coming to an understanding of (at 
least) two participants (the text and its reader) about some matter, i. e. the 
aspect of reality which is the subject matter of the text. The 'true meaning' of 
the text relates to the truth which the text asserts about 'things' and which the 
reader applies to the particularities of his own situation. Truth can only be 
established through this process of application which concerns the reality as it 
exits beyond the linguistic realm. Hence there is a concept of practice which 
has a regulative function regarding the multitude of possible interpretations. 
There is something beyond the text, i. e. that which it speaks about, which 
impacts on the process of interpretation. 
Gadamer's belief that there is terra firma on which to ground the truth of an 
interpretation seems to imply that reality intervenes and perhaps 'protests' 
against misunderstandings in ways which are not again open to 
interpretations - and misinterpretations. Anstoss and umstossen are imbued 
with an almost physical power to assert a reality beyond the realm of words; 
they do not, however, point the way back to an idea that reality gets itself 
represented 'as it is'. The interpreter who is an- or umgestossen is always 
historically/culturally/linguistically situated, he is never the neutral, detached 
scientist-observer. Gadamer's hermeneutics, whilst criticising the premises of 
an objectivist epistemology, does not give up on reality as it exists beyond the 
linguistic domain. 
Richard Rorty, who in many respects follows and further develops Gadamer's 
philosophy, seems to be in disagreement with Gadamer when he (Rorty) 
urges us to give up on the idea that we can get to the way things are beyond 
their linguistic signification. It is a consequence of the realisation of the 
ineluctable implication of the knower in the known, that knowledge of how 
things 'really are' is inaccessible to us. From this Rorty (1980) draws the 
radical sceptical conclusion and insists we must give up on epistemology 
altogether. Philosophy was for much too long led astray by the entirely 
misguided metaphor of "the mirror of nature". We can never succeed in 
removing ourselves from our particular situatedness; all we can do is to gain 
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different perspectives on what we are interested in, and no single perspective 
can support claims to be more than a well-received opinion. 
Different views as to what is the matter can therefore not be settled with 
reference to the matter itself. The `world' does not rule on the accuracy of our 
descriptions of it - or if it did, we could not know this since we have no access 
to 'world' except under one of our descriptions. In consequence, the object 
cannot assert its reality in a way which lets us see this reality beyond our 
conceptions and evaluations. It cannot therefore be called upon to decide in 
favour of one interpretation over another. The question of truth is not one 
which 'reality' can answer, it is rather a matter for social discourse to settle. It 
is, in Rorty's view, the task of hermeneutics not to replace epistemology, but, 
on the contrary, to keep open the space vacated by its departure. 
Hermeneutics plays an important role in Rorty's particular 'post-modern' 
variety of pragmatism. Rather than continue to argue over which of our 
various descriptions most accurately represents reality, he insists that we 
should differentiate them primarily with regard to what they enable us to see 
and do. Changes in our descriptive vocabularies do much more than simply 
portray things in a different light; they effect changes to who we are and to the 
world we inhabit. A self differently conceived is a different self; a world newly 
described a different world. Rorty is in agreement with Charles Taylor who 
writes, "man is a self-defining animal. With changes in self-definition go 
changes in what man is, such that he has to be understood in different terms" 
(quoted ibid. p. 350). The way we think about ourselves, whilst it can never 
reflect our `true nature', to an important extent constitutes our being in the 
world. The vocabulary we use is therefore of great importance: it can seriously 
limit who we are or free us up to new possibilities. Once we forget that we are 
always dealing with ways of seeing things and never with how things really 
are, once, that is, we forget about the essentially metaphorical character of 
our conceptions, we entrap ourselves within the restrictions of one 
vocabulary. This `one and only' vocabulary we credit with attributes like 
`objective' and 'true'. 
221 
Paralleling Kuhn's (1962) distinction between `normal' and `revolutionary 
science' Rorty differentiates between two tendencies within philosophy, 
constructive or systematic philosophy on the one hand, and reactive or 
edifying philosophy on the other. Revolutionary science challenges the 
received wisdom of what counts for normal science in any historical period. It 
does so by providing a powerful new set of key metaphors, a new paradigm 
for re-organising our perceptions. The new paradigm offers immensely fruitful 
avenues for new research projects, thus vastly increasing our knowledge and, 
by the same token, the range of things we are able to do. Once these 
possibilities are explored and accommodated into contemporary discourse, 
what used to be revolutionary science becomes accepted as `normal'. The 
once new metaphors lose their powerful impact. In their acceptance they die 
as metaphors in that they are no longer perceived as showing us a new way 
of seeing, but are believed to represent things as they are. 
Like Gadamer, Rorty gives centrality to the concept of edification (Bildung); in 
fact, his development of Gadamer's hermeneutics, which he sees as 
culminating in the idea of Bildung, forms the centre of the concluding chapter 
of his magnum opus Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980). The German 
term Bildung carries strong connotations of cultural education as a process of 
self-formation. Rorty is in agreement with Gadamer who asserted that Bildung 
can replace knowledge as the goal of thinking. Edification, which Rorty 
juxtaposes to systematic philosophy, stands for the "project of finding new, 
better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking" (ibid. p. 360). 
Constructive or systematic philosophers set out to provide a coherent theory 
of the world, and the whole project of epistemology is founded, in Rorty's 
view, on an idea that a unified set of descriptions can be found which 
represents reality as it is. Systematic philosophies consequently attempt to 
find the final version of normal science, a philosophy to end all philosophies. 
The task of edifying philosophy (and hermeneutics is part of this tendency) is 
to disrupt the establishment and sedimentation of systematic philosophy. 
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Edifying philosophy does not seek to succeed systematic philosophy through 
the provision of a better coherent theory, but criticises the project of unified 
knowledge. Edifying philosophy takes its departure from systematic 
philosophy and is to that extent dependent on it. Rorty reminds us that 
"abnormal and 'existential' discourse is always parasitic upon normal 
discourse, that the possibility of hermeneutics is always parasitic upon the 
possibility (and perhaps upon the actuality) of epistemology, and that 
edification always employs material provided by the culture of the day" (ibid. 
p. 366). It is the aim of edifying philosophy to provide new metaphors which 
alienate us from our normal discourse. "Edifying discourse is supposed to be 
abnormal, to take us out of ourselves by the power of strangeness, to aid us 
in becoming new beings" (ibid. p. 350). It lends support to "our `existentialist' 
intuition that redescribing ourselves is the most important thing we can do" 
(ibid. p. 358). The importance of new metaphors does not lie in their being 
'better', i. e. more accurate, than the existing ones, but precisely in their 
capacity to make us look and think differently. Whilst the ultimate (ideal) aim 
of systematic philosophy is to end the argument as to what is the case, the 
main aim of edifying philosophy is to prevent this from happening. 
The danger which edifying discourse tries to avert is that some given 
vocabulary, some way in which people come to think of themselves, will 
deceive them into thinking that from now on all discourse could be, or should 
be, normal discourse. The resulting freezing-over of culture would be [... ] the 
dehumanisation of human beings. (ibid. p. 377) 
To use Bakhtin's terminology, edifying philosophy seeks to disrupt the 
monologue of normal discourse by keeping up a supply of heteroglot 
metaphors. Rorty draws the consequence that the notion of the correctness of 
a view should be replaced by one of `wisdom', a notion which he links with 
practice and the capacity to converse: 
One way of thinking of wisdom as something of which the love is not the 
same as that of argument, and of which the achievement does not consist in 
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finding the correct vocabulary for representing essence, is to think of it as the 
practical wisdom necessary to participate in a conversation. One way to see 
edifying philosophy as the love of wisdom is to see it as the attempt to 
prevent conversation from degenerating into inquiry, into an exchange of 
views. (ibid. p. 372) 
Rorty's pragmatism radicalises the idea of the continuous open-ended 
dialogue: the conversation itself, rather than the truth of what it is about, 
become the only good that is worth pursuing in philosophy. In doing so he 
departs from Gadamer's hermeneutics which insists that reality has a say in 
this conversation. In Gadamer the truth of what the conversation is about has 
the force to 'push over misguided ideas (if, that is, understanding is sought in 
the hermeneutic spirit). Whilst these are significant differences between 
Gadamer and Rorty there is, perhaps more importantly, agreement about the 
primacy of continuing dialogue, which demands that the `other voice' (the new 
metaphor) is never excluded. The significance of this agreement is surely 
evidenced, on Rorty's side, by the prominence he gives Gadamer's concept of 
edification in his main work; Gadamer, for his part, said in an interview he 
gave in 1992 that his ideas were close to Rorty's - adding that Rorty's ideas 
were "more extreme" (Chessick, 1992). 
The preceding discussion of Gadamer's hermeneutics and some of the 
contrasting concepts from Bakhtin and Rorty (plus Kuhn) allows for the, 
somewhat rough and ready, juxtaposition of the following groups of opposites: 
normal science revolutionary science 
systematic philosophy edifying philosophy 
dead metaphors new metaphors 
unifying, centripetal language heteroglot, centrifugal language 
monologic discourse dialogic discourse 
identification difference 
the one the many 
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Whilst this listing is obviously not unproblematic, it highlights a fundamental 
tension, common to these pairings, of diversification resisting unification, the 
alien resisting the familiar, the many refusing the subsummation under the 
dominance of the one. All three philosophers emphasise the inevitability of 
this tension and the importance of continued openness to the voice of 'the 
other'. This tension possesses creative potential, a potential which can, 
however, only be realised under the condition of an on-going dialogue with the 
other. The concept of Bildung as developed by Gadamer, and subsequently 
Rorty, posits this openness to the other as the essential philosophical attitude. 
Certainly in Gadamer's philosophy, this hermeneutic attitude is continually 
played out (and reinforced) in the dialectic engagement of self with the other. 
There is a hermeneutic circularity which always involves a return to oneself in 
the unfolding of the dialectic of self and other, sameness and difference. The 
confrontation with the other changes, expands the self. There is an idea of 
progression in this repeated return to oneself in the process of Bildung which 
is, in practice as well as in principle, interminable. In contrast to Hegel's 
conception of the dialectical evolution of self-consciousness towards its telos 
of complete self-realisation of Geist (spirit), Gadamer's dialectic is and 
remains open-ended. Bildung for him is to embrace this openness to 
continuous change, it is to give up the idea of an end-state of complete 
understanding and, by the same token, of a fully realised self. Just as there is 
no endpoint to the hermeneutic understanding of the object so the constitution 
of self-identity of the subject is never finally realised in an act of reflective self- 
possession. Rather than aiming at such a point of arrival, i. e. a metaphysical 
notion of ultimate knowledge of self and the world, Gadamer's hermeneutics 
promotes a continuous disposition of openness to new experience and new 
understandings. Given this idea of interminable progression his hermeneutics 
is perhaps better portrayed by the (suitably optimistic) image of an upward 




Triangulation and Dialogue 
The hermeneutics of clinical understanding 
Introduction 
Gadamer's dialogic hermeneutics, together with some of the ideas of Bakhtin 
and Rorty discussed in the previous chapter, provides us with some 
conceptual tools with which to return to the problems of clinical understanding 
laid out in chapters 1-4. In this concluding chapter I will first address the 
question to what extent the insights from Gadamer's philosophy can be 
transferred to interpersonal, clinical understanding, before developing some of 
its implications for psychotherapeutic practice. In doing so I hope to do some 
justice to the following questions: What are the conditions under which 
interpersonal understanding can emerge? How can the particular structure of 
the therapeutic dialogue be conceptualised? What prevents this dialogue of 
understanding from deteriorating into the monologue of the already 
understood? What can be said about the position, and the attitude, the 
therapist needs to assume vis-ä-vis his patients? And are there also perhaps 
conclusions which can be drawn for the development of psychotherapy, as a 
body of theories and as a profession? Whilst it is not possible in this thesis to 
fully elaborate what a 'Gadamerian' psychotherapy might look like, I hope to 
develop at least some of its aspects. 
In this chapter a concept of therapy will emerge which emphasises the 
facilitation of the patient's capacity to be in dialogue with the world. The 
therapeutic conversation is described as a dialogue to enable fuller dialogue. 
Following Gadamer's insight that to understand is to understand differently 
this dialogue is conceptualised as involving a multiple negative dialectic. One 
horizon (that of the therapist) is brought into contact with another (that of the 
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patient) in order to investigate the (defensive) ways in which the latter is 
structured. The patient's relation to his 'other is examined and challenged by 
this confrontation with the therapist's horizon of understanding. The challenge, 
however, is not unilateral. In the hermeneutic spirit, for real (that is: new) 
understanding to occur the therapist's horizon also undergoes change as a 
result of its confrontation with 'otherness'. The therapist meets his 'other' in 
two guises - as the other of his patient, and as alternative psychotherapy 
theory. Clinical understanding, as it emerges in the process of a particular 
psychotherapy, involves a two-directional dialogue in the therapist's mind. It is 
consequently described as being triangular in structure. 
A hermeneutics of psychotherapy? 
it is by no means clear that Gadamer himself saw his hermeneutic philosophy 
as appropriate for the task of psychological understanding. His theory of 
understanding as it is developed in Wahrheit und Methode is concerned 
mainly with the understanding of historical events or cultural objects. As we 
saw, Gadamer suggests that we dialogue with these objects (e. g. a historical 
text) as if with a 'you', that is, we enter into a linguistic communication in the 
process of which both 'partners' decentre towards the other, eventually 
leaving both participants changed by the fusion of horizons that occurs in 
understanding. This is not the same as understanding the text by attempting 
to recover its author's meanings and intentions. We are not asked to enter 
into dialogue with the author's subjectivity, but with the answers the text 
provides to the questions it is concerned with. Gadamer considers the 
understanding of the other person's subjectivity not primary to the 
hermeneutic task, since the task of understanding is to reveal a fuller range of 
meanings of the cultural object and these meanings are never exhausted 
through the understanding of the creator's mind. Understanding for Gadamer 
is primarily a coming to an understanding with someone about something. It is 
for this reason that Gadamer thinks of the understanding of another person, 
i- 
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as it is, for instance, sought in a clinical consultation, as constituting a different 
problematic. 
However, Gadamer's references to the process of clinical understanding and 
clinical practice reveal some ambiguity on this subject. In Wahrheit und 
Methode he seems to exclude the clinical consultation from the domain of 
hermeneutics precisely on the ground that its aim is not the gaining of an 
understanding regarding a present concern, but instead the gaining of the 
horizon of the other person itself. If this is the purpose of the conversation, 
then, Gadamer argues, the person seeking understanding has, as it were, 
withdrawn from the conversation. He is not present and available (antreffbar) 
as a person with his own horizon (1960, p. 308). 
It is not clear to me however why the understanding of another person should 
fall outside the realm of hermeneutic inquiry, especially given Gadamer's 
dialectic conception of experience and understanding. Experience is always 
the experience of something, it is always the self in relation to world. The unity 
of self-understanding and knowledge of the object that Gadamer posits 
implies that to hear about the person's subjective experience is to hear about 
her world and vice versa. It is hard to imagine that there are many statements 
a person might make 'just about themselves' which are not, by the same 
token, statements about 'how the world is' for this person (this includes 
statements which take oneself as the object of one's assertions). These 
statements too claim to be taken as true statements about the way things are 
and open up the possibility for someone else (e. g. a therapist) to step into this 
person's horizon. The distance of otherness is not, like in the understanding of 
a historical text, given primarily via the dimension of time, but through the 
differences in life historical particulars, including the variations of social and 
cultural background. If a text ought to be read as in conversation with a 'you', 
it is hard to see why Gadamer's thoughts should not apply to the utterances of 
an actual you, i. e. a real conversational partner. Since the experiences 
communicated in this psychologically focussed conversation are always 
experiences of something, mediated by language, expressed mainly in 
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language, and understood in linguistic terms, it seems to me that the 
understanding of another person can very well be formulated as a coming to 
an understanding with that person as to 'what is the case'. 
In texts where Gadamer addressed directly issues of health and medical care, 
as he did in a small collection of essays and lectures called Über die 
Verborgenheit der Gesundheit (1 993a; The enigma of health"), he did indeed 
apply the ideas of his hermeneutic philosophy to the clinical consultation. In 
Hermeneutik und Psychiatrie (contained in this collection) Gadamer 
establishes-the close vicinity of the two disciplines on the basis that both seek 
to gain understanding of that which resists comprehension in the expressions 
of experiences of other persons. "[The] incomprehensible and that which is 
unpredictable in the whole of the mental experience of man constitutes the 
subject matter of the art of understanding which is called hermeneutics" (ibid. 
p. 203). 
In Behandlung und Gespräch ("Treatment and Dialogue", also in 1993a) 
Gadamer analyses the role that dialogue plays in the context of medical (i. e. 
not primarily psychological) treatment, and he does so mainly in terms of the 
dialectic between distance and commonality. The discussion of the clinical 
consultation follows his analysis of the structure of the hermeneutic dialogue, 
thus moving the clinical dialogue firmly in the vicinity of other hermeneutic 
investigations. Behandlung (treatment) implies the idea of 'handling' the other 
person, doing something to the other person by the use of the hand to effect a 
change (carrying connotations akin to those of the term manipulation). Whilst 
this suggests the intimacy of one person touching another in the process of 
treatment, it also implies "a peculiar acknowledgement of distance and 
difference" (ibid. p. 160). This distance calls for the finding of a "shared 
ground" on which understanding becomes possible: "The fact of this distance 
entails for doctor and patient the task of finding a shared ground, and it is only 
dialogue which can achieve this" (ibid. ). Gadamer reminds us that the German 
word for surgery hours is Sprechstunde (literally 'speaking hour'), and he 
suggests this word usage recognises the fact that the dialogue between 
ý , gym. -^i s> ..... Q., v«,. F. "týs , -« ., 
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doctor and patient constitutes "the first and the last commonality between 
them". Through dialogue the distance can be overcome. 
Crucial for the success of this conversation is the extent to which both 
partners can give themselves over to the movement of the dialogue. It is 
important "that one slips into a dialogue, which is not really directed by 
anyone, but which directs us all" (ibid. p. 172). The model for this dialogue is 
the Socratic-Platonic dialectic in which the exchanges are geared to the sole 
purpose of "leading the other to his own view" (ibid. ). "The dialogue only puts 
the other into the potentiality, without further confusing himself, to awaken his 
own inner activity, which the doctor calls `joining in'" (ibid. ). Such dialogue is 
far from being only the precursor to medical treatment; it is an essential part of 
it. Whilst it might seem to aim only at finding out 'what's wrong', it can of itself 
make an important contribution to putting something right. In order to give 
dialogue its proper role in clinical practice, which otherwise is misconceived 
as a purely technical treatment, Gadamer says it is important 
daß wir die theoretische Selbstdisziplin, die zur Wissenschaft befähigt, in die 
Kräfte zurückintegrieren, die wir 'praktische Vernunft' nennen. So heißt es seit 
dem 18. Jahrhundert, was die Griechen mit dem Wort praktike' bedacht 
haben und mit , phronensis', 
jener situationsangemessenen Wachheit, in der 
sich Diagnose und Behandlung und Gespräch und das Mitmachen' des 
Patienten, zusammenschliessen. Was da zwischen Arzt und Patient spielt, 
das ist die Wachsamkeit, die Aufgabe und Möglichkeit des Menschen ist, die 
Fähigkeit, die Situation des Augenblicks und den einem im Augenblick 
begegnenden Menschen richtig aufzunehmen und ihm zu entsprechen. 
Zugleich versteht man von hier aus, was das Heilgespräch ist. Es ist kein 
solches Gespräch, da es erst durch das Gespräch auf das eigentliche Ziel 
hinzielt, in dem Patienten den Kommunikationsfluss des Erfahrungslebens 
und die Kontakte mit den anderen wieder in Gang zu setzen, von denen der 
Psychotiker so unheilvoll ausgeschlossen ist. (ibid. p. 173) 
that we re-integrate the theoretical self-discipline which enables science into 
the forces we call 'practical reason'. This is what we call since the 18th century 
-, 
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what the Greeks referred to by the terms 'praktike' and 'phronesis', the 
alertness to the particularities of the situation, in which diagnosis and 
treatment and dialogue and the 'joining in' of the patient come together. What 
is at play between doctor and patient is the alertness, which is the task and 
the possibility of man, the capacity to properly perceive and do justice to the 
present situation and to the other person who we are encountering in that 
moment. This clarifies at the same time the nature of the therapeutic 
dialogue. It is not a dialogue of this kind, since dialogue is directed first of all 
at its real aim of again getting under way within the patient the flow of 
communication of his lived experience and the contact with others, from 
which the psychotic is so tragically excluded. 
In this paragraph Gadamer addresses a number of points relevant to the 
question of the therapeutic dialogue. He asserts that such a dialogue needs to 
be guided by an idea of 'practical reason', rather than the theoretical, 
detached, disciplined, generalising stance adopted by science. The scientific 
stance has it value, but it has to be re-integrated into practical reason. The 
direction of this integration - science into practical reason - demonstrates the 
priority Gadamer gives to the latter. The notion of practical reason is derived 
from the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, a form of knowledge which, as we 
saw, arises out of and finds its meaning only through the engagement with the 
particularities of a given situation. As such, phronesis is juxtaposed to an idea 
of generalised knowledge applied to a particular case. In the clinical context, 
knowledge does not come in sequentially, as it were, with diagnosis first 
establishing under which general category this particular case 
falls, and 
subsequently applying the prescribed treatment strategies. In phronetic 
knowing diagnosis comes about through the engagement with the patient 
which is already treatment; and treatment comes about via diagnosis which 
arises form the form this particular engagement takes. 
It is significant that Gadamer says this phronetic alertness is "at play" 3x Play, 
in Gadamer's analysis, is not so much played by the participants, but rather 
38The literal translation is: "What plays here between doctor and patient is the alertness [... J". 
231 
has its own rules which take over the movements of the players. The play 
plays the players, rather than the other way round. This notion of play is 
important for the appreciation of what Gadamer means by "properly 
perceiving and doing justice to" the present situation and the present other 
person. The appropriate response arises out of the engagement in the play of 
the present moment that is the unfolding of the clinical dialogue. Phronetic 
understanding is, first and foremost, an understanding of the way in which this 
particular dialogue is to be engaged in, and refers only secondarily to any 
further understanding arising out of the sustained participation in it. 
For such dialogue to take place its participants need to be able to 'play' - it is, 
after all, a dialogue which evolves between doctor and patient, requiring the 
`joining in' of both. And this is where Gadamer sees the distinction to the 
Hei/gespräch (therapeutic dialogue): The conditions for dialogue proper have 
to be created in the first place by a dialogue of a particular, therapeutic, kind. 
The therapeutic dialogue is not itself dialogue proper; it deals with the 
disruption in the patient's capacity to participate in dialogue. Its aim is to 
reconnect the patient to the flow of his own experiences and to the contact 
with others which are the preconditions for dialogue. It seems here that 
Gadamer implies (but does not specify) a distinction between two 'flows of 
communication', which are nevertheless interrelated: the 
Kommunikationsfluss des Erfahrungslebens and the Kontakte mit anderen. 
In Sprache und Verstehen (1970) Gadamer addresses the problem of 
disruptions to the discourse of understanding. The following quote takes this 
up in relation to questions of psychopathology, social critique and language. It 
allows some further insight into his ideas about the therapeutic dialogue - and 
at the same time provides evidence for my view (expressed in the last 
chapter) that his distance to Bakhtin is not as far as it may seem. Gadamer 
discusses the disturbance to the dialogic capacity in the context of the 
development of language. Language always evolves; in parallel to historic 
change, language changes, constantly producing new forms of expression 
which challenge and expand existing meanings. New language disrupts old 
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language, Gadamer argues, but seeks to regain the shared ground of 
understanding whilst insisting that this restoration of understanding takes on 
board the new points of view. 
Neue Sprache bringt Störung in die Verständigung, aber im kommunikativen 
Geschehen zugleich Überwindung der Störung. Mindestens ist das das 
ideelle Ziel aller Kommunikation. Es mag sich unter besonderen Bedingungen 
als unerreichbar erweisen. Zu solchen besonderen Begingungen zählt 
insbesondere der pathologische Abbruch des zwischenmenschlichen 
Einverständisses, welcher durch den Tatbestand der Neurose 
gekennzeichnet ist, und es fragt sich, ob auch im gesellschaftlichen Leben im 
ganzen der kommunikative Vorgang nicht auch der Verbreitung und 
Aufrechterhaltung eines falschen' Bewußtseins zu dienen vermag. Das 
wenigstens ist die These der Ideologiekritik, daß der Gegensatz in den 
gesellschaftlichen Interessenlagen das kommunikative Geschehen praktisch 
ebenso unmöglich macht wie im Falle der seelischen Erkrankung. Aber wie 
im letzteren Falle die Therapie gerade darin besteht, den Erkrankten an die 
Verständnisgemeinschaft der Gesellschaft wieder anzuschliessen, ist es doch 
auch gerade der Sinn der Ideologiekritik selbst, das falsche Bewußtsein zu 
berichtigen und damit ein richtiges Einverständnis neu zu begründen. 
Sonderfälle eines tiefgestörten Einverständnisses mögen dabei eigene 
Formen der Wiederherstellung nötig machen, die auf einem expliziten Wissen 
um die Störung beruhen. Sie bestätigen aber damit die konstitutive Funktion 
der Verständigung selber. (ibid. p. 189) 
New language introduces disturbance into understanding, but at the same 
time also, in the communicative event, the overcoming of disturbance. That at 
least is the ideal goal of all communication. It may prove unattainable under 
special conditions. Amongst such particular conditions there is especially the 
pathological rupture of interpersonal understanding which is characterised by 
the fact of neurosis, and the question arises whether the communicative 
process may not also contribute, in the whole of social life, to the proliferation 
and maintenance of a 'false' consciousness. This at least is the thesis of 
Ideologiekritik that the conflicting social interests render the communicative 
process just as impossible as in the case of psychic illness. But just as in the 
/ý 
233 
latter case the therapy consists in reconnecting the patient to the community 
of understanding of society, is it precisely the point of Ideologiekritik itself to 
correct false consciousness and thus to found anew a proper understanding. 
Special cases of deeply disturbed understanding may necessitate their own 
forms of restitution, which are based on an explicit knowledge of the 
disturbance. They do however thus confirm the constitutive function of 
understanding. 
Gadamer does not use the terms 'psychotic' and 'neurotic' as precise clinical 
categories, but seems to ignore this distinction to talk about psychopathology 
in general. The important feature, which we could take as the kernel of a 
theory of psychopathology, is the disruption of interpersonal understanding, 
the incapacity to participate in the Verständigungsgemeinschaft der 
Gesellschaft (community of understanding of society). The therapeutic task is 
consequently defined as Wiederanschluss (reconnection) to this community of 
understanding. 
Interestingly, two types of social bonds are brought into play here, 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (community and society), the first being based 
on communality, the second on a competition of interests. 
39 Gemeinschaft is 
carried by a sense of shared history, tradition, and a commonality of meaning; 
Gesellschaft is characterised by diversity and otherness, and the social- 
political struggle over access to resources and the dominance of meaning. 
There is a tension between these two types of social bonds, but, in 
Gadamer's view, this does not mean that there is a problem to be overcome: 
"[it] goes without saying that language always has its life full of tension in the 
antagonism between conventionality and revolutionary departure" (ibid. 
p. l89). On the one hand, there is always the pressure to conform, to fall in 
with the established social and linguistic order: "[... ] this is society, this is how 
society functions, always norming and conforming"; on the other hand, "[... ] in 
spite of all conformity language lives" (ibid. ). Difference asserts itself in the life 
3' This distinction was developed by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tbnnies in his book 
Community and Society (1887). 
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of language; and it does so precisely by finding its way into - and that is back 
to - the shared and understood meanings of the community of speakers. This 
is a conception of the way in which language, and understanding, develops 
which has strong parallels with Bakhtin's view of language as evolving in the 
tension between centrifugal and centripetal forces. 
The need for therapeutic intervention may arise when an individual is, or feels 
to be, cut off from this social discourse, that is, when the process of finding 
shared ground has become problematic. The question of the types of social 
bond brings into focus an important issue regarding the aims of 
psychotherapy. To make the return of the patient to the shared ground of the 
Verständigungsgemeinschaft der Gesellschaft the objective of the therapy 
process could be construed as the attempt to reduce or even eradicate 
'otherness'. Although there is an adaptive and conformist, and that means 
also politically conservative, force in play, conformism is not Gadamer's 
vision, neither of the political nor of the psychotherapeutic process. Inevitably 
we operate from within a tradition, which places limits on the scope of 
meanings and behaviours and which tends to exert pressure to conform to 
certain norms. But this adaptive tendency is always confronted by some forms 
of `otherness' which strive to overcome their alienation. The recognition of the 
claims of the other is, politically, liberating and, psychologically, therapeutic. 
Alienation is overcome through the acceptance of the `other' by and into the 
community of understanding (which is of course changed by this acceptance). 
Gadamer's comment on the aims of Ideologiekritik in the previous long quote 
makes just this point: The new and better understanding it seeks to achieve 
can come about only if and when their Kritik is embraced by the 
Verständigungsgemeinschaft. The 'other seeks its liberation in the reduction 
of this gap of otherness, i. e. in the process of (re-)connection with the 
community of understanding. 
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40 Within the history of the psychoanalytic movement the debate between the adaptive versus 
the liberating strands of practice form an interesting, if somewhat marginal, sub-chapter. It is 




We are, at this stage, left with two different ways in which the hermeneutic 
dialogue is related to the therapeutic task. On the one hand, hermeneutic 
dialogue is portrayed 'as distinct from the therapeutic one, in that it is the 
incapability of engaging in proper dialogue which necessitates therapy. The 
task of therapy is to enable the resumption of dialogue. On the other hand, the 
task of understanding presented in the therapeutic situation is a hermeneutic 
task and must be approached in a hermeneutic, and that is dialogic, fashion. 
In Hermeneutik und Psychiatrie Gadamer speaks of the "particular 
hermeneutic problematic" (hermeneutische Sonderproblematik) involved in 
the treatment of mental disturbance which is characterised by the doctor's 
predicament "sich verständigen zu müssen, auch wenn der Patient sich 
entzieht" (1993a, p. 208; "to have to communicate even when the patient 
evades understanding"). Human partnership, which in Gadamer's philosophy 
is pretty much defined by the preparedness to find shared ground with an 
other through dialogic engagement, is, to a smaller or larger degree, 
prevented by the patient's resistance. Gadamer, in identifying the 
Sonderproblematik of the therapeutic dialogue, understands a central paradox 
of psychotherapy: It is a process that requires an agreement (i. e. a 
willingness) to engage in a dialogue designed to help the patient to open up 
and to embrace that which he does not want (can't agree to). Psychotherapy 
involves wanting what you don't want; agreeing to something you can't agree 
to. It requires a willingness to engage in a negation of a negation of oneself. 
The disturbed patient, whose present way of functioning nevertheless 
constitutes a coping mechanism (the 'neurotic equilibrium'), comes to therapy 
in order to be disturbed. (I will return to this idea of therapy as a negative 
dialectic. ) 
The chances of psychotherapeutic intervention hinge on the degree to which 
the possibility of communication is disrupted. This is reflected in the fact that 
the patient's agreement to engage in psychotherapy is considered a 
necessary condition of treatment. Psychotherapy has its field of application 
where full participation in dialogue is not possible (otherwise no treatment 
would be needed), but is not entirely precluded either (otherwise treatment 
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has nowhere to go). Another way of putting this is to say that, whilst the 
access to shared meanings has become problematic (otherwise there would 
be neither psychopathology nor the struggle to understand), there must be 
minimal participation in shared meanings. Utter otherness is madness, with no 
starting point for dialogue. 
Aspects of a clinical hermeneutics 
Crucial to the therapist's understanding of his patient is an appreciation of the 
conditions under which this understanding can proceed. This is the question 
of the therapist finding the right position vis-ä-vis his patient. Clinical 
hermeneutics is participation in the extremely complex event of the patient's 
mental life as it unfolds in the present therapeutic session. The mode of 
knowledge in operation here is phronetic. Phronesis requires the engagement 
of the therapist; it is neither (just) the reconstruction/duplication of the patient's 
state of mind in the mind of the therapist, nor (just) the application of prior 
generalised knowledge - although I will argue that aspects of both these 
modes play a role in understanding the patient. 
The psychotherapist needs to enter into a dialogue with the patient, which 
involves a participation in the patient's linguistic meanings. Understanding is 
the finding of shared ground through the finding of a common language. This 
in turn involves a participation in the dialogue which the patient has with his 
world, and which has run into problems. The therapeutic dialogue is 
conceptualised as the participation of the therapist in the (ruptured) dialogue 
the patient has with the world. 
Using Gadamer's terms, the patient's state of mind, his way of 
thinking/feeling/acting, is seen as a response to problems (an answer to 
questions) the patient was, and still is, faced with in his life. - The patient's 
answer has become a question, and questionable, in two senses: because it 
is an occasion for understanding, and also because it is of questionable use 
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to the patient now. To understand the answer is to understand the question. 
To understand the question is to ask it. In this way the therapist seeks to gain 
the horizon of the patient, yet never forgets that he can do so only from within 
his own horizon. Empathy is never the duplication of the patient's mind in the 
mind of the therapist; it cannot escape the fact that, like all perception and 
experience, it is construed in the light of one's own situatedness. Thus, whilst 
asking the patient's question (i. e. making the patient's question his own) and 
taking the patient's answer as a question, the therapist remains 'other to the 
patient. Otherness, as well as commonality, is, after all, as Gadamer showed 
us, a precondition of dialogue. 
It is only from within his own horizon that the therapist understands the 
patient's mental process. Interpretation (both in the hermeneutic sense which 
is tied to understanding and in the clinical sense of conveying this 
understanding to the patient by means of a verbal intervention) cannot be 
avoided or postponed ('deferred') until the case `gets clarified'. Gadamer 
urges us to grasp hold of the meanings as they present themselves to us, that 
is, to understand and to interpret on the basis of our limited perspectives - but 
to be prepared, indeed to expect, that our first understandings will be modified 
in the process of the hermeneutic dialectic. The realisation of the multiplicity of 
meaning and, consequently, the demand for openness towards new 
meanings does not entail interpretive abstinence. Only through risking our 
interpretations can new interpretations emerge which constitute an advance 
on our previous (mis)understandings. The acknowledgement of the limitations 
of understanding serves as an injunction to critical reflection, which has to be 
worked out through further dialogic engagement; it does not lead to the 
demand to step back from giving meaning to the material on the grounds that 
we know that we can never know. 
Gadamer's concept of experience as new experience requires the therapist to 
adopt something like a dual mental attitude towards any understandings 
which emerge in the process. Understanding, as we have seen, can only 
proceed taking prior understandings as its starting point; yet these first 
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understandings are expected to be upset. The therapist needs to be open to 
be 'corrected', but, logically, he cannot know where this 'correction' is going to 
come from and what shape it will take. There is an expectation of something 
unexpected, the expectation of a surprise. 
Hermeneutics thus involves a dual movement -a grasping hold of meaning 
and bringing it to bear on the object of understanding, and a distancing 
oneself from the interpretation to allow for further meanings to emerge. In 
saying how he understands the patient's material, the therapist says where he 
stands in relation to the patient's material. This however is often the beginning 
(or some 'middle') of the interpretive process, not its endpoint. As it is 
communicated to the patient, the interpretation, whilst 'in answer' to what the 
patient said, becomes itself a question and now awaits its response. 
Frequently contemporary therapists preface their interpretations with a "I 
wonder if... " or a "Perhaps... ". The interpretation then given is as much 
statement as question. This dual movement of stepping forward and standing 
back, asserting and asking, grasping and letting go, knowing and not knowing 
is central to the therapeutic work conducted in a hermeneutic spirit. 
In this dual movement of the therapeutic dialectic there are always (and 
therefore always simultaneously) two things at stake, which at first sight 
appear to be very different: the patient's sense/understanding of himself and 
the therapist's understanding of the patient. Meaning as it is made and 
changed in the course of the therapeutic process affects the patient on the 
level of his sense of self; but it also affects the therapist in his relation to his 
evolving framework of understanding. The therapist's job is to help bring 
about meanings which help the patient. His capacity to do so is both 
confirmed and undermined as new meanings develop. This seeming paradox 
is a consequence of the essentially negative dialectic of understanding (of 
which I will say more below). It must not be forgotten that not only the patient, 
but the therapist too struggles with a sense of his understanding not being 
adequate. - If he doesn't, he isn't a hermeneut. 
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The dual movement of the process of understanding confronts and yet 
repeats the dual aspect of meanings as constitutive of (personal and 
professional) identity. To understand oneself or another in a particular way 
`fixes' the person as the person such perceived, to the exclusion of alternative 
perspectives. The individual (myself, the other) gets identified as this or that 
particular person, and not, by implication, any of its possible alternatives or 
opposites. Understanding as new understanding challenges this fixity. The 
psychotherapeutic dialogue is designed to help the patient think about himself 
in different ways; i. e. in ways that go beyond the established (conscious or 
unconscious) self-descriptions. This is the liberating aspect of finding new 
meaning. The therapist assists the patient in this process from his own 
standpoint, which is constituted by his set of 'personal' and 
`professional/theoretical' meanings. It is by virtue of the fact that the therapist 
operates from within a different horizon that he can help the patient think and 
feel differently. Yet this also entails the danger that the new meaning, 
liberating at one moment, becomes the new restriction. This is inevitably so, 
but has to be confronted nevertheless. It can only be confronted constructively 
if the therapist too is open to facing this challenge. In terms of his 
understanding of the patient, which always involves his theoretical 
commitments, the therapist, as the patient, is called upon to face the ways in 
which his meanings are restrictive - and are perhaps defensively so. 
The challenge to the fixity of meanings thus cuts both ways. Not just the 
patient's personal self-descriptions, but also the therapist's 
(professional/theoretical as well as personal) established meanings come 
under pressure. Questions are asked which 
demand an answer; yet no 
answer that might be given in the process can 
be treated as the final answer. 
Any given answer gives rise to new questions demanding new answers, and 
so on. The dialectic of understanding 
(and this includes, of course, self- 
understanding and the construal of personal identity) is interminable; it is 
generated by the tension between the demand for the answer to be singular 
(i. e. final) and the challenge of a plurality of questions pointing to the 
multiplicity of possible alternative accounts. To understand, to find meaning is 
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after all, as we have seen, a process of organising disparate elements in 
terms of a unifying whole. The multiplicity of meanings (Bakhtin's 
heteroglossia) disrupts this unity of meaning (its tendency to set itself up as 
the only meaning, i. e. as monologue). In doing so it perpetuates the need to 
understand. The tension between 'the one' and 'the many' is again revealed 
as a central dynamic of the hermeneutic process. 
This argument repeats Bakhtin's point that dialogue opens up that which 
monologue seeks to close down. Or, to say the same thing in terms Rorty 
(1980) uses: edifying (i. e. hermeneutic) philosophy calls into question the 
answers given by systematic philosophy. Hermeneutics must not strive to give 
answers which are 'better' than those given by systematic philosophers; it 
must not seek to become the successor discipline to epistemology. Instead, 
Rorty says, it is the task of hermeneutics to keep open the space vacated by 
the departure (or was it an eviction? ) of epistemology. 
In terms of the therapeutic process this means that we should not keep 
pursuing the notion of a final (proper) understanding, but regard 
understanding as fluid, multiple and continuous. It is a joint creation, rather 
than seeking access to what really is. To show some further implications of 
this hermeneutic approach for the conceptualisation of the therapy process I 
wish to briefly return to the discussion of transference and resistance, two 
concepts which, as we have seen, are central certainly to a psychoanalytic 
theory of therapy. 
Revisiting transference and resistance 
Since understanding begins with pre-understanding there is always the 
tendency to perceive something new, present, other as something old, past, 
familiar. This is one way in which to generalise the structure of transference 
phenomena. Transference, however, unless it is delusional, maintains the 
recognition of a degree of difference. To the extent that the present 
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object/situation is not entirely equated with the object/situation of the past, the 
perception of similarities is accompanied by the recognition of differences 
between the two. The present object/situation resists complete assimilation; it 
asserts its otherness which requires accommodation, i. e. a change in the way 
of understanding. An expansion of horizon ensues, rather than a mere 
addition of 'further information' into a conceptual system which remains 
unchanged. 
In the therapeutic situation this problem pertains to both the patient and the 
therapist. Both tend to see the other from within their horizons, projecting 
preconceived ideas and experiences. Both are carried by the tendency to 
assimilate the other in terms of what is known. Gadamer insists, however, that 
assimilation is not understanding. Understanding comes about only when this 
one-way transposition of preconceived ideas turns into an interactive, 
dialogical process. In terms of the therapeutic process, the therapist must 
resist (minimally, not fall in with; often, actively seek to disrupt) the patient's 
easy assimilation of him into his (the patient's) horizon. He must resist being 
drawn into identification with both the patient and the patient's 'objects' (the 
internalised important figures of his past). This element of the therapeutic 
process is well established and widely acknowledged by clinicians. A further 
conclusion must be drawn, however, pertaining to the therapist's 
understanding of the patient. This too must not be executed purely via 
assimilation. The patient must resist the therapist's ready-made 
understandings, and the therapist must give weight to the patient's assertions: 
er muss sich etwas von ihm sagen lassen. Only then does understanding take 
place, which, as Gadamer explained, always involves this fusion of horizons, 
an event in which both object and subject, patient and therapist change. 
Understanding the other as other is thus in more than one sense to 
understand the other differently. The understanding differs from the self- 
understanding of the other - through the dialogue with the therapist the patient 
becomes other to himself; and the understanding differs from the pre- 
understanding of the understanding subject - the therapist must understand 
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that, when he first understood the patient, he, in an important sense, 
misunderstood him. Understanding is thus conceived as a process of 'un- 
misunderstanding' in the course of which both parties gain a richer insight into 
themselves as well as the other. 
Horizons are part and parcel of' our situatedness; furthermore, they derive 
from the ways in which the experience of the given situation is organised. 
That is to say, situatedness does not determine understanding (if it did, there 
would be no room for subjectivity and, by the same token, no use for a 
dynamic psychotherapy). Our world is constituted by the way in which 
experience is organised, i. e. it is always an interpreted world. This process is 
largely out of awareness (it is unconscious, but not necessarily in the 
psychoanalytic sense of being dynamically repressed). Mostly we do not know 
that (and how) we see something as something. It is the work of 
wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein to bring this to light. 
In therapy the patient is helped to understand the particular tendencies at 
work in the organisation of his experience of the world; at the same time, he 
gains an increasing recognition of the ways in which his experience and 
understanding of himself is structured in particular and limiting ways. The 
structuring of meanings which constitute the patient's horizon is subjected to a 
careful examination. Of particular importance are those aspects of experience 
which are systematically (dynamically) left out in order to reduce anxiety and 
psychic pain. 
Transference is here conceived as the manifestation of the patient's horizon in 
the therapeutic setting. It denotes the way in which the patient organises 
(interprets) the totality of this situation, i. e. his experience in and of therapy, 
his view of the therapist and himself in relation to the therapist. The 
hermeneutic therapist, in a sense, helps the patient to become a hermeneut 
himself, that is, he helps the patient to develop wirkungsgeschichtliches 
Bewußtsein. The patient learns that he is indeed an active interpreter of the 
situation he finds himself in (i. e. he learns that he does in fact see something 
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as something), and he is helped to understand better the particular and 
systematic ways in which this shaping of experience proceeds. In the course 
of the therapeutic process experiences which had been disavowed (Freud's 
`unconscious thoughts', Sullivan's 'not-me'; Schafer's 'disclaimed action') 
come to light and some understanding may be gained regarding the origins of 
this defensive mental behaviour. In showing to the patient his active role in 
construing experience and the particular ways in which this structuring takes 
place (by using interventions such as, "You seems to view me as... ", or "You 
tend to experience the end of our sessions as me rejecting you... "), the 
presenting situation can be thought about and new ways of understanding 
(and consequently acting) can open up. 
Horizon in this view is not only the culturally constituted, linguistically 
mediated shared horizon of Gadamer's philosophy, but is co-constituted by 
personal life-historical experience. The patient's subjective experience had 
become organised in a fashion that rendered unconscious (in a different 
terminology: systematically excluded from his self-descriptions) wishes, 
thoughts and feelings which could not be entertained or expressed in his 
earlier life. Defensive mechanisms came into operation turning these aspects 
of his mental life into 'not-me', i. e. making parts of himself `other' to him. This 
leads to a narrowing of the personal horizon in comparison to the potential 
horizon available within a given culture. Therapy's task is to analyse and take 
down these defensive structures and facilitate the re-connection to excluded 
experience. This can of course only be done to the extent that the therapist's 
horizon is not co-extensive with that of the patient. 
Transference, as I present it here, is conceived not as a failure on the part of 
the patient to see the therapist as he is (i. e. a perceptual/cognitive error), but 
as an over-rigidity in the organisation of experience - as a case of, to use 
Piaget's terms, too much assimilation and not enough accommodation. In this 
view transference cannot any longer be understood as resulting from a 'wrong 
connection', as the early Freud did, simply because it has become impossible 
to specify what the `right connection' looks like. The quarrel with a concept of 
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transference as distortion - or, for that matter, a concept of projection as a 
superimposition of an internal reality onto an external one - does not result 
from a rejection of the idea that previous experience gets `transferred', but, on 
the contrary, from the rejection of the idea it might be possible not to do so. 
The difference in the conceptualisation of transference rests on a shift in the 
way the relation between imagination and reality is conceived. Imagination is 
not understood as a failure or refusal to see reality, and therapy is not 
founded on the belief that the therapist has direct access to reality and sees it 
as his job to analyse the systematic ways in which the patient doesn't. 
Instead, imagination is seen as constitutive of reality. The therapist 
investigates the ways in which the patient 'imagines the real', keeping in mind 
that his interpretations have the same relationship to reality as the 
'transference' of his patient. The job is then no longer to get the patient to 
agree with the therapist's notion of the real, but to analyse the rigidities in the 
organisation of the patient's experience and meaning. By facilitating the 
preparedness to entertain alternative accounts - through the introduction of 
new metaphors - the capacity for accommodation of new meaning is 
increased. 
Rather than getting the patient to 'wake up' from the dream of the past to the 
reality of the present situation (as known by the therapist) the patient learns to 
see and think about the present situation (and, by the same token, himself) in 
new ways. Rather than pursuing the idea of dropping a wrong perception for 
an accurate one, the focus is on the increase in possibilities that can be 
entertained. 
41 Therapy, in the conception developed here, does not, like a 
comedy of errors, find its happy ending in the realisation of a cognitive 
mistake, but proceeds in ways more akin to a Bildungsroman. This view 
agrees with Rorty that edifying philosophy rather than epistemology should be 
pursued. 
41 it should be added that the idea that the patient should be induced to give up a misguided 
'take' on reality, as assessed by the therapist, is perhaps more virulent in practice than in the 
literature. An example of an analyst advocating this line is however Spitz (1956). 
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Thinking about the therapy process from a hermeneutic perspective has 
implications also for the concept of resistance. Resistance, as we saw in 
chapter 1, was defined by Freud as that in the patient's unconscious which 
counteracts the psychoanalytic cure (by interrupting the spontaneous 
associations leading to remembering). Whilst he held that the analyst does 
not know the contents of the patient's unconscious, and resistance was 
therefore not against the content of the analyst's interpretation but an 
interruption of the process of free association, I have argued that the 
diagnosis of resistance and its explanation in the particular case is by no 
means 'content-free'. In practice at least the problem of resistance was seen 
not only as non-compliance with the method but also as a refusal to entertain 
meanings suggested by the analyst. 
From a hermeneutic viewpoint some form of 'resistance' is, as we have seen, 
a necessary condition of understanding, not its refusal. Both participants need 
to resist the pre-understandings of the other. To not resist is to accept the 
other's discourse as the dominant one, i. e. it is to let dialogue deteriorate into 
monologue. The role of resistance in the hermeneutic process of 
understanding can be clarified with the help of Gadamer's concept of play. We 
have seen that for Gadamer every real dialogue is dialectic; as such it has the 
structure of a game. In playing a game the players submit themselves to the 
movements of the game. The rules of the game control the movements of the 
players; the game can be said to play the players, rather than the other way 
around. This holds true also for the 'play' of dialogue, so long as this dialogue 
is conducted according to the ethos of hermeneutics. Coltman, a 
contemporary American philosopher, describes the Gadamerian dialogue as 
follows: "[... ] the course of a dialogue is determined by the verbal play of the 
speakers, and not by the speakers themselves. But in order for the play of 
conversation to take over, the speakers must be willing to yield to its 
movement" (1998, pp. 52-3). What is required for this movement to take over 
is, as we have seen, primarily openness to the other's truth claims, i. e. a 
preparedness to risk one's own opinions. 
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We can now differentiate two meanings of the term resistance. The first is to 
resist the acceptance of the other person's point of view. The absence of 
such a resistance would be marked by an 'agreeing with' (a 'falling in with' 
which entails an abandoning of one's own position). 'Coming to understand' 
according to this notion is to 'come to see things as the other does', rather 
than 'coming to an understanding with the other. This kind of resistance is put 
up by the patient who refuses to submit to the 'expert opinion' of the therapist, 
as well as by the therapist who refuses to underwrite the patient's view of 
himself. In refusing the submission of their views they might indeed insist on 
playing the hermeneutic game. 
The second meaning of the term refers to the refusal to enter that dialectic 
movement. The patient (or indeed the therapist), rather than give herself over 
to the movement of the dialogue, may seek to control the therapeutic 
conversation in 'monologic' fashion, asserting that only one voice has 
something of importance to say. This can take the shape of the patient either 
dominating or 'high jacking' the conversation, or by insisting that the therapist 
be the only active participant in this process. This concept of resisting dialogic 
engagement of course also pertains to the therapist's insistence that the 
conversation proceed in one or another circumscribed manner (whether this 
takes the form of rigid 'ready-made' interpretations, remaining mute, or 
offering solely 'empathic' paraphrases of the patient's utterances). 
Resistance, in its first meaning, is the refusal to accept a particular 
understanding; in its second meaning, it is the refusal to enter into the 
dialogic-dialectic movement of understanding. In this sense, resistance in the 
first meaning is the insistence that resistance in the second meaning must be 
overcome - that is, that dialogue must prevail over monologue. 
247 
The negative dialectic of clinical understanding 
The hermeneutic conception of the therapeutic dialogue is dialectic, that is to 
say, it involves a mutual negation, which in turn implies a mutual confirmation, 
of its participants. In the course of this dialogue the other is revealed as 
another other, i. e. different from any first understandings of him. In 
understanding, preconceptions of the other (and, by the same token, of 
oneself) are to some extent disconfirmed. I will try to elaborate this thought. 
In the playing out of the hermeneutic circle the other is first understood in 
terms of the subject's preconceptions. This pre-understanding, as any 
understanding, has, as Heidegger showed us, the structure of 'understanding 
something as something (different)', i. e. understanding the other as someone 
other (other to the actual other individual in front of us, that is, as someone he 
is not). The other is not just understood as he presents himself, in his own 
terms, but in terms formed prior to the meeting; to this extent something about 
the other's individuality is negated in the process of first understanding. First 
understandings seek to impose prior experience onto the new 
person/situation. In Piaget's terms, they seek assimilation of the new within 
the old, negating its newness/difference in the process. So far, there is no 
hermeneutics; there is only an attempt to make the new 'case' 'just another 
case' of a class of similar cases, i. e. to understand it in terms of established 
knowledge. No learning can be said to take place, only a subsuming of 
another instance under the given categories. To put the same thing in 
different terms: the process of understanding something/someone as 
something/someone else is using only what Rorty (following Nietzsche) calls 
dead metaphors. 
For hermeneutic understanding of the other to take place there needs to be, 
on the part of the subject, an openness to the otherness of the other. 
Gadamer insists man muss sich etwas sagen lassen, one has to let the other 
speak and to be receptive to what he says. It is important to pay attention to 
the ways in which the other resists easy assimilation. In an inquiry which is 
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conducted in the hermeneutic spirit of openness the preconceptions and first 
understandings are put to the test, they have to be challenged and revised in 
the course of the dialogue with the other. The subject has to come to 
understand the other as another other, different from the other first assumed. 
Without this modification of the first understanding there is no hermeneutic 
circle and no new understanding. This assertion follows Gadamer's analysis 
of Erfahrung as negation and his conception of understanding as a dialectic 
process unfolding within the structure of question and answer. 
The process of understanding thus conceived involves a process of mutual 
negation. Paradoxically, since - or better to the extent that - the negation is 
indeed mutual it is, by the same token, a process of mutual confirmation. The 
subject's first understanding of the other as something/someone other is, as I 
have argued, at least to some extent a negation of the other as (seen by) 
himself. However, this negation is itself negated in the process of the re-vision 
of the initial understanding. In so far as such a revision takes place as a 
consequence of the resistance of the other to be thus understood, the other in 
fact successfully affirms something about his otherness as and when he is 
received by the understanding subject. The other is indeed capable of making 
himself heard by the subject. Therefore, the other who has the power to effect 
the modification of the initial understanding (which constituted a negation of 
himself) is confirmed in his otherness through the negation of the subject's 
first understanding. 
In the context of the therapeutic setting the negation and modification of the 
initial understanding of the patient by the therapist is, hopefully, paralleled by 
the negation and modification of the patient's preconceptions regarding the 
person of the therapist and the nature of the therapeutic process. Only if the 
patient is able to hear something from the therapist which challenges, and 
thus in part negates, his own pre-understandings does change ensue. It is in 
the nature of the transference process that the patient seeks to assimilate the 
new person of the therapist into the schemata of previous relational 
experience. Only if the patient comes to realise that his pre-understandings 
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are indeed, at least to a significant extent, construals of the present in terms 
of the past is the process of assimilation accompanied by one of 
accommodation. Only the process of accommodation brings with it new 
understanding (the only understanding worth bothering with) and therapeutic 
change. To speak about this process in terms of the use of metaphors: there 
has to be an emergence of new metaphors (live metaphors, Rorty) for change 
to take place. 
Horizon and countertransference 
Central to this hermeneutic dialectic is, as we have seen, the openness to 
new understandings on the part of the therapist, that is, the preparedness to 
risk his pre-understandings. This requires an awareness of the fact that first 
understandings are shaped by the particular horizon from within which the 
patient is met. At this point we have to confront, once again, the question what 
we take to be constitutive of this horizon. With regard to the problem of clinical 
understanding questions have to be asked concerning the factors, on the 
therapist's side, shaping this understanding, and the assessment of their 
impact on the quality of understanding. 
Freud became aware of the fact that the particularities of the analyst's life 
history as they might result in neurotic 'hang-ups' do have a bearing on the 
analyst's capacity to do the analytic work. He developed the concept of 
countertransference (discussed in chapter 3) to account for the distortions 
introduced into the process from the therapist's side. The analyst's own 
analysis was meant to deal with these personal interferences and so to 
restore her to a point where she could again function `objectively'. Thus, whilst 
there was an acknowledgement of a need for a concept like 
countertransference, which problematises the contributions the therapist 
makes to any 'distortions' in the clinical picture, this problem was dealt with on 
the level of personal neurosis, rather than seen as intrinsic to the task of 
understanding. Countertransference, as Freud understood it, is the way in 
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which the individualised horizon of the therapist prevents or distorts the 
pursuit of science. Once neurosis is out of the way science can proceed. 
Hermeneutics, as formulated by Gadamer, does not see the problem of the 
horizon - if it is a problem at all - as primarily personal, and, furthermore, it 
does not suggest it can or should be 'overcome'. Horizon, quite apart from 
any idiosyncratic aspects coming into it, is constituted as Wirkungsgeschichte, 
that is as a particular historical-cultural heritage, mediated largely through 
language, in which we participate and which powerfully contributes to the 
shaping of 'the world as we know it'. Gadamer's horizon is, in comparison with 
the idiosyncratic nature of Freud's problematic of countertransference, 
infinitely more generalised. 
We could say that Gadamer made problematic aspects of what Freud took for 
granted, whilst Freud's ideas can be used to problematise a certain 
homogenising tendency in Gadamer. The hermeneutic notion of horizon 
emphasises the shared ways of understanding, and thus addresses the more 
general cultural and socio-historical level. Differences within a given 
community/society, let alone the very particular life-historical contingencies, 
fade in significance in comparison with the commonalities given through 
cultural tradition. This emphasis on the broad and historically long-term 
picture tends to homogenise the horizons of the members of a given 
community/society. Freud, by comparison, took for granted that there were 
universals which science would eventually come to know. Whilst the state of 
science was not developed enough to yield this 
knowledge at present, in 
principle this was not a problem. 
For the Freudian analyst there did not exist 
the problem of horizon as such but for the ways in which life-historical 
contingencies interfered with 
the analyst's participation in this scientific 
endeavour. The way in which 
Freud focussed psychoanalysis on the problem 
of (counter)transference emphasises the particularities and 
idiosyncrasies of 
the individual as the factors distorting this access to reality. Hermeneutic 
philosophers, amongst others, started 




This interrelating of Gadamer and Freud seeks to draw attention to the 
necessity, for the purposes of psychological understanding, to reflect on the 
contingencies of both the more generalised cultural-historical horizon of 
hermeneutic philosophy and the life-historically individualised horizon 
focussed on in the therapy process. Psychotherapy theories, which normally 
include a theory of how we become individualised in the course of our 
development, tend to 'pull down' towards the particular and diverse concepts, 
like Gadamer's horizon, designed to account for the ways in which we 
experience ourselves and the world. In contrast, hermeneutics, by showing 
us how all theory is itself contingent on cultural history, tends to 'pull up' 
psychological theory towards a more generalised explanation of the 
constitution of horizon emphasising that which is, in Gadamer's sense, 
culturally shared. 
suggest that it is useful to think of horizon as stratified. There are cultural, 
sub-cultural, and idiosyncratic-personal strata to horizon (the distinctions 
between which I do not wish to draw too sharply). The different levels of 
stratification require for their understanding a corresponding stratification of a 
notion like Verständigungsgemeinschaft (community of understanding). 
Prejudices, in Gadamer's sense of the word, arise from the participation in the 
cultural life of any given society in the widest sense (say, the English speaking 
members of a Western democracy at the beginning of the 216t century). They 
arise also, on a more differentiated level, out of the participation in particular 
'sub-cultures' (e. g. a farming community in Wales or the group of people 
participating in the cultural discourse and practice called psychoanalysis, 
which in turn divides up into numerous 'sub-sub-cultures'). Much more 
personalised and idiosyncratic prejudices result from the 'accidents' of life 
history (having had these particular parents and that particular set of life 
events). 
To think of horizon as stratified in such a way affects a hermeneutic 
conception of clinical understanding. The therapist's horizon from within which 
/ý 
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she understands her patient is constituted by the totality of her situatedness, 
i. e. it exists only as the kind of stratified continuity outlined above. I wish to 
argue that Gadamer's concept of horizon and Freud's countertransference 
can be viewed as the poles of this continuity which stretches from the 
culturally shared to the individualised, from the social-cultural to the personal, 
from the general to the particular. Horizon, then, is generalised 
countertransference, countertransference particularised horizon. 42 
The therapist's theoretical commitments (her affiliation to a particular sub- 
Verständigungsgemeinschaft) are of course an important component of the 
totality of her situatedness vis-ä-vis her patient. Her 'theoryr43 co-constitutes in 
important ways her horizon of understanding (on an intermediary level, 
somewhere between the culturally shared and the individualised). Theory 
shares with the concept of horizon the characteristic that it enables the 
viewing and foregrounding of certain aspects of the world, whilst leaving out 
or neglecting others. It creates coherence by virtue of its limitations. Like 
horizon, theory is, by definition, one amongst others; it is always multiple and 
heterogeneous. The different theoretical commitments that make up 
adherence to one school of psychotherapy or another constitute rather 
different interpretive horizons. From within a Freudian horizon things do not 
look the same as from a Kleinian, an Object Relations or a self-psychology 
perspective. This emphasis on multiplicity and divergence problematises any 
singular notion of Verständigungsgemeinschaft. 
The tradition of 
psychoanalysis, itself a 'sub-cultural' discourse, consists of many 
'sub-sub- 
Verständigungsgemeinschaften'. 
The reconnection of the patient to the Verständigungsgemeinschaft 
(Gadamer's way of formulating the aim of the therapeutic process) is therefore 
42 It is not intended here to introduce yet another definition of the concept of 
countertransference (there are enough 
different uses of this term already). I am stretching 
existing uses of the term solely 
for the purposes of thinking about the therapist's position from 
a hermeneutic perspective. 
43 gy 'theory' I mean here more than the set of theoretical explanations that she may be able 
to give, I include the whole cluster of psychotherapy related beliefs and `prejudices' in 
operation, together with a set of practices 
more or less connected to any theory espoused. 
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never the return to a singular homogenous discourse of understanding, but a 
reconnection which is relative to the particular interpretive horizon of the 
therapist. It is the resumption of communication by the patient with the kind of 
Gemeinschaft to which the Verständigung mediated by the therapist's 
interpretive horizon gives access. 
The hermeneutically minded therapist is called upon to reflect on the ways in 
which her preferred theory shapes, and hence delimits clinical understanding. 
This leads to an injunction to try to think beyond what she has come to inhabit 
as her professional horizon. This 'thinking beyond' is, as I will try to show 
later, occasioned by the challenge of the patient's difference on the one hand 
and the alternative interpretive framework of competing theories on the other. 
The hermeneutic therapist will not shy away from, but actively seek this 
challenge. It is implied here that the therapist who cannot risk meeting and 
dialoguing with the 'theoretical other cannot really open herself up to the 
otherness of her patients. This is Gadamer's challenge: hermeneutics leads to 
change in both participants. It is - if it is hermeneutics at all -a risky 
business... Only by entertaining a notion like horizon, which vastly expands 
the original Freudian concept of countertransference to include our cultural 
and professional prejudices, will the therapist be able to develop the kind of 
wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein which is the hallmark of the hermeneutic 
attitude. 
Having repeatedly stressed the point of the therapist's changes in the process 
of clinical understanding, I feel a qualification needs to be made. Normally, 
and necessarily, there exists a difference in the nature and amount of change 
the therapist and her patient go through. It is, after all, crucial to the business 
of psychotherapy that the change process of the patient, and not that of the 
therapist, constitutes the goal of therapy (in as much as goals are `allowed' by 
the theory in operation). Much of (or in) the therapist needs to remain `steady' 
in order to facilitate this difficult process. And yet, if the therapist thinks and 
feels in all respects just the same as she did before meeting this patient, 
something in the patient remains not understood. To that extent a normative 
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point about hermeneutic understanding is made: no changes in the therapist's 
horizon means something about the patient remains unseen. 
One horizon per person? 
So far I have been discussing the concept of horizon as if there was no 
question that each person has one, and only one, horizon at any one time. 
This might appear as common sense. Gadamer, as we have seen, does not 
really allow the allocation of horizons to persons at all - for him they 'belong' 
rather to very large cultural groupings. His view of horizons as developing 
historically via the dialogue between cultural tradition and its 'other' does give 
them a considerable, but never critical, 'homogenous mass'. This does not 
mean however that Gadamer allows for the 'counting' of horizons (even if the 
count is one). 
Perhaps the most important contribution of psychoanalytic thought was to 
show that mind is not organised in a unitary fashion, and it does not coincide 
with consciousness. Freud's dual conception of the mind as conscious and 
unconscious (employing very different, 'primary' and 'secondary', processes 
of organising experience), Klein's paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, 
Winnicott's real and false self, all suggest that mind (and hence also horizon 
in its more individualised sense) in the singular is too unified a conception to 
capture these divisions. Psychoanalysis teaches us that really we are dealing 
with a doubling, or even a multiplicity of horizons. 
Again, we can see hermeneutic philosophy and psychoanalytic thought pulling 
in somewhat different directions. Psychoanalytic understanding is, to a large 
extent, the understanding of internal conflict between the multiple ways of 
organising psychic experience. Psychoanalytic understanding engages with 
the conflict without striving to rid the psyche of the conflicting tendencies (this 
would be impossible, certainly in Freud's theory). Gadamer's hermeneutics, in 
contrast, progresses towards a unity where what is understood can be 
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forgotten. Whilst Gadamer's understanding seeks unification in the moment of 
the fusion of horizons, Freud's understanding, which proceeds after all via the 
remembering of the 'other, realises the multiplicity and conflictedness of the 
human mind. Perhaps Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia can be drawn upon 
again to safeguard against the dangers of understanding ending up with 
unitary meanings. Certainly from a psychoanalytic perspective, if one listens 
closely one becomes aware that more than one language is spoken at any 
one time. 
If experience is indeed simultaneously organised in more than one fashion 
(from different psychic viewpoints, as it were, giving rise to a plurality of 
horizons) then the questions arise to what extent there exists communication 
between these different understandings and how this 'internal communication' 
bears on the 'external' conversation with the other person. This is one way of 
delineating the domain of psychoanalysis. Psychopathology as it is 
conceptualised by psychoanalysis (and other forms of psychological theory 
derived from it) is understood as a manifestation of an insufficient or disturbed 
flow of internal communication. Most forms of psychoanalysis see the 
capacity for internal communication as heavily influenced by the early 
communications (non-verbal to a large extent) with caregivers. This capacity 
in turn determines the extent to which external communication, and in 
particular inter-personal dialogue, is possible in the present. The reconnection 
of the patient to the Verständigungsgemeinschaft was, at the beginning of this 
chapter, suggested as a hermeneutic formulation of the psychotherapeutic 
cure. Now it is argued that this reconnection goes hand in hand with the repair 
of the flow of inner communication. The therapeutic process, then, is one 
where the horizon(s) of one person is brought into contact and communication 
with that (those) of another. The purpose of the therapeutic dialogue is to 
facilitate the contact and communication of the patient with alienated aspects 
of himself, i. e. to bring into communication different horizons within the 
person. The therapist shows the patient his self-alienations, in the hope that 
they can be overcome. Increased capacity for internal communication is seen 
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to increase in turn the capacity for dialoguing with others (the therapist first, 
and then also others in the patient's life). 
Third terms in clinical understanding 
In this chapter clinical understanding is conceptualised as a dialectic process, 
where understanding comes about as a result of the interaction of two (sets 
of) horizons, 'belonging' to therapist and patient respectively. Understanding 
is the newly created 'third term' which emerges from the bringing together of 
the two 'original terms'. Understanding as new understanding is a 'third' which 
contains elements of the original two terms whilst coinciding with neither one 
of them. In terms of Heidegger's concept of understanding as a metaphorical 
process, the 'understanding of something as something' changes to an 
'understanding of something as something different' - different, as we saw, 
from the original understandings of both participants. Further questions have 
to be asked how new understanding comes about, particularly if this 
understanding concerns a patient in psychotherapy. Are these new metaphors 
necessarily created solely by the two participants engaged in the 
conversation, or do they possibly enter into the arena as if from outside? 
Should we think of understanding as primarily a two-person process? And if 
not, what third element is involved? In this section I will focus on the problem 
of clinical understanding, returning to the discussion of formulations of 
understanding in the psychoanalytic literature. I will concentrate mainly on two 
authors, Andre Green and Thomas Ogden, whose ideas on clinical 
understanding lend themselves to a hermeneutic psychoanalysis of the kind 
am discussing here. Both authors give centrality to the process of 
symbolisation, in which some notion of the third plays a crucial role. I will 
discuss their contributions before putting forward my own triangle of 
understanding. 
Green, a French psychoanalytic writer with strong leanings towards British 
Object Relations, suggests that analytic understanding proceeds via the joint 
257 
creation of a new object. This so-called analytic object, which arises as 
symbol from the communication of analyst and patient, is however only 
seemingly a product of a two-person dialogue. Crucial to this process is a 
third object, who, whilst absent, makes his presence felt. 
Understanding for Green is the emergence of potential meaning, a process 
which is adequately described neither as creating nor finding, but can perhaps 
be thought of as some combination of the two. Meaning is 
constituted in and by the analytic situation; but if the analytic situation reveals 
it, it does not create it. It brings it from absence to potentiality, and then 
makes it actual. To actualise it means to call it into existence, not out of 
nothing (for there is no spontaneous generation), but out of the meeting of 
two discourses [the communications of the patient and the analyst], and by 
way of that object which is the analyst, in order to construct the analytic 
object. (1986, p. 293) 
The analytic object is jointly formed by analyst and analysand through the 
process of their communication. Communication is by no means just verbal 
communication, and it cannot proceed in a straight-forward manner. Green 
introduces the notion of the double to denote that which mediates 
unconscious understanding. 
What the analysand communicates is an analogue, a double of his affective 
and bodily experience; what the analyst communicates is a double of the 
effect produced on his bodily, affective, and intellectual experience by the 
patient's communication. Thus the communication between analysand and 
analyst is an object made up of two parts, one constituted by the double of 
the analysand, the other by the double of the analyst. (ibid. p. 288) 
We see here that Green describes the analytic dialogue as constituted by four 
parts. Each of the two participants appears as double, but the two doubles are 
not structured symmetrically. The analyst's double is generated in response to 
the patient's communications - an idea which moves the concept of the 
-- 7 
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double into the area of countertransference technique. The communications 
to each other are (only) versions of that part of their experience which cannot 
(or must not) be expressed directly. The analytic object thus constituted 
corresponds precisely to the etymological definition, in Robert's Dictionary, of 
a symbol: 'an object cut in two, constituting a sign of recognition when its 
bearers can put together the two separate pieces'. In my opinion this is what 
occurs in the analytic setting. The analytic object is neither internal (to the 
analysand or to the analyst), nor external (to either the one or the other), but 
is situated between the two. So it corresponds exactly to Winnicott's definition 
of the transitional object and to its location in the intermediate area of 
potential space, the space of 'overlap' demarcated by the analytic setting. 
(ibid. p. 288) 
The construction of the analytic object is the creation/discovery of the symbol 
which gives meaning to the patient's experience. It results from the coming 
together of two discourses in the potential space between analysand and 
analyst in the same way as Winnicott's transitional object arises in the 
potential space between the infant and his mother. Winnicott famously 
pronounced, "there is no such thing as a baby", implying that both baby and 
mother can only be meaningfully thought about in the context of the mothering 
relationship. Green however adds that the maternal relationship always exists 
in the context of the (absent) father, without whom, after all, there would be 
neither baby nor mother. "Thus we can assert that ultimately there 
is no dual 
relationship. There can be no dual exchanges, but there 
is always some link 
establishing the possibility of duality, 
in the form of areas of reunion and 
separation within the dual relationship" (ibid. p. 295). Duality is brought about 
and can be thought about only 
in terms of a third. 
In the same vein, the analytic dialogue takes place within a field which is 
essentially triangulated. In the analytic situation, Green asserts repeatedly, 
the third element (the absent father) is present as the boundaries of the 
analytic setting. The setting is that which defines and limits the analytic time 
ý-- 
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and space. Whilst it allows the work to proceed (even though it also interrupts 
it until its resumption), normally it moves into the background of the work. At 
one point, however, Green specifies this third element differently: The absent 
one in analysis is none other than the analyst's own analyst - which goes to 
show that analysis always proceeds across generations" (ibid. p. 289). In a 
footnote to this, Green adds: 'Hence the inequality and the heterogeneity of 
the double analytic discourse. The analyst relies upon a discourse with the 
absent, namely his own analyst, author of his difference from the analysand. " 
Whilst in dialogue with his patient, the analyst is involved in a second (silent) 
discourse with his own (absent) analyst; and it is exactly this dual 
engagement which constitutes the analyst qua analyst. In his discourse with 
his own analyst the present analyst is linked to the psychoanalytic tradition 
(presumably the whole lineage of absent fathers down to Freud). Analytic 
understanding, as it emerges from the communication between patient and 
analyst, therefore involves a triangulation of dialogue and is bound, much like 
Gadamer's horizon, to a cultural tradition which guarantees relative stability of 
meaning. 
4 
The triangulation of the analytic dialogue introduces, to my mind, an 
interesting ambiguity into Green's theory, which can perhaps best be 
demonstrated in relation to his notion of the game. Green invokes, as Freud 
had done, the game as a metaphor for the analytic process. 44 He does, 
however, believe that chess, the game that Freud used to liken analysis to, is 
much too rational and rule-bound a process, and prefers instead Winnicott's 
'squiggle game'. However, Green's own use of the game metaphor pulls in 
two directions. On the one hand, he asserts that the analyst lays down the 
rules, based on the fact that The 
is ahead of the game" (for not only has he 
been analysed already, he also has conducted other analyses). The rules of 
the game are of course most obviously manifested in the establishment and 
maintenance of the analytic setting, denoting, as we saw, the presence of the 
44 Gadamer too, as we saw earlier, takes the game as paradigmatic for the hermeneutic 
dialogue. 
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absent father. On the other hand, the game played is like the squiggle game, 
the most important point of which is that it unfolds according to its own 
dynamic. In relation to the 'game of analysis' Green's analyst is involved in 
two different types of games, which are related to two different aspects of the 
child-parent relationship. On the one hand, the analyst is setting and 
controlling the rules of the game; in establishing the boundaries of the game 
the analyst also establishes his own analyst/father (and himself as [the 
placeholder of] the father) in the background of the process. On the other 
hand, within this boundary, the game played resembles the game which the 
infant plays with mother. It is within the framework of 'inherited' meanings (the 
meanings of the absent father which have both `receded into' the background 
and 'form' this background) that new meanings are created/found. The 
tension between these two aspects of the analytic game seems to parallel, in 
Gadamer's hermeneutics, the tension between the conventionality of meaning 
introduced by the cultural tradition and the renewal meaning finds in the fusion 
of horizons with an other. 
The American psychoanalyst Thomas Ogden draws on concepts from Freud 
and the British Object Relations theorists to formulate an intersubjective 
theory of psychoanalysis45 in which the jointly created analytic third becomes 
the focus of understanding. The importance of the notion of the triangulation 
of the analytic situation is linked to his theory of subjectivity and what he calls 
mental space. Subjectivity - the sense of `I-ness' and agency, the sense that 
experience is interpreted rather than only passively suffered - develops 
simultaneously with the symbolic function, in a process involving a multiple 
psychological dialectic. 
Mental space, the space to think, self-reflect and understand, comes about in 
the experience of what Winnicott called the "potential space" of beginning 
differentiation between self and (m)other, me and not-me, internal and 
45 In spite of the centrality given to the concept of intersubjectivity there seem to be hardly any 
points of contact between Ogden and the intersubjectivist theorists discussed in chapter 3. 
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external, fantasy and reality. With the beginning awareness of separation from 
the mother the infant not only comes to realise that mother and he are two 
separate beings (i. e. starts to constitute mother and self as objects), but at the 
same time begins to become aware of himself as the one who observes this 
two-ness, i. e. begins to experience himself as subject. Out of an experience of 
un-differentiation (within which existed no gap, hence no desire, and hence no 
need for symbols) the initial mother-infant unit gets transformed into the three 
distinct entities of mother, infant, and observer of mother-and-infant. This 
triangulation coincides with (is the other side of the coin of) the development 
of the symbolic function. As the observer of the interaction between mother 
and infant the infant becomes a subject, which is to say he is now the creator 
and interpreter of his symbols. 
Ogden describes this process of differentiation as the establishment of a 
psychological dialectic where self and (m)other constitute each other in the 
growing realisation of their difference. This dialectic process 'triangulates' 
mind the very moment two-ness arises out of oneness. The triangulation of 
this interpersonal differentiation parallels that of the symbolic function which is 
its counterpart. 
The attainment of the capacity to maintain psychological dialectics involves 
the transformation of the unity that did not require symbols into 'three-ness', a 
dynamic interplay of three differentiated entities. These entities are the 
symbol (a thought), the symbolized (that which is being thought about), and 
the interpreting subject (the thinker generating his own thoughts and 
interpreting his own symbols). [... ] The differentiation of symbol, symbolized, 
and interpreting subject creates the possibility of triangularity within which 
space is created. That space between symbol and symbolized, mediated by 
an interpreting subject, is the space in which creativity becomes possible and 
is the space in which we are alive as human beings, as opposed to being 
simply reactive beings. This is Winnicott's potential space. (1986, p. 213) 
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Subjectivity exists only to the extent that this mental space is kept open. It 
requires the experience of a gap - the difference between the symbol and the 
symbolised, with the subject experiencing himself as the active agent in the 
generation of meaning (interpretation). Creation of meaning always implies 
difference, i. e. possible other meanings. In the absence of difference things 
are 'just what they are', which is to say that the symbolic function has broken 
down. If understanding is taken as the creation of meaning, and meaning as, 
by definition, layered and in a sense constituted by its alternatives, then it 
follows that to take up any one position exclusively precludes understanding. 
Understanding needs the space to entertain different possible meanings. 
Symbolisation thus involves a triangulation of the mind into symbol, 
symbolised and interpreting subject. Symbolisation, which simultaneously 
creates meaning and the self creating this meaning, is a dialectical process. 
Psychopathology, in this model, is the collapse of the mental space and, by 
the same token, the impairment or breakdown of the symbolising function. 
Paralleling Gadamer's notion of psychopathology as the incapacity to partake 
in dialogue, Ogden's conceptualisation too centrally involves the breakdown 
of an internal discourse with 'otherness'. 
Ogden's concept of psychoanalysis as intersubjective dialogue also involves a 
negative dialectic. The confrontation with the other which occurs in the 
analytic process is a radical challenge to the sense of self not only of the 
patient, but also of the analyst: 
The confrontation with alterity will not let us rest; that perception of the other I- 
ness once perceived will not allow us to remain who we were and we cannot 
rest until we have somehow come to terms with its assault on who we had 
been prior to being interrupted by it. [... ] The analyst must be prepared to 
destroy and be destroyed by the otherness of the subjectivity of the 
analysand and to listen for a sound emerging from that collision of 
subjectivities that is familiar, but different from anything that he has previously 
heard. (1994, p. 3) 
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The analytic process is conceived by Ogden as the most intense confrontation 
with otherness, and it is thought about in exclusively intersubjective terms. 
The analyst cannot possibly remain simply an observing subject, "since his 
subjective experience in this endeavour is the only possible avenue through 
which he gains knowledge of the relationship he is attempting to understand" 
(ibid. p. 4). This intersubjective knowledge comes about as the knowledge of 
the "analytic third", which is the experience and the understanding of the 
experience of the "present past" of the analysand as it is jointly created with 
the analyst in the course of the analytic process. 
The analyst gives voice to and participates in the creation of experience that 
is the living past of the analysand and in this way not only hears about the 
analysand's experience, but experiences his own creation of it. The analyst 
does not experience the past of the analysand; rather, the analyst 
experiences his own creation of the past of the analysand as generated in his 
experience of the analytic third. (ibid. p. 5) 
The analytic third is a "middle term" that is created by analysand and analyst, 
but which at the same creates the analyst and the analysand as two separate 
subjects. It is the analyst's task to put into words the experience of 'living 
within' that intersubjective analytic third. He, who has also been changed by 
that experience, "is able to speak about it, in his own voice, as analyst to the 
analysand (who has also been a part of the experience of the third)" (ibid). 
The analyst's expressions of his thoughts on the present jointly created 
experience are meant to facilitate the establishment or restoration of the 
patient's symbolising function, enlarging his mental space in the process. 
The similarities with and differences from Gadamer's conception of the 
hermeneutic process deserve some elaboration. Whilst Ogden knows that, 
"the listener must be rooted in the history that has created (spoken) him" (ibid. 
p. 4), if he is to be able to understand the presently unfolding joint experience 
of the analytic third, this "middle", in spite of being constituted through 
language, is thought of as radically (inter)subjective and hence knowable only 
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(inter)subjectively. Gadamer's "middle", too, is language, and he also takes it 
as a precondition of understanding that both speakers participate in a history 
of shared meanings. But for Gadamer it is precisely the fact that meaning 
comes about in the joint participation in a shared language that understanding 
cannot be thought of as essentially (inter)subjective. The shared history of 
participation in a common language, which constitutes the ground for 
understanding, is exactly what makes understanding much more than an 
intersubjective event. Gadamer's notion of understanding as a giving oneself 
over to the dialectic of the dialogue differs from Ogden's, whose idea of the 
creation of language and meaning is much more (inter)personal and private. 
Whilst Gadamer and Ogden share similar ideas regarding the dialectics of 
understanding via the joint creation of a third fused horizon, on the question 
as to what constitutes a horizon they seem to have very different views. 
Gadamer's notion of horizon as situatedness within cultural history leaves 
very little room for contributions from the intensely intimate interpersonal field 
of the early parental environment within which subjectivity and meaning is 
created according to Ogden. Ogden, for his part, pays tribute to, but 
underplays the significance of the tradition of shared meanings. 
it is important, in this context, to consider further the question what creates 
the analyst as analyst. According to Ogden, patient and analyst create and 
negate each other in the dialectic process of analysis. The analytic third is the 
`product' of their dialogic engagement; it sustains and is being sustained by 
the analyst and her patient as they contribute to the analytic work according to 
their respective positions/interests. The experience by the analyst of this 
particular third which is being created with this particular patient, and the 
understanding of its meanings constitute the most important material for the 
analyst's thoughts. Whilst I agree that, importantly, the particularities of this 
third are being created as this patient and this analyst create (negate and 
affirm) each other, the creation of the analyst does, of course, not begin there. 
First and foremost, the analyst is being created by his own training, a very 
lengthy process involving training analysis (the analyst as patient), years of 
immersion in analytic theory, professional moulding etc. By the time this 
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patient arrives for his first session the analyst exits qua analyst, in terms of 
qualification, public status, professional identity, theoretical commitments, 
clinical experience, personal style etc. The analyst who this patient turns to is 
already constituted by his situatedness within the analytic discourse and 
practice, that is, his horizon is established as that of a psychoanalyst. Green, 
as we saw, recognised this fact when he points to the analyst's own analyst 
as the absent, but present, third object. He also argued that the influence of 
the theoretical and clinical learning the analyst brings to the meeting should 
be considered as part of the countertransference. The analytic third, which is 
being created with this particular patient, interacts with the `professional 
dialogue' that the therapist has with his tradition and seeks to interrupt it. This 
particular third is such a remarkably individual creation only to the extent that 
it takes shape against the background of knowledge, experiences and 
expectancies brought to the work by the analyst. The particular third is 
created in dialectic tension between the 'ready-made' analyst and the one he 
is 'forced' to become by the present patient. 
The triangulation of understanding 
The dialogue of clinical understanding is not identical with the actual 
exchange of verbal communications between therapist and patient. To an 
important extent, this dialogue is conducted 'internally', i. e. in the therapist's 
mind, when he thinks about the possible meanings of the material presented 
to him. Plato called thinking being in dialogue with oneself. Buber too asserts 
that "thinking is essentially a man's speaking to himself, but he adds: "The 
so-called dialogue with oneself is possible only because of the basic fact of 
men's speaking with each other; it is the `internalization' of this capacity" 
(1965/1988, p. 102). Thinking, then, is the continuation of a dialogue with an 
other in one's mind. 
For thinking to remain dialogic the engagement with the other's viewpoint has 
to be kept alive. The therapist, as we have seen, has to make the patient's 
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experience, his point of view, 'strong' in himself, in a mental move that can be 
described as empathic 'identification'. Er muß sich etwas sagen lassen, says 
Gadamer - he has to let the patient's assertions count; Buber's central 
concept of Umfassung (inclusion) points to the same thing. The patient's 
question has to become his question, that is, he has to ask it himself. And yet, 
the therapist has to engage with the patient from within his own horizon; there 
is no other starting point for the patient's expressions to take on a meaning at 
all. The acceptance of one's horizon as the proper position for understanding 
reflects, furthermore, the insight that a mere empathic duplication of the 
patient's mind in the mind of the therapist cannot of itself be helpful. 
In thinking about the patient's communications and his own subjective 
response to them the therapist 'stands back' internally in order to gain a 
measure of distance which allows for thought. 'Standing back' refers to a 
distanciation which increases the scope of reflection - it does not suggest it is 
possible to 'stand outside' after all. Rather than re-introducing reflective 
objectivity, this distanciation introduces a gap which allows for the possibility 
of understanding the patient's words in terms other than either those supplied 
by the patient or those which readily present themselves to the therapist's 
mind. For a brief period the therapist disengages from the immediate contact 
with the present patient and consults, as it were, a 'third object' (in Green's 
sense of the absent father-analyst; not in the sense of Ogden's 'analytic 
third'). This mental move can be described in various ways - as a cathexis of 
the 'observing or analysing ego' (Greenson, 1967), a turning towards 
theoretical concepts or diagnostic categories, a brief imagined conversation 
with the therapist's supervisor46, or a consideration of the present case in 
terms of previous clinical experience. It is a move to bring to bear what 
generalised knowledge (or 'theory') might have to contribute to an 
understanding of this particular case. 
48 Casement (1985) suggests that the therapist has an 'internal supervisor', an internalised 
version of actual supervisory 
input, which can be consulted during the analytic session to 




The concept of transference is perhaps the best example of such a 
distanciation which allows for reflective thought. For the therapist to think in 
terms of transference is to observe and reflect on the relationship which he is 
part of from a position which differs from (is 'outside of) his immediate 
experience of it. Furthermore, transference suggests that the most important 
aspect of the relationship involves not only the present dyad, but is, at least, 
triangulated. The person of the therapist stands in for a past love object of the 
patient; he is, on the level of the unconscious, not the real addressee. The 
therapist can think of himself as a substitute object of the patient's 
communications only to the extent that he can achieve distanciation in 
thought. 
Szasz (1963) speculates that the discovery of transference (an upshot of 
Breuer's work with his patient 'Anna O. ', discussed in Studien Über Hysterie 
[1895]) was only possible due to the fact that Freud was not the analyst on the 
receiving end of the emotional pressure exerted by this patient. It was Breuer 
who was engaged with her on the level of intense and direct participation. For 
Breuer the emotional and sexual pressure was too much to sustain without 
the conceptual tools to put his clinical experience in perspective. He had to 
flee from his patient, and in the event gave up psychoanalysis altogether. 
Freud was the disengaged observer who was still able to identify with the 
emotional experience of his older and admired colleague, a position which 
allowed him to think in new ways about what was happening in this analysis. 
Szasz maintains that it is precisely the separation of the experiencing position 
of Breuer and the observing position of Freud which made the discovery of 
transference possible. Once the concept existed the two positions (and 
functions) could be united in the analyst's mind. 
The notion of distanciation is introduced here to talk about a particular way in 
which 'knowledge' (theory or generalised experience) comes into play. I think 
it is understood that both theory and experience are always already involved 
in the therapist's immediate (pre-)understanding of the patient. She 




are familiar to her. These terms are informed by prior experience, including 
any theoretical formulations. It is in this sense that I think Green was inclined 
to regard the analyst's theoretical background as part of her 
countertransference. Distanciation is sought when these first understandings 
appear to be insufficient, i. e. when the patient's otherness defeats 
understanding in the terms available to the therapist. It is at this point that 
further understanding is called for. Additional ways of thinking about the 
clinical material are needed, i. e. ways which differ from or exceed readily 
47 available understanding. The therapist might feel the need to speak to her 
supervisor, or to read one more book. The important aspect is that in 
distanciation a third perspective is sought, one which opens up additional 
ways of thinking and, by the same token, establishes the difference between 
prior and further understanding. The third perspective does not exist 
independently of the perspectives already in operation, and it is not chosen at 
random. It is constituted by the same dialectic of question and answer which 
Gadamer posited as the deep structure of hermeneutic inquiry; as such, the 
third, alternative position is still contingent on the therapist's horizon. 
In his attempt to understand his patient the therapist is thus engaged in 
dialogue in two directions: with the other of this particular patient, and with the 
other of what I would like to summarily call 'theory' (generalised knowledge 
and experience). The dialogue of understanding can thus be thought of as 
triangulated. I suggest it is precisely the triangularity of the dialogic structure 
that opens up the space within which new understanding becomes possible. 48 
Both 'others' (the patient and 'theory') have to have the power to challenge 
47 Understanding which exceeds established understanding is also different understanding, 
but it does not necessarily constitute an alternative. Understanding may just be clarified or 
elaborated in terms of the theory in operation. If the adopted theory does not allow sufficient 
understanding alternative ways of thinking may be sought. 
48 The discovery of transference discussed above was made possible by such a triangulation 
of dialogue. Due to the fact that Breuer was in dialogue with Anna 0. on the one hand, and 
(later) with Freud on the other, the experience of otherness (the strangeness of this patient's 
symptoms and the frightening intensity of the countertransference) could be joined up with 
conceptual thought to develop new understanding. It is feasible that, had Breuer been in 
dialogue with Freud whilst treating Anna. 0., the concept of transference might have helped 
him to maintain the analytic dialogue with his patient. 
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each other's assertions - otherwise the triangle collapses and any space for 
the mediation of preconceptions, i. e. understanding, disappears. 
To illustrate this point I wish to paint two admittedly extreme scenarios: If 
'empathy' is taken up as the dominant mode of understanding, the 'voice' of 
the patient rules supreme. The assumption is that the patient's subjectivity 
can only properly be understood in its own terms; in a sense, the patient is 
deemed the true expert on himself. Different theories may suggest ways of 
understanding his experience which run counter to his self-understanding. 
These are likely to be ruled out of court if they do not coincide with the 
patient's subjective experience. Extreme proponents of the empathic 
approach think it inadmissible to go beyond what the patient himself is saying, 
reducing the role of the therapist to that of a 'reflector'. The therapeutic 
conversation becomes in essence monologic - in this case ruled by the 
monologue of the patient. 
The same monologic structure ensues if the therapist's theoretical 
formulations are taken to have settled the issue of understanding. Therapies 
which are essentially theory-driven tend to be not much more than the 
application of prior knowledge. The patient's communications constitute the 
raw material for ready-made interpretations; nothing the patient could say, has 
even the potential to add to the understanding supplied by the body of 
generalised knowledge. The voice of the expert therapist pronounces the only 
meaning; he offers nothing but dead metaphors. This is the monologue of the 
therapist. 
These caricatures of therapeutic conversations are meant to demonstrate how 
see the triangle of understanding collapsing, unless both participants in the 
therapeutic dialogue are believed (by themselves and by each other) to have 
something of value to say. Rather than assuming that the answer to the 
question of expertise can get us into the right position for understanding, 
hermeneutic thinking requires that we attend to a question of a different kind. 
The question now becomes: How can this communication be understood 
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differently? Different, that is, from any of the monologic answers which offer 
themselves up rather easily from any one of the positions one might wish to 
privilege. Understanding, in the hermeneutic sense suggested here, is bound 
to be different from 1) the patient's initial self-understanding, 2) the therapist's 
first (pre) understandings, and 3) ready-made explanations supplied by any 
one psychological theory. Understanding will have occurred only when both 
the object and the subject of understanding have changed in the process. 
The therapist's understanding of the patient, in this model, 'swings boldly', not 
as Buber thought, between two poles, but between three. The therapist 
indeed needs to make the patient's experience and view of things strong 
inside his own mind; he has to let the patient speak to him and let what is said 
challenge his own pre-understandings. Insofar, something like empathy, a 
taking up of the patient's position, is involved. Yet the therapist's own position, 
his experience, opinions, values, and prejudices need to stay in play - 
otherwise no-one is there to hear what is said. Both positions assert certain 
truths, and they claim to be accepted by the other. These two sides of the 
dialogue - the I and Thou dimension of Buber's encounter - could be thought 
of as the poles of a horizontal axis. This axis could be used to represent the 
participatory level of the therapeutic engagement - the level on which 
therapist and patient speak to each other and on which, for their speaking to 
be capable of engendering new understanding, it must have the power to 
effect the other, that is, to get the other to change his mind. 
In the context of the therapy situation, however, this dialogue has a third 
dimension, which is also active in the therapist's mind: the body of theoretical 
knowledge and clinical experience on which the therapist draws to reflect on 
the dialogue evolving between him and his patient. As with the participatory 
dimension of the therapist's internal inclusive dialogue with the patient (which 
is inclusive only to the extent that the actual other person is heard), 'theory' is 
alive in the therapist's mind as the continuation of an actual conversation, i. e. 
as the inclusive dialogue with an other's point of view (even if this other is a 
book). This third dimension establishes a second, vertical axis along which we 
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can imagine the therapist operating when he internally shifts between a more 
participatory, directly involved engagement with the patient and a more 
detached, observatory-explanatory stance. I suggest to view the three poles 
of the two axes as forming a triangle within which the therapist thoughts can 
'play'. The triangle constitutes the mental space which comes about precisely 
because the therapist does not remain 'static' in terms of the position from 
which he views his patient. Only to the extent that there is such mental space 
does it become possible to move about and see things differently. The 
existence of this kind of triangularity is a necessary condition for clinical 
understanding. If the therapist remains 'stationary' in his mind (coming 
exclusively from, say, an empathic identification, or any one theoretical 
framework) and thus sees things only from one point of view, the space for 
thought and new understandings collapses, and the mental space for 
understanding the patient disappears. Dialogue is 'trialogue' - or else 
degenerates into monologue. The struggle for understanding must not be 
'fixed' in favour of either position; if superiority ('expertise', 'privileged access' 
etc. ) is presumed from the start to lie with either party, points of view end up 
making claims on monopolies on 'truth'. The ensuing conversation will turn out 
to be decidedly one-way. Understanding is prevented from deteriorating into 
monologue precisely to the extent that the therapist, in the process of clinical 
thinking, stays in dialogue(s) with the other's (others') point of view. 
To understand implies to see the other with the eyes of the other(s). This 
means two different things: One, to see 'things' (the patient's world including 
himself) as the patient himself sees these things, which is of course the 
empathic movement; and, two, to see the patient as the 'theoretical others' 
(the other possible therapists) might see him. The therapist thus 'decentres' in 
two directions, 'horizontally' in the direction of an as-if identification with the 
person in front of him, and 'vertically' onto a 'higher theoretical plane from 
which alternative perspectives can be considered. Both moves are in the 
direction out of the immediacy of his reactions, perceptions, and judgements, 
away from "what first comes to mind" (Sullivan). The intention is to increase 
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distance to oneself in order to open up the 'gap' which allows for reflection 
and, by the same token, other views. 
Whilst both moves increase distance to one's own 'centre of subjectivity', the 
moves differ regarding the directions they take. The horizontal empathic move 
seeks to get closer to (even into) the patient's subjectivity, thus reducing or 
eradicating the distance between them. The vertical theoretical move seeks to 
get onto a plane where an internal dialogue with other perspectives becomes 
possible. Both these decentring movements result in the therapist, in a sense, 
becoming 'other to himself. This 'becoming other to oneself appears to be an 
essential aspect of the understanding of the other person. 49 To view 
understanding as this dual decentring is to acknowledge as primary the 
immediacy of the interpersonal ('dialogic') position. This, incidentally, supports 
Heidegger's view that we find ourselves always already engaged with the 
world. Our effort to gain knowledge of the world, in a move which distances an 
inquiring subject from the world as its object, is a secondary step. 
The triangular model suggested here implies an awareness of the existence 
of 'third terms' (other theories) outside the horizons of the two participants, 
and often third terms are actively searched out precisely in order to be able to 
understand things differently. For the purposes of clinical understanding the 
dyad is seen as insufficient; the third is needed precisely to question and 
perhaps disrupt a too narrow understanding. The horizontal, participatory axis 
(the intersubjective understanding between the two individuals) needs thinking 
about, and can only be thought about from the more detached standpoint of 
generalised theoretical knowledge and clinical experience. 'Theory' is 'the 
other' (the third) which separates out and opens up for thought the way in 
which the two subjectivities come together. In terms of the vertical axis (the 
axis on which the therapist and his theory come to an understanding about 
the patient) it is the particular individuality and subjectivity of the patient, as it 
49 The extent to which the therapist as the other to himself constitutes a focus of reflection in 




enters the therapist's mind via empathy, which plays the role of 'the other' that 
demands to be taken into account. 
This dialectic approach attempts to address the problem of clinical 
understanding as it was diagnosed by Green (1975) with regard to 
psychoanalysis. Green describes a significant shift within psychoanalysis 
towards a recognition of the degree to which analysts are implicated in the 
understanding of their patients, both due to their subjective involvements and 
as an effect of their theoretical convictions. He then diagnoses the following 
problem: 
I think that one of the main contradictions which the analyst faces today is the 
necessity (and the difficulty) of making a body of interpretations (which derive 
from the work of Freud and classical analysis) co-exist and harmonize with 
the clinical experience and the theory of the last twenty years. This problem is 
aggravated by the fact that the latter do not form a homogeneous body of 
thought. (ibid. p. 33). 
On the vertical axis there is a theory - the body of 'classical' Freudian 
analysis in Green's case - to which the therapist is committed. This theory 
needs to be made to harmonise (because it doesn't in its present shape) with 
clinical experience as this experience changes with the shifting, increasingly 
intersubjective, position of the analyst. What is happening on the horizontal, 
inter-subjective, participatory axis challenges established understanding on 
the vertical axis. Theory has to be amended to accommodate this new clinical 
material. In the process of the ensuing series of amendments the body of 
theory has ceased to be unified. Psychoanalysis itself has become 
'heteroglot'; it has become other to itself, giving rise to alternative 
interpretations and, by the same token, to the need for a dialogue of 
understanding between the analysts of different persuasions. 
In the following section I wish to turn to theorists who deliberately turn to 
alternative theories and I will briefly discuss their contributions. This 
274 
discussion will have to address the problem of operating with multiple 
theories, a problem which has become increasingly pressing for many 
contemporary therapists. The question posed by a plurality of theories 
concerns that which holds this multiplicity together. In other words, we will 
have to return once more to the theme of the relationship between 'the one' 
and 'the many'. 
A multiplicity of theories? 
A small number of psychoanalytic theorists have embraced a multi- 
perspectival approach to clinical understanding. A key idea here is that more 
ways of thinking about the clinical material increases the scope for 
understanding. Hearing/looking from different perspectives (from within 
different horizons) focuses on different kinds of 'data' yielding different kinds 
of `knowledge'. The idea of using a multiplicity of models to increase the 
possibilities of understanding is perhaps foreshadowed in comments like the 
one made by Green in 1975: 
A fundamental change in contemporary analysis comes from what the analyst 
hears -and perhaps cannot help but hear - which has until now been 
inaudible. Not that I mean that analysts nowadays have a more highly trained 
ear - unfortunately one often finds the reverse - but rather that they hear 
different things which used not to cross the threshold of audibility. 
(1986, p. 33-4) 
The lowering of the 'threshold of audibility' goes hand in hand with the 
growing diversity within psychoanalytic theory. The emergence of new 
theoretical concepts enables the analyst to hear in different - not necessarily 
better - ways. As a result different - not necessarily truer - things are heard, 
that is, understood. New ways of hearing lead to (and in turn result from) new 
theoretical elaborations. The acceptance of a multiplicity of ways of 




does not see this as a problem, for "[... ] analysis should lead to the sharing of 
a truth supposed possible between the analyst and the analysand, 
acknowledgement of which aids in their mutual emancipation" (ibid. p. 314). 
Green only deals in potential truth. Shared potential truth has a liberating, and 
that is, therapeutic effect. The potential for potential truth is increased when 
new theory enables new hearing. 
A later and much more explicit example of a multi-perspectival approach is 
found in Spence (1987), who advises 
to approach the material from different points of view in an effort to gain 
understanding of a relevant dimension. This line of reasoning also gives us a 
way to accommodate different schools of therapy in our approach to the 
patient; we might learn more about mastery and inferiority and striving for 
achievement if we listen from an Adlerian point of view [... ] and hear 
something about disclaimed action if we listen a la Roy Schafer. (ibid. p. 61) 
Schafer himself is in fact an important figure amongst the hermeneutic 
psychoanalysts. He rejects what he sees as Freud's attempt to establish 
psychoanalytic theory within the paradigm of -natural science, and instead 
highlights and develops currents within Freudian thinking which point it into 
the direction of an interpretive discipline concerned mainly with meanings and 
narrations. He asserts that reality is knowable, but it is always seen, and thus 
construed, from a particular perspective and for particular purposes. By 
necessity, we attempt to organise disparate elements of experience into more 
or less coherent accounts. These accounts are always hermeneutically 
circular in that they already shape the data they are designed to explain. This 
is the case for the self-descriptions of clients, the formulations of 
understanding of the client by the therapist, case histories and psychological 
theories. 
Schafer (1983) argues not only that multiple readings of clinical data are 
always possible; he insists it is often necessary to approach and formulate the 
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same clinical material from various angles. What Freud had termed 
overdetermination, the fact that the same dream, or memory, or behaviour 
can be multiply motivated and is only understood, or 'fully analysed', once 
retold from various interpretive perspectives, is an instance of the narrative 
interpretive function, rather than of the economic paradigm guiding classical 
psychoanalytic understanding. The analytic concept of 'working through' is re- 
interpreted in narrative terms; it is understood to refer to the repeated re- 
telling from various perspectives of key experiences in the course of the 
analysis. 
Whilst the concept of narration always points to the possibilities of alternative 
accounts - every story can be re-told, and thus challenged as to its truth- 
value - Schafer is keen to reduce the relativistic potential of this stance by 
stressing this does not imply a free-for-all when it comes to assessing the 
clinical usefulness of different interpretative approaches. Apart from being 
assessed for its therapeutic efficacy the new narrative has to satisfy other, 
seemingly literary, criteria such as cohesiveness, comprehensiveness, and 
persuasive power. There are some apparent affinities and similarities between 
his view of narrative action and Rorty's assertion that all we ever get hold of 
are descriptions and re-descriptions of situations and events. But Schafer is, 
as a philosopher, less radical than Rorty in that he believes that reality is 
knowable once we manage to employ strategies such as "realistic appraisal' 
and "objective consideration" (ibid. p. 107), which do however remain 
unspecified. 
Perhaps Schafer's most important argument is that too much personal 
experience is described (by analysands as well as analysts, and also within 
much of psychoanalytic literature starting with Freud) in terms that reify 
dynamic processes and leave no room for even unconscious intentionality. 
His 'action language' is an attempt to re-describe not just behaviour, but also 
thinking, wishing, dreaming and symptom formation as conflicted action rather 
than the effects of the manifestations of non-personal forces with which the 
individual is left to struggle (1976). Schafer's account of the analytic enterprise 
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is one where the patient learns, over time, to take responsibility for previously 
"disclaimed actions" by re-telling the life history in ways which from various 
standpoints consider and embrace intentions and wishes that were felt to be 
utterly outside one's consciousness and, by the same token, control. It is the 
construction of a complex, often overdetermined and at times paradoxical life 
history of personal agency in conflict, re-told along the lines suggested by the 
various psychoanalytic theories. This new, much richer narration entails an 
increase in personal freedom by opening up not just alternative pasts but also 
alternatives for the present and future. 
Schafer's hermeneutics, which he exercises strictly within the field of analysis, 
can perhaps be extended to the wider field of psychotherapy. His arguments, 
to my mind, do not contain compelling reasons why the relevant storylines 
should be restricted to the analytic developmental narratives of early struggles 
with sexual and aggressive impulses. There are other psychological theorists 
(and philosophers) who contribute powerful new metaphors to the 
psychotherapeutic discourse. The increase in freedom which is to be gained 
from psychotherapy depends on the dialogic engagement with new 
persuasive metaphors. 
Chessick, an American psychoanalyst who has written extensively on the 
contributions contemporary philosophy has to offer to a theory of 
psychotherapy, suggests that the various psychoanalytic approaches 
constitute "channels' of listening to the patient. He writes: 
All data and data collection presuppose theories, values, and some sort of 
previously established ideology. The 'telephone receiver' of today's therapist 
must, in my opinion, be able to be tuned to at least five data-organizing 
channels, either simultaneously or by oscillating from channel to channel, in 
order to achieve a complete understanding of the patient's material. 
(1989, p. xvii) 
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The five channels, which, Chessick admits, differ from and contradict each 
other in ways which are presently irreconcilable, are constituted by four 
variants of psychoanalytic theory (classical Freudian, Object Relations, 
Kohutian self-psychology and countertransference technique) and a "socio- 
cultural approach' drawing on a number of continental philosophers from 
Hegel to Foucault. Chessick believes that the analyst can determine which 
one of these channels is most relevant for a given patient, depending on the 
patient's developmental issues and the type of psychological problems he 
presents. However, his belief that particular channels correspond to 
developmental phases and, by the same token, to particular diagnostic 
groupings, together with his confidence that a complete understanding of the 
patient's material is achievable sit rather awkwardly with the sympathy for 
hermeneutic and postmodern philosophies which he also expresses. 
For Green the diversification of psychoanalysis leads to an increase of 
possibilities of shared truths. Schafer, whilst emphasising the possibility, and 
indeed therapeutic necessity, of multiple re-descriptions, asserts that reality is 
knowable and can be determined via "realistic appraisals". Chessick's idea of 
multiple channels implies that there is a position outside those channels which 
one can take up to determine which one it is one should be switching to. 
Whilst I agree with the notion of multiple descriptive vocabularies enhancing 
clinical understanding I reject the possibility of finding a meta-theoretical 
position from which to decide which one offers the correct understanding. 
With regard to this question I think it is unwise to go further than Green's 
notion of a "sharing of a truth supposed to be possible". In terms of the 
hermeneutic approach to clinical understanding developed here it is precisely 
through the (re-)establishment of a shared horizon that truth comes about. 
Whilst my formulation is certainly sympathetic to the idea of multiple theories I 
would emphasise that theory is only a part of what makes up the therapist's 
horizon. Theory in my model makes a distinct contribution only as one of the 
three poles dialogically-dialectically interacting with each other. 
- ,. 
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The three positions put forward here give rise to different views of the patient. 
One way of thinking about this is to say that the three positions allow for 
different kinds of 'information' to emerge from different types of relatedness. 
Another way of saying what amounts to pretty much the same thing is, 
seeking to decentre from one's own horizon (in the direction of the patient, 
and in the direction of - multiple - theory) will help new metaphors to emerge. 
Dialoguing with particular concepts or frameworks in mind inevitably shapes 
how we understand the patient. Dialoguing with the patient will bring to mind 
particular aspects of theory. The therapeutic metaphors, it is important to 
remember, are not being `supplied' by one side, but result from dialogic 
engagement. 
The kind of clinical thinking that this model gives rise to can perhaps be 
demonstrated by considering once more the contribution an extended notion 
of countertransference can make to the understanding of the patient. As we 
have seen, countertransference technique uses the therapist's mental 
processes in the session as meaningfully related to the patient's mental 
processes, so that what occurs to the therapist or what the therapist may be 
feeling or sensing is thought to be in response to the patient and thus 
constituting important 'data' for clinical understanding. Sullivan dismisses this 
as naive. His first question, which he endeavours to hold in the back of his 
mind, is Can this material mean anything but what first occurs to me?, leading 
him to much further exploration of the patient's particular meanings. I don't 
see these two approaches as mutually exclusive. Rather, I suggest that the 
two could be used in a complementary fashion, in order to collect further 
information - from different 'sources', as it were. This could lead to a 
strengthening of an emerging hypothesis, that is, an increase in faith in the 
usefulness of a particular metaphor regarding the nature of the patients 
experience. By the same token, if one has access to more than one 'channel 
of information', different pictures can emerge as to what is the case, allowing 
for a more reflective and critical use of interpretation. This can facilitate a 




Where does the discussion of the problem of clinical understanding, viewed 
through a hermeneutic lens, leave the 'three positions of understanding' 
posited at the beginning of this thesis? It is my view that all three positions, 
when adopted exclusively, are entirely insufficient as a basis for clinical 
understanding. Only taken together, and brought into dialectic dialogue, can 
they open up the space that allows for thought and understanding. 
Neither the pursuit of objective knowledge nor the duplication of the patient's 
subjectivity offer convincing candidates for the solution of the problem of 
understanding. Furthermore, any 'direct' understanding which arises out of the 
immediacy of the interpersonal engagement (the therapist's unreflected 
subjectivity), cannot be relied upon. The question of clinical understanding 
needs to be reformulated as: how to participate in the interpersonal 
engagement, which is foundational of the therapeutic endeavour, and yet 
maintain a distance that allows for reflective thought. This question can be 
addressed, in my view, by considering clinical understanding as a dialectic 
process which operates not only between the two participants in the 
therapeutic conversation, but also, in the therapist's mind, between the 
different perspectives which open up from the three positions the therapist 
can assume vis-ä-vis his patient. Empathy (the other as self; self as other), 
the dialogic position (the other as other), and the observing-explanatory 
position (the other as an instance of established knowledge) mutually negate 
each other - that is, confirm each other - in the process of new understanding. 
Gadamer's philosophy provides encouragement to go ahead and engage with 
the patient, to give meaning to the presenting material in the light of one's 
best understanding. Standing back in the hope of seeing the shape of things 
'objectively' is not an option open to us. Yet, any first understandings are 
limited by the particularities of one's own situatedness. The expansion of 
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one's horizon which leads to a better understanding of the other results from 
the engagement with that which lies 'beyond' our horizon, i. e. with 'otherness'. 
I have said much in this chapter about engaging with the otherness of the 
individual patient; I want to conclude saying a bit more about the `theoretical 
other(s)'. 
The principle underpinning all psychotherapies which have evolved in the 
wake of Freud (after Hegel) - i. e. that self is constituted in relation to an other, 
and that therefore self-understanding can only proceed in continued 
engagement with otherness - this principle, which is practiced every working 
day in every psychotherapy session, holds not only for the constitution of 
subjectivity, but also for the formulation of theory. In the same way that the 
patient's limited and (defensively) limiting self-understanding has to be 
challenged (disturbed) by the therapist, the therapist's framework guiding this 
work has to undergo the continual process of decentering which is the dialogic 
engagement with its other(s). 
The 'theoretical others' (the alternative psychotherapy theories), too, have to 
be engaged with in the spirit of hermeneutic enquiry. Given the limitations that 
one's own framework of interpretation inevitably places on any understanding 
the engagement with alternative perspectives is needed for their 
transcendence. If one accepts the fundamental proposition of hermeneutic 
philosophy - that any understanding is contingent on the situatedness of the 
one who understands - then the demand arises that, as part of any serious 
enquiry, communication is sought with that which is, in the first instance, left 
out. 
Theories can, after all, serve exactly the kind of defensive purposes 
psychoanalysis was designed to undermine. This is a point made by the 
psychoanalyst Peter Lomas who makes the following comment on Freud's 
achievement to show us our propensity for defensive self-deception: 
"Paradoxically, however, his method has itself proved fertile ground for the 
development of a strategy for the avoidance of unwelcome experience. 
j -- 
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Explanation and interpretation are means by which we may attempt to control 
and diminish the full force of being" (1987, p. 4). This is a comment which is, I 
believe, equally valid in regard to any theory of psychotherapy. In the same 
way that the exclusive meanings of the patient need to be opened up through 
analysis of the clinical material, psychotherapy theory needs to be subjected 
to examination and critical assessment, which can only come from a position 
of difference. Only assertions which come from 'outside' have the capacity to 
stimulate new understanding and to prevent theoretical and' professional 
discourse from deteriorating into monologue (the constant re-iteration of 
perceived knowledge and wisdom). 
Both the meaning we give to the clinical material presented to us and the set 
of more generalised meanings which make up our theories are here viewed 
as (necessary) constructions which need to be subjected to a process of 
critical examination; that is to say, they need to be brought into dialogue with 
their alternatives (their others). This approach recognises that, in order to 
understand the other, it is of crucial importance that we find some access to 
the domain of 'otherness', which is co-constituted together with our horizons 
(that which lies outside/beyond). 'Self, like systematic theory, whilst giving 
coherence to experience and allowing understanding is at the same time 
conceived as an 'alienating fiction' (Lacan), which defensively tries to shut 
down the multiplicity of meaning and the indeterminacy of the 
understanding(s) of ourselves (our'selves'). 
Ogden (1999) writes in a similar fashion about therapy as a process of, almost 
simultaneously, creating and undoing meaning. The analyst's language, which 
creates and conveys the best possible understanding of the patient's 
experience in the present moment, 
must embody in itself that there is no still point of meaning. Meaning is 
continuously in the process of becoming something new and in doing so, is 
continually undoing itself (undercutting its own claims to certainty). It is 
essential that the analyst's language embody the tension of forever being in 
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the process of struggling to generate meaning while at every step casting 
doubt on the meanings 'arrived at' or'clarified' (ibid. p. 218). 
Just as there is no endpoint to the hermeneutic understanding of the object 
the constitution of the subject is never finally realised in an act of reflective 
self-possession. Rather than aiming at such a point of arrival, i. e. a 
metaphysical notion of ultimate knowledge of self and the world (including the 
final version of psychological theory), Gadamer's hermeneutics promotes a 
continuous disposition of openness to new experience and new 
understandings. The understanding of the individual patient and the 
formulation of psychotherapy theory are constantly evolving and are forever 
undone in this process. 
This conception of psychotherapy echoes the description Bakhtin gave of the 
life and development of language in the continuous tension between its 
unifying/monologic and heteroglot/dialogic tendencies, as well as the pull 
between Rorty's systematic and edifying philosophers. I believe that the 
parallel competition between 'systematic' vs. 'deconstructive' therapy is not 
one which needs to be decided, but is to be held in abeyance. As Rorty 
acknowledged, deconstructive or edifying strategies are responses to 
systematic ones, and as such parasitic on them. The work-in-process which is 
psychotherapy (as the particular therapeutic process and as the development 
of the body of theories) unfolds as a dialectic process between these two 
poles. This agrees with the 18th century German Romantic philosopher 
Schlegel who wrote: it is just as fatal for the mind to have a system and not to 
have a system. It will therefore have to decide to connect the two" (cited in 
Bowie 1997, p. 144). The 'connection' proposed here is not a stable link, but a 
dialogic dialectic. 
The important point in this dialectic movement is not the resolution of the 
tension between the two poles in a sublation (Aufhebung) a la Hegel, where 
the newly found third term brings one nearer to some ideal point of final 
integration (call it Spirit, self-actualisation, maturity, or truth). Hermeneutic 
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psychotherapy, as it is developed in this discussion of Gadamer, has as its 
aim not the reaching of a final destination; there is no 'truth' that is found, no 
`real self that is, at last, realised. Rather than looking for the 'final word', 
psychotherapy aims to increase the capacity to participate in ongoing 
conversation. The most important aspect of this dialogue is not what is said in 
the end, but whether a full discussion was possible. It is hoped one goes 
away seeing the point of some further talk in the future. 
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